1 


n 


.(T 


EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 


BY 


WILLIAM    CHANDLER  BAGLEY 

PROFESSOR   OF   EDUCATION,   UNIVERSITY  OF   ILLINOIS 

AUTHOR    OF     "THE    EDUCATIVE    PROCESS,"     "CLASSROOM 

MANAGEMENT,"  "  CRAFTSMANSHIP  IN  TEACHING,"  ETC. 


THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 
1911 

Aft  rights  reserved 


COPYRIGHT,  1911, 
BY  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.    Published  April,  1911. 


Nortoooti 

J.  S.  Gushing  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 
Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


PREFACE 

THE  purpose  of  the  present  volume  is  stated  in  the 
Introduction,  and  a  brief  outline  of  the  treatment  is 
there  presented.  The  book  has  grown  gradually  out 
of  the  early  attempts  of  the  writer  to  organize  the 
methods  of  teaching  upon  a  rational  basis.  Lacking 
such  a  basis  of  organization,  the  task  of  equipping  can 
didates  for  educational  service  with  the  experience  that 
the  preceding  generations  of  teachers  had  accumulated 
seemed  well-nigh  hopeless.  Lacking  such  a  system, 
also,  the  adequate  evaluation  of  new  methods  and  new 
tendencies  could  not  be  satisfactorily  accomplished. 
The  terminology  developed  in  the  following  chapters 
has  proved  helpful  to  the  writer  in  his  own  classroom 
work.  It  is  hoped  that  it  may  prove  suggestive  to 
others,  and  it  is  for  this  reason  that  it  is  presented. 

The  time  is  perhaps  not  yet  ripe  for  a  final  statement 
of  educational  functions;  this  must  await  the  satisfac 
tory  development  of  the  science  of  psychology,  espe 
cially  in  the  field  of  the  higher  thought-processes  and 
in  the  field  of  the  emotions.  The  recent  investigations 
in  these  two  fields,  however,  seem  to  warrant  at  the 
present  time  a  tentative  restatement  of  educational 
doctrine.  The  time  will  never  be  ripe  for  a  final  state-j 
ment  of  educational  values,  for  values  vary  with  the! 
varying  conceptions  of  the  end  of  education.  But  in 
the  proposed  distinction  between  functions  and  values 
there  is  indicated,  it  is  hoped,  a  group  of  educational 

V 

224476 


VI  PREFACE 

problems  that  may,  after  patient  and  painstaking  inves 
tigation,  be  solved  once  for  all.  These  are  the  problems 
of  function ;  and  the  failure  to  make  this  distinction 
between  the  problems  of  function  which  can  be  solved 
by  an  appeal  to  positive  science,  and  the  problems  of 
value  which  must  ever  recur  with  the  changing  con 
ceptions  of  educational  aims,  lies  at  the  basis  of  much 
of  the  present  confusion  in  our  educational  discussions. 
All  of  the  chapters  in  the  present  volume  have  under 
gone  many  changes  and  revisions  since  they  were  first 
projected.  These  changes  have  been  made  at  the 
suggestion  of  the  friends  of  the  writer,  who  have  been 
so  good  as  to  go  over  the  material  from  time  to  time 
and  to  point  out  the  defects.  That  the  present  treatment 
is  still  so  far  from  adequate  is  not  at  all  the  fault  of 
these  men ;  without  their  kindly  criticism,  the  writer 
would  never  have  been  spurred  on  to  make  the  changes 
that  now  seem  to  him  to  constitute  by  far  the  most 
valuable  portions  of  the  book.  To  Mr.  C.  M.  McConn, 
Registrar  of  the  University  of  Illinois,  and  formerly 
Principal  of  the  University  Academy  and  Supervisor 
of  Practice  Teaching ;  Superintendent  E.  A.  Turner 
of  the  Training  Department,  Illinois  State  Normal 
University;  Superintendent  H.  B.  Wilson,  of  Decatur, 
Illinois ;  and  Professor  T.  H.  Briggs,  of  the  Eastern 
Illinois  Normal  School,  the  writer's  gratitude  is  due 
for  this  invaluable  service.  He  would  also  acknowledge 
his  indebtedness  to  his  colleagues,  Professor  S.  S. 
Colvin,  Professor  L.  F.  Anderson,  and  Dr.  E.  L.  Norton, 
for  many  valuable  suggestions. 

URBANA,  ILLINOIS, 

December  31,  1910. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION 

PAGE 

PURPOSE  AND  PLAN  OF  THE  TREATMENT        .        .        .        .        .    xvii 
PART    I 

THE  CONTROLS   OF  CONDUCT 

CHAPTER  I 
THE  INHERITED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT 

i.  Meaning  of"  conduct-control "  ;  instinct  as  a  control  of  behavior  in 
lower  organisms.  2.  Complexity  of  human  conduct  conditioned 
by  complex  nervous  system ;  hereditary  and  environmental 
forces  as  conditioning  the  two  large  classes  of  conduct-controls. 
3.  Inherited  controls  of  conduct ;  distinction  between  reflex 
and  instinctive  movement.  4.  Instincts  in  the  human  organ 
isms  ;  the  adaptive  instincts.  5.  Relation  of  the  adaptive  in 
stincts  to  education.  6.  Individualistic  instincts  and  their 
relation  to  education.  7.  Sex  and  parental  instincts  and  their 
relations  to  education.  8.  Social  instincts  ;  educational  signifi 
cance  of  cooperation  and  sacrifice.  9.  The  important  human 
instincts  are  general  rather  than  specific  in  their  operation. 
10.  Three-fold  problem  of  education  with  reference  to  instincts  : 
sublimation,  confirmation,  utilization  .  .  .  .  .  .  I 

CHAPTER  II 

THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT 
A.     Specific  Habits 

I.  The  conservation  of  experience  as  the  paramount  problem  of  edu 
cation  ;   conduct-controls  as  products  of  experience.     2.   Classi- 
vii 


V1U  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS 

PAGE 

fication  of  conduct-controls  engendered  by  experience.  3.  Habits 
as  controls  of  conduct ;  definition  of  a  specific  habit ;  limitations 
of  instinctive  tendencies  to  form  habits  ;  law  of  habit-building. 
4.  Limitations  and  dangers  of  habit-formation.  5.  Objections 
to  the  term  "  generalized  habit  ";  meaning  of  "  mental "  habits  14 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT 
B.     Ideas,  Meanings,  Concepts,  Facts,  and  Principles 

I.  Preliminary  definition  of  terms ;  ideas,  etc.,  as  intellectual 
controls.  2.  Function  of  ideas  in  bringing  past  experience  con 
sciously  to  bear  on  present  situations  ;  types  of  ideas ;  illustra 
tions.  3.  "  Meaning"  as  a  "cue"  to  adjustment.  4.  Concept 
as  a  synonym  of  idea  and  meaning.  5.  An  analysis  of  the 
influence  of  ideas  in  guiding  conduct.  6.  Facts  and  principles 
as  formulations  of  relations  existing  between  ideas.  7.  Facts 
and  principles  function  in  guiding  conduct  as  ideas  function. 
8.  Methodology  of  ideas,  facts,  and  principles  ;  significance  of 
the  concrete.  9.  The  law  of  concept-building ;  limitations 
of  the  "  inductive  "  method  of  teaching.  10.  Distinction  be 
tween  development  and  instruction  ;  types  of  school  exercises 
important  in  fixing  ideas,  facts,  and  principles,  n  il  Controls  of 
this  group  important  as  "guides"  to  conduct;  distinguished 
from  "  ends  "  or  "  purposes  " 26 

CHAPTER  IV 

THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT 
C.     Ideals  and  Emotionalized  Standards 

I.  Conduct  fundamentally  controlled,  not  by  the  stimuli  from  the 
environment,  but  by  the  needs  of  the  organism.  2.  These 
needs  are  reflected  first  in  the  instincts,  later  in  conscious  pur 
poses.  3.  Relation  of  purpose  to  instinct.  4.  Contributions 
of  experience  to  consciousness  of  purpose.  5.  Operation  of 
ideals  and  standards  in  realization  of  purpose.  6.  Structural 
distinction  between  idea  and  ideal ;  illustrations.  7.  Functional 


TABLE    OF  CONTENTS  IX 

PACK 

distinction  between  idea  and  ideal ;  the  former  a  guide  to  real 
ization  of  purpose,  the  latter  an  end  or  motive  of  conduct. 
8.  The  ethical  "virtues"  as  standards  of  conduct.  9.  The 
methodology  of  inspiration 54 

CHAPTER   V 
THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT 

D.  Prejudices  and  Tastes.     E.  Attitudes  and  Perspectives.     Summary 

I.  Prejudices  as  products  of  the  repeated  functioning  of  ideals. 
2.  Tastes  as  related  to  prejudices.  3.  Attitudes  as  the  resultant 
of  the  operation  of  facts  and  principles.  4.  The  advantages 
of  recognizing  prejudices,  tastes,  and  attitudes  as  controls  of 
conduct;  the  doctrine  of  Bewusstseinslagen ;  the  doctrine  of 
mental  attitudes.  5.  Relation  of  prejudices  and  attitudes 
to  habit.  6.  Prejudices  and  attitudes  often  determined  by 
personality  of  teacher  and  general  atmosphere  of  school. 
7.  Methods  of  teaching  are  not  radically  modified  by  recog 
nizing  prejudices  and  attitudes  as  important  outcomes  of  the 
educative  process ;  the  principal  point  of  practical  application 
is  in  connection  with  the  organization  of  subject-matter.  8.  Gen 
eral  summary  of  Chapters  II-V.  9.  Advantages  of  the  pro 
posed  classification  of  conduct-controls 64 

CHAPTER  VI 

THE  LIMITATIONS  OF  EDUCATIVE  FORCES  IN  MODIFYING  CONDUCT 

!  ij  Capacity  to  depart  from  the  customary  conduct  of  the  race  in 
the  direction  of  improved  efficiency  is  one  of  the  marks  of 
"  genius."  ^  Tentative  statement  of  the  relation  of  education 
to  the  development  of  genius  :  (a)  education  must  raise  genius 
to  the  race  level.  3.  (£)  Educative  forces  may  correct  an 
otherwise  unfortunate'  physical  or  physiological  condition,  and 
so  permit  genius  to  operate.  4.  (<:)  Beyond  this,  the  appear 
ance  of  genius  must  be  attributed  to  the  factors  of  organic  varia 
tion  ;  the  a  priori  argument  to  the  contrary  may  be  met  on  its 
own  ground.  5.  Investigations  in  the  field  of  mental  inheritance 
support  this  view:  (a)  investigations  into  the  conditions  of 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS 


eminence  (Galton,  de  Candolle,  Odin,  Cattell);  (£)  Investiga 
tions  of  heredity  in  royalty  (Woods)  ;  (<r)  Studies  of  con- 
sanguineal  resemblances  in  mental  traits  (Pearson,  Galton, 
Thorndike).  6.  Restatement  of  the  conditions  under  which 
education  can  affect  inherent  capacity  :  («)  where  environ 
mental  forces  are  equal,  differences  will  be  due  to  heredity. 
7.  (£)  Where  environmental  forces  are  radically  different,  great 
differences  in  conduct-types  result.  (8* ;  (<r)  Genius  raises  the 
race  to  higher  levels  of  conduct,  education  supports  it  at  these 
levels.  fa  (</)  While  civilization  is  only  a  "veneer"  of  im 
proved  conduct,  it  constitutes  the  most  important  distinction 
between  advanced  and  backward  peoples.  10.  (e)  Moral 
traits  probably  more  amenable  to  modifying  influence  than  in 
tellectual  capacity.  II.  (/)  The  relation  of  environmental 
influences  to  the  factors  of  zeal,  ability,  and  capacity  for  work ; 
relation  between  heredity  and  training  to  be  expressed  as  a 
product  rather  than  as  a  sum.  12.  General  conclusion:  power 
of  education  over  conduct-controls  may  be  increased  when 
education  clearly  understands  the  processes  that  it  employs. 
13.  Negative  evidence  purposely  emphasized  ....  78 

PART   II 

THE   CLASSIFICATION  OF  FUNCTIONS  AND    VALUES 

CHAPTER  VII 

THE  Cur  J;RION  OF  VALUE 

i.  Problem  of  the  chapter.  2.  "he  criterion  of  social  efficiency  as 
the  standard  for  measuring  educational  values.  3"*  Criticisms 
of  the  social  aim  of  education ;  (a)  its  objective  nature 
which  possibly  minimizes  the  importance  of  aesthetic  factors. 
4.  Answers  to  this  objection.  5.  Reasons  why  social  aim 
should  hold  the  position  of  primacy.  6.  Relation  of  intelli 
gent  choice  to  the  primitive  saacti  f  pleasure  and  pain. 
7.  (3)  Acceptance  of  social  aim  ss  open  the  question, 
What  is  the  aim  of  society  ?  8.  /aluable  achievement 
as  the  aim  of  life.  9.  Acceptanc  1m  does  not  rule  out 
the  emotions.  10.  This  concept  •  les  a  place  in  educa 
tional  psychology  for  the  ethical  c  .  Duty  .  ,  .  107 


TABLE   OF  CONTENTS  XI 

CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  RUBRICS  OF  FUNCTION  AND  VALUE 

PAGE 

Former  discussions  of  educational  values  have  confused  problems 
of 'function  with  problems  of  value.  2.  Distinction  between 
these  two  types.  3.  Classification  of  functions.  4.  Classifica 
tion  of  values ;  (a)  utilitarian  values.  5.  Utilitarian  values 
represented  chiefly  by  (i)  habits  of  skill,  and  (2)  facts  and 
principles.  6.  Young's  distinction  between  direct  and  contin 
gent  utility.  7.  (£)  Preparatory  values ;  their  nature.  8.  Il 
lustrations  of  preparatory  values.  9.  (<:)  Conventional  values  ; 
illustrations.  10.  Socializing  values  .  '.  .  .  .  .117 


CHAPTER 

VALUES  TO  BE  REALIZED  IN  FULFILLING  THE  TRAINING 
FUNCTIONS 

I.  Analysis  of  an  average  day's  conduct  in  adult  life  seems  to  show 
very  little  direct  influence  of  formal  education  ;  this  chapter 
proposes  to  examine  the  values  of  the  habits  fixed  by  school 
activities.  2.  (a)  Utilitarian  value  of  habits  gained  from  school 
exercises  in  language.  3.  Utilitarian  importance  of  training  in 
reading.  4.  The  automatisms  of  number,  and  their  economic 
importance.  5.  Music  and  drawing  from  point  of  view  of 
utility.  6.  Manual  training  and  economic  efficiency.  7.  (£)  Pre 
paratory  value  of  habits ;  the  language  arts.  8.  The  number 
arts.  9.  Drawing  and  music.  10.  Manual  training.  II.  Pre 
paratory  value  of  the  principal  seconc^-ry  subjects.  12.  (c)  The 
conventional  value  of  habits.  13.  (i. )  The  socializing  value  of 
habits.  14.  Habit-building  the  most  important  task  of  ele 
mentary  education  ;  dangers  and  sources  of  waste  involved  in 
habit-building  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .128 


CHAPTER  X 

VALUES  TO  BE  REALIZED  IN  FULFILLING  THE  INSTRUCTIONAL 
FUNCTIONS 

I.    (a)  Utilitarian  values  of  ideas,  facts,  and  principles ;    from  the 
point    of  view    of    general    education,    this    value    is    small. 


Xll  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


2.  Arithmetic  as  the  most  important  instructional  subject  from 
this  point  of  view.  3.  Utilitarian  value  of  grammatical  princi 
ples.  4.  Geographical  facts  possess  slight  utilitarian  value. 
5.  The  utility  of  historical  facts ;  Spencer's  contention  ;  its 
fallacies.  6.  Spencer's  view  of  the  utility  of  physiology  ;  reasons 
why  the  utilitarian  values  of  physiology  are  so  infrequently 
realized.  7.  Other  subjects  of  the  elementary  curriculum. 
8.  Conclusions  with  regard  to  elementary  curriculum.  9.  The 
secondary  curriculum  presents  a  similar  condition.  10.  Eng 
lish  instruction  in  the  high  schools  with  reference  to  economic 
efficiency,  n.  Foreign-language  instruction.  12.  Contingent 
utility  of  secondary  mathematics.  13.  Why  secondary  science 
fails  to  realize  utilitarian  values ;  present  tendencies  that  may 
correct  this  condition.  14.  History  and  civics  are  not  impor 
tant  from  standpoint  of  utility.  15.  Conclusions  with  regard 
to  both  elementary  and  secondary  curriculums  ;  importance  of 
training  in  the  art  of  study.  1 6.  (£)  Conventional  value  of 
knowledge  as  such  admittedly  slight;  where  such  values  are 
to  be  realized,  the  process  may  be  justified  usually  upon  another 
basis.  1 7.  (c)  Preparatory  values  of  knowledge  are  especially 
important,  especially  in  the  development  of  concepts  and  mean 
ings.  1 8.  (</)  The  socializing  value  of  knowledge  is  important 
in  that  facts  and  principles  must  form  the  guides  for  the  real 
ization  of  social  ideals  ;  illustrations.  19.  Suggestions  for  en 
riching  the  curriculum  from  the  social  point  of  view ;  importance 
of  agriculture ;  importance  of  educative  materials  drawn  from 
the  local  environment 139 


CHAPTER   XI 

VALUES  TO  BE  REALIZED  IN  FULFILLING  INSPIRATIONAL 

FUNCTIONS 

i.  Chief  emphasis  in  this  and  following  chapters  will  be  upon  social 
izing  values.  2.  Restatement  of  difference  between  idea  and 
ideal.  3.  Importance  of  the  emotional  element  in  the  develop 
ment  of  ideals  ;  the  individualistic  instincts  as  sources  of  emo 
tional  force.  4.  The  sex  and  parental  instincts  and  the  ideals 
dependent  upon  them.  5.  The  adaptive  instincts  as  sources  of 
ideals.  6.  Ideals  that  are  based  upon  the  play  instincts.  7.  The 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS  Xlll 


instinct  of  imitation  as  the  basis  for  ideals  of  construction. 
8.  The  ideal  of  reverence  and  its  instinctive  basis.  9.  The 
ideal  of  achievement.  10.  Educative  forces  influence  the 
development  of  ideals  both  directly  and  indirectly;  the  direct 
influence  the  specific  theme  of  the  present  chapter.  1 1.  History, 
biography,  and  literature  as  media  for  the  transmission  of  ideals  ; 
illustrations  from  history.  12.  The  socializing  importance  of 
national  ideals  ;  function  of  history  in  engendering  these  forces. 

13.  Universal  ideals  engendered  by  a  study  of  general  history. 

14.  Sources  of  the  emotional  force  necessary  to  render  national 
ideals  effective.     15.   Literature  as  a  source  of  ideals.     16.  The 
basic  themes  of  fiction  and  the  drama  represent  fundamental 
instincts.     17.    Ideals  are  crystallized  in  plastic  art;    difficulty 
of  utilizing  these  as  educative  materials.     18.   A  similar  condi 
tion  confronts  the  educator  in  connection  with  music.     19.  Re 
ligion  as  a  source  of  ideals.     20.    Instinctive  forces  to  which 
religion  appeals.      21.  Summary.      22.   Tentative  list  of  ideals 
which  may  be  directly  engendered  by  educative  forces       .        ."    156 


CHAPTER  XII 
VALUES  TO  BE  REALIZED  IN  FULFILLING  DISCIPLINARY  FUNCTIONS 

I.  The  present  status  of  the  formal-discipline  controversy.  2.  His 
torical  sketch  of  the  controversy  ;  James's  testimony ;  Hins- 
dale's  conclusions.  3.  The  Thorndike-Woodworth  experiments. 
4.  Thorndike's  conclusions.  5.  Norsworthy's  investigations. 
6.  The  Montana  experiment.  7.  General  conclusions  from 
these  data  negative.  8.  The  doctrine  of  transfer  through 
ideals.  9.  Ruediger's  confirmation  of  this  doctrine.  10.  Im 
portance  of  the  emotional  element,  n.  General  evidence  in 
favor  of  transfer  through  a  conscious  process :  (a)  Ebert-Meu- 
mann  experiments;  (£)  Coover-Angell  experiments;  (<:)  Winch's 
experiments;  (</)  Fracker's  experiments;  (<?)  Ruger's  experi 
ments.  12.  General  conclusion.  13.  Importance  of  the 
doctrine  of  transfer  through  ideals  in  furnishing  a  "  cue "  for 
educational  method;  illustrations.  14.  Conditions  under  which 
disciplinary  functions  may  be  fulfilled.  15.  Possibilities  of 
conflict  in  values.  16.  Illustrations  of  such  a  conflict  in  pure 
vs»  applied  science;  brief  for  pure  science.  17.  Brief  for 


XIV  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS 

PAGB 

applied  science;  Gilbert's  experiment.  18.  Solution  of  the 
antinomy.  19.  The  case  for  pure  mathematics.  20.  General 
conclusions  with  regard  to  science  and  mathematics.  21.  The 
case  for  the  ancient  languages.  22.  Conclusions  with  regard 
to  the  ancient  languages.  23.  A  tentative  list  of  ideals  that 
may  be  engendered  by  fulfilling  disciplinary  functions  .  .180 

CHAPTER  XIII 
VALUES  TO  BE  REALIZED  IN  FULFILLING  RECREATIVE  FUNCTIONS 

I.  Recreative  functions  may  be  made  to  realize  important  socializing 
valyes.  2.  Justification  for  fulfilling  recreative  functions: 
(#)  a  pleasurable  state  of  mind  increases  the  availability  of 
energy.  3.  (^)  Instinctive  pleasures  sometimes  inconsistent 
with  social  welfare;  necessity  for  replacing  these  with  higher 
pleasures.  4.  Materials  that  may  fulfill  recreative  functions: 
literature,  art,  and  music.  5.  Why  these  functions  are  often 
inadequately  fulfilled;  (a)  the  technique  of  teaching  has  not 
been  sufficiently  differentiated  as  yet.  6.  (£)  Literature  espe 
cially  is  often  given  an  artificial  difficulty  in  competition  with 
other  subjects.  7.  (f)  It  is  often  assumed  in  practice  that 
every  pupil  may  be  made  to  admire  every  form  of  art.  8.  His 
tory  as  a  source  of  recreative  tastes.  9.  Manual  training  and 
recreation.  10.  Nature  study  and  appreciation  of  nature. 
II.  Other  materials  of  the  curriculum 216 

CHAPTER  XIV 
VALUES  TO  BE  REALIZED  IN  FULFILLING  INTERPRETIVE  FUNCTIONS 

I.  Restatement  of  definitions  of  attitudes  and  perspectives.  '2.'>  Dif 
ference  between  educated  and  uneducated  individuals  in  general 
and  specialized  adjustments  due  to  differences  in  these  factors; 
illustrations  of  the  operation  of  attitudes.  3.  "  Negative  "  ad 
justment  :  its  importance  in  life  and  its  relation  to  general  as 
distinguished  from  vocational  education;  illustrations.  4.  Effec 
tive  attitudes  and  perspectives  free  the  mind  from  the  incubus 
of  superstition;  importance  of  solving  perplexing  problems  irre 
spective  of  their  direct  economic  bearing.  5.  Materials  that 
may  be  made  to  fulfill  an  interpretive  function;  the  natural 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS  XV 

PAGE 

sciences.  6.  Science  underlies  all  arts.  7.  The  chief  function 
of  history  is  interpretive.  8.  The  interpretive  functions  of  lit 
erature.  9.  The  importance  of  coherent  theory  in  holding  facts 
together 229 

CHAPTER   XV 

THE  SCHOOL  ENVIRONMENT  AS  A  SOURCE  OF  EDUCATIVE 
MATERIALS 

Purpose  of  the  chapter.  2.  Habits  and  ideals  the  important 
resultants  of  school  life  as  such.  3.  Difficulties  confronting  the 
teacher  in  so  organizing  school  life  as  to  make  it  issue  in  valu 
able  controls.  4.  The  reaction  of  youth  against  adult  control 
and  direction.  5.  The  high-school  fraternity  problem  in  this 
connection.  6.  Ideals  and  prejudices  that  may  come  out  of 
school  life;  the  ideal  of  social  conduct.  7.  The  ideals  of  self- 
government;  difficulties  and  dangers  of  self-governing  bodies 
of  pupils.  8.  The  ideals  of  democracy.  9.  The  importance 
of  "habit -likeness"  in  civilized  society 242 


INTRODUCTION 
PURPOSE  AND  PLAN  OF  TREATMENT 

THAT  education  is,  in  the  last  analysis,  a  process  of 
modifying  conduct,  is  the  fundamental  thesis  of  the  fol 
lowing  discussions.  These  discussions  have  a  three 
fold  purpose.  In  the  first  place,  they  will  attempt  to 
classify  the  controls  of  conduct,  and  to  describe  the 
various  ways  in  which  educative  materials  may  influ-' 
ence  these  controls.  In  the  second  place,  they  will 
attempt  to  evaluate,  in  terms  of  the  social  aim  of  educa 
tion,  the  controls  that  education  may  furnish.  In  the 
third  place,  they  will  outline  the.  specific  methods  through 
the  operation  of  which  educative  materials  may  be  made 
to  fulfill  the  functions  that  are  recognized  as  possessing 
value  when  measured  by  the  social  criterion.  This  last 
problem  will  be  touched  only  incidentally  in  the  present 
volume,  leaving  for  subsequent  treatment  the  systematic 
analysis  of  methods  of  organization  and  teaching  in  the 
light  of  the  principles  and  hypotheses  here  developed. 

The  first  five  chapters  present  a  classification  of  the 
controls  of  conduct.  The  inborn  or  inherited  controls 
are  treated  briefly  in  Chapter  I,  the  chief  emphasis  being 
laid  upon  the  relation  of  the  instincts  to  education.  In 
the  four  subsequent  chapters,  the  conduct-controls  that 
result  from  experience  are  discussed  in  detail,  with  the 

xvii 


XVU1  INTRODUCTION 

aim  of  indicating  the  genesis  of  these  controls,  and  the 
general  methods  which  education  may  employ  to  develop 
them.  In  this  connection,  the  following  factors  are  con 
sidered  in  detail :  (a)  specific  habits ;  (b)  ideas,  concepts, 
meanings,  facts,  and  principles,  —  generically,  "  knowl 
edge,"  furnishing  " interpolated "  controls  of  conduct; 
(c)  ideals  and  emotionalized  standards,  furnishing 
" final"  or  "ultimate"  controls  of  conduct;  (d)  preju 
dices  and  tastes,  which  may  be  looked  upon  as  result 
ants  of  ideals  and  standards;  and  (e)  attitudes  and 
perspectives,  which  may  be  looked  upon  as  resultants 
of  the  " knowledge"  group. 

In  Chapter  VI,  the  limitations  of  educative  forces  in 
developing  conduct-controls  are  briefly  considered.  In 
this  connection,  the  more  important  investigations  in 
the  field  of  mental  inheritance  are  summarized,  and  an 
attempt  is  made  to  reconcile  the  results  of  these  investi 
gations  with  the  aims  and  purposes  of  education. 

In  Chapter  VII,  the  ultimate  aim  of  education  is  for 
mulated  as  "social  efficiency."  The  principal  objections 
that  have  been  urged  against  this  conception  are  con 
sidered,  and  the  arguments  in  favor  of  accepting  social 
efficiency  as  the  criterion  of  educational  value  are  briefly 
outlined. 

The  two  terms  "function"  and  "value"  are  sharply 
differentiated  in  Chapter  VIII,  —  the  former  being 
referred  to  the  psychological  processes  through  which 
educative  materials  engender  conduct-controls;  the 
latter  being  reserved  to  include  the  judgments  regarding 


INTRODUCTION  XIX 

the  worth  of  the  controls  thus  engendered  when  meas 
ured  by  the  accepted  criterion  of  value.  Functions  are 
then  grouped  under  the  following :  heads :  (a)  the  train 
ing  function,  resulting  in  specific  habits ;  (b)  the  instruc 
tional  function,  resulting  in  ideas,  concepts,  facts,  and 
principles;  (c)  the  inspirational  function,  resulting  in 
ideals  and  emotionalized  standards ;  (d)  the  disciplinary 
function,  resulting  in  ideals  of  method  or  procedure  ;  (e) 
the  recreative  function,  resulting  in  tastes  ;  (/)  the  inter 
pretive  function,  resulting  in  attitudes  and  perspectives. 
The  classification  of  values  follows,  in  the  main,  the  cus 
tomary  grouping :  (a)  the  utilitarian  value  attaches  to 
controls  which  promote  simple  economic  efficiency; 
(6)  the  preparatory  value  attaches  to  controls  that  do 
not  necessarily  function  as  direct  guides  or  ends  of  social 
or  economic  conduct,  but  which  form  the  basis  for  the 
acquisition  of  controls  that  do  so  function ;  (c)  the  con 
ventional  value  attaches  to  controls  that  possess  worth 
only  in  so  far  as  society  takes  it  for  granted  that  each 
individual  shall  be  governed  by  them ;  (d)  the  socializing 
value  attaches  to  controls  that,  while  unnecessary  from 
the  narrow  economic  and  conventional  points  of  view, 
make  possible  social  stability  and  insure  social  progress. 
Chapters  IX-XIV  consider  in  detail  the  values  that 
may  be  realized  in  fulfilling  the  six  functions  outlined 
above.  This  treatment  involves  a  rapid  survey  of  the 
elementary  and  secondary  curriculums,  and  the  effort  is 
made  to  show  how  present  problems  of  organization  and 
method  may  be  modified  by  the  perspective  which  is 


XX  INTRODUCTION 

furnished  by  the  principles  of  function  and  value. 
Among  other  problems,  the  present  controversy  con 
cerning  " formal  discipline"  and  the  transfer  of  training 
is  discussed  in  detail  (Chapter  XII),  and  the  functions 
of  "general"  education,  as  distinguished  from  specialized 
or  vocational  education,  are  outlined  in  Chapters  XII, 
XIII,  and  XIV. 

The  life  of  the  school  as  a  source  of  educative  mate 
rials  is  briefly  treated  in  the  concluding  chapter,  the  chief 
emphasis  being  placed  upon  the  valuable  habits  and  ideals 
that  may  be  made  to  issue  from  the  proper  type  of  school 
organization. 


EDUCATIONAL    VALUES 


PART   I 
THE   CONTROLS   OF   CONDUCT 

CHAPTER   I 

THE  INHERITED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT 

i.  THE  first  problem  is  to  make  clear  the  meaning  of 
the  term  "conduct-control"  as  this  term  is  used  in  the 
following  pages.  Conduct  or  behavior  implies  an  ad 
justment  or  response  of  the  organism  to  some  form  of 
stimulation.  Among  the  lower  orders  of  life,  this  re 
sponse  is  relatively  simple.  The  range  of  adjustment  is 
limited.  A  comparatively  few  types  of  behavior  exhaust 
the  possibilities.  They  consist  in  single,  often  unrelated, 
movements  which  follow  upon  the  appropriate  stimula 
tion  sometimes  as  mechanically  as  the  ringing  of  an 
electric  bell  follows  upon  the  pushing  of  the  button. 
While  such  reactions  vary  with  general  external  condi 
tions,  and  with  the  general  physiological  state  or  "tone" 
of  the  organism,  relative  uniformity  is  their  fundamental 
characteristic,  and  this  relative  uniformity  is  due  to  the 
narrow  physiological  and  anatomical  range  of  possible 
variation.  It  may  be  laid  down  as  a  general  rule  that, 
under  the  same  physiological  conditions,  the  same  re 
sponse  inevitably  follows  upon  the  same  stimulus. 


EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

Jennings  characterizes  the  conduct  of  the  lower  animal  forms 
in  the  following  words:  "  What  a  given  organism  does  under 
stimulation  is  limited  by  its  action  system,  and  within  these 
limits  is  determined  largely  by  its  physiological  condition  at 
the  time  stimulation  occurs.  In  the  lowest  organism  the 
action  system  confines  the  variations  in  behavior  within 
rather  narrow  limits,  and  the  different  physiological  condi 
tions  distinguishable  are  few  in  number  ;  hence  the  behavior 
is  less  varied  than  in  the  higher  animals.  But  the  difference 
is  one  of  degree,  not  of  kind."  1 

2.  With  the  advance  of  the  organism  in  complexity  of 
structure,  and  with  the  organization  of  differentiated 
parts  and  the  consequent  specialization  of  the  functions 
of  these  parts,  there  is  an  accompanying  development  in 
the  complexity,  organization,  and  specialization  of  con 
duct.  Specialized  sets  of  cells  fulfill  specialized  functions 
in  the  economy  of  the  animal's  life.  Nutrition,  respira 
tion,  locomotion,  and  reproduction  are  taken  care  of 
by  separate  tissues,  each  adapted  to  do  its  own  specific 
work,  and  each  depending  upon  the  others  for  the  serv 
ice  which  this  high  degree  of  specialization  prevents  it 
from  doing  for  itself. 

The  problem  of  adjustment  in  a  complex  animal  form 
becomes,  therefore,  highly  complicated.  A  multitude  of 
activities  must  be  made  to  work  together  harmoniously 
for  the  welfare  of  the  organism  as  a  whole.  In  meeting 
this  problem  there  has  been  developed  in  the  more  com 
plicated  animal  forms  a  master-tissue,  —  the  nervous 

1  H.  S.  Jennings :  Behavior  of  the  Lower  Organisms,  New  York, 
1906,  p.  281. 


THE  INHERITED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT       3 

system.  This  master-tissue  serves  not  only  to  har 
monize  the  activities  of  the  various  groups  of  cells  that 
fulfill  the  different  functions  of  respiration,  nutrition, 
locomotion,  and  reproduction,  but  also,  in  the  highest 
organisms,  to  retain,  in  some  way  the  mechanism  of 
which  is  now  shrouded  in  mystery,  the  experiences  that 
the  organism  has  undergone  in  the  past,  to  bring  these 
experiences  to  bear  upon  the  problems  of  present  ad 
justment,  and  —  in  man,  at  least  —  to  project  adjust 
ment  into  the  future  in  time  or  into  the  distant  in  space 
and  adapt  the  organism  to  situations  that  are  not  present 
or  proximate. 

3.  Human  behavior  represents  the  most  complicated 
known  type  of  adjustment,  and  the  nervous  system  that 
governs  it  is  the  most  complicated  and  highly  organized 
tissue  that  has,  so  far  as  is  now  known,  been  developed 
by  natural  selection.  Through  the  nervous  system 
operate  the  forces  that  control  conduct,  and  while  it  is 
impossible  in  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  accu 
rately  to  describe  the  mechanism  of  control,  two  large 
factors  that  are  of  especial  significance  to  our  present 
problem  may  be  readily  distinguished.  These  are 
(i)  heredity,  and  (2)  experience. 

In  so  far  as  both  of  these  factors  condition  human 
conduct,  —  in  so  far  as  human  conduct  is  governed  in 
part  by  hereditary  influences  and  in  part  by  experi 
ential  influences,  —  we  may  speak  of  heredity  and  en 
vironment  as  the  two  large  /fubrics  of  "conduct-con 
trols."  Under  each  rubric,  more  specific  controls  are 


4  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

to   be   identified,    as    the   following   analysis   will   in 
dicate. 

4.  Inherited  Controls  of  Conduct.  —  These  include 
(i)  simple  reflex  movements,  and  (2)  the  more  com 
plicated  instinctive  movements  and  the  conscious  im 
pulses  with  which  the  latter  may  be  correlated.  The 
spontaneous  winking  of  the  eyes  is  a  type  of  reflex 
movement,  and  the  " control"  of  conduct  in  this  instance 
is  the  tendency  of  a  reflex  nerve  center  to  respond  me 
chanically  to  a  certain  type  of  stimulation, — in  this  case 
an  irritation  of  the  sensory  nerve  endings  in  the  cornea. 
An  instinctive  movement  may  be  regarded  as  an  organiza 
tion  of  simpler  reflex  movements.  It  is,  as  it  were,  a 
chain  of  reflexes,  the  completion  of  one  movement  form 
ing  the  stimulus  for  the  " setting  off"  of  the  next,  and  so 
on  until  the  chain  is  completed.  Instinctive  movements 
are  further  complicated  by  the  fact  that  they  are  com 
monly  for  the  benefit  of  the  body  as  a  whole,  rather  than 
for  the  benefit  of  any  one  particular  part  or  organ,  and 
also  by  the  fact  that  they  are  frequently  initiated  by  a 
conscious  "impulse  "  and,  in  general,  are  more  frequently 
correlated  with  conscious  processes  than  are  the  simpler 
reflexes.1  The  nest-building  activities  of  birds  represent 
a  very  complex  type  of  instinctive  movement,  running 

1  Cf.  E.  A.  Kirkpatrick :  Genetic  Psychology,  New  York,  1909,  p.  92 : 
"  Where  the  reaction  is  of  a  part  of  the  organism  only,  it  is  more  properly 
called  a  reflex ;  while  more  complex  reactions  of  many  parts  for  the  good 
of  the  whole  organism  are  designated  as  instincts.  In  the  lower  organ 
isms  reactions  are  largely  reflex,  while  in  higher  animals,  instincts  become 
more  and  more  prominent." 


THE  INHERITED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT       5 

its  course  through  a  large  number  of  simple  reflexes 
until  the  important  end  has  been  attained.  It  is  not 
probable  that  the  bird  is  conscious  of  the  end,  but  there 
is  every  reason  to  believe  that  conscious  processes  are 
correlated  with  many  of  the  separate  movements.  In 
general,  then,  a  group  of  coordinated  activities  con 
trolled  by  inherited  and  not  by  experiential  factors  is 
called  an  instinctive  movement,  and  the  inherited  tend 
ency  toward  such  movement  is  known  as  an  instinct. 

5.  Human  conduct,  like  that  of  the  lower  animals,  is 
subject  to  these  instinctive  controls.  It  is  with  these 
that  education  must  start,  and  upon  these  its  processes 
must  ultimately  be  based,  no  matter  how  far  it  goes  or 
how  elaborately  it  organizes  and  refines  its  methods. 
It  is  essential,  therefore,  that  the  student  of  education 
understand  the  nature  of  instinct  and  the  relation  of 
educative  processes  to  instinctive  forces. 

While  no  type  of  instinctive  tendency  is  without  its 
relation  to  education,  certain  classes  of  instincts  are 
particularly  significant  in  this  connection.     Of  the  great 
est  importance,  perhaps,  are  the  adaptive  instincts,  - 
play,  curiosity,  imitation,  and  repetition. 

The  instinct  of  play  manifests  itself  in  the  spontaneous 
impulse  to  activity  of  various  sorts  that  has  no  end  or  purpose 
other  than  the  mere  enjoyment  which  this  activity  brings. 
Spencer  maintained  that  the  function  of  this  activity  was  sim 
ply  to  provide  an  outlet  for  the  "excess  energy"  accumulated 
in  the  system.  Karl  Groos,  however,  called  attention  to  the 
fact  that  the  purely  spontaneous  plays  of  childhood  very  fre 
quently  involve  adjustments  essential  to  the  preservation 


0  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

of  life  under  primitive  conditions.  Thus  among  all  races 
of  people  certain  uniform  types  of  play-activity  are  to  be 
found,  —  " hide-and-seek"  and  other  hunting  games  which 
tend  to  develop  certain  types  of  skill  needed  in  hunting; 
" prisoner's  base"  and  similar  games  of  mimic  warfare; 
playing  with  dolls,  which  gives  expression  to  the  maternal 
impulse.  Groos's  conclusion  that  the  play  impulse  has 
developed  through  natural  selection  as  a  means  of  adapt 
ing  the  organism  to  its  future  environment  has  been  a  very 
fruitful  contribution  to  the  theory  of  childhood.  It  was  one 
of  the  earliest  recognitions  of  a  principle  that  has  done  much 
to  enlighten  educational  practice,  —  the  principle,  namely, 
that  there  has  been  provided  in  the  adaptive  instincts  a  "nat 
ural"  basis  for  the  educative  process. 1 

Curiosity  as  an  adaptive  instinct  expresses  itself  in  the  un 
reasoned  impulse  to  investigate,  —  to  determine  the  nature 
especially  of  what  is  new  and  strange  in  one's  environment,  — 
without  conscious  reference  to  the  use  to  which  the  knowledge 
thus  obtained  may  be  put.  This  impulse  to  investigate  be 
yond  the  immediate  needs  of  the  moment  is  obviously  the 
basis  of  all  knowledge  and  its  adaptive  function  is  clearly 
apparent.2 

1  Cf.  K.  Groos:  Play  of  Man  (tr.  E.  L.  Baldwin),  New  York,  1901, 
pp.  361  ff. ;  E.  A.  Kirkpatrick :  Genetic  Psychology,  New  York,  1909, 
p.  100 ;  S.  H.  Rowe :  Habit-Formation,  New  York,  1909,  p.  75. 
Stanley  Hall  (Adolescence,  New  York,  1905,  vol.  i,  pp.  202  ff.)  pro 
poses  a  theory  of  play  differing  somewhat  both  from  that  of  Groos  and 
from  that  of  Spencer.  He  maintains  that  the  spontaneous  play  of  child 
hood  has  its  chief  function  in  gratifying  in  a  wholesome  and  vicarious 
fashion  the  impulses  that  were  essential  to  survival  at  an  earlier  period 
in  race  history,  but  which  are  no  longer  significant.  Their  persistence, 
however,  indicates  their  deeply  seated  character;  they  form,  as  Hall 
figuratively  expresses  it,  "vestigial  organs  of  the  soul,"  and  like  certain 
other  vestigial  functions,  a  certain  amount  of  activity  is  essential  if  de 
velopment  is  to  be  normal.  2  Cf.  Kirkpatrick,  op.  cit.,  p.  102. 


THE  INHERITED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT       7 

The  instinct  of  imitation  manifests  itself  in  the  unreasoned 
impulse  to  copy  the  adjustments  that  are  made  by  others  when 
there  is  no  consciousness  of  the  purpose  of  adjustment :  merely 
copying  the  movement  is  sufficient  to  gratify  the  impulse. 
It  is  clear,  however,  that  an  instinct  of  this  sort  is  particularly 
important  in  developing  the  types  of  conduct  that  are  im 
portant  in  civilized  life.  Without  the  imitative  impulse,  the 
task  of  education,  especially  in  its  earlier  stages,  would  be  diffi 
cult  in  the  extreme,  —  if  not,  indeed,  insurmountable. 1 

Closely  related  to  the  imitative  impulse  is  the  impulse  to 
what  Baldwin  terms  the  "circular  reaction."  In  this  case, 
the  individual,  instead  of  copying  the  adjustments  of  another, 
repeats  or  copies  some  adjustment  that  he  has  made  himself 
(either  accidentally  or  through  imitation).  This  repetition 
of  a  reaction  is  clearly  seen  in  children  from  the  ninth  month 
on,  becoming,  of  course,  less  and  less  frequent  in  its  occurrence 
as  useful  adjustments  are  made  habitual.  It  is  to  be  noted 
that  the  individual  is  not  necessarily  conscious  of  the  purpose 
of  the  repetition.  The  mere  pleasure  that  it  affords  gives  it 
a  sufficient  sanction.  The  adaptive  function  of  this  impor 
tant  impulse  is  clearly  apparent.  It  is  the  instinctive  basis 
for  what  is  termed  in  formal  education,  "drill"  or  training. 

6.  The  recognition  of  the  adaptive  instincts  and  an 
understanding  of  the  many  ways  in  which  they  con 
tribute  to  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  education  have 
been  among  the  most  important  of  the  recent  advances 
in  educational  science.  Like  all  important  discoveries, 
they  have  undoubtedly  led  to  extreme  practices.  While ' 

1  The  importance  of  the  instinct  of  imitation  was  first  clearly  pointed 
out  by  J.  M.  Baldwin  (Mental  Development:  Methods  and  Processes, 
New  York,  1906,  pp.  249  ff.)  and  by  G.  Tarde:  The  Laws  of  Imitation 
(tr.  Elsie  C.  Parsons),  New  York,  1903,  ch.  i;  cf.  also  Kirkpatrick,  op. 
cit,,  p.  101. 


8  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

nature  has  provided  adaptive  instincts  that  will,  in  a 
certain  measure,  automatically  educate  the  child,  — 
that  is,  lead  him  to  acquire  the  experiences  that  are 
essential  to  life  in  civilized  society,  —  it  should  not  be 
forgotten  that  this  automatic  education  has  very  decided 
limitations  and  that  an  educational  system  depending 
upon  these  entirely  is  not  likely  to  carry  the  individual 
very  far.  Curiosity,  play,  imitation,  and  the  spontane 
ous  repetitive  impulse  may  very  well  serve,  one  may  say, 
as  the  starting  point  of  an  educative  process  that  very 
soon  carries  the  individual  beyond  these  unreasoned 
impulses  into  the  realm  of  purposeful  action.  While 
the  instincts  form  the  basis  of  education,  they  are,  after 
all,  only  the  basis. 

Curiously  enough,  the  repetitive  impulse  has  not  been  recog 
nized  in  educational  practice  as  a  sanction  for  a  certain  type 
drill  that  is  essential  to  the  acquisition  of  skill  in  a  number  of 
fundamental  adjustments.  It  is  sometimes  said  that  a  child 
should  never  be  subjected  to  drill  processes  for  which  he  can 
see  no  reason.  A  familiar  precept,  based  upon  this  principle, 
is  the  warning  against  requiring  pupils  to  mechanize  rules  and 
formulae  that  they  do  not  understand.  While  this  precept 
is,  in  general,  a  safe  guide  to  educational  practice,  it  may 
easily  be  carried  too  far,  and  an  extreme  generalization  of  its 
implications  is  obviously  quite  contradicted  by  nature's  own 
method  of  insuring  the  formation  of  necessary  habits. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  sole  dependence  upon  the  repetitive 
impulse  to  form  the  necessary  habits  would  be  quite  futile. 
So  far  as  natural  selection  has  fixed  this  impulse,  it  seems  to  be 
narrowly  limited  to  the  more  obvious  adjustments  absolutely 
essential  to  social  life.  Thus,  through  instinctive  repetition, 


THE   INHERITED   CONTROLS   OF   CONDUCT  9 

the  child  masters  the  mechanism  of  speech,  but  only  in  a  com 
paratively  crude  way.  For  many  of  the  arts  arid  automatisms 
that  the  more  highly  developed  social  life  requires,  the  limited 
repetition  that  this  impulse  would  provide  is  quite  inadequate. 
In  other  words,  the  pleasant  affective  tone  which  has,  through 
natural  selection,  come  to  attach  to  certain  types  of  repetition 
during  a  certain  period  of  childhood,  fails  to  attach  itself 
to  the  longer  and  more  tedious  series  of  repetitions  essential 
^to  the  formation  of  the  more  complicated  habits.  It  is 
the  failure  to  recognize  this  limitation  that  constitutes  the 
fallacious  element  in  the  doctrines  of  the  neo-Rousselian 
school  of  "  natural  education." 

7.  Of  the  individualistic  instincts,  —  the  unreasoned 
tendencies  to  such  adjustment  as  will  tend  to  preserve 
the  organism  in  conflict  with  his  fellows,  —  the  instinct 
of  emulation  is  probably  most  significant  to  education. 

The  limits  within  which  the  emulative  impulse  may  be  en 
couraged  and  consequently  confirmed  in  educational  practice 
have  long  been  the  subject  of  controversy.  Of  the  strength 
of  this  impulse  among  normal  individuals  there  can  be  no 
doubt,  and  all  teachers  will  testify  to  its  efficiency  as  the 
source  of  what  is  perhaps  the  most  powerful  school  incentive 
—  rivalry.  Theoretically,  the  danger  of  employing  it  exten 
sively  lies  in  the  self-centered  ideals  which  it  may  engender. 
Since  all  ideals  have  an  emotional  and  consequently  instinctive 
basis,  it  is  necessary  to  inquire  seriously  whether  the  employ 
ment  of  any  instinctive  impulse  in  the  work  of  education  may 
not,  in  the  end,  do  more  harm  than  good  by  developing  a  con 
duct-control  that  is  quite  inconsistent  with  the  fundamental 
aim  of  education.  This  problem  must  be  left  to  a  later  section 
for  detailed  consideration. 


10  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

8.  The  sex  and  parental  instincts  are  of  more  vital 
import    to    education    than    is    commonly    recognized. 
These  impulses  form  the  basis  of  the  prime  controls  of 
human  conduct  from  adolescence  on.     How  to  develop 
from  these  impulses  the  ideals  that  mast  be  developed 
if  education  is  to  fulfill  its  function  in  social  life  is  a  prob 
lem  that  must  also  be  left  for  further  treatment  in  the 
discussion  of  ideals. 

The  investigations  in  the  field  of  "psycho-analysis"  indicate 
very  clearly  that  the  sex-instincts  are  vastly  more  fundamen 
tal  and  important,  even  in  the  life  of  children,  than  education 
has  hitherto  recognized.  It  is,  as  yet,  too  early  to  predict 
what  modifications  of  present-day  educational  practices  will 
be  made  necessary  by  researches  in  this  new  field ;  but  every 
indication  points  to  some  discoveries  in  the  near  future  that 
will  compel  the  educator  to  take  very  serious  account,  not 
only  of  the  awakened  sex  impulses  of  the  adolescent  but  also 
of  the  premonitions  of  sex-consciousness  that  are  normal 
with  very  young  children.1 

9.  The  social  instincts,  —  the  unreasoned  tendencies 
to  seek  companionship,   to  cooperate,  and  to  sacrifice 
oneself  for  the  welfare  of  the  group,  —  are  so  late  in 
their  development,  and   so  intricately  interwoven  with 
experiential  factors,  that  their  instinctive  basis  is  often 

1  "According  to  the  findings  of  psycho-analysis,  the  sexual  life  of 
children  is  much  richer,  both  physically  and  mentally,  than  is  generally 
believed,  and  ...  the  manner  of  its  development  is  of  decisive  impor 
tance  for  the  whole  life-history  of  the  individual."  —  E.  JONES  :  "Psycho- 
Analysis  and  Education,"  Journal  of  Educational  Psychology,  vol.  i,  1910, 
p.  504.  Cf.,  also,  S.  Freud:  Selected  Papers  on  Hysteria  (tr.  A.  A. 
Brill),  New  York,  1909,  ch.  ix. 


THE  INHERITED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      II 

quite  obscured.  So  far  as  education  is  concerned,  it  is 
perhaps  sufficient  to  recognize  that  there  is  an  inborn 
tendency  that  makes  toward  cooperation  and  sacrifice. 
It  is  very  doubtful,  however,  whether  this  tendency  can 
be  depended  upon  to  insure  the  elaborately  organized 
altruistic  adjustments  that  a  complicated  social  structure 
necessitates.  In  other  words,  natural  selection  has  pro 
vided,  as  usual,  only  for  such  adjustments  as  are  essential 
to  bring  the  race  to  a  plane  upon  which  the  conscious 
ness  of  purpose  may  function  effectively  in  providing 
more  highly  specialized  controls  much  more  adequately 
adapted  to  the  needs  of  a  constantly  changing  social 
environment. 

10.  In  general,  the  instincts  of  man  may  be  character 
ized  as  conduct-controls  which  are  general  rather  than 
specialized  or  particularized  in  their  function.  Highly 
specialized  instinctive  movements  (such  as  the  nest- 
building  instinct  in  birds)  would  be  a  decided  disadvan 
tage  in  the  human  species.  The  characteristic  feature  of 
human  life  is  its  adaptability,  and  any  high  degree  of 
specialization  in  the  tendencies  to  conduct  that  are 
transmitted  as  instincts  through  the  germ  cell  would 
stand  squarely  in  the  road  of  human  progress. 

The  general  acceptance  of  the  doctrine  of  the  non-inheri 
tance  of  modifications  through  the  germ  cell  has  occasioned  a 
pessimistic  outlook  among  some  students  of  society.  If  the 
improved  adjustments  that  each  generation  toilsomely  ac 
quires  are  not  transmitted  through  the  germ  cell ;  if  the  race 
is  not  growing  better  through  the  experience  of  each  succeed- 


12  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

ing  generation ;  if  each  child  must  start  on  the  same  physica' 
and  physiological  plane  that  its  ancestors  of  three  thousam 
years  ago  started  on ;  then  what  is  progress  or  civilization  bir 
a  mere  veneer  which  may  be  scraped  off  completely  if  a  single 
generation  fails  in  its  paramount  duty  of  training  and  educat 
ing  its  offspring  ? 

Whether  human  progress  is  or  is  not  a  mere  veneer,  it  i< 
true  that  the  failure  of  social  heredity  to  transmit  its  worthy 
elements  would  serve  to  eliminate  every  trace  of  civilization 
within  a  very  brief  period.  But  far  from  being  depressed  by 
this  condition,  one  should  take  from  it  the  largest  measure  of 
comfort.  The  fixation  of  habit  in  instinct  would  simply  mean 
the  inevitable  perpetuation  of  inadequate  habits.  How  far 
the  customs  and  skills  of  to-day  are  removed  from  those  of  a 
century  ago  is  frequently  remarked.  Certainly  some  of  the 
elements  that  have  been  lost  were  well  worth  preserving ;  but, 
on  the  whole,  man  may  be  thankful  that  he  is  not  required  to 
carry  about  in  his  nervous  system  a  multitude  of  specialized 
tendencies  acquired  by  his  ancestors  in  response  to  some  re 
mote  environmental  need,  but  totally  unadapted  to  present 
conditions.  It  is  quite  enough  of  a  burden  for  him  to  have 
embedded  in  his  nervous  system  a  few  instincts,  the  utility  of 
which  has  been  outlived.  These  were  provided  by  natural 
selection  in  some  period  far  antedating  human  history,  but, 
like  the  vermiform  appendix,  they  are  only  a  source  of  trouble 
and  vexation  to-day.  If  the  habit-modifications  acquired  by 
each  of  one's  ancestors  were  similarly  reflected  in  one's 
nature,  how  hopeless  would  be  the  problem  of  adaptation ! 

ii.  The  task  of  education  with  reference  to  the 
instincts  is  threefold :  (i)  Certain  instinctive  controls 
must  be  "  sublimated ";  that  is,  the  energy  that  they 
release  must  be  directed  to  ends  other  than  those  indi- 


THE  INHERITED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      13 

cated  by  the  primitive  instincts  themselves.  The  few 
but  troublesome  unsocial  or  anti-social  impulses  are  in 
this  class,  —  the  impulse  to  appropriate  what  pleases 
one;  the  impulse  to  inflict  bodily  injury  upon  those 
against  whom  the  feeling  of  resentment  has  been  aroused ; 
the  impulse  to  follow  the  strongest  external  stimulus 
regardless  of  its  bearing  upon  the  remote  ends  that  one 
seeks  to  attain ;  the  impulse  to  seek  change  and  variety; 
and,  in  the  ever-lengthening  period  that  elapses  between 
physiological  and  economic  maturity,  the  imperious  sex 
and  parental  instincts. 

(2)  In  the  second  place,  certain  instincts  must  be  con 
firmed  and  given  the  sanction  of  repeated  experience. 
Chief  among  these  are  the  comparatively  weak  instincts 
of  cooperation  and  sacrifice. 

(3)  Finally,  certain  instincts  form  the  basis  of  incen 
tives  or  natural  interests  which  may  be  directed  toward 
the  acquisition  of  controls  that  may  be  quite  unrelated 
to  the  instincts  employed  as  means.     Among  these  are 
the  instinct  of  emulation,  the  " property  "  instinct,  and 
especially  the  adaptive  instincts,  —  play,  curiosity,  imita 
tion,  and  repetition. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT.    (A)  SPECIFIC 

HABITS 

i.  THE  power  to  rise  above  the  operation  of  blind 
instinct,  and  to  control  conduct  in  the  light  of  experience 
and  conscious  purpose,  is  the  most  significant  human 
prerogative.  It  is  the  prime  task  of  education  to  see  to 
it  that  the  useful  modifications  of  conduct  that  have  been 
accumulated  with  the  experience  of  the  race  are  trans 
mitted  safely  from  generation  to  generation.  Physical 
heredity,  so  far  as  is  now  known,  cannot  transmit  these 
modifications  through  the  germ  cell.  As  was  pointed  out 
in  the  last  chapter,  the  physical  inheritance  of  modifica 
tions  would  doubtless  prove  a  disadvantage  rather  than 
a  benefit  to  man.  The  shortcomings  of  physical  heredity 
in  this  regard  place  a  correspondingly  heavy  responsi 
bility  upon  social  heredity,  and  in  social  heredity,  formal 
education  is  the  important  factor. 

The  paramount  problem  of  education  becomes,  there 
fore,  the  conservation  of  experience;  and  the  materials 
of  education  are  the  controls  of  conduct  which  represent 
the  resultants  of  that  experience.  Of  these  controls,  not 
all  are  worthy  of  perpetuation.  Changing  conditions 
bring  changed  needs  and  demand  new  adjustments. 

14 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      1 5 

Thus  the  task  of  selecting  for  survival  the  essential  ele 
ments  of  experience  is  one  of  the  most  troublesome 
constructive  problems  of  the  educator.  Subsequent 
chapters  will  attempt  to  lay  down  certain  principles 
that  may  serve  as  a  guide  in  this  selection;  but,  as  a 
preliminary  to  this  discussion,  it  will  first  be  necessary 
to  define  and  classify  the  conduct-controls  that  come 
out  of  experience,  and  which  constitute  the  materials 
with  which  education  has  to  deal. 

2.  The  following  outline  will  indicate  at  a  glance  the 
various  rubrics  of  classification  that  will  be  followed  in 
the  subsequent  discussions :  - 

I.  Acquired  automatic  controls  of  conduct. 

(a)  Specific  habits. 

II.  Acquired  conscious  controls  of  conduct  in  which  the  sen 
sory  or  intellectual  element  predominates. 

(a)  Ideas,  concepts,  meanings. 

(b)  Facts  and  principles. 

III.  Acquired  conscious  controls  of  conduct  in  which  the 
affective  or  emotional  element  predominates. 

(a)  Ideals. 

(b)  Emotionalized  standards. 

IV.  Acquired  controls  of  conduct  which  evince  some  of  the 
characteristics  of  habits,  while  still  retaining  many 
features  characteristic  of  the  conscious  controls. 

(a)  Those  in  which  the  affective  or  emotional  element 
predominates :   tastes ;   prejudices. 

(b)  Those  in  which  the  sensory  or  intellectual  element 
predominates :   attitudes ;   perspectives. 

3.  Habits  as  Controls  of  Conduct.     The  most  obvious 
resultant  of  experience  is  the  group  of  specific  habits 


1 6  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

that  control  so  large  a  part  of  human  conduct.  A  specific 
habit  is  a  mode  of  response  that  has  been  acquired 
through  experience,  and  has  then,  through  repetition, 
been  reduced  to  an  automatic  form.  This  does  not 
necessarily  mean  that  the  response  thereafter  is  uncon 
scious.  One  may  be  thoroughly  aware  of  an  automatic 
adjustment.  -  The  significant  characteristic  of  a  specific 
habit  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  various  elements 
making  up  the  response  follow  upon  one  another 
automatically.  The  stimulus  to  the  response  may  or 
may  not  come  into  consciousness;  but  if,  at  any  point 
of  the  series,  hesitation  occurs  and  consciousness  is 
called  upon  to  direct  the  movement,  or  to  choose  between 
alternate  possibilities  of  action,  the  response,  at  that 
point  at  least,  loses  its  automatic  character,  and  becomes 
a  matter  of  judgment,  —  in  other  words,  comes  under 
the  guidance  of  ideas. 

The  automatic  spelling  of  a  word  illustrates  the  salient 
features  of  a  specific  habit.  So  long  as  the  writing  of  the 
word  follows  immediately  upon  the  stimulus  (in  this  instance 
the  idea  of  the  word,  or  its  auditory  perception  in  case  it  is 
dictated),  the  response  is  automatic.  Should  doubt  arise  as 
to  the  proper  sequence  of  letters,  however,  the  form  becomes 
focalized  in  attention,  and  the  automatic  character  of  the 
writing  is  lost.  Consciousness  is  now  called  upon  to  direct  the 
process. 

The  making  of  a  chain  by  a  blacksmith  may  illustrate  an 
other  type  of  habit.  Here  a  large  number  of  related  move 
ments  must  first  be  coordinated  or  related  to  one  another  by 
imitation  or  instruction.  At  this  stage  the  process  is  con- 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      17 

trolled  by  judgment ;  there  are  infinite  possibilities  of  move 
ment,  from  which  the  apprentice  must  consciously  select  those 
that  are  effective.  Gradually  successive  phases  of  the  process 
become  automatic ;  the  simpler  adjustments  follow  upon  one 
another  without  conscious  control.  As  practice  proceeds, 
these  segments  of  automatic  responses  gradually  merge  into 
larger  automatic  wholes,  until  finally  perhaps  only  a  fleeting 
" awareness"  of  certain  "cues"  (the  hue  of  the  metal  when  it 
is  ready  for  bending  and  welding ;  the  "feel"  of  the  hammer- 
blow  that  indicates  cold  and  unyielding  iron ;  the  perception 
of  form  that  means  one  more  link  completed)  is  all  that  con 
sciousness  need  concern  itself  with. 

4.  As  was  suggested  in  the  last  chapter,  habits  may  be 
initiated  by  imitation,  and  carried  to  the  plane  of  au 
tomatism  by  the  instinctive  delight  in  rhythmic  repeti 
tion.  But,  as  was  also  suggested,  the  instinctive  basis 
for  habit-forming  will  not  carry  the  individual  very  far, 
for  it  will  not  provide  for  the  complicated  forms  of  ad 
justment  and  for  the  consequent  multiplication  of  repe 
titions  essential  to  their  automatic  functioning.  The 
individual  here  as  elsewhere  must  rise  above  instinct  if 
he  is  to  achieve  a  significant  measure  of  progress.  It  is 
at  this  point  that  the  conscious  direction  of  the  educa 
tive  process  becomes  absolutely  essential. 

The  law  of  habit  building  becomes,  therefore,  the 
basis  of  a  large  and  important  part  of  formal  educa 
tion.  This  law  consists  of  three  articles :  (a)  Focaliza- 
tion 1  of  consciousness  upon  the  process  to  be  made 

1  It  is  true  that  fortunate  variations  in  an  adjustment  may  come  about 
without  the  intervention  of  consciousness,  but  the  building  of  these 


1 8  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

automatic ;  (b)  attentive  repetition  of  this  process ;  (c)  per 
mitting  no  exceptions  until  automatism  results.  These 
three  articles  should  be  supplemented  in  practice  by  a 
recognition  of  the  beneficial  influence  which  a  proper 
motivation  or  initiation  may  exert  upon  all  stages  of  the 
habit-forming  process. 

The  implications  of  this  fundamental  principle  have  been 
so  thoroughly  worked  out  by  Dr.  S.  H.  Rowe  l  that  they  need 
not  detain  us  long  at  this  point.  In  general,  a  habit  may  be 
focalized  either  by  demoiisLrajiQri  (that  is,  by  giving  the  indi 
vidual  who  is  to  form  the  habit  a  clear-cut  example  of  the  way 
in  which  the  adjustments  are  to  be  made),  by  trial  and  error 
and  chance  success  (placing  the  individual  face  to  face  with  a 
situation  to  which  he  must  adjust  himself  in  various  ways  until 
he  "  stumbles  upon  "  the  appropriate  response),  or  by  judgment 
(placing  the  individual  in  contact  with  the  situation  but  letting 
him  "reason  out"  the  appropriate  adjustment  rather  than 
blunder  into  it  blindly) .  Each  one  of  these  three  methods  has 
its  advantages  and  its  special  fields  of  effective  application. 

In  securing  attentive  repetition,  it  is  essential  that  the 
"practice"  essential  to  automatism  should  be  under  condi 
tions  that  will  prevent  the  distraction  of  attention  through  the 

variations  into  useful  habits  is  largely  a  matter  of  focalized  recognition. 
Cf.  the  following  from  Ruger's  report  of  his  investigations  in  the  psy 
chology  of  efficiency  (Archives  of  Psychology,  No.  15,  June,  1910,  pp.  14  f.) : 
"It  has  been  maintained  by  some  that  variations  in  method  are  most 
effective  when  they  are  not  attended  to,  when  they  come  and  also  build 
themselves  into  habits  'unconsciously'  or  'marginally'  rather  than  'con 
sciously  '  or  '  focally.'  The  results  of  the  puzzle  experiments  are  in  accord 
with  this  view  so  far  as  the  coming  of  variations  is  concerned,  but  not  as 
to  the  subsequent  relations,  the  employment  of  the  variations." 

1  Cf.  Habit-Building  and  the  Science  of  Teaching,  New  York,  1909, 
chs.  vii,  viii,  ix,  and  x. 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      IQ 

almost  inevitable  monotony  of  the  task.  Inattentive  repeti 
tion  before  the  correct  adjustments  have  become  automatic 
places  a  premium  upon  inadequate  habits  because  of  the  ex 
ceptions  that  are  certain  to  occur.  This  is  one  reason  why 
practice  should,  so  far  as  possible,  be  effectively  motivated,  — 
that  is,  the  individual  undergoing  the  discipline  should  have, 
if  possible,  a  strong  incentive  for  making  perfect  responses. 
Short  periods  of  practice  and  the  provision  of  devices  that 
introduce  a  superficial  variety  while  preserving  the  funda 
mental  uniformity  of  the  adjustment  are  also  important  in 
this  phase  of  habit-building. 

The  prevention  of  exceptions  should  be  the  result  of  the  at 
tentive  repetition.  The  disadvantage  of  permitting  excep 
tions  lies  in  the  probability  that  they  may  undo  the  work 
of  the  preceding  repetitions  as  well  as  initiate  inadequate 
habits. 

Initiative  may  be  insured  in  a  variety  of  ways.  Ambition 
to  acquire  skill,  hope  of  rewards  and  fear  of  penalties,  a  desire 
to  produce  some  material  product,  competition  and  rivalry, 
delight  in  group  and  rhythmic  activity  (as  in  military  drill, 
dancing,  singing,  etc.),  —  each  of  these  may  be  used  under 
appropriate  conditions.  In  complex  processes  of  habit-for 
mation,  it  will  be  necessary  to  employ  several  types  of  incen 
tives  and  motives,  —  now  one  will  be  most  effective,  now 
another.  It  may  belaid  down  as  a  general  rule  that  the  incen 
tive  should  be  related  as  closely  as  possible  to  the  field  in  which 
the  habit  is  to  function  later.  It  is  fairly  well  established  that 
specific  habits  function  readily  only  in  situations  in  which 
they  have  been  developed,  or  in  the  situations  closely  similar. 
But  the  similarity  of  one  situation  to  another  depends  largely 
upon  subjective  factors.  Consequently,  the  motives  and  in 
centives  employed  in  the  formation  of  habits  may  determine 
in  large  measure  the  efficiency  with  which  these  habits 
operate  in  later  life. 


20  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

5.  Rousseau  looked  with  suspicion  upon  habit-build 
ing  as  a  phase  of  education.  He  would  have  Emile 
form  but  one  habit,  —  and  that  the  habit  of  forming  no 
habits  whatsoever.  This  extreme  view  could  not,  of 
course,  be  defended  in  the  light  of  what  we  now  know 
concerning  the  control  of  human  conduct.  Habit  stands 
to  man  as  instinct  stands  to  the  lower  animals;  and 
the  youth  who  reaches  maturity  without  having  made 
a  multitude  of  useful  responses  thoroughly  automatic 
will  be  poorly  adjusted  to  the  conditions  of  social  life. 
And  yet,  like  many  extreme  statements,  Rousseau's 
dictum  contains  its  germ  of  truth,  —  its  warning  against 
the  dangers  that  lie  in  the  opposite  extreme.  Habit- 
building  is  a  laborious  and  time-consuming  process,  and 
whenever  the  educator  prescribes  that  a  habit  or  a  set 
of  habits  is  to  be  formed  by  all  children,  there  should  be 
sound  reason  back  of  his  prescription.  The  task  of 
selecting  the  habits  that  are  essential  is  one  of  the 
heaviest  burdens  laid  upon  the  educational  administra 
tor.  Not  to  form  the  essential  habits  during  the  plastic 
period  is  to  commit  an  irremediable  blunder;  to  form 
useless  habits  is  not  only  to  consume  valuable  time  and 
energy,  but  also  to  load  the  individual  with  automatic 
responses,  the  very  fixity  of  which  may  be  his  un 
doing. 

What  habits  should  be  formed  at  various  stages  of 
the  educative  process  will  be  considered  in  another  sec 
tion.  It  is  sufficient  here  to  note  certain  principles  that 
will  underlie  the  choice.  Specific  habits  may  be  con- 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      21 

veniently  grouped  into  two  classes;    (i)  habits  of  skill, 
and  (2)  habits  of  manner. 

Habits  of  skill  are  typically  represented  by  the  handicrafts, 
such  as  wood  working,  metal  working,  and  weaving,  and  by 
certain  processes  involved  in  the  arts  of  husbandry,  seaman 
ship,  trade,  and  the  like.  The  more  complicated  types  of 
skill  represented  by  these  arts  are  the  products  of  a  long  period 
of  evolution  through  which  the  experiences  of  successive  gener 
ations  have  been  accumulated  and  sifted.  Consequently  the 
problem  of  their  transmission  from  generation  to  generation 
is  of  paramount  importance  to  the  welfare  of  the  race.  Many 
of  these  habits  of  skill,  like  other  specialized  forms  of  response, 
were  developed  under  the  stress  of  conditions  that  no  longer 
prevail,  and  have  thus  lost  their  usefulness.  Machinery 
has  rendered  it  possible  for  a  once  important  group  of  skill- 
habits,  like  those  employed  in  manipulating  the  hand  loom, 
to  lapse.  Society  no  longer  requires  its  members  to  be  profi 
cient  in  a  large  number  of  handicrafts. 

The  advocates  of  manual  training  have  made  extensive  use 
of  this  fact  as  an  argument  for  reinstating  in  the  school  some 
of  the  arts  that  machinery  has  rendered  unnecessary.  The 
argument  does  not  always  discriminate  between  the  learning  of 
a  useless  art  and  the  indirect  training-products  that  are  as 
sumed  to  come  from  its  mastery.  It  is  unquestioned  that 
practicing  arts  now  useless  may  give  the  child  a  clearer  under 
standing  of  the  industrial  processes,  and  a  keener  appreciation 
of  what  science  and  invention  in  the  field  of  mechanics  have 
accomplished  for  the  human  race.  How  much  of  this  sort 
of  training  should  be  given  is  a  matter  of  dispute,  but  it  seems 
clearly  evident  that  a  high  degree  of  skill  is  not  essential  to 
these  ends.  Beyond  this,  however,  there  are  certain  types  of 
skill  that  are  important  enough  to-day  to  warrant  the  ex 
penditure  of  some  time  and  attention  in  their  mastery. 


22  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

The  ability  to  use  tools  efficiently  in  the  fashioning  of  useful 
articles  from  both  wood  and  metal  would  be  of  direct  utilitarian 
value  to  almost  every  individual  living  under  present  conditions. 

Habits  in  these  fields,  however,  are  not  of  so  much  concern 
to  general  (as  distinguished  from  technical)  education,  as  are 
the  more  general  habits  of  skill  that  must  be  acquired  by  every 
individual.  In  this  class,  the  habits  of  speech,  of  written 
language,  and  of  computation  are  easily  the  most  significant 
to  the  social  life. 

Habits  of  manner,  or  customs,  are  distinguished  from  habits 
of  skill  only  by  partaking  more  of  the  conventional,  and  less  of 
the  utilitarian,  nature.  Educationally  they  are  particularly 
important,  because  they  crystallize  the  social  ideals  of  the  race. 
The  amenities  of  social  conduct  have,  like  the  arts  and  skills, 
been  developed  through  a  long  period  of  evolution.  As  with 
habits  of  skill,  there  is  constant  danger  of  losing  these  amen 
ities  through  a  failure  of  the  educative  process  to  inculcate 
them  faithfully  in  each  generation.  So  long,  of  course,  as 
they  are  well  represented  in  the  social  life,  informal  education, 
working  largely  through  imitation,  will  guarantee  their  sur 
vival.  But  when,  through  changing  conditions,  customs  and 
amenities  of  manner  that  are  unquestionably  of  fundamental 
social  value  are  gradually  relaxed,  it  becomes  the  paramount 
duty  of  formal  education  to  insure  their  perpetuation.  For 
mal  education  has  also  a  function  in  generalizing  throughout 
society  the  social  amenities  that  have  developed  in  certain 
groups  or  classes ;  provided,  of  course,  that  these  are  worthy 
of  generalization.  Thus  the  habits  of  courtesy  and  gentle 
manners,  the  habits  of  hospitality  and  of  regard  for  the  feelings 
of  others, — which  were  originally  limited  to  the  leisure  classes, 
—  may,  through  formal  education,  be  extended  to  all  classes 
of  society ;  and  this  must  be  done  in  a  democracy  if  democ 
racy  is  to  " level  up,"  rather  than  to  "level  down";  where 
all  are  of  the  "nobility,"  noblesse  oblige  must  be  universal. 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      23 

6.  Thus  far  the  term  " habit"  has  been  used  to  refer 
exclusively  to  specific  motor  responses  that  have  been 
acquired  through  experience,  and  reduced  to  the  plane 
of  automatic  functioning  through  repetition.  The  word 
" habit"  has  been  employed  too  loosely  in  the  literature 
of  educational  psychology.  The  line  has  not  been 
drawn  sharply  between  modes  of  response  that  are  un 
questionably  of  this  specific  character  and  other  conduct- 
controls  that  are  related  in  one  way  or  another  to  habit 
as  thus  conceived,  but  which  must  not  be  confused  with 
this  simple  type.  The  term  "general  habit"  or  " gen 
eralized  habit"  has  sometimes  been  used  to  denote  a 
conduct-control  that  seems  to  the  writer  both  important 
enough  in  itself,  and  sufficiently  different  from  simple 
habit,  to  deserve  a  distinctive  name.  Confusion  has  also 
resulted  from  differentiating  between  " mental"  and 
"physical"  habits,  or  between  "habits  of  thought"  and 
"habits  of  action." 

In  the  following  pages,  the  term  "habit"  will  be  em 
ployed  with  reference  to  any_acc|uired  mode  of  response, 
the__sepap,te  ingredients  of  which  (the  component  simpler 
responses)  have  at  one  time  or  another  been  coordinated 
or  associated  through  conscious  control,  but  in  which 
the  connections  are,  in  the  completed  habit,  quite  me 
chanical.  This  will,  of  course,  include  fixed  associations 
of  ideas  in  so  far  as  these  associations  are  between  motor 
responses  which  are  symbols  of  the  ideas.  Thus  the 
formula,  "Six  sevens,  forty-two,"  is  a  specific  habit. 
The  association  between  the  symbols 


24  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

"forty-two"  has  become  mechanical  through  repetition. 
" Forty- two"  is  the  motor  response  to  the  stimulus  "six 


sevens." 


As  will  be  seen  in  the  sequel,  it  is  difficult  to  draw  funda 
mental  distinctions  between  habits  and  ideas.  The  bond  that 
associates  image  and  meaning  is  to  be  looked  upon  as  a  type 
of  habit.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  fatal  from  the  point  of 
view  of  educational  practice  not  to  make  a  distinction.  The 
methodology  of  fixing  habits  in  the  process  of  education  is 
quite  different  from  the  methodology  of  implanting  ideas. 
Experience  that  is  to  function  unerringly  as  habit  must  be  ac 
quired  differently  from  experience  that  is  to  function  adap- 
tively  in  thought  and  judgment.  The  chief  implications  of 
this  distinction  must  be  left  for  the  following  chapter. 

In  place  of  the  term  "generalized  habit"  which  has 
given  rise  to  so  much  difficulty  in  educational  psy 
chology,  the  writer  will  use  certain  terms,  the  meanings 
of  which  will  be  developed  in  a  subsequent  section. 
These  terms  are  "prejudices,"  "attitudes,"  "perspec 
tives,"  and  "tastes."  That  the  conduct-controls  de 
noted  by  these  various  terms  have  marked  relations 
with  the  simpler  habits  just  discussed,  the  following  chap 
ters  should  abundantly  prove ;  that  they  should  not  be 
confused  with  simple  habits  should  also  be  clearly  ap 
parent.  In  general,  the  basis  of  these  conduct-controls 
that  are  so  closely  related  to  habit  is  the  "propensity" 
which  any  automatic  form  of  response  tends  to  develop. 
A  propensity  is  primarily  an  affective  or  emotional  phe 
nomenon.  It  expresses  itself  typically  in  a  feeling  of 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      25 

discontent  or  irritation  when,  for  any  reason,  a  stimulus 
that  normally  gives  rise  to  an  automatic  response  fails 
to  evoke  that  response.  As  Stout  expresses  it,  "  Every 
interruption  to  our  routine  way  of  doing  things  is  felt 
as  a  disturbance  or  annoyance."  1 

1  G.  F.  Stout :  Analytic  Psychology,  London,  1896,  vol.  i,  p.  259.  See 
also,  Rowe,  op.  cit.,  p.  35  ;  B.  R.  Andrews :  "Habit,"  American  Journal 
of  Psychology,  vol.  xiv,  1903,  p.  137. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE   ACQUIRED  CONTROLS   OF   CONDUCT.    (B)  IDEAS, 
MEANINGS,  CONCEPTS,  FACTS,  AND  PRINCIPLES 

i.  IT  was  pointed  out  in  the  preceding  chapter  that 
experience  may  influence  conduct  through  the  specific 
habits  that  are  formed  by  repetition  of  the  same  reaction. 
These  habits  come  gradually  to  control  the  customary 
and  unvarying  adjustments  of  life.  When  new  situa 
tions  arise,  however,  the  specific  habits  already  formed 
are  frequently  inadequate,  and  a  new  synthesis  is  re 
quired;  that  is,  adjustments  already  mastered  must  be 
put  together  in  a  new  way.  This  process  of  solving  new 
problems  or  new  situations  in  the  light  of  former  experi 
ence  may  be  termed  the  process  of  judgment,  and  it  is 
in  this  process  that  the  controls  of  conduct  to  be  dis 
cussed  in  the  present  chapter  have  their  function. 

This  distinction  between  habit  and  judgment  may  be  illus 
trated  by  any  act  of  attention  in  normal  adult  life.  If,  for 
example,  I  am  in  the  habit  of  taking  a  certain  street  car  at  a 
certain  time  every  day,  there  is  very  little  conscious  direction 
of  my  conduct  in  so  far  as  this  specific  adjustment  is  concerned. 
Attention  may  well  occupy  itself  with  other  matters,  leaving 
to  habit  the  direction  of  my  steps  to  the  street  corner,  the  hail 
ing  of  the  car,  the  mounting  of  the  steps,  and  all  of  the  other 
concatenated  adjustments  that,  taken  together,  enable  me  to 

26 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      27 

reach  my  destination.  But  if,  on  reaching  the  corner,  my  car 
fails  to  appear  at  the  usual  time,  and  if  I  learn  from  a  passer-by 
that  an  accident  around  the  next  corner  has  "tied  up"  all  the 
traffic,  a  new  situation  is  presented  to  which  I  must  attend, 
and  toward  the  solution  of  which  I  must  now  collect  and  ar 
range  my  " ideas,"  —  my  " knowledge"  of  other  possible 
means  of  reaching  my  destination.  In  other  words,  I  immedi 
ately  begin  to  "  think"  how  I  am  to  solve  the  problem,  —  and 
this  " thinking"  involves  the  recall  of  "ideas,"  "meanings," 
"concepts,"  "facts,"  or  "principles,"  which  we  term,  generi- 
cally,  knowledge. 

2.  But  what  is  the  nature  of  these  conduct-controls 
that  may  come  to  one's  assistance  when  the  specific 
habits''  that  one  has  formed  are  inadequate,  and  how  do 
they  differ,  both  in  their  nature  and  in  their  method  of 
operation,  from  specific  habits  ?  To  answer  these  ques 
tions  in  a  satisfactory  degree  of  completeness  would  in 
volve  far  more  space  than  can  here  be  given  to  the  task. 
It  will  be  possible,  however,  to  indicate  some  of  the 
chief  characteristics  of  these  important  controls,  as  well 
as  some  of  the  more  striking  differences  between  "ideas" 
and  " habits." 

It  should  be  said  at  the  outset  that  the  three  terms, 
"idea,"  "meaning,"  and  "concept,"  are  virtually  syn 
onymous  as  they  are  used  in  the  following  discussions, 
and  that  facts  and  rjnncir^les  are  statements  or  formula 
tions  of  the  relations  that  exist  between  different  ideas 
or  meanings  or  Concepts.  It  should  also  be  said  that 
these  five  words  may  be  conveniently  designated  by  the 
generic  term  "knowledge."  In  general,  they  represent 


28  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

the  conduct-controls  that  owe  their  importance  to  the 
fidelity  with  which  they  mirror  to  consciousness  the 
conditions  of  the  environment,  and  the  relation  of  these 
conditions  to  the  life  of  the  organism  as  determined  by 
its  experience.  It  is  in  this  respect  that  they  are  to  be 
differentiated  from  the  controls  to  be  discussed  in  the 
following  chapter.  They  may  be  looked  upon  as 
" guides "  to  conduct;  and  they  are  to  be  differentiated 
sharply  from  " ideals"  and  " standards,"  which  are 
"ends"  of  conduct.  In  other  words,  the  controls  that 
are  here  designated  by  the  generic  term  "knowledge" 
are  predominantly  intellectual  in  their  nature,  while  the 
controls  that  are  discussed  under  the  head  of  ideals  and 
standards  are  predominantly  emotional  in  their  nature. 
3.  For  the  sake  of  initial  clearness,  the  following 
definitions,  couched  in  the  terminology  of  contemporary 
psychology,  are  suggested. 

A  perception  is  a  group  of  elemental,  irreducible,  conscious 
processes  called  sensations.  Thus  when  one  "perceives"  an 
orange,  the  "consciousness"  of  the  object  is  made  up  of  visual 
sensations  (the  sensation  of  yellow,  for  example,  against  a 
background  of  some  other  color  or  shade  which  enables  con 
sciousness  to  distinguish  the  form  or  outline)  plus  certain  sen 
sations  originating  in  the  eye  muscles  which  enable  the  outline 
and  contour  to  be  imaged  upon  the  retinae  of  the  eyes.  Touch 
ing  or  grasping  the  orange  may  add  to  these  elements  the 
sensations  of  pressure  and  temperature,  and  the  movement- 
sensations  (kinaesthetic  sensations)  involved  in  touching  and 
grasping.  Sensations  of  taste  and  smell  may  also  cooperate 
in  the  perception  of  the  object.  These  various  sensory  de- 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      2Q 

tails  combine  to  inform  consciousness  of  the  object ;  and,  in 
asmuch  as  these  are  the  data  of  which  consciousness  is  chiefly 
aware,  they  may  be  termed  the  focal  constituents  of  the  per 
ception  ;  that  is,  they  occupy  the  center  or  focus  of  the  con 
scious  field.  But,  in  addition  to  these  sensations  which  occupy 
the  focus  of  the  conscious  field,  and  which  are  aroused  by 
the  immediate  stimulation  of  various  sense  organs  (the  retinae 
of  the  eyes,  the  sensory  nerve-endings  in  the  muscles  and  ten 
dons,  the  pressure  and  temperature  sense-organs  of  the  skin, 
etc.),  there  is  something  in  the  awareness  of  the  orange  that 
comes  out  of  past  experience.  An  infant,  who  had  never 
had  experience  with  oranges,  might  have  the  same  sensations 
from  the  object,  but  his  perception  would  be  quite  different 
from  that  of  the  adult. 

In  other  words,  practically  every  perception  of  adult  life  is 
a  complex  of  (i)  sensations  immediately  evoked  by  external 
stimuli,  and  (2)  sensations  that  are  revived  from  past  experi 
ences.  These  two  types  of  sensations  fuse  together  to  form 
what  is  technically  called  an  "assimilation."  A  "pure" 
perception,  —  a  perception  that  does  not  involve  elements  of 
past  perceptions,  —  is  obviously  an  extremely  rare  occurrence 
in  mental  life  after  the  earliest  years  of  infancy. 

Now  the  term  "idea"  is  used  in  a  generic  sense  to  indicate 
the  contributions  that  past  experience  makes  to  one's  present 
consciousness.  In  an  assimilation,  for  example,  the-idea- 
tional  elements  (coming  from  past  experience)  are  to  be  dis 
tinguished  from  the  perceptual  elements  (coming  from  imme 
diate  sensory  stimulation).  One  may  easily  verify  this 
from  one's  own  experience:  in  correcting  proof,  for  ex 
ample,  the  unpracticed  proof  reader  is  actually  "aware"  of 
letters  and  perhaps  even  of  words  that  a  later,  more  careful 
scrutiny  fails  to  find  upon  the  printed  sheet ;  that  is,  past 
experience  has  supplied  the  words  or  letters  that  ought  to  be 
there,  and  the  reader  actually  sees  them,  so  far  as  his  own 


30  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

awareness  is  concerned;  the  same  phenomenon  is  clearly 
apparent  in  other  sensory  " illusions." 

But  while  the  word  "idea"  is  used  in  this  generic  sense  to 
indicate  all  possible  appearances  of  past  experience  in  present 
consciousness,  it  is  used  more  specifically  to  designate  a 
revived  or  recalled  perception.  One  speaks  of  one's  idea  of  an 
orange  when  the  object  is  represented  to  consciousness  but  not 
presented  to  the  peripheral  organs  of  sensation.  It  is  in  this 
connection,  especially,  that  the  word  will  be  employed  in  the 
following  discussions. 

The  most  important  contribution  that  past  experience  makes 
to  present  perception,  however,  is  what  is  termed  meaning. 
It  was  said  above  that  one's  awareness  of  an  object  is  chiefly 
centered  upon  certain  focal  ingredients  of  the  perception  which 
can  readily  be  identified  with  elementary  sensations.  But  an 
untutored  mind  (like  that  of  the  young  child  or  the  savage) 
might  have  the  same  sensory  ingredients,  —  the  same  focal 
ingredients,  —  as  the  mind  of  a  civilized  adult ;  and  yet 
the  quality  of  the  perception  in  the  two  cases  would  be 
quite  different.  It  is  this  difference  that  constitutes  for  con 
sciousness  a  difference  of  meaning,  and  this  difference  is  a  re 
sultant  of  past  experience.  When  the  perception  is  revived 
as  an  idea,  it  is  clear  that  this  difference  still  persists ;  indeed, 
in  the  idea,  meaning  is  the  most  important  factor. 

Now,  what  is  it  over  and  above  the  focal  sensations 
that  constitutes  this  awareness  of  meaning  ?  This  is  one  of 
the  perplexing  problems  of  present-day  psychology.  Some 
authorities1  simply  designate  it  as  a  "feeling  of  meaning" 

1  For  example,  E.  L.  Thorndike :  Elements  of  Psychology,  New  York, 
1905,  p.  65:  "Sensations,  percepts,  images,  and  emotions  are  direct 
feelings  of  things,  qualities,  and  conditions.  The  feeling  appears  to  be 
the  thing.  But  we  can  feel  or  refer  to  a  thing  without  directly  feeling 
it."  Also  p.  6:  "These  feelings  of  meaning  are  very  important  in  all 
higher  sorts  of  thinking." 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      31 

and  attempt  no  further  analysis.  This  simplifies  the  problem, 
but  it  does  not  inform  us  regarding  the  genesis  and  develop 
ment  of  these  important  attributes ;  such  information  might 
conceivably  be  furnished  if  these  " feelings  of  meaning"  were 
analyzed  into  their  elements.  The  same  criticism  could  be 
made  of  the  theories  of  meaning  that  definitely  assume  this 
factor  to  be  an  unanalyzable  element  of  consciousness,  coordi 
nate  in  every  respect  with  the  elements  that  are  termed  sensa 
tions.1  The  present  disposition  of  certain  German  psychol 
ogists  to  identify  the  awarenesses  of  meaning  as  one  of  the 
various  types  of  "attitudinal  consciousness"  or  "conscious 
attitudes"  2  aids  somewhat,  for  the  term  " attitude"  suggests 
a  mode  of  genesis  which  may  aid  educational  psychology  in 
tracing  the  development  of  meanings,  —  one  of  its  most  im 
portant  tasks. 

So  far  as  educational  psychology  is  concerned,  however,  the 
most  promising  theory  of  meaning  is  that  which  explains  it 
in  terms  of  sensation.  This  explanation  is  typically  repre 
sented  by  Titchener's  statement:  "An  idea  means  another 
idea,  is  psychologically  another  idea,  if  it  is  that  idea's  context. 

1  Cf.  R.  S.  Woodworth :  "Imageless  Thought,"  Journal  of  Philosophy, 
Psychology,  and  Scientific  Methods,  vol.  iii,  1906,  pp.  701  ff.,  especially 
pp.  705  f . :  "I  would  suggest  that,  in  addition  to  sensorial  elements, 
thought  contains  elements  which  are  wholly  irreducible  to  sensory  terms. 
Each  such  element  is  sui  generis,  being  nothing  else  than  the  particular 
feeling  of  the  thought  in  question.     Each  is  a  quality,  as  red  and  sweet 
are  qualities ;  not  syntheses  of  sensory  qualities,  but  simply  and  purely 
the  qualities  of  particular  thoughts.  .  .  .     There  is  a  specific  and  un 
analyzable  conscious  quale  for  every  individual  and  general  notion,  for 
every  judgment  and  supposition.     These  qualities  recur  in  the  same 
sense  as  red  and  green  recur." 

2  The  Bewttsstseinslagen  of  the  German  investigators  of  the  thought- 
psychology;    the  term  was  first  used  by  A.  Mayer  and  J.  Orth :  "  Zur 
qualitativen  Untersuchung  der  Association,"  Zeitschrift  fiir  Psycholo- 
gie,  vol.  xxvi,  1901,  p.  6. 


32  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

And  I  understand  by  context  simply  the  mental  process  or 
complex  of  mental  processes  which  accrues  to  the  original  idea 
through  the  situation  in  which  the  organism  finds  itself,  — 
primitively  the  natural  situation ;  later,  either  the  natural 
or  the  mental." l  This  statement  implies  that  there  is 
nothing  in  the  awareness  of  meaning  that  cannot  be  attributed 
to  the  sensations  that  are  either  aroused  by  immediate  stimuli 
or  revived  from  past  experiences.  If  this  is  extended  to  in 
clude  the  marginal  "halo"  of  kinaesthetic  (muscular  and 
strain)  sensations,  which  may  be  supposed  to  surround  a  per 
ception,  and  to  represent  the  various  types  of  adjustment  or  re 
action  which  the  object  perceived  normally  initiates,  there  is 
suggested  a  working  hypothesis  for  the  development  of  mean 
ings  in  education ;  for  the  problem  is  now  definitely  to  insure 
the  development  of  meanings  through  adjustment  to  typical 
situations,  —  a  procedure  which  finds  much  to  commend  it  in 
the  results  of  actual  school  practice.2 

1  E.  B.  Titchener :  Experimental  Psychology  of  the  Thought  Processes, 
New  York,  1909,  p.  175. 

2  This  explanation  of  meaning  was  advanced  in  the  writer's  "Apper 
ception  of  the  Spoken  Sentence,"  American  Journal  of  Psychology,  vol. 
xii,  pp.  80  ff.,  and  elaborated  with  reference  to  its  educational  applica 
tions  in  The  Educative  Process,  chs.  iv-vi.     Cf.  especially,  p.  145  :*'... 
the  marginal  'halo'  or  fringe  of  relations,  which  'carries  the    meaning,' 
and  in  which  the  kinaesthetic  sensations,  representing    as  they  do  the 
constant  factors  in  experience,  occupy  a  prominent  place."     That  these 
marginal  constituents  may  fulfill  this  function  is  recognized  by  C.  O. 
Taylor  ("Ueber  das  Verstehen  von  Worten  und  Satzen,"  Zeitschrift  fur 
Psychologic,  vol.  xl,  1905,  p.  248  n.},  although  he  maintains  that  his  ob 
servers  did  not  discover  these  contents ;   this  is  not  at  all  surprising,  for, 
by  hypothesis,  they  are  marginal  and  consequently  obscure.     Titchener 
(op.  cit.,  p.  176)  admits  the  importance  of  the  kinaesthetic  factor  in  primi 
tive  experience,  but  doubts  its  primacy  in  the  more  advanced  types  of 
thinking:   "Meaning  is,  originally,  kinaesthesis ;   the  organism  faces  the 
situation  by  some  bodily  attitude,  and  the  characteristic  sensations  which 
the  attitude  involves  give  meaning  to  the  process  that  stands  at  the  con- 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      33 

Whatever  theory  may  be  called  upon  to  explain  these  aware 
nesses  of  meaning,  it  is  obvious  that  meanings  are  products  of 
experience.  If  the  perceptions  that  mirror  to  mind  the  con 
ditions  of  the  environment  are  " meaningful,"  it  is  because  re 
peated  adjustments  to  these  conditions  have  endowed  with 
significance  the  bare  sensations  which  report  to  consciousness 
the  happenings  of  the  objective  world.  As  a  tentative  work 
ing  hypothesis,  we  may  look  upon  pej^e^tiojis_an_d^ideas  as 
images  (the  focal  constituents,  made  up  primarily  of  sense- 
materials)  j>lus_a_"  halo"  of  kinasthetic  and  other  organic  sen 
sations,  which  constitute,  so  far  as  consciousness  is  concerned, 
the  meanings  which  these  focal  constituents  hold  for  the  or 
ganism.  Thus  the  orange  that  we  perceive  is  made  known  to 
us  by  means  of  certain  sensations ;  these  sensations  occupy 
the  focus  of  consciousness ;  but  surrounding  them,  enveloping 
them,  is  a  mass  of  marginal  sensations,  which  have  been  derived 
from  past  experience,  and  which  cause  the  focal  sensations 
to  form  a  unified  perception.  All  of  the  possible  uses 
to  which  an  orange  may  be  put,  —  all  of  the  relations  that 
it  may  possess,  —  are,  in  so  far  as  such  uses  and  relations  have 
come  within  the  range  of  one's  experience,  represented  in  this 
conscious  margin.  Its  meaning  as  food,  as  a  commodity  of 
commerce,  as  a  means  of  table  decoration,  —  each  is  there 
implicitly,  potentially;  and  there  is  needed  only  the  selective 
activity  of  a  purpose,  or  a  situation,  to  make  this  implicit 
meaning  explicit.  Thus  in  the  breakfast  situation,  the  "  food  " 
meaning  may  be  made  explicit,  and  the  focal  ingredients  of  the 
perception  may  "set  off"  the  food-adjustment;  at  the  fruit 
store,  the  meaning  of  the  orange  as  a  commodity  of  com 
merce  may  become  explicit ;  and  so  on. 

scious  focus,  are  psychologically  the  meaning  of  that  process.  After 
wards,  when  differentiation  has  taken  place,  context  may  be  mainly  a 
matter  of  sensations  of  the  special  senses,  or  of  images,  or  of  kinaesthetic 
or  other  organic  sensations  as  the  situation  demands." 

D 


34  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

Meaning  may  be  defined,  then,  as  the  marginal  "halo"  of 
possible  "cues"  to  conduct  surrounding  every  well-developed 
perception  or  idea  and  endowing  it  with  its  essential  and 
unique  quality  as  an  idea ;  and  since  meaning  is,  upon  our  as 
sumption,  made  up  of  revived  sensations  (mainly  kinaesthetic) 
and  is  consequently  "ideational"  in  its  character,  and  since  it 
is  obviously  the  most  important  factor  in  ideas,  we  may  speak 
of  "idea"  and  "meaning"  as,  for  all  practical  purposes,  syn 
onymous  terms.  When,  in  education,  we  aim  to  develop  ideas, 
we  are  aiming  primarily  to  develop  meanings ;  and  when  we 
aim  to  develop  meanings,  we  are  attempting  to  associate  with 
the  sensations  and  sensation-compounds  aroused  by  external 
stimuli  the  appropriate  adjustment  to  these  stimuli;  we  are 
attempting  to  associate  with  the  objects  and  forces  of  the  ex 
ternal  world  the  appropriate  adjustment  of  the  human  organ 
ism  to  these  objects  and  forces.  Once  these  associations  are 
thoroughly  fixed  (and  it  is  clear  that  they  may  be  most  effec 
tively  fixed  by  actual  reaction  or  adjustment  to  them),  the 
revived  perceptions  (or  ideas)  will  carry  with  them  these  va 
rious  possibilities  of  adjustment,  and  consequently  the  ideas 
may  later  be  used  in  "thought"  problems  as  condensed  rep 
resentatives  of  the  former  experiences,  —  the  meaning  that  is 
made  explicit  in  any  case  depending  upon  the  nature  of  the 
problem.  Beyond  this,  the  original  sense-materials  consti 
tuting  the  focal  constituents  of  the  perception  may,  when  the 
ideas  are  used  in  thought-problems,  be  replaced  by  a  symbol 
such  as  a  word,  a  sign,  a  diagram,  and  the  like.  But  the  ef 
fective  use  of  symbols  demands  that  the  "halo  of  meaning," 
which  would  ordinarily  attach  to  the  image  or  the  perception, 
now  attach  to  the  symbol.  So  long  as  this  meaning  is  there, 
the  essential  conditions  have  been  fulfilled.  In  actual  adjust 
ment  to  real  objective  situations,  we  need  focal  sensations 
mirroring  with  precision  the  relations  of  the  forces  and  objects 
that  constitute  the  situations;  in  thought-situations,  the 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      35 

barest  trace  of  focal  sense-material  may  be  sufficient  to  "carry 
the  meaning  "  effectively.  In  other  words,  when  we  "  think  " 
about  our  problems,  the  meaning  of  the  symbols  that  we  em 
ploy  is  primarily  important ;  when  we  are  using  perceptual 
data  as  a  guide  to  immediate  adjustment,  it  is  the  perceptual 
data  that  are  important,  —  we  are  really  gathering  new  mean 
ing  around  the  perceptual  data,  through  the  adjustment  that 
we  are  making.1 

A  concept,  for  our  purposes,  is  simply  a  meaning.2  It  may 
be  either  general  or  particular  in  its  reference,  —  it  is,  in 
any  case,  ultimately  a  "cue"  to  adjustment,  or  better  a 
bundle  of  possible  "cues"  to  adjustment,  the  particular  cue 
to  be  acted  upon  being  determined  by  the  situation  or  the 
problem.  Thus  my  concept  "water"  is  simply  the  center 
of  a  vast  number  of  possibilities  of  conduct,  —  drinking, 
bathing,  swimming,  drowning,  pouring,  rowing,  sailing,  look 
ing  at,  admiring,  etc. 

A  fact  is  the_  statement  _o^ 

concept  and  a  general  concept ;  for  example,  "This  rock  is 
granite  "  ;  or  betw^n_£wj)j)]LJ2ic^£^^  "The 

chair  is  behind  the  table. ' '  A  principle  is  the  statement  of  a  re 
lation  between  general  concepts :  "  Granite  is  an  igneous  rock." 

1  Whether  meanings  can  be  manipulated  in  thought  entirely  apart 
from  focal  constituents  (whether  there  is  such  a  thing  as  "imageless" 
thinking)  is  not  a  question  that  is  of  vital  importance  in  the  present 
connection.     The  important  thing  is  the  meaning,  and  if  this  is  present, 
the    type    of    focal    material    seems    inconsequential.     In    any  event, 
"  imageless  thinking,"  if  it  is  a  possibility,  is  probably  possible  only  as 
an  outcome  of  dealing  explicitly  with  sensory  materials  which  originally 
were  '  focal "  in  consciousness  (cf.  W.  F.  Book :  "  On  the  Genesis  and 
Development  of  Conscious  Attitudes,"  Psychological  Review,  vol.  xvii, 
1910,  pp.  381  ff.) 

2  Cf.  J.   Dewey:   How   We    Think,    Boston,    1910,   p.    125:   '^ny 
meaning  sufl5cienj:Iy_  individualized  .to  be  erectly  grasped  and  readily 
used,  and  thus  fixed  by  a  word,  is  a  conception  or  notion." 


36  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

The  above  terms  have  been  defined  somewhat  arbitrarily 
and  perhaps  without  due  reference  to  the  possible  omis 
sions  and  overlappings ;  but  to  account  for  all  of  the  possibili 
ties  would  be  to  write  not  one  chapter,  but  a  book.  The  aim 
here  is  to  make  as  clear  as  is  possible  in  a  brief  space  the  mean 
ings  that  are  attached  to  these  various  terms.  In  the  present 
connection,  it  is  not  so  much  the  structural  characteristics  of 
these  different  conduct-controls  that  concern  us,  as  it  is  their 
functional  significance,  to  which  we  must  now  turn. 

4.  In  what  ways  will  ideas,  meanings,  concepts,  facts, 
and  principles  affect  conduct?  Their  general  function 
may  be  summed  up  in  the  statement  that  these  controls 
bring  consciously  to  bear  upon  the  problems  of  adjust 
ment  the  related  factors  of  past  experience,  thus  making 
possible  a  response  that  is  consciously  adapted  to  the 
situation  in  question.  For  convenience  in  discussion, 
ideational  materials  may  be  classed  under  four  heads, 
each  of  which  has  important  relations  to  conduct: 
(a)  relatively  complete  sensory  reconstructions  of  past 
experiences;  (b)  partial  reconstructions  of  past  experi 
ences  which  fuse  with  present  impressions  to  form  what 
we  have  termed  "  assimilations ";  (c)  mental  construc 
tions  which  unite  elements  of  different  past  experiences 
in  new  combinations ;  (d)  symbolic  representations  of 
experiences  or  combinations  of  experiences  that  cannot 
or  need  not  be  accurately  constructed  or  reconstructed 
in  primary  sensory  terms. 

(a)  The  relatively  complete  sensory  reconstructions  of  past 
experience  most  frequently  function  as  guides  to  adjustment 
when  immediate  sensory  data  are  lacking.  Thus  when  one 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      37 

attempts  to  walk  through  the  woods  on  a  dark  night,  the 
appearance  of  the  woods  by  daylight  may  be  recalled  as 
vividly  and  distinctly  as  possible,  and  thus  serve  the  purpose 
that  the  actual  perception  would  serve  under  other  conditions. 
Or,  if  one  is  uncertain  of  the  pronunciation  of  a  word,  the 
word  may  be  imaged  as  one  has  heard  it  pronounced,  and  the 
articulatory  adjustments  may  thus  be  guided  in  the  light  of 
this  conscious  reconstruction  of  the  sounds.  One  planning  a 
journey  may  image  the  map  of  the  region  through  which  the 
journey  Is  to  be  made,  and  determine  the  route  accordingly. 

The  degree  in  which  these  relatively  accurate  reconstruc 
tions  of  experience  are  used  in  guiding  conduct  varies  with  the 
needs  of  the  organism  for  making  adjustments  of  this  type, 
and  is  dependent  also  upon  the  ability  of  the  organism  to 
recall  experience  in  these  "free  images."  This  ability  seems 
to  be  a  relatively  late  development  in  the  natural  history  of 
mind ;  only  the  higher  animals  are  capable  of  forming  such 
images  and  acting  upon  them.1  In  the  human  species,  the 
frequency  of  such  functioning  depends  also  upon  the  individ 
ual's  capacity  for  visual  imagery,  since,  in  immediate  percep 
tion,  the  visual  sensations  normally  form  the  most  accurate 
guides  to  adjustment. 

(b)  The  immediate  "  assimilation  "  of  perceptual  elements 
to  ideational  elements  has  a  manifestly  important  relation  to 
conduct.  When  one  reacts  intelligently  to  a  situation,  one 
reacts  with  reference  to  the  meaning  with  which  experience 
has  endowed  the  situation.  The  immediate  "recognition" 
of  the  objects  of  the  environment  as  such  means  simply  that 
these  objects  have  been  referred  instantaneously  to  their  ap 
propriate  place  in  the  scheme  of  individual  life.  We  "read" 
meaning  into  the  tables,  chairs,  books,  and  other  objects  that 
surround  us ;  experience  is  reacting  upon  present  consciousness 

1  Cf.  M.  F.  Washburn :   The  Animal  Mind,  New  York,  1908,  p.  275. 


38  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

through  the  ideational  elements  that  are  fused  with  immedi 
ately-aroused  sensations. 

(c)  Mental  constructions  which  unite  in  a  new  way  different 
elements  of  past  experience  are  popularly  known  as  products 
of  the  imagination.  As  controls  of  conduct,  these  construc 
tions  are  significant  in  two  ways :  (i)  They  permit  "  remote 
adaptation,"  !  or  adjustments  to  situations  which  are  not 
actualized  in  the  present  environment.  By  taking  elements 
from  past  experiences,  one  may  construct  an  idea  of  what  the 
coming  winter  is  likely  to  be,  and  prepare  for  it  accordingly. 
The  inventor  may  put  together  a  machine  in  his  imagination 
before  he  actually  constructs  it  from  real  materials.  The  ar 
tist  may  envisage  his  picture  before  he  places  a  single  pigment 
upon  the  canvas.  The  composer  may  construct  his  sympho 
nies  before  he  writes  the  score  or  works  out  the  various  phases 
upon  the  piano.  This  constructive  imagination  is  a  factor 
of  the  very  largest  importance  in  the  control  of  human 
conduct.  In  it,  the  elements  of  past  experience  are  com 
bined  in  the  light  of  some  dominant  end  or  purpose  or 
ideal ;  the  ideas  and  images  that  one  orders  and  arranges 
are  then  guides  to  the  realization  of  one's  purpose.  (2)  The 
"passive  imagination,"  which  lacks  the  influence  of  a 
dominant  end  or  purpose,  is  not  without  its  function  in  the 
control  of  conduct.  The  tendency  to  phantasy  or  "day 
dreaming,"  which  is  responsible  for  many  ideal  constructions 
that  cannot  be  actualized,  may,  by  chance,  suggest  an  impor 
tant  modification  of  conduct.  Nature's  prodigality  is  no 
where  more  evident  than  in  the  realm  of  phantasy,  and  not  a 
few  of  the  important  advances  made  by  the  race  have  prob 
ably  had  their  inception  in  passive  imagination, —  in  idle 
"  day-dreaming."  Again,  imagination,  whether  of  the  con- 

1  Cf.  I.  M.  Bentley:  "The  Memory  Image,"  American  Journal  of 
Psychology,  vol.  xi,  1899,  pp.  i  Q. 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      39 

structive  or  of  the  merely  passive  sort,  may  serve  a  useful 
recreative  purpose,  particularly  in  initiating  attenuated  ad 
justments,  —  reduced  and  schematized  units  of  conduct, 
which  gratify  vicariously  some  instinctive  desire  or  impulse 
which  could  not,  under  existing  conditions,  be  actualized  in  ob 
jective  conduct,  but  which,  if  denied  all  gratification  whatso 
ever,  might  give  rise  to  serious  results.  It  is  in  stimulating 
imagination  to  these  ends  that  fiction  and  the  drama  have 
a  large  sphere  of  usefulness.  Love  and  war,  —  the  two  domi 
nant  themes  of  imaginative  literature,  —  have  their  roots  in 
fundamental  instincts,  the  gratification  of  which  is  often  in 
consistent  with  social  requirements  and  restrictions.1 

(d)  Symbolic  representations  of  experience  are  typically 
illustrated  by  the  words  which  language  employs  to  represent 
ideas  and  meanings.  As  already  suggested,  no  new  element 
is  introduced  here.  Instead  of  employing  the  original  sen 
sory  data  of  experience,  a  symbol  is  used  to  represent  in  the 
focus  of  consciousness  the  meanings  which  are  the  important 
factors  in  constructive  thinking.  This  has  the  manifest  ad 
vantage  of  being  related  to  other  symbols  through  conven 
tional  forms;  language  facilitates  thinking  by  making  it 
possible  to  reconstruct  the  essence,  the  meaning,  of  experience 
without  necessitating  the  recall  of  all  of  the  original  sensory 
details.  Thus  the  individual  is  enabled  to  manipulate  his 
own  experiences  much  more  economically  and  effectively  than 
would  otherwise  be  the  case.  If,  for  example,  I  have  under 
gone  a  very  disagreeable  experience  by  taking  a  journey  upon 

1  Cf .  Freud's  interesting  theory  of  the  function  of  dreams  in  providing 
a  vicarious  gratification  for  instinctive  desires  that  cannot  be  actualized. 
S.  Freud:  "The  Origin  and  Development  of  Psychoanalysis,"  Lectures 
and  Addresses  before  the  Departments  of  Psychology  and  Pedagogy,  Clark 
University,  Sept.,  1909,  p.  22  :  "The  manifest  dream,  which  we  remember 
after  waking,  may  then  be  described  as  a  disguised  fulfillment  of  repressed 
wishes." 


40  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

a  certain  railroad,  it  is  not  essential  for  me  to  reconstruct  the 
entire  experience  in  order  to  guide  my  conduct  on  my  next 
trip.  All  that  I  need  to  do  is  to  attach  the  word  "disagree 
able"  to  the  name  of  the  railroad  in  question.  This  word 
carries  with  it  the  "cues"  to  conduct  that  are  essential,  and 
that  represent  everything  in  the  entire  earlier  experience 
that  has  an  important  bearing  upon  the  present  situation. 

Constructive  thinking  differs  in  no  essential  feature  from 
what  has  just  been  described  as  constructive  imagination. 
Indeed,  the  two  forms  may  often  work  together  in  the  solu 
tion  of  problems.  The  chief  difference  lies  in  the  fact  that 
imagination  deals  with  concrete  images,  while  thought  deals 
with  symbols ;  but  it  is  manifest  that,  in  both  cases,  it  is  the 
meanings  that  are  important ;  in  the  one  case  these  meanings 
attach  to  images  that  represent  more  or  less  faithfully  the 
sensory  details  of  earlier  experiences;  hi  the  other  case  the 
meanings  attach  to  symbols  that  have  no  necessary  sensory 
resemblance  to  the  experiences  that  they  represent. 

As  has  been  pointed  out,  thinking  in  symbols  involves  the 
formulation  of  relations  between  concepts  or  meanings,  —  the 
process  that  has  been  referred  to  as  conceptual  judgment, 
the  products  of  which  are  crystallized  in  facts  and  principles. 

5.  The  chief  distinction  between  the  controls  that  we 
are  now  discussing  and  the  specific  habits  discussed  in 
the  preceding  chapter  lies  in  the  fact  that  habits  are 
specific  responses  to  specific  stimuli,  while  ideas,  concepts, 
and  meanings  are  centers  of  possibility  of  adjustment. 
For  this  reason,  habit-building  in  education  emphasizes 
invariability  of  response,  while  idea-formation  empha 
sizes  adaptability  of  response.  The  same  fact  may  be 
expressed  by  saying  that  habit-building  lays  its  emphasis 


THE   ACQUIRED   CONTROLS   OF   CONDUCT  41 

upon  the  adjustment,  aiming  not  only  to  associate  the 
response  unerringly  with  its  stimulus,  but  also  and 
more  fundamentally  to  associate  the  component  parts 
of  the  total  response  with  one  another  in  an  unchanging 
series.  Idea-formation,  on  the  other  hand,  lays  its  em 
phasis  upon  the  stimulus  as  the  center  of  a  number  of 
possible  responses,  any  one  of  which  is  to  be  recalled 
and  applied  as  the  needs  of  a  given  situation  may  dictate. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  formation  of  ideas  and  concepts 
deals  so  largely  with  "qualities"  of  objects  and  forces.  The 
idea  "river,"  for  example,  if  it  is  to  be  an  effective  guide  to 
conduct  in  any  situation  in  which  rivers  may  play  a  part,  must 
suggest  various  qualities,  such  as  wetness,  motion,  capacity 
to  float  buoyant  objects,  difficulty  of  crossing,  and  the  like. 
Now  these  qualities  have  meaning  ultimately  in  terms  of 
adjustment,  but  the  celerity  and  adequacy  of  the  adjustment, 
important  though  these  factors  may  be,  are,  as  it  were,  taken 
for  granted  in  idea-formation.  If  rivers  were  always  to  be 
adjusted  to  in  the  same  way,  the  "meaning"  of  river  would  be 
simple  enough,  and  idea-formation  and  habit-building  would 
coincide ;  river  would  have  meaning  in  terms  of  a  single  ad 
justment. 

For  the  routine  worker,  the  meanings  of  the  objects  with 
which  he  deals  doubtless  approach  this  simple  type.  For  the 
ditch-digger  the  clod  of  earth  may  mean  but  one  type  of  ad 
justment.  The  idea,  in  other  words,  is  narrowly  circum 
scribed;  it  is  a  "cue"  to  but  one  type  of  conduct.  To  the 
farmer  the  same  clod  of  earth  may  have  more  numerous  sig 
nificances.  To  the  agricultural  chemist  a  shovelful  of  earth 
may  be  a  whole  universe  of  meanings.  To  the  ditch-digger 
the  relation  of  stimulus  to  adjustment  is  simple,  direct,  and 
immediate.  To  the  farmer  the  relations  are  more  involved, 


42  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

and  the  interval  between  the  reception  of  the  stimulus  and 
the  reaction  may,  on  occasion,  be  longer,  owing  to  the  fact 
that  the  meaning  which  bears  upon  the  present  situation  must 
be  selected  from  the  totality  of  possible  meanings.  To  the 
chemist,  the  clod  of  earth  is  a  mass  of  qualities,  each  of  which, 
it  is  true,  may  be  —  must  be  —  a  cue  to  conduct,  but  no  one 
of  which  need  be  immediately  associated  with  a  conduct 
outcome. 

In  developing  the  concept  of  "commerce"  in  elementary 
geography,  the  problem  is  to  associate  the  word  with  its  mean 
ing.  To  this  end  reference  is  made,  by  excursions  or  by  picto 
rial  or  verbal  illustrations,  to  the  activities  which  are  em 
bodied  under  that  term.  The  pupil  gradually  grasps  the  idea 
that  commerce  means  the  buying  and  selling  and  transporting 
of  articles  and  commodities  which  people  need.  An  adequate 
concept  of  this  word  involves  the  possibility  of  working  its 
implications  back  into  actual  experience.  The  activities 
will  mean  little  to  the  pupil  so  long  as  they  are  concerned 
with  articles  that  he  does  not  himself  know  through  actual 
adjustment.  But  when  reference  is  made  to  these  articles,  — 
sugar,  flour,  coal,  clothing,  and  the  like,  —  an  initial  extension 
of  these  meanings  to  other  activities  is  possible.  In  other 
words,  the  " qualities"  and  "attributes"  that  are  analyzed 
out  in  idea-formation  are  themselves  simpler  meanings, 
simpler  "cues,"  through  a  synthesis  of  which  the  new  idea 
may  be  developed. 

One  further  example  may  serve  to  clinch  this  point.  The 
high  school  instructor  who  wishes  to  develop  the  physical 
concept  "work"  must  first  develop  the  concept  "force."  He 
can  readily  relate  this  to  the  pupils'  experience  by  associat 
ing  it  with  the  words  "push"  and  "pull."  But  these  words, 
in  turn,  must  be  ultimately  translated  into  terms  of  actual 
motor  adjustment,  else  the  definitions  that  are  constructed 
are  purely  verbal. 


THE    ACQUIRED   CONTROLS    OF    CONDUCT  43 

One  may  say,  then,  that  concept-building  or  idea- 
formation  differs  from  habit-building  in  laying  its  em 
phasis  upon  the  qualities  or  attributes  of  objects  and 
forces  of  the  environment  rather  than  upon  the  special 
ized  responses  which  represent  certain  adjustments  to 
these  objects  and  forces.  To  "know"  an  object  or  a 
force,  then,  is  not  simply  to  have  an  automatic  response 
ready  for  adjustment  to  it,  but  to  know  its  qualities  and 
attributes  so  that  the  various  responses  which  these 
qualities  and  attributes  suggest  may  be  available  for 
adjustment  if  need  be.  General  education  can  make  au 
tomatic  but  comparatively  few  responses,  for  the  needs 
of  individuals  vary  widely,  and  it  is  impossible  to  know 
just  what  types  of  habitual  adjustment  may  be  required 
in  each  pupil's  later  life.  But  general  education  may 
supply  the  pupil  with  ideas,  concepts,  and  meanings, 
and  with  facts  and  principles,  and  this  "knowledge  "  may 
enable  him  to  initiate  adjustments  and  form  effective, 
specific  habits  in  the  field  of  activity  in  which  his  prin 
cipal  work  will  lie.  "Complete"  knowledge  is,  in  any 
case,  impossible,  for  complete  knowledge  would  imply  a 
knowledge  of  all  possible  attributes  and  qualities  of  all 
possible  objects  and  forces,  together  with  a  recognition 
of  the  relation  of  these  attributes  and  qualities  to  adjust 
ment.  Knowledge,  then,  is  always  relative;  and  an 
important  task  of  general  education  is  to  determine  what 
knowledge  is  important  to  all  individuals. 

5.  The  above  analysis  also  suggests  a  danger  that 
must  be  guarded  against  in  using  the  term  "conduct- 


44  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

control."  Conduct  is  normally  associated  with  action, 
and  action  with  muscular  activity.  But  digging  ditches 
and  plowing  fields,  running  races  and  fighting  battles, 
do  not  represent  the  only  kinds  of  conduct  or  adjustment 
that  it  is  possible  to  make ;  and  unless  one  extends  the 
meaning  of  the  term  " conduct"  far  beyond  its  signifi 
cance  in  ordinary  speech,  one  is  certain  to  fall  into  the 
danger  that  has  been  noted.  An  adjustment  may  mean 
physical  inactivity  or  quiescence  just  as  truly  as  it  may 
mean  activity  or  movement.  It  may  mean  contempla 
tion,  reflection,  aesthetic  enjoyment.  An  adjustment  is 
an  adaptation  of  the  organism  to  a  situation.  It  is,  in 
terms  of  consciousness,  the  solution  of  a  problem  that 
confronts  the  organism.  In  still  broader  terms,  it  is  the 
process  of  satisfying  some  felt  need.  One  may  feel  a 
need  that  demands  in  its  satisfaction  absolute  bodily 
inertia,  or  "pure"  contemplation.  The  adaptation  of 
the  organism  to  satisfy  the  one  need  or  the  other  is  an 
adjustment,  —  is  a  unit  of  conduct.  When  the  adjust 
ment  itself  does  not  involve  conscious  control,  it  operates 
on  the  basis  of  either  instinct  or  habit,  according  as  the 
mechanism  of  the  adjustment,  —  the  coordination  of 
functions  essential  to  bring  it  about,  —  has  been  either 
inherited  or  acquired.  Even  the  need  itself  may  not 
come  into  the  field  of  consciousness.  When,  however, 
the  need  is  distinctly  felt  and  the  adjustment  is  not 
automatic  or  mechanical,  a  problem  or  a  situation 
arises.  It  is  then  that  the  factors  essential  to  satisfying 
the  need  and  solving  the  problem  must  be  directed 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      45 

consciously  and  in  the  light  of  ideas  or  revived  experi 
ences.  It  is  then  that  the  images,  with  their  various 
potentialities  of  adjustment,  come  into  play.  They  are 
"  tried  out,"  as  it  were,  with  reference  to  the  end  sought, 
-  with  reference  to  the  solution  of  the  problem.  Per 
haps  they  pass  through  a  long  series  of  associations 
before  the  right  cue  makes  its  appearance.  Perhaps 
they  are  highly  elaborated  and  organized.  But  finally 
they  must  resolve  themselves  into  one  form  of  conduct 
or  another.  In  one  way  or  another  the  chain  must  be 
completed ;  in  one  way  or  another  the  problem  is  solved, 
or  it  is  abandoned,  —  and  abandonment  is  solution  for 
the  time  being. 

Suppose  that  I  am  awakened  at  night  by  a  measured,  rhyth 
mic  sound  that  I  cannot  satisfactorily  identify.  A  situation 
arises.  My  sleep  has  been  disturbed  and  a  consciousness  of 
possible  danger  constitutes  a  "need"  for  the  immediate 
solution  of  the  problem.  I  may  tentatively  interpret  the 
sound  as  representing  burglars  in  the  house.  The  meaning 
"burglars"  which  I  read  into  this  stimulus  is,  then,  the  first 
reaction  of  experience  upon  my  consciousness  of  the  situation. 
The  idea  "burglars"  holds  within  itself  several  cues  to  ad 
justment.  I  may  be  "satisfied"  that  it  is  a  burglar.  In  that 
case  my  first  problem,  —  to  identify  the  sound,  —  has  been 
solved,  and  another  problem  has  arisen.  Assuming,  however, 
that  the  identification  is  not  satisfactory,  I  must  cast  about 
for  another  "cue,"  —  for  another  meaning  under  which  to 
subsume  this  situation.  I  revive  successive  images  of  the 
surroundings  of  my  house,  —  each  image  with  its  attendant 
meanings  and  possibilities.  One  by  one  they  pass  "before  the 
mind";  but  no  "cue"  that  suggests  a  "satisfactory"  solu- 


46  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

tion  makes  its  appearance,  until  through  the  associative  pro- 
cesses,  the  image  of  my  neighbor's  barn,  which  is  not  far  dis 
tant,  is  evoked.     This  image  also  has  its  quotaof  meanmgs,- 
its  quota  of  possible  cues  for  adjustment.     The  idea  barn  is 
associated  with  the  idea  horse,  and  this,  in  its  turn,  suggests 
the  idea,  «  stamping  horse."    With  reference  to  my  problem, 
the  situation  is  solved.    A  satisfying  adjustment  is  at  o 
initiated  by  the  idea. 

What  I  have  done  in  a  case  of  this  sort  has  been  to  solve 
a  situation  by  means  of  ideas.  Had  not  my  former  experi 
ences  furnished  me  with  such  ideas,  the  situation  could  have 
been  solved  only  by  a  process  of  trial  and  error.  At  it  was, 
the  solution  was  delayed  only  long  enough  for  me  to  follow 
through  a  series  of  associated  meanings  until  the  one  ap 
peared  that  satisfied  the  conditions  of  the  problem.  My  ad 
justment  in  this  instance  has  involved  but  a  minimum  c 
muscular  activity. 

6.  In  the  process  of  conscious  adjustment  to  different 
situations,  one  is  constantly  making  such  "discoveries" 
as  that  just  noted,  —one  is  constantly  identifying  new 
situations  with  old  meanings  or   discovering  some  "re 
lation"  between  new  situations  and  old  meanings,  whether 
that  relation  be  one  of  identity,  of  similarity,  of  difference, 
of  cause  and  effect,  or  of  any  other  of  the  various  types 
of  relationship  which  the  logicians  recognize.    But  what 
ever  the  relation,  its  value  (if  value  it  possesses)  must 
always  be  in  terms  of  adjustment.    When   I  identify 
the  disturbing  sound  with  the  stamping  of  the  horse, 
I  am  simply  transferring  to  the  sound  the  significance 
or   meaning   which   the  stamping  horse   may  possess 
with   reference   to    the    problem    that   confronts    me, 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      47 

When,  as  the  result  of  reacting  to  a  situation,  I  dis 
cover  that  water  solidifies  at  a  temperature  below  32°  F., 
my  concept  of  water  has  been  thereby  enriched;  its 
quota  of  potential  cues  has  been  increased;  my  con 
trol  over  future  possible  situations,  —  my  potential 
ability  to  solve  such  situations  satisfactorily,  —  has  been 
widened  and  strengthened.  In  other  words,  as  I  identify, 
subsume,  and  relate  meanings  and  situations  through  con 
tinued  experience  or  adjustment,  I  reduce  my  experience 
to  the  form  of  facts  and  principles,  which,  in  turn,  may 
make  my  future  conduct  more  effective. 

Facts  and  principles,  therefore,  may  be  listed  with 
ideas  and  meanings  as  conduct-controls  that  come  out  of 
experience.  They  constitute  one  of  the  most  important 
forms  in  which  the  experience  of  the  race  is  crystallized, 
and,  in  virtue  of  the  possibility  of  recording  these  result 
ants  of  experience  in  written  and  printed  language,  and  in 
formulae,  diagrams,  pictures,  and  models,  facts  and  prin 
ciples  form  numerically  the  largest  class  of  educative 
materials. 

7.  As  guides  to  conduct,  facts  and  principles  do  not 
differ  essentially  from  ideas  and  concepts.  The  fact,  as 
the  result  of  a  particular  judgment  ("  This  substance  is 
chloride  of  calcium  " ;  "  D  arwin  was  born  in  1 809 ' ') ,  simply 
makes  explicit  an  element  of  meaning  that  may  later  be 
implicit  in  the  particular  concept  or  idea.  Thus  what 
ever  "cues"  attach  to  the  meaning  of  chloride  of  lime 
come  to  attach  to  the  particular  substance  which  I  iden 
tify  as  chloride  of  lime.  Once  the  predicate  is  intimately 


48  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

associated  with  the  subject,  the  explicit  relations  ex 
pressed  in  the  predicate  come  thereafter  to  be  implied 
in  the  subject.  Once  I  have  learned  that  Darwin  was 
born  in  1809,  whatever  general  meaning  attaches  to 
birth  in  1809  attaches  to  my  particular  concept,  Darwin. 
The  principle  as  the  result  of  a  general  judgment  (for 
example,  "All  men  are  mortal  ")  similarly  makes  ex 
plicit  a  quality  that  will  afterward  be  implicit  in  the  gen 
eral  concept. 

8.  The  methodology  of  the  development  of  the  con 
duct-controls  belonging  to  this  group,  —  ideas,  meanings, 
concepts,  facts,  and  principles,  —  is  less  well  understood 
than  the  methodology  of  habit-building.  The  chief  prob 
lems  are  to  insure  wealth  and  accuracy  of  meanings,  to 
insure  the  association  of  these  meanings  with  situations 
which  are  likely  to  arise  in  connection  with  the  problems 
of  everyday  life,  and  through  organization  to  insure  the 
recall  of  meanings  when  they  are  needed  in  meeting  these 
and  other  problems. 

When  we  think  of  meanings  as  cues  to  conduct,  the  functional 
significance  of  "qualities"  and  "properties"  is  much  clearer 
than  when  qualities  and  properties  are  considered  simply  as 
logical  attributes  of  concepts.  If  the  idea  of  "commerce"  is 
to  function  effectively  as  a  conduct-control,  the  characteristics 
that  are  associated  with  the  term  must  be  associated  also  with 
adjustment.  It  is  coming  to  be  recognized  as  fundamentally 
important,  therefore,  that  the  terms  which  are  used  to  charac 
terize  different  phases  of  meaning  be  related  to  actual  ad 
justment.  The  emphasis  that  has  been  laid  upon  objective 
teaching  during  the  past  quarter-century  is  an  expression  of 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      49 

this  recognition.  Within  the  last  decade  objective  teaching 
which  does  not  provide  actual  situations  demanding  real 
adjustment  has  come  to  be  looked  upon  as  not  thoroughly 
effective.  The  old  maxim, "Proceed  from  the  concrete  to  the 
abstract,"  still  holds,  but  the  term  "concrete"  has  assumed 
a  new  significance.  Because  something  is  objective  or  mate 
rial  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  it  is  "concrete"  to  the 
mind.  Concreteness  —  reality  —  lies  in  the  situation  demand 
ing  adjustment,  —  stimulating  one  to  a  reaction.  That  effective 
concepts  must  have  this  sort  of  a  basis  is  one  of  the  important 
principles  of  latter-day  educational  theory.1 

To  fulfill  this  condition  does  much  to  insure  the  accuracy 
of  concepts  and  ideas.  If  I  define  salt  as  chloride  of  sodium, 
and  have  no  "meaning"  for  either  "chloride"  or  "sodium," 
my  meaning  of  salt  has  not  been  in  any  sense  enriched. 
Either  to  extend  a  concept  or  to  intensify  it,  necessitates  an 
association  of  the  concept  with  meanings,  not  with  mere  sym 
bols.  And  somewhere,  ultimately,  the  chain  of  associated 
meanings  must  touch  the  bed-rock  of  actual  motor  adjust 
ment. 

Present-day  educational  practice  is  beginning  to  shaje 
itself  conformably  with  this  principle.  In  so  doing,  however, 
it  is  tending  to  neglect  one  of  the  chief  virtues  of  its  proto 
type,  the  old-time  pedagogy,  which  insisted  so  strenuously 
upon  logical  organization  and  coherent  system.  The  neces 
sity  for  the  latter  requirement  is  not  lessened  in  the  slightest 
degree  by  the  emphasis  that  is  now  being  placed  upon  con- 

1  The  "  continuation  schools  "  that  have  been  adapted  from  the 
German  plan  and  applied  to  American  conditions  in  Cincinnati  and 
Fitchburg  furnish  almost  ideal  conditions  for  an  effective  pedagogy. 
The  actual  adjustments  come  in  the  work  that  pupils  do  in  stores, 
shops,  and  factories.  The  school  work  takes  this  intimate  acquaintance 
with  real  situations  as  a  basis  and  on  this  builds  the  theoretical  in 
struction. 


50  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

crete  reference  in  teaching.  Indeed,  it  is  all  the  more  essen 
tial,  for  under  the  older  system  a  proportion  of  the  pupils  in 
our  schools  made  the  concrete  references  for  themselves ;  they 
found  that  it  facilitated  the  learning  process  in  a  way  that 
they  were  not  slow  to  utilize.  The  insistence  upon  coherent, 
logical  organization  was,  therefore,  all  that  they  needed  to 
make  the  development  of  ideas  and  principles  thoroughly 
effective,  and  the  school  took  good  care  that  this  condition, 
at  least,  was  adequately  met.  To-day  the  effort  of  the  schools 
is  directed  largely  toward  insuring  concrete  bases  for  concepts, 
while  the  important  task  of  logical  organization  is  frequently 
neglected.  It  is  clear  that  this  task  is  frequently  beyond  the 
powers,  even  of  those  pupils  who  were  able,  under  the  old 
regime,  to  "concrete"  the  concepts  for  themselves.1 

9.  The  "law  of  concept-building  "  has  been  formulated 
in  recognition  of  the  necessity  for  this  concrete  basis.  It 
is  expressed  in  the  familiar  pedagogical  dictum,  "  Proceed 
from  the  concrete  to  the  abstract,  and  from  the  particular 
to  the  general."  Spencer  2  very  clearly  formulated  the 
law  as  a  specific  expression  of  the  principle  that  the  de 
velopment  of  generalizations  in  the  mind  of  the  child 
should  proceed  in  the  same  general  fashion  as  the  develop 
ment  of  the  same  generalizations  in  the  experience  of  the 
race.  The  followers  of  Herbart 3  have  worked  out  an  elabo 
rate  system  of  instruction  following  this  inductive  order. 
As  a  result,  the  institutions  for  the  training  of  teachers 

1  Cf .  J.  Adams :    Exposition  and  Illustration  in    Teaching,   London, 
1909,  especially  pp.  197-198. 

2  H.  Spencer :  Education,  New  York,  1895,  ch.  ii. 

8  For  example,  W.  Rein:  Outlines  of  Pedagogics  (Eng.  trans.),  Syra 
cuse,  1895;  C.  De  Garmo:  Essentials  of  Method,  Boston,  1889;  C.  A. 
and  F.  M.  McMurry :  Method  of  the  Recitation,  New  York,  1903. 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      51 

have  come  to  lay  strong  emphasis  upon  the  well-known 
"  formal  steps  "  of  development.  In  fact,  even  to-day, 
there  is  but  one  " approved"  method  of  impressing 
general  concepts  and  general  principles,  and  that  one  way 
is  to  lead  up  gradually  to  the  general  form  through  the  par 
ticulars  upon  which  it  is  based,  and  to  which  it  must  be 
referred  if  its  meaning  is  to  be  clearly  apprehended. 

This  emphasis  of  the  inductive  procedure  has  been  of 
great  importance  in  the  development  of  educational 
method;  but  it  has  also  led  to  the  condition  that 
was  noted  above,  —  in  the  eagerness  to  lay  concrete 
bases,  logical  oganization  has  been  frequently  neglected. 
This  neglect  of  the  "logical"  for  what  has  been  called 
the  "  psychological "  order  of  development  has  also  tended 
to  blind  teachers  to  the  very  important  type  of  instruc 
tion  that  begins  with  a  clear  enunciation  of  the  principle 
and  then  proceeds  to  illustrate  it  by  concrete  cases.  It 
has  also,  in  some  instances,  insisted  upon  a  tedious  de 
velopment  of  a  concept  or  a  principle  the  meaning  of 
which  would  be  clearly  apparent  to  all  pupils  without 
taking  these  steps.  A  fourth  criticism  to  which  the 
overemphasis  of  inductive  development  may  be  sub 
jected  owes  its  cogency  to  the  readiness  with  which  in 
duction  as  a  process  of  instruction  has  been  confused  with 
induction  as  a  process  of  establishing  truth. 

The  value  of  proceeding  from  the  concrete  to  the  abstract 
in  teaching  is  obviously  quite  independent  of  the  value  of  a 
rigorous  process  of  induction  in  firmly  establishing  a  principle. 
It  should  not  be  assumed  that  merely  leading  the  pupil  to 


52  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

attend  to  a  few  clear  cases  and  to  formulate  whatever  resem 
blances  or  differences  he  may  discover  among  them  justifies 
him  in  assuming  that  he  has  established  the  formula.  In  other 
words,  the  inductive  procedure  in  this  case  is  simply  a  peda 
gogical  expedient,  and  it  has  its  sole  justification  in  the  fact 
that  it  will,  under  certain  conditions,  serve  to  fix  the  principle 
more  effectively  than  another  procedure  would  do. 

10.  In  the  "Educative  Process"1  the  writer  distin 
guished  between  "development "  and  ''instruction,"  —  in 
cluding  under  the  former  term  the  processes  of  teaching 
which  lead  the  pupil  himself  to  induce  principles  from 
particulars  or  to  infer  particulars  from  principles;  and 
including  under  the  latter  term  the  processes  of  teaching 
which  simply  place  ready-made  judgments  before  the 
pupil  in  such  a  way  that  he  may  adequately  appre 
hend  the  inductions  or  inferences  drawn  by  the  teacher. 
It  is  clear  that  the  methodology  of  concepts,  facts, 
and  principles  may  employ  either  of  these  two  methods  : 
it  may  be  either  developmental  or  instructional ;  and,  in 
either  case,  the  procedure  may  be  inductive  or  deductive. 

The  formal  school  exercises  which  have  for  their  function 
equipping  the  pupils  with  concepts,  facts,  and  principles  may, 
accordingly,  be  classified  under  four  types :  — 

(a)  The  inductive  development  lesson,  which  aims  through  a 
heuristic  method  to  develop  concepts  and  meanings  upon  the 
basis  of  particular  experiences,  or  to  develop  principles  upon 
the  basis  of  preformed  particular  judgments. 

(b)  The  deductive  development  lesson,  which  similarly  em 
ploys  a  heuristic  method  in  leading  the  pupil  to  infer  from  the 

1  Ch.  xvii. 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      53 

operation  of  a  known  principle  certain  conditions  which  he 
may  later  prove  to  be  facts,  or  to  explain  a  known  fact  by 
bringing  it  under  the  operation  of  a  known  principle.1 

(c)  The  inductive  expository  lesson,  which  is  similar  to  the 
inductive  development  lesson,  except  that  it  employs  the 
instructional  rather  than  the  developmental  procedure. 

(d)  The  deductive  expository  lesson,  which  differs  in  like 
manner  from  its  heuristic  prototype.2 

1 1 .  Ideas,  meanings,  concepts,  facts,  and  principles  have 
been  referred  to  in  the  preceding  paragraphs  as  " guides" 
to  conduct.  Subsequent  discussions  will  revert  to  this 
designation,  for  it  is  this  essential  feature  which  distin 
guishes  the  controls  of  this  type  from  those  later  to  be  dis 
cussed.  Essentially,  these  controls  are  instruments,  not 
ends;  and  as  instruments,  their  efficiency  depends  upon 
the  clearness,  the  accuracy,  and  the  certainty  with  which 
they  reflect  experience.  As  instruments,  also,  they  are 
impersonal,  and  may  be  used  to  direct  conduct  to  un 
worthy  ends  as  readily  as  to  worthy  ends.  The  impor 
tance  of  insuring  that  the  ends  of  conduct  shall  be  worthy 
justifies  the  emphasis  that  the  next  chapter  will  lay  upon 
the  distinction  between  ideas  and  ideals. 

1  This  type  of  lesson  is  described  and  illustrated  in  The  Educative 
Process,  ch.  xx. 

2  For  an  excellent  discussion  of  expository  teaching,  see  J.  Adams, 
op.  tit. 


CHAPTER   IV 

THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF   CONDUCT.     (C)   IDEALS 
AND  EMOTIONALIZED  STANDARDS 

i.  THUS  far,  the  discussion  has  recognized  two  im 
portant  types  of  acquired  conduct-controls ;  habits  on 
the  one  hand,  and  concepts,  facts,  and  principles  on  the 
other  hand.  If  these  exhausted  the  list,  the  task  of  the 
following  pages  would  be  greatly  simplified.  The  ma 
terials  of  education  could  readily  be  reduced  to  two  great 
classes,  and  the  value  of  the  results  of  education  could  be 
determined  readily  by  reference  to  the  social  criterion. 
Unfortunately  for  our  comfort,  however,  human  conduct 
persistently  refuses  to  be  included  entirely  under  these 
two  categories,  and  an  educational  psychology  that  stops 
here  is  ineffective  in  practice  because  it  leaves  untouched 
a  large  mass  of  educative  materials  which  practice  simply 
cannot  neglect. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  conduct  is  fundamentally  deter 
mined,  not  by  the  environment  of  the  objective  world, 
which  sensation  mirrors  to  us  and  to  which  perceptions 
and  ideas  refer,  but  rather  by  the  needs  of  the  organism. 
As  was  pointed  out  above,  it  is  only  with  reference  to 
organic  needs  that  situations  arise  and  form  the  objective 
centers  of  adjustment,  of  experience.  It  is  these  needs 

54 


THE   ACQUIRED    CONTROLS    OF   CONDUCT  55 

and  their  satisfaction  that  lie  at  the  basis  of  mental  life, 
and  it  is  to  these  needs  that  we  must  now  turn  to  com 
plete  the  list  of  conduct-controls  with  which  education 
has  primarily  to  deal. 

2.  At  the  beginning,  a  return  must  be  made  to  instinct, 
which  was  dismissed  so  summarily  a  few  pages  back. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  consciousness,  the  essence  of  an 
experience  (a " complete"  adjustment)  lies  in  the  con 
sciousness  of  the  problem  to  be  solved.  This  conscious 
ness  is  more  or  less  affective  in  its  structure,  —  that  is,  it 
is  represented  by  some  emotional  content. 

This  factor  may  be  illustrated  by  reference  to  any  great 
achievement.  Peary's  conquest  of  the  Pole,  for  example, 
represents  a  large  unit  of  human  experience,  which,  because  of 
its  very  "bulk,"  so  to  say,  and  because  of  the  unity  of  pur 
pose  which  bound  together  all  of  its  elements,  serves  admi 
rably  the  purposes  of  psychological  study.  Obviously,  the 
prime  controlling  force  in  Peary's  achievement  was  the  pur 
pose  that  dominated  it.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  describe  this 
purpose  simply  by  saying  that  it  was  the  idea  of  reaching  the 
Pole.  Thousands  of  men  might  have  that  idea.  In  Peary, 
however,  the  idea  of  reaching  the  Pole  was  infused  with  a  pow 
erful  emotional  force  which  made  the  idea  directive  over 
his  conduct  during  the  long  series  of  efforts  and  trials  and 
interpolated  experiences.  The  idea  of  reaching  the  Pole 
came  to  be  for  Peary  an  ideal. 

Now  to  realize  this  ideal  became  Peary's  problem.  The 
solution  of  this  problem  involved  a  series  of  adjustments  to 
a  series  of  objective  situations.  In  each  adjustment,  other 
ideas,  and  undoubtedly  other  ideals,  operated  to  control  seg 
ments  of  conduct.  In  planning  for  his  trip,  he  had  to  avail 


56  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

himself  of  his  own  former  experiences  and  of  the  experiences  of 
others  (both  types  largely  crystallized  in  ideas,  facts,  and 
principles).  From  experience  had  been  derived  the  fact  that 
Arctic  travel  requires  certain  carefully  selected  supplies  of 
food  and  clothing.  Experience  had  supplied  the  data  essen 
tial  to  determine  the  most  favorable  season  for  travel,  the 
best  means  of  travel,  the  number  of  men  essential  to  an  effi 
cient  exploring  force,  and  the  like.  As  each  problem  pre 
sented  itself,  Peary's  former  experience,  and  the  knowledge 
that  he  had  gained  from  a  study  of  the  carefully  preserved 
records  of  former  explorers,  supplied  the  solution.  But  the 
entire  trip,  from  the  moment  of  its  first  inception  to  its  cul 
minating  victory,  was  dominated  and  controlled  by  a  funda 
mental  ideal. 

3.  From  what  did  this  ideal  derive  the  force  that  made 
it  directive  over  so  long  a  period  in  this  man's  life  ?    It 
is  here  that  we  must  turn  back  to  instinct  for  an  ultimate 
explanation.     It  may  be  that  there  is  no  distinctively 
native  impulse  which  we  may  identify  with  ''achieve 
ment,"  but  there  is  something  closely  akin  to  it  to  be 
noticed  even  in  very  young  children.     The  impulse  to 
accomplish  something,  to  do  something  that  others  have 
not  done,  to  secure  the  commendation  and  praise  of  our 
fellows,  —  if  this  impulse  is  not  inborn,  then  something  is 
inborn  that  is  readily  transformed  into  it.     At  the  core 
of  every  effective  ideal  one  will  find,  if  one  analyzes  far 
enough,  some  element  of  instinct,  —  something  that  must 
be  included  among  the  "given"  factors  in  the  problem  of 
existence. 

4.  But  the  instinctive Jactor^is,  in  highly  developed 
ideals,  only  the  "core."      Experiential    factors    come 


THE    ACQUIRED    CONTROLS    OF    CONDUCT  57 

to  play  a  most  important  part  in  the  composition  of  ideals. 
The  idea  of  the  Pole,  —  the  meaning  that  the  word  had 
for  Peary  even  at  the  outset  of  his  career,  —  formed  an 
indispensable  part  of  the  ideal  that  was  so  effective  as  a 
control  in  his  later  life.  The  concept  "Pole"  has  certain 
conventional  implications.  From  the  point  of  view  of 
formal  definition  (which  is  only  making  the  "meanings" 
of  terms  more  explicit  by  bringing  them,  through  other 
terms,  closer  to  experience)  the  North  Pole  is  one  end  of 
the  earth's  axis.  But  it  also  implies  to  most  of  us  rela 
tive  inaccessibility,  danger,  cold,  unspeakable  discomfort. 
These  are  vital,  human  meanings  as  contrasted  with 
the  formal  definition-meanings  of  the  logicians.  It  was 
these  human  meanings,  one  may  readily  believe,  that  were 
important  in  Peary's  conception  of  the  Pole.  However 
that  may  be,  the  ideal  that  dominated  his  conduct  had  its 
intellectual  constituents  derived  from  experience  as  well 
as  its  core  of  raw  impulse  or  native  emotion. 

5.  The  ideal  of  reaching  the  Pole,  then,  was  only  the 
large  dominant  purpose  that  actuated  Peary  in  his  efforts. 
Other  ideas  operated,  as  has  already  been  pointed  out,  and 
other  ideals  came  in  to  check  and  control  conduct  even 
within  the  sphere  governed  chiefly  by  his  dominant  pur 
pose.  The  ideals  of  science  led  him  to  pause  frequently 
on  his  course  to  take  deep-sea  soundings  and  to  make 
dredgings  of  the  sea  bottom  in  order  to  determine  for 
science  the  contour  of  the  sea  bed  and  the  kind  of  life 
that  it  harbored.  The  magnetic  and  meteorological 
conditions  were  observed  with  a  care  and  precision  far 


58  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

beyond  the  needs  of  his  principal  purpose.  His  ideals  of 
loyalty  to  the  service  that  employed  him,  of  regard  for  his 
family  and  for  the  families  and  friends  of  his  companions, 
—  all  these  were  factors  that  over  and  over  again  con 
ditioned  his  adjustment.  And  each  of  these  ideals,  too, 
had  its  instinctive  basis  and  its  elements  of  intellectual 
meaning. 

6.  The  illustration  has  been  followed  far  enough, 
perhaps,  to  indicate  what  is  meant  by  an  ideal  as  a  con 
trol  of  conduct,  and  by  what  essential  features  it  is  dis 
tinguished  from  what  has  been  termed  an  idea.  In  dis 
entangling  the  essential  factors  from  the  complicated 
web  of  human  action,  one  is  almost  certain  to  derive 
elements  that  seem  purely  formal  and  lifeless.  This  life- 
lessness  and  formalism  become  all  the  more  apparent 
when  an  attempt  is  made  to  distinguish  these  dissected 
factors  or  elements  by  formal  definition.  Nevertheless, 
ayerhal  definition  has^.-funrtinri;  even  if  it  "hides  as 
much  truth  as  it  re  veals. 'r  To  sum  up  the  differences 
between  ideas  and  ideals  in  definite  terms,  one  may  say 
that  an  idea  is  an  image  plus  a  meaning,  and  that  an  ideal 
is  an  image  plus  a  meaning  plus  a  strong  emotional  or 
affective  coloring.  One  should  hasten  to  add  that  the 
" image"  referred  to  here  need  not  be  a  concrete  image : 
it  may  well  be  a  symbol,  such  as  a  word,  or  it  may  be  any 
other  form  of  sense-material  to  which  the  meaning  is 
attached.  And  when  one  speaks  of  the  emotional  or 
affective  coloring,  one  simply  means  that,  upon  psy 
chological  analysis,  the  conscious  " stuff"  that  makes 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      5Q 

up  the  ideal  is  more  vitally  infused  with  a  pleasant  or 
unpleasant  feeling- tone  than  is  the  conscious  "stuff" 
that  makes  up  the  idea. 

One  or  two  examples  will  make  clear  that  there  is  a  distinc 
tion  with  a  very  important  difference  between  these  two 
terms.  A  certain  idea  of  national  unity  was  prevalent  in  this 
country  prior  to  the  Civil  War.  The  events  of  the  war  trans 
formed  that  idea  into  an  ideal.  Whatever  has  been  in 
timately  associated  with  pain  and  sacrifice  and  anguish  can 
never  again  be  quite  the  same.  Just  as  instinct  is  basic  to 
reason  and  sometimes  overrides  it,  so  the  affective  elements  in 
an  ideal  overshadow  the  intellectual  factors.  Objectively 
and  intellectually,  national  unity  means  the  same  to-day  that 
it  did  in  1860,  but  its  directive  force  over  conduct  is  far  more 
powerful,  and  its  emotional  content  is  far  richer. 

The  idea  of  temperance  may  be  clear  enough  to  the  man  who 
scoffs  at  temperance.  He  may  know  what  temperance  means. 
The  word  may  be  surrounded  by  that  halo  of  kinaesthesis 
which  enables  him  to  use  the  concept  effectively  as  an  inter 
polated  control  of  conduct,  —  as  a  means  to  an  end.  In  an 
abstract  and  purely  intellectual  way,  he  may  even  recognize 
its  worth.  But  this  is  a  vastly  different  thing  from  feeling  its 
worth  and  making  it  an  ideal  that  is  directive  as  an  end  over 
his  own  conduct,  acting  through  a  long  series  of  adjustments, 
and,  therefore,  becoming  a  prime  control. 

7.  In  general,  ideals  are  the  prime,  the  basic,  the  funda 
mental  controls  of  conduct.  Ideas  are  the  subordinate, 
the  interpolated  controls.  Ideals  determine  purpose; 
ideas  guide  to  the  realization  of  purpose. 

Ideals  dominate  large  experiences  or  large  adjust 
ments.  Ideas  control  the  smaller  segments  of  experience, 


60  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

the  adjustments  that  are  incidental  as  means  to  the 
desired  or  idealized  end.  The  efficiency  of  ideas  is 
largely  dependent  upon  the  fidelity  with  which  they 
represent  to  consciousness  the  world  in  which  it  works. 
The  efficiency  of  ideals  is  largely  dependent  upon  the 
emotional  force  that  lies  back  of  them  —  upon  the 
directness  of  their  reference  to  felt  needs.  Ideas  as  prod 
ucts  of  race-experience  are  organized  into  facts  and  prin 
ciples,  and  crystallized  in  the  records  of  investigation. 
Ideals  as  products  of  race  experience  are  expressed  in 
poetry,  in  imaginative  literature,  in  the  fine  arts,  in  music, 
in  the  forms  of  religion,  government,  arid  other  social 
institutions.1 

To  see  to  it  that  the  ideals  which  accumulated  human 
experience  has  shown  to  be  worthy  and  to  make  for 
social  welfare  are  safely  and  effectively  transmitted  from 
generation  to  generation  is  obviously  a  prime  task  of 
education.  The  decline  of  the  ancient  civilizations  is 
generally  recognized  as  having  been  due  to  the  fact  that 
the  races  which  had  so  laboriously  built  up  these  civili 
zations  failed  to  transmit  from  generation  to  generation 
the  ideals  that  were  essential  to  their  perpetuation. 
Chief  among  these  are  the  ideals  of  self-denial  and  self- 
sacrifice,  —  those  essential  standards  of  human  conduct 
that  have  made  all  advancement  possible.  It  is  because 
material  prosperity  eliminates  the  economic  conditions 

1  Cf .  W.  W.  Charters :  Methods  of  Teaching,  Chicago,  1909,  pp.  45-48. 
Charters  here  shows  the  importance  of  determining  in  teaching  any  sub 
ject,  whether  it  is  to  function  as  "end"  or  as  "instrument." 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      6l 

which  give  vitality  and  emotive  force  to  these  ideals, 
—  it  is  for  this  reason  that  material  prosperity,  unless 
checked  and  controlled  by  educative  forces,  tends  to 
national  and  ethnic  decay.  Both  Greece  and  Rome 
lacked  an  organized  educational  institution  that  would 
automatically  instill  these  ideals  into  each  generation. 
It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  modern  education  will  be 
adequate  to  the  task.  Certain  it  is  that  the  present 
tendencies  in  our  schools  toward  ease  and  comfort  and 
the  lines  of  least  resistance  confirm  rather  than  counter 
act  the  operation  of  that  Zeitgeist  which  reflects  so  per 
fectly  the  moral  decadence  that  comes  with  prosperity 
-  the  letting  loose  the  grip  that  our  forefathers,  who 
lived  under  sterner  and  harsher  conditions,  had  upon  the 
ideals  of  self-denial  and  self-sacrifice. 

8.  It  is  clear  that  ideals,  as  well  as  determining  pur 
pose,  also  serve  as  standards  or  criteria  for  conduct  in  the 
realization  of  purpose.  All  of  the  recognized  " virtues" 
represent  particularly  this  type  of  ideal.  Honesty, 
personal  honor,  chastity,  patriotism,  altruism,  self-denial, 
cleanliness,  —  all  these  are  ideas  which  must  be  strongly 
and  effectively  emotionalized  in  order  to  serve  as  conduct- 
controls.  They  have,  it  is  true,  an  intellectual  or  idea- 
tional  content,  but  this  may  be  relatively  simple.  In  any 
case,  it  is  the  emotional  factor  that  is  important. 

It  should  be  understood  that  the  non-intellectual  character 
of  many  effective  ideals  is  not  an  essential  condition  of  their 
efficiency.  There  is  no  reason  why  ideals  that  have  a 
thoroughly  justifiable  rational  basis  should  not  be  so  strongly 


62  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

emotionalized  as  to  become  ends  in  themselves.  It  is  well  to 
understand,  however,  that  the  efficiency  of  an  ideal  is  not 
necessarily  dependent  upon  what  is  popularly  known  as  an 
appeal  to  reason.  To  "  understand  "  why  it  is  well  to  hold  fast 
to  certain  moral  standards  is  not,  from  the  social  point  of  view, 
nearly  so  important  as  to  hold  fast  to  these  standards ;  and, 
unless  rationalizing  moral  standards  helps  to  increase  the  hold 
which  they  have  upon  social  conduct,  the  justification  of  an 
educative  policy  that  insists  upon  such  rationalization  is  not 
at  all  clear.  Certainly  it  should  be  determined  in  how  far 
such  attempts  may  serve  to  increase  or  decrease  the  efficiency 
of  the  ideals.  It  will  probably  be  generally  agreed  that  there 
are  some  ideals  that  have  cost  the  race  far  too  much  in  the 
slow  process  of  their  development  to  permit  incurring  any 
risk  of  losing  them  through  a  premature  rational  appeal. 

9.  In  each  of  the  two  preceding  chapters  a  section 
was  devoted  to  the  discussion  of  the  "methodology" 
of  fixing  the  conduct-controls  under  consideration. 
The  term  "methodology"  sounds  pedantic  at  best,  and 
in  connection  with  the  transmission  of  ideals  it  is  almost 
ominous.  And  yet,  unless  education  can  come  to  a 
rational  understanding  of  this  process,  it  will  be  unable 
to  control  with  certainty  the  most  important  group  of 
factors  that  determine  conduct.  At  the  present  time, 
educators  are  working  very  largely  in  the  dark  in  the 
solution  of  this  problem.  The  school  exercises  that  have 
to  do  with  the  teaching  of  history,  literature,  and  art 
in  all  of  its  forms  have  been  scarcely  differentiated  from 
those  that  have  to  do  with  the  fixing  of  habits  and  the 
development  or  exposition  of  facts  and  principles.  Of 


THE   ACQUIRED   CONTROLS   OF   CONDUCT  63 

late,  it  is  true,  what  is  known  as  the  "appreciation 
lesson"  1  has  been  recognized,  but  it  is  yet  to  be  analyzed 
and  described.  Here  is  a  field  for  a  type  of  pioneer  work 
that  is  sorely  needed. 

1 1  believe  that  Professor  G.  D.  Strayer  deserves  the  credit  for  having 
first  recognized  that  the  school  exercise  in  which  "appreciation"  is  the 
chief  concern  should  be  differentiated  by  a  distinctive  name  from 
instruction  and  training.  See  Columbia  University  Extension  Syllabi, 
Series  A,  No.  23,  1908  p.  6. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT.  (D)  PREJU 
DICES  AND  TASTES;  (E)  ATTITUDES  AND  PERSPEC 
TIVES;  SUMMARY 

1.  THE  conduct-controls  discussed  in  the  last  chapter 
—  ideals  and  standards  —  tend,  through  repeated  func 
tioning,  to  become  prejudices.     That  is,  they  may  be  in 
their  operation  (and  often  in  their  genesis)  quite  inde 
pendent  of  reasoned  processes.     More  than  this,  their 
operation  is  closely  similar  to  that  of  habit,  although 
the  conscious  accompaniments  are  clear  and  unequiv 
ocal.    When  prejudices  govern  conduct,  the  reaction  is 
commonly  represented  in  consciousness  by  a  strong  wave 
of  feeling  or  emotion,  as  when  one  experiences  a  "revul 
sion"  of  feeling  at  a  proposal  that  is  inconsistent  with  the 
ideals  of  honesty  or  personal  honor.     They  form,  as  it 
were,  immediate  and  self-sufficient  conduct-controls. 

2.  Closely  related  to  prejudices  as  controls  of  conduct 
are  what  we  ordinarily  term  tastes,  although  the  latter 
are  commonly  somewhat  milder  in  their  effect  upon  con 
sciousness.     Like  prejudices,  they  are  characterized  by 
the  propensity  that  was  noted  in  connection  with  habits ; 
that  is,  conditions  which  fail  to  satisfy  standards  that 
have  been  repeatedly  applied  to  the  evaluation  of  certain 

64 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      65 

activities  arouse  a  feeling  of  irritation  and  unpleasant 
ness,  which  may  indeed  be  only  vaguely  localized  at  the 
time  being. 

The  person  whose  musical  tastes  have  been  highly  "culti 
vated,"  for  example,  will  react  almost  instinctively  against 
musical  efforts  that  fall  below  his  standard.  This  is  not  a  case 
of  the  direct  application  of  the  standard  to  the  effort  in  ques 
tion  ;  it  is  rather  an  immediate  and  unreasoned  reaction.  It  is 
undoubtedly  due,  as  has  been  suggested  above,  to  a  frequent 
conscious  application  of  the  standard ;  just  as  prejudices  grow 
gradually  out  of  the  repeated  conscious  operation  of  ideals. 

3.  This  conception  of  prejudices  and  tastes  as  controls 
of  conduct  suggests  still  another  type,  even  more  intan 
gible  and  difficult  to  analyze.    Just  as  on  the  emotional 
side  prejudices   and   tastes  grow  out  of    the  frequent 
application  of  ideals  and  standards,  so   attitudes  are, 
on  the  intellectual  side,  schematic  and  reduced  resultants 
of  the  operation  of  ideas,  facts,  and  principles.     The 
two  types  of  control  are  similar  in  that  they  operate  upon 
consciousness  in  a  peculiar  way.     They  determine  the 
manner  in  which  a  situation  is  interpreted,   and  this 
determines,  of  course,  the  reaction  that  is  made  to  the 
situation.     The  two  types  differ  in  that  the  attitude  is 
more  closely  related  to  the  intellectual  and  ideational 
processes,  while  the  prejudice,  as  has  just  been  noted, 
expresses  itself  through  an  emotional  reaction. 

4.  Educational     theory     has     until     recently     been 
hampered   by   the   failure   of   psychology   to   recognize 
types  of  conduct-controls  other  than  habits  and  judg- 


66  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

ments.  But  psychology  now  recognizes  that  attitudes, 
prejudices,  tastes,  perspectives,  and  various  other 
factors,  while  they  are  extremely  difficult  to  analyze 
out  of  the  complex  states  of  consciousness,  are  none 
the  less  fundamentally  important  in  determining  the 
way  in  which  consciousness  influences  adjustment. 
Educational  theory  must  determine  how  these  important 
controls  are  developed,  —  for  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
they  are  profoundly  influenced  by  experiential  factors, 
although  their  bases  may  be  instinctive. 

The  psychology  of  these  intangible  controls  is  still  in  a  very 
unsatisfactory  condition,  —  but  it  is  something  to  know  that 
they  have  been  isolated,  recognized,  and  named.  The 
Germans  have  employed  the  untranslatable  word,  Bewusst- 
seinslage,  to  designate  them,  and  recognize  certain  types, 
such  as  Bewusstseinslagen  of  determination  (problem),  doubt, 
certainty,  familiarity,  meaning,  etc.1 

Judd  also  explicitly  recognizes  "attitudes"  as  distinc 
tive  and  significant  features  of  consciousness.  "Each  indi 
vidual  has  his  attitudes  toward  his  acquaintances,  toward  his 
ordinary  forms  of  experience,  and  these  attitudes  have  a  stabil 
ity  and  sanction  which  no  single  impression  and  no  single 
disastrous  result  of  applying  the  attitude  can  overcome.  This 
is  no  where  better  illustrated  than  in  referring  to  those  attitudes 

1  See  A.  Mayer  and  J.  Orth :  "Zur  qualitativen  Untersuchung  der 
Association,"  Zeitschrift  fur  Psychologic,  vol.  xxiv,  1901,  p.  6. ;  K. 
Marbe :  Experimentell-psychologische  Untersuchung  tiber  das  Urteil, 
Leipzig,  1901;  also  a  critique  by  E.  von  Aster:  "Die  psychologische 
Beobachtung  und  experimentelle  Untersuchung  von  Denkvorgangen," 
Zeitschrift  filr  Psychologic,  vol.  xlix,  1909,  pp.  56-107;  also  an  admi 
rable  summary  of  the  German  work  in  E.  B.  Titchener :  Experimental 
Psychology  of  the  Thought  Processes,  New  York,  1909,  ch.  iii. 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      67 

which  we  describe  in  ordinary  life  as  one's  tastes.  .  .  .  That 
tastes  are  built  up  on  the  foundation  of  individual  experiences 
no  one  will  deny;  that  they  are  forms  of  memory  is  an  assertion 
which  no  one  would  make  unless  he  were  prepared  to  extend  the 
word  'memory'  to  include  all  organizations  within  personal 
consciousness"  1 

It  is  just  this  conception  of  a  mental  attitude  which  is 
not  to  be  identified  with  memory,  and  which  consequently 
does  not  influence  adjustment  directly  through  a  judg 
ment  process  or  through  the  conscious  application  of 
previously  acquired  ideas  and  concepts,  —  it  is  precisely 
this  conception  that  educational  theory  needs  in  order 
to  make  thoroughly  rational  the  justification  of  what  we 
have  termed  "general  culture."  So  long  as  control  over 
conduct  was  thought  to  be  limited  on  the  one  hand  to 
specific  habits  and  on  the  other  hand  to  ideas,  facts,  and 
principles,  explicitly  revived  and  applied,  it  was  impossible 
rationally  to  justify  a  large  part  of  the  educational 
curriculum,  although  a  great  many  people  "felt  certain" 
that  important  values  were  realized  by  the  materials  in 
question.  "Feeling  certain"  that  something  is  true  and 
being  able  to  demonstrate  its  truth  are  two  quite  different 
matters,  as  any  tyro  in  geometry  can  testify ;  and  when 
one's  conviction  is  loudly  and  persistently  challenged,  the 
mere  "feeling"  is  likely  to  satisfy  only  the  person  imme 
diately  concerned. 

An  attitude  is  well  illustrated  by  the  resultant  of  historical 
study.  As  will  be  shown  in  the  sequel/  one  does  not,  from  the 

1  C.  H.  Judd :  Psychology,  New  York,  1907,  pp.  240  f.     (Italics  mine.) 

2  See  below,  pp.  140  ff.,  p.  237. 


68  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

study  of  history,  ordinarily  gain  generalizations  and  principles 
which  are  rationally  applied  to  the  solution  of  existing  prob 
lems.  One  gains  rather  a  perspective  upon  present  problems, 
or  an  attitude  toward  present  problems,  because  one  inter 
prets  them  in  the  light  of  their  genesis,  —  one  sees  them 
through  a  vista  of  the  events  which  led  up  to  them  and  of 
which  they  (the  existing  situations)  are  the  culmination.  If 
one  is  skeptical  of  the  great  difference  in  conduct  that  is 
caused  by  looking  at  situations  through  such  a  medium,  one 
may  quickly  be  convinced  of  this  difference  by  subjecting  some 
problem  to  an  historical  investigation.  Let  a  teacher  take, 
for  example,  some  controverted  question  in  the  teaching  of  his 
own  subject.  And  then  let  him  go  back  over  the  history  of 
teaching  the  subject  and  learn  how  this  problem  arose.  He 
will  find  that  his  attitude  toward  the  problem  has  been  meas 
urably  modified.  The  reaction  to  the  situation  is  vastly 
different  from  what  it  would  have  been  had  he  not  made  this 
historical  excursus. 

The  concept  of  attitude  is  also  illustrated  by  the  difference 
between  the  effect  which  unusual  natural  phenomena  have  upon 
the  ignorant  and  the  effect  which  they  have  upon  those  who 
are  "educated."  Knowledge  has  " liberated"  mankind  from 
the  thralldom  of  mystery  and  fraud,  but  this  enlightenment 
finds  its  commonest  expression  in  an  "attitude"  rather  than  in 
a  series  of  reasoned  judgments.  Those  phenomena  which  once 
aroused  fear  and  dread,  and  stimulated  mankind  to  mystify 
ing  interpretations  and  the  consequent  inadequate  adjust 
ments,  no  longer  exert  their  irritating  influence.  They  have 
been  reduced  to  law  and  order  —  they  have  been  given  their 
proper  place  in  the  scheme  of  things.  So  far  as  the  individual 
is  concerned,  the  "understanding"  of  such  phenomena  results 
in  an  attitude  that  might  be  termed  a  "negative"  adjustment : 
situations  that  would  otherwise  impel  one  to  an  unnecessary 
or  inadequate  response  are  unheeded,  and  mental  energy  is 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      69 

consequently  "freed"  or  "liberated"  and  is  available  for 
other  purposes. 

5.  Prejudices,   tastes,   and  attitudes  are,   like  ideas, 
closely  related  to  habit.     This  relation  is  twofold :    in 
the  first  place,  they  may  initiate  specific  habits,  as  when 
one's  prejudice  in  favor  of  personal  honor  governs  one's 
conduct  in  a  new  situation,  and  repetitions  of  the  same 
experience  gradually  reduce  the  specific  adjustment  to  an 
habitual  response;  in  the  second  place,  prejudices  and  atti 
tudes  may,  under  certain  conditions  to  be  described  later, 
grow  out  of  specific  habits,  —  as  when  the  habits  of 
Sunday    observance,    established    in    early    childhood, 
become  more  or  less  explicitly  formulated  as  ideals  and 
gradually  come  to  express  themselves  in  a  deeply  seated 
prejudice  or  " propensity,"  which  makes  the  lack  of  such 
observance  a  matter  of  discomfort  in  later  life,  even 
though  one's  ideas  of  the  sanctions  for  such  observance 
may  have  undergone  a  radical  change.     The  present  in 
terpretation  of  the  doctrine  of  formal  discipline  is  based 
upon  the  belief  that  specific  habits  may  be  generalized 
into  ideals  and  prejudices  which,  in  turn,  make  possible 
the  acquisition  of  similar  habits  in  new  fields,  —  as  when, 
from  the  specific  habits  of  accuracy  and  close  reasoning 
developed  in  the  school  exercises  in  mathematics,  one 
comes  gradually  to  idealize  accuracy  and  close  thinking 
as  methods  of  procedure  that  will  bring  desirable  results 
in  other  fields. 

6.  The  paramount   importance   of    recognizing   atti 
tudes   and  prejudices   as  resultants   of   the   educative 


70  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

process  is  confirmed  from  two  points  of  view.  In  the 
first  place,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  it  is  in  these  out 
comes  that  the  value  of  a  " general"  education  must  be 
very  largely  expressed ;  in  the  second  place  the  key  to 
moral  training  is  to  be  sought  primarily  in  the  develop 
ment  of  these  controls.  As  James  has  suggested  in  his 
chapter  on  Habit,  they  are  the  great  flywheels  of  society, 
holding  the  conduct  of  men  true  to  the  type  that  social 
experience  has  found  to  be  most  effective  in  maintaining 
social  stability. 

Nor  is  it  only  in  the  consciously-undertaken  processes  of 
formal  education  that  attitudes  and  prejudices  are  significant. 
Recent  investigations  in  the  field  of  mental  pathology  indicate 
very  clearly,  not  only  the  fundamental  import  of  these  factors 
as  controls  of  conduct,  but  also  their  intimate  connection  with 
forms  of  stimulation  and  influence  that  are  not  consciously 
directed  toward  educative  ends.  This  is  clearly  brought  out 
in  the  following  quotation  from  an  authority  in  this  field.1 

"It  is  not  the  good  and  pious  precepts,  nor  is  it  any  other 
inculcation  of  pedagogic  truths,  that  have  a  molding  influ 
ence  upon  the  character  of  the  developing  child ;  but  what  most 
influences  him  is  the  peculiarly  affective  state  which  is  totally 
unknown  to  his  parents  and  educators.  The  concealed  discord 
between  the  parents,  the  secret  worry,  the  repressed  hidden 
wishes,  —  all  these  produce  in  the  individual  a  certain  affec 
tive  state  with  its  objective  signs  which  slowly  but  surely, 
though  unconsciously, 2  works  its  way  into  the  child's  mind, 

1  C.  G.  Jung:    "The  Association  Method,"  Lectures  and  Addresses 
Delivered  before  the  Department  of  Psychology,  Clark  University,  Sept., 
1909,  pp.  66  f. 

2  The  assumption  that  these  influences  are  "unconscious"   seems 
scarcely  warranted.    The  parent  or  the  teacher  may  be  unconscious  of 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      71 

producing  therein  the  same  conditions,  and  hence  the  same 
reactions  to  external  stimuli.  [That  is,  the  same  conduct.] 
.  .  .  The  father  and  mother  impress  deeply  into  the  child's 
mind  the  seal  of  their  personality;  the  more  sensitive  and 
moldable  the  child,  the  deeper  is  the  impression.  Thus  even 
things  that  are  never  spoken  about  are  reflected  in  the 
child." 

How  the  teacher  may  go  about  to  develop  the  proper 
attitudes,  prejudices,  and  tastes,  —  the  "  methodology  " 
of  this  group  of  conduct-controls,  —  is  a  problem  that 
can  here  be  treated  only  in  the  briefest  manner,  for 
the  very  good  reason  that  the  laws  underlying  the  genesis 
of  these  controls  have  yet  to  be  formulated.  In  general, 
it  is  probable  that  the  personality  of  the  teacher  and  the 
"atmosphere"  of  the  school  are  fundamental  factors 
here.  In  other  words,  the  teacher's  own  attitudes  and 
prejudices  must  be  right  (for  attitudes  and  prejudices 
are  the  sum  and  substance  of  that  hitherto  unanalyzed 
quality  that  has  been  termed  personality)  and  the  life 
of  the  school  must  be  impregnated  with  the  positive 
tendencies  which  we  wish  to  have  transferred  to  the  minds 
of  the  pupils.  As  will  be  pointed  out  in  a  later  chapter,1 
the  concrete  realities  surrounding  the  child  are  the  most 
effective  sources  of  his  ideals,  and  it  is  through  the 
repeated  application  of  ideals  that  prejudices  are  de 
veloped. 

their  influence,  and  the  child  himself  may  be  unconscious  of  what  it  is 
that  influences  him,  but  the  resultant  mood  or  disposition  is  certainly 
a  product  of  conscious  processes. 
1  Cf.  ch.  xv. 


72  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

There  is  nothing  so  contagious,  perhaps,  as  the  attitudes, 
tastes,  and  prejudices  of  any  one  who  stands  in  an  authorita 
tive  relation  to  others,  but  unfortunately  the  contagion  is 
sometimes  negative  rather  than  positive;  that  is,  the  atti 
tudes  of  those  in  authority  are  reacted  against,  and  ideals  of 
the  opposite  type  are  engendered.  The  problem  here  is  to 
see  to  it  that  the  teachers  themselves  have  an  adequate  under 
standing  of  the  various  forces  that  may  operate  to  negate  the 
results  of  their  positive  efforts.  Much  of  the  work  of  the 
school  fails  to  "hit  the  mark,"  not  because  the  teacher  does  not 
work  sincerely  and  conscientiously,  but  because  he  is  unaware 
of  the  factors  in  his  own  life  that  are  continually  undoing  the 
work  that  he  has  so  carefully  planned  and  executed.  The  un 
spoken  and  apparently  unexpressed  feelings  and  emotions 
that  hover  in  the  background  of  his  consciousness  are  continu 
ally  revealing  themselves  in  his  bearing,  his  tone  of  voice,  his 
facial  expression,  his  gestures ;  and  the  emotional  tone,  of  which 
these  expressions  are  the  unmistakable  symbols,  is  inevitably 
taken  up  by  those  about  him.  The  writer  is  convinced  that 
many  of  the  deleterious  effects  following  from  such  conditions 
could  be  avoided  if  all  teachers  understood  clearly  the  ease 
with  which  emotional  states  are  communicated,  and  the  conse 
quent  responsibility  which  rests  upon  them  to  govern  the  con 
ditions  of  their  own  lives  so  that  this  silent  but  insistent  influ 
ence  shall  be  wholesome  rather  than  baneful  in  its  effects. 
And  it  goes  without  saying  that  the  community  which 
supports  the  school  should  see  to  it  that  the  teacher  is  able 
to  live  under  economic  conditions  that  will  preclude  at  least 
one  very  disastrous  source  of  worry  and  irritation. 

7.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  formal  instruction, 
the  methodology  of  fixing  the  appropriate  attitudes  and 
prejudices,  once  the  teacher's  personality  and  the  atmos- 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      73 

phere  of  the  school  are  favorable,  differs  in  no  radical 
way  from  the  methodology  of  ideas  and  ideals.  The 
intellectual  attitudes  and  perspectives  result,  it  may 
be  assumed,  from  the  operation  of  facts  and  principles; 
the  emotional  attitudes  (prejudices  and  tastes)  result 
from  the  operation  of  ideals.  There  are,  however,  some 
important  implications  for  the  organization  of  educative 
materials  in  this  connection,  even  if  the  specific  methods 
of  teaching  are  not  materially  affected.  Of  these  the 
most  important  has  to  do  with  the  arrangement  of  facts 
and  principles  in  such  a  way  that  they  will  inevitably 
result  in  appropriate  attitudes  and  perspectives.  If  the 
study  of  history,  for  example,  is  to  give  one  an  effective 
perspective  upon  present  situations,  the  treatment  must 
emphasize  causal  relations ;  it  must  take  the  pupil  back 
into  the  past  and  give  him  a  view  of  the  present  through 
the  medium  of  the  events  which  have  made  the  present 
what  it  is.  Again,  if  the  study  of  natural  science  is  to 
give  one  an  adequate  attitude  toward  the  phenomena  of 
nature,  it  must  explain  these  phenomena  in  the  light  of 
their  causes.  The  coherent,  logical  organization,  which 
is  just  now  in  danger  of  neglect,  is  of  fundamental 
importance  in  this  connection. 

8.  Summary.  The  controls  of  conduct  which  edu 
cation  may  develop  may  be  restated  and  denned  in  the 
following  terms :  — 

(a)  Habits  :  definite  responses  to  definite  stimuli, 
initiated  consciously,  and,  through  practice  and  repeti 
tion,  freed  from  the  necessity  of  conscious  control. 


74  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

(b)  Ideas,  concepts,  and  meanings:  definite  mental 
structures,  representing  consciously  the  objects  and  forces" 
of  the  environment,  and  the  significances  which  these 
objects  and  forces  have  for  the  life  of  the  organism. 
These  controls  function  chiefly  as  interpolated  or  sub 
sidiary  guides  to  adjustment. 

(d)  Ideals,  emotionalized  standards :  mental  structures, 
less  tangible  and  definite  than  ideas,  and  more  highly 
colored  by  emotion,  and,  by  that  token,  more  closely 
related  to  instinct  and  primitive  impulse.     These  con 
trols  function  in  determining  the  purpose,  end,  or  motive 
of  conduct,  as  contrasted  with  ideas,  facts,  and  principles, 
which  are  conscious  guides  to  the  realization  of  pur 
pose. 

(e)  Prejudices,  tastes:   emotional  tendencies  and  dis 
positions,    resembling    habits    in  "many  ways,  but    on 
the  whole  more  general  in  their  reference  and  having  a 
more  noticeable  effect  upon  consciousness;    these  con 
trols   function   in   determining    the   manner   in   which 
situations  are  interpreted. 

(/)  Attitudes,  perspectives:  mental  tendencies  and  dis 
positions,  differing  from  ideas  in  being  less  explicitly 
conscious  in  their  operation,  and  from  both  prejudices 
and  ideals  in  lacking  the  strong  emotional  element. 
Attitudes  determine  the  manner  in  which  situations  are 
interpreted.  In  one  sense,  they  are  closely  related  to 
habits,  the  term  "attitude"  being  somewhat  synony 
mous  with  the  term  "mental  habit"  as  used  by  the  older 
descriptive  psychologists  to  distinguish  an  habitual  or 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT       75 

automatic  mental  tendency  from  a  specific  motor  re 
sponse  or  physical  habit. 

9.  To  multiply  terms  needlessly  has  been  one  of  the 
chief  sins  of  educational  theory.  It  is  easy  to  "  darken 
counsel  by  words  without  meaning,"  and  in  a  complex 
field  like  education  there  is  much  that  is  intangible  and 
hard  to  define  in  any  serviceable  way.  The  writer  has 
hesitated  long  before  committing  himself  to  the  above 
analysis.  It  is  not  presented  as  a  set  of  terms  each  of 
which  connotes  a  distinct  and  unique  set  of  activities, 
for  the  various  factors  that  have  been  isolated  and  classi 
fied  fuse  together  in  a  multitude  of  ways  to  form  the 
infinitely  varied  patterns  in  the  web  of  human  conduct. 
Isolation  and  attempted  definition  in  this  field  must 
always  do  more  or  less  violence  to  actual  conditions. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  believed  that  certain  large  and 
vital  distinctions  are  represented  by  these  five  rubrics, 
—  distinctions  that  are  fundamentally  important  as 
"cues"  to  an  effective  use  of  educative  materials.  It 
is  because,  in  the  actual  work  of  education,  these  dis 
tinctions  are  constantly  recurring, — it  is  because  actual 
practice  has  over  and  over  again  demonstrated  the 
futility  of  neglecting  these  more  intangible  factors  in 
conduct,  —  it  is  for  this  reason  that  an  attempt  has  been 
made  to  dissect  them  out  and  define  them  consistently 
in  terms  of  psychology.  A  distinction  can  be  justified 
only  by  its  effect  upon  practice,  and  the  justification  of 
the  distinctions  that  we  have  made  must  be  left  to  the 
following  chapters.  When  we  state  that  a  certain  sub- 


76  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

ject  of  school  instruction  should  result  in  specific  habits 
and  that  another  should  result  in  ideals,  and  still  another 
in  attitudes,  the  statement  should  carry  with  it  a  dis 
tinctive  "cue"  for  educational  adjustment.  It  should 
suggest  a  distinctive  position  for  the  subject  in  the  gen 
eral  curriculum  of  education,  and,  more  than  this,  it 
should  suggest  a  distinctive  method  of  treatment  spe 
cifically  designed  to  develop  the  desired  control.  If  our 
distinctions  give  us  effective  "cues"  to  the  solution  of 
the  problems  of  organization  and  instruction,  then  the 
classification  will  be  justified.  If  they  fail  to  help  us 
in  this  way,  they  will  be  futile,  no  matter  how  distinc 
tive  the  differentiae. 

It  is  true  that  psychological  investigation  has  not  as 
yet  furnished  sufficient  data  to  permit  the  establishment 
of  principles  that  are  unquestionably  true.  In  some 
cases  reliable  data  are  at  hand ;  in  other  cases  —  far 
more  numerous  than  one  would  wish  —  it  will  be  neces 
sary  to  base  our  conclusions  upon  what  may  be  termed 
"working  hypotheses,"  built  up  from  the  best  material 
that  is  available  and  "pieced  out"  by  inference  and  anal 
ogy.  In  other  words,  the  time  is  far  in  the  future  when 
a  final  statement  of  educational  functions  can  be  made. 
If  we  could  postpone  the  demands  of  practice  indefinitely, 
we  might  insure  with  absolute  certainty  against  mis 
takes  that  have  their  source  in  false  assumptions  or 
erroneous  conclusions.  But  happily  or  unhappily,  the 
demands  of  practice  cannot  await  the  refinements  of 
theory.  Educational  progress  to-day  is  largely  deter- 


THE  ACQUIRED  CONTROLS  OF  CONDUCT      77 

mined  by  a  process  of  trial,  error,  and  chance  success. 
A  new  doctrine  is  proposed  and  " tried  out"  in  practice ; 
it  is  discarded  or  continued  according  to  the  verdict  of 
those  who  use  it.  If  it  is  continued,  it  is  generally  so 
profoundly  modified  as  scarcely  to  retain  a  recognizable 
resemblance  to  its  original  form.  And  yet,  slowly  but 
surely,  progress  is  being  made.  To  the  acceleration  of 
this  progress  no  step  is,  in  the  writer's  opinion,  so  thor 
oughly  essential  as  agreement  among  educators  upon 
some  principle  of  valuation ;  and,  to  this  end,  as  has  been 
shown,  it  is  necessary,  first  of  all,  to  determine  with 
approximate  certainty  the  ways  in  which  the  various 
phases  of  the  educative  process  affect  the  conduct  of 
the  individual. 

In  this  connection,  a  question  of  a  very  general  nature 
still  remains  to  be  considered;  namely,  Within  what 
limits  is  human  conduct  amenable  to  educative  influ 
ences?  This  problem  will  be  treated  very  briefly  in 
the  following  chapter. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  LIMITATIONS  or  EDUCATIVE  FORCES  IN  MODIFYING 
CONDUCT 

i.  SIGNIFICANT  additions  to  the  habits,  the  items  of 
knowledge,  the  ideals,  and  the  resultant  attitudes  and 
prejudices,  which  may  be  termed  generically  the 
culture-heritage  of  the  race,  are  made  through  the 
experience  of  discoverers,  inventors,  investigators,  — • 
men  who  gain  new  insights  into  the  forces  that  play  upon 
them,  make  new  adjustments  to  these  forces,  and  then, 
through  social  heredity,  give  to  the  mass  of  mankind 
the  benefit  of  their  experience.  This  capacity  to  depart 
in  some  measure  from  the  customary  conduct  of  the  race, 
to  distinguish  new  situations  which  thereafter  become 
"cues"  for  new  and  improved  adjustment,  is  so  relatively 
rare  that  the  individuals  possessing  it  are  by  common 
consent  recognized  as  differing  essentially  from  the 
average  of  humanity,  and  are  classed  as  exceptions  or 
"geniuses."  When  their  discoveries  fill  a  recognized 
gap  in  the  culture-materials  of  the  race,  the  rewards  in 
the  forms  of  honor,  homage,  and  worldly  emoluments  are 
frequently  surprisingly  large.  The  question  naturally 
arises,  Can  education,  by  the  proper  employment  of 
its  materials,  increase  the  number  of  individuals  possess- 

78 


THE    LIMITATIONS   OF   EDUCATIVE   FORCES  79 

ing  this  capacity  for  " initiating"  new  modes  of  ad 
justment?  In  other  words,  Can  education  contribute 
in  any  way  to  the  production  of  " genius"? 
£2.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  education  may  influence 
tne  individual  of  exceptional  capacity  precisely  as  it 
influences  the  individual  of  ordinary  capacity;  namely, 
it  may  raise  him  to  the  culture-level  that  the  race  has 
reached,  —  it  may  transmit  to  him  the  culture-materials 
that  the  past  experience  of  the  race  has  furnished.  In 
fact,  the  genius,  because  of  his  exceptional  capacity, 
may  frequently  profit  more  effectively  by  an  educative 
process  than  can  a  person  of  ordinary  capacity.  His 
advancements  must  be  made  upon  the  summit  of  the 
pyramid  which  represents  the  past  acquisitions  of  the 
race;  otherwise,  though  they  may  be  "new"  to  him, 
they  will  not  constitute  a  contribution  to  social  progress. 
This,  however,  does  not  mean  that  education  is  in  any 
way  responsible  for  the  exceptional  capacity  of  the  indi 
vidual  who  is  thus  subjected  to  its  processes.  It  is 
responsible  only  for  the  level  upon  which  that  capacity 
operates. 

3.  Again,  education  may,  through  the  application  of 
principles  gleaned  from  race-experience,  so  modify  the 
physical  constitution  of  the  individual  that  certain  ca 
pacities,  otherwise  precluded  from  operation,  will  be  per 
mitted  to  function  effectively.  Thus  native  capacity 
might  be  delayed  in,  or  prevented  from,  its  normal 
development  by  unfortunate  physical  conditions.  The 
thyroid  gland,  for  example,  which,  in  some  way,  at 


80  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

present  a  matter  of  mystery,  is  so  essential  to  normal 
mental  development,  may  be  defective  or  entirely  lack 
ing.  Educative  forces  (using  the  term  in  a  broad  sense 
to  cover  all  consciously-undertaken  environmental  influ 
ences)  may  supply  the  missing  element  in  the  form  of 
thyroid-extract,  and  so  insure  normal  development. 
Or,  through  insufficiency  of  food,  or  lack  of  appropriate 
external  stimuli,  the  nascent  capacities  may  fail  of 
development.  In  cases  of  this  sort,  educative  forces 
may  correct  the  environment  and  so  make  possible  a 
normal  growth.  But  again  it  is  quite  clear  that  educa 
tion  does  not  create  the  capacity.  It  simply  provides 
the  appropriate  stimuli  and  opportunities  which  develop 
capacity. 

4.  The  question  might  be  raised,  however,  Are  not 
these  differences  that  we  term  differences  of  mental 
capacity,  —  differences  in  ability  to  detect  new  situations 
and  make  new  adjustments,  —  due  to  differences  in 
early  training  and  environment  rather  than  to  differences 
in  native  or  inherited  endowment  ?  In  the  light  of  our 
present  knowledge  concerning  this  problem,  this  question 
must  be  answered  in  the  negative.  Capacity  for  initia 
tion  seems  to  be  inherent  in  the  nervous  structure  of 
some  individuals,  lacking  in  others.  What  its  physical 
basis  is,  —  with  what  differences  of  nerve-structure  or 
nerve-quality  it  is  correlated,  —  cannot  be  determined 
at  the  present  time,  but  of  the  general  fact  of  "  congenital 
variation"  in  capacity  there  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt. 

The  evidence  for  this  conclusion  can  be  only  briefly 


THE   LIMITATIONS   OF   EDUCATIVE   FORCES  8 1 

sketched  in  this  connection.  Fundamentally,  the  argu 
ment  against  the  assumption  that  such  differences  are 
to  be  attributed  primarily  to  environmental  or  educa 
tional  forces  owes  its  cogency  to  the  fact  that  mental 
capacity  follows  the  same  laws  with  regard  to  its  appearance 
and  its  transmissibility  as  do  the  physical  characteristics 
that  are  admittedly  not  acquired. 

(a)  The  a  priori  argument  to  the  contrary  can  be  met 
on  its  own  ground.  Exceptional  capacity,  like  varia 
tions  in  physical  structure,  may  "crop  out"  from  lines 
of  descent  that  have,  for  generations,  been  perfectly 
normal  or  " ordinary."  This  stamps  genius  as  a  "  varia 
tion"  representing  some  analogous  physical  variation 
in  the  structure  or  function  of  the  nervous  system. 

The  sudden  and  unheralded  appearance  of  genius  from 
sources  that  seem  most  unpromising  is,  therefore,  a  fact  in 
favor  of  the  native  character  of  genius  rather  than  a  factx 
that  would  argue  against  such  an  explanation.  Lincoln,  the 
product  of  a  most  unpromising  heredity,  is  sometimes  cited 
by  the  advocates  of  the  influence  of  the  development  of  ca 
pacity  through  environmental  forces.  The  conditions  of  life 
under  which  Lincoln  grew  up  can  reasonably  be  assumed 
to  have  developed  those  qualities  of  head  and  heart  that  are 
recognized  as  constituting  his  greatness.  The  struggle  with 
poverty,  it  may  be  urged,  developed  a  keenness  of  judgment 
and  a  clearness  of  vision  that  a  man  brought  up  under  easier 
and  "softer"  conditions  might  have  lacked.  The  opportuni 
ties  of  a  free  and  democratic  life  in  a  new  country  brought 
forth  the  deep  and  penetrating  sympathy  that  so  thoroughly 
characterized  his  later  adjustments.  The  answer  to  these 
arguments  is  obvious  enough.  Of  the  thousands  of  men 


82  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

who  were  products  of  the  same  environment,  Lincoln  was 
the  only  man  to  achieve  this  degree  of  eminence. 

The  case  of  John  Stuart  Mill  has  also  been  frequently  cited 
as  showing,  in  quite  the  opposite  way,  the  influence  of  environ 
ment.  The  carefully  planned  educative  process  to  which 
James  Mill  subjected  his  son  may  be  reasonably  urged  as  an 
adequate  explanation  of  the  son's  remarkable  capacity.  But 
other  fathers  have  certainly  subjected  their  sons  to  excellent 
educative  processes  without  obtaining  proportionately  re 
markable  results. 

In  both  cases,  capacity  can  be  much  more  satisfactorily 
accounted  for  by  the  principle  of  variation,  —  in  Lincoln's 
case  by  original  "fortuitous"  variation ;  in  Mill's  case  by  in 
herited  organic  variation.  This  theory  is  much  the  simpler, 
and  consequently,  by  the  principle  of  parsimony,  is  the  one 
to  be  chosen.  In  both  cases,  however,  the  influence  of  the 
environment  is  not  to  be  neglected.  In  both  cases,  doubtless, 
the  forces  of  the  environment,  acting  upon  the  inherited  tend 
encies,  stimulated  these  tendencies  to  appropriate  develop 
ment  and  function. 

5.  (&)  In  the  second  place,  this  fact — that  differences 
in  mental  capacity  follow  the  same  laws  with  regard  to 
their  inheritance  as  do  variations  in  physical  character 
istics  —  has  been  fairly  well  established  through  a  series  of 
investigations  that  merit  much  more  extended  treatment 
than  can  be  accorded  in  this  place.  It  will  be  well,  how 
ever,  to  notice  a  few  of  the  more  significant  of  them,  and 
a  few  also  of  the  investigations  that  tend  to  confirm  the 
opposite  contention. 

(a)  Investigations  into  the  Conditions  of  Eminence,  (i)  Gal- 
ton's  Studies.  The  first  investigations  of  note  in  this  field 


THE    LIMITATIONS   OF   EDUCATIVE   FORCES  83 

were  those  of  Sir  Francis  Galton,  the  results  of  which  were 
published  in  1869  in  his  " Hereditary  Genius."  Galton  in 
vestigated  the  heredity  of  a  number  of  men  that  the  world 
agrees  to  designate  as  geniuses,  and  also  that  of  a  number  of 
others,  who,  while  not  reaching  the  plane  of  genius,  may  still 
be  characterized  as  illustrious  or  eminent.  He  maintains 
that  eminence  is  due  to  three  factors :  zeal,  ability,  and  a  ca 
pacity  for  hard  work ;  and  that  these  factors  are  " native" 
are  not  modified  in  any  appreciable  degree  by  environmental 
forces.  To  prove  this  thesis,  he  considers  several  types  of  emi 
nence:  English  judges,  English  peers,  military  leaders, 
artists,  scientists,  musicians,  poets,  painters,  and  divines. 
These  he  groups  into  three  classes :  (i)  those  whose  genealogy 
shows  one  eminent  relative ;  (2)  those  having  two  or  three 
eminent  relatives ;  and  (3)  those  having  four  or  more  eminent 
relatives.  From  his  results  it  appears  that  the  most  distin 
guished  among  the  persons  he  selects  fall,  generally,  in  the 
third  class,  and  this  third  class  is  usually  larger  than  either 
of  the  others.  That  is,  the  greater  the  man,  the  greater  the 
number  of  eminent  relatives.  As  illustrations,  the  following 
may  be  cited :  Napoleon,  Caesar,  and  Scipio  among  military 
leaders;  Macaulay,  Fielding,  Schlegel,  Sidney,  and  Hallam 
among  writers ;  Arago,  Bacon,  and  Boyle  among  scientists ; 
Mozart  among  musicians ;  Titian,  Ponte,  and  Veccelli  among 
painters ;  and  Junius,  Usher,  and  Herbert  among  divines. 

It  is  clearly  apparent  that,  although  the  most  eminent  men 
selected  are  found  to  have  distinguished  relatives,  the  most 
eminent  men  in  the  various  fields  covered  by  the  investigation 
were  not  always  chosen  by  Galton  for  his  study.  Thus  Shake 
speare's  name  is  not  even  mentioned,  while  Goethe,  Byron, 
Racine,  and  Heine  are  credited  with  but  two  relatives  of  note, 
and  Galton  admits  that  these  are  so  far  removed  as  probably 
to  preclude  any  inferences  from  the  relationship.  Among 
divines,  Luther's  name  finds  no  place. 


84  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

Galton's  studies,  then,  are  open  to  criticism  in  respect  of  the 
selections  that  he  makes.  The  cases  that  would  count  against 
his  argument  seem  to  have  been  carefully  excluded.1  For  ex 
ample,  in  a  supplementary  list  of  great  statesmen,  whose  gen 
ealogy  he  traces,  the  name  of  but  one  American  family  is  to  be 
found.  It  is  not  that  of  Washington,  or  Lincoln,  or  Clay; 
these  men  he  passes  over,  while  he  selects  the  Adamses.  A 
plainer  case  of  selecting  the  exception  in  order  to  support  a 
theory  would  be  hard  to  find.  Again  he  limits  the  main 
materials  of  his  study  to  the  eminent  men  of  England,  and 
consequently  selects  from  a  society  in  which  class-distinctions 
are  relatively  rigid,  and  in  which  the  candidates  for  positions 
that  give  eminence  are  very  largely  drawn  from  the  small  mi 
nority  of  the  upper  classes.  When  he  considers  literary  genius, 
which  is  obviously  less  trammeled  by  bonds  of  caste,  he  finds, 
out  of  thirty-seven  eminent  men  selected,  only  eleven  that 
fall  in  his  third  class,  —  that  is,  among  those  having  four 
or  more  eminent  relatives. 

Notwithstanding  the  weak  points  in  Galton's  evidence,  his 
conclusion  that  exceptional  ability  cannot  be  created  by  the 
environment  is  fairly  well  established.  He  has  failed  to  show, 
however,  that  the  hereditary  factors  that  he  mentions,  — 
ability,  zeal,  and  the  capacity  for  hard  work,  —  cannot  be  in 
creased  or  diminished  by  environmental  or  educative  influ 
ences.  The  conclusion  that  his  investigations  justify  is  that 
there  is  an  extreme  likelihood  that  these  qualities  are  very 
largely  factors  of  heredity.2 

1  Galton  recognized  the  operation  of  this  factor.      Cf.  Hereditary 
Genius,  p.  322. 

2  The  frequently  cited  instance  of  the  Popes'  adopted  sons,  adduced 
by  Galton  to  prove  the  inadequacy  of  the  environment  in  creating  ability, 
has  several  weaknesses  that  have  not  always  been  noted.     In  the  first 
place,  such  "sons"  were  frequently  nephews,  and  consequently  possessed 
some  of  the  hereditary  characteristics  that  the  Popes  themselves  pos- 


THE    LIMITATIONS   OF   EDUCATIVE   FORCES  85 

(2)  De  Candolle's  Investigations.     Gallon's  conclusion  that 
the  factors  conditioning  genius  may  in  part  be  transmitted 
by  the  forces  of  physical  heredity  has   not   been  seriously 
questioned ;   but  his  contention  that  genius  will  always  come 
into  its  own  in  spite  of  environmental  conditions  has  met 
with   active    opposition.      DeCandolle1  was   the   first    in 
vestigator  seriously  to  question  this  contention.     He  made 
a  statistical   study  of  the  men  of   genius  represented  by 
the  membership  of  the  three  academies  of  science,  Paris, 
Berlin,  and  London.     He  reached  the  conclusion  that  at  least 
nineteen  different  factors  condition  the  development  of  genius, 
and,  of  these,  heredity  is  only  one.     In  other  words,  innate 
capacity  is  not  likely  to  come  into  its  own  unless  some  im 
portant  environmental  conditions  are  fulfilled,  and  among 
these  formal  education  has  a  place. 

(3)  Odin's  Investigations.     Much  more  thoroughgoing  and 
trustworthy  are  the  investigations  of  Odin 2  upon  the  condi 
tions  favoring  the  development  of  literary  talent.     He  found 
that  the  5620  notable  French  authors  whom  he  studied  were 
not  distributed  equitably  among  the  French-speaking  people, 
but  that  certain  localities,  especially  the  larger  cities,  produced 
a  much  larger  proportion  than  certain  other  localities,  particu- 

sessed.  Gallon's  assertion,  therefore,  that  the  history  of  the  Papacy 
records  no  instance  of  an  adopted  son's  attaining  eminence  proves  almost 
too  much.  Again,  even  neglecting  this  factor,  the  consciousness  that  one 
is  only  an  adopted  son  and  not  the  physical  offspring  of  one's  foster- 
parents  may  conceivably  preclude  the  operation  of  certain  incentives  that 
might  otherwise  stimulate  one  to  unusual  achievement  for  the  "pride 
of  the  race."  Cf.  Hereditary  Genius,  New  York,  1871,  p.  42. 

1  A.  de  Candolle :    Histoire  des  sciences  et  des  savants  depuis  deux 
siecles,  Geneva,   1873.     (Second  edition,  Geneva,  1885.)     Summarized 
from  Ward. 

2  A.  Odin :    Genese  des  grands  hammes,  Paris,  1895.      See  especially 
vol.    i,   pp.   543   ff.;    also  Ward's  excellent  summary  in  his  Applied 
Sociology. 


86  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

larly  the  country  districts.  Furthermore,  this  distribution  was 
quite  disproportionate  to  the  differences  in  population.  Thus 
Geneva  (including  its  immediate  environment)  was  the  birth 
place  of  the  largest  number  of  eminent  writers  in  proportion 
to  its  population;  Paris  and  its  vicinity  came  next;  then, 
with  a  very  pronounced  decrease  in  the  proportion,  came 
Marseilles;  other  cities  of  still  less  importance  were  Dijon, 
Avignon,  Lyons,  Orleans,  and  Metz.  The  conclusion  is  that 
the  advantages  offered  by  urban  life,  and  by  a  community  of 
ideals  and  standards  of  evaluating  .effort,  are  extremely  im 
portant  in  the  development  of  native  talent. 

(4)  Cattell' s  Investigations.  This  conclusion  receives  some 
measure  of  confirmation  from  the  statistical  studies  more  re 
cently  made  by  Cattell 1  regarding  American  men  of  science. 
Out  of  a  total  of  867  eminent  men  of  science,  the  New  England 
states  have  furnished  a  much  larger  number  in  proportion  to 
the  population  than  any  other  section  of  the  country. 

The  conclusions  that  have  been  drawn  from  these  three 
last-named  investigations  are  preponderantly  in  favor  of  the 
environment  as  the  determining  factor  in  the  development  of 
talent,  although  they  do  not  prove  that  superior  ability  is  not 
primarily  due  to  variation  and  heredity.  As  Thorndike  has 
pointed  out, 2  the  data  adduced  by  Odin  and  Cattell  do  not 
justify  a  conclusion  that  heredity  is  not  an  important  factor, 
for  the  environments  that  are  found  to  be  favorable  for  the 
development  of  talent  are  also  the  environments  which  attract 
the  men  of  talent ;  in  other  words,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  rest 
simply  with  the  conclusion  that  the  birth  rate  in  certain  lo 
calities  is  likely  to  show  a  higher  proportion  of  individuals 
who  later  become  eminent ;  it  must  also  be  recognized  that 

1  J.  McK.  Cattell :  "A  Statistical  Study  of  American  Men  of  Science," 
Science,  vol.  xlvi,    1906,  pp.  732  ff. 

2  Educational  Psychology,  New  York,  1910  (20!  edition),  pp.  122  f. 


THE   LIMITATIONS   OF   EDUCATIVE   FORCES  87 

these  localities  are  likely  to  draw  to  them  as  residents  men  of 
exceptional  ability.  Thus,  while  the  university  city  of  Cam 
bridge,  Massachusetts,  has  much  more  than  a  normal  propor 
tion  of  eminent  individuals  among  those  who  claim  it  as  a 
birthplace,  it  is  also  true  that  a  disproportionate  number  of 
eminent  men  are  drawn  to  Cambridge,  and  there  become  par 
ents  of  children  who  may  be  presumed  to  inherit  some  of  their 
exceptional  qualities. 

(b)  Heredity  in  Royalty.  Another  type  of  investigation  is 
represented  by  Frederick  Adams  Woods's  "  Mental  and  Moral 
Heredity  in  Royalty."  1  Woods  escapes  the  fallacy  of  selec 
tion  which  beset  Galton,  by  choosing  a  group  every  individual 
of  which  could  be  investigated  as  to  ancestry  and  achieve 
ments,  and  also  gauged  with  a  fair  degree  of  nicety  in  respect 
of  his  mental  and  moral  qualities.  Obviously  there  is  but  one 
group  whose  genealogical  records  are  kept  with  sufficient  care 
to  permit  such  treatment,  and  that  group  is  royalty.  By  ex 
amining  the  principal  royal  families  of  Europe,  Woods  reached 
the  conclusion  that  both  mental  capacity  and  moral  excellence 
"go  with  the  blood,"  and  are  furthermore  not  essentially 
modified  by  the  environment.  He  chose  fifteen  families,  of 
which  about  3500  representatives  were  studied.  He  graded 
the  intellectual  and  moral  traits  of  these  representatives  on  a 
scale  of  ten,  —  "one"  representing  the  lowest  order  of  merit, 
and  "  ten  "  the  highest.  In  grading  these  qualities,  he  used  as 
a  standard  the  adjectives  that  biographers  and  historians 
employ  in  describing  these  royal  personages.  If  the  leading 
biographers  characterized  a  king's  mental  attainments  as  emi 
nent  or  illustrious,  a  grade  of  nine  or  ten  was  accorded  him ; 
if  he  was  characterized  as  an  imbecile  or  a  fool,  he  was  given  the 
grade  one  or  two.  Moral  qualities  were  treated  in  the  same 
general  way.  Drawing  the  information  from  a  number  of 

1  New  York,  1906. 


88  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

authorities  lessened,  of  course,  the  chance  of  error,  —  that  is, 
the  errors  in  the  judgment  of  the  authorities  tended  to  coun 
terbalance  one  another. 

A  better  idea  of  the  nature  of  Woods's  evidence  may  be 
gained  by  reference  to  some  of  the  better-known  characters 
that  fall  in  the  various  grades.  Ranking  in  Grade  III  for 
intellectual  capacity  —  that  is,  ranking  low  in  intellect  —  are 
George  II  and  William  IV  of  England ;  in  Grade  IV,  George 
IV ;  in  Grade  I,  Louis  XVI  of  France ;  in  Grade  VI,  Victoria 
of  England ;  in  Grade  VII,  William  I  of  Germany ;  in  Grade 
VIII,  Alexander  I  of  Russia ;  in  Grade  IX,  the  chief  male  fig 
ures  are  William  III  of  England,  Peter  the  Great  of  Russia, 
Charles  XII  of  Sweden,  and  Henry  the  Navigator  of  Portugal ; 
and,  in  a  line  closely  related  to  royalty,  Admiral  Coligny  of 
France.  Among  women  of  Grade  IX  is  Maria  Theresa. 
Grade  X,  representing  the  highest  rank  in  intellectual  ability, 
includes  the  following :  Louis  II,  the  Great  Conde ;  William 
the  Silent ;  John  the  Great  of  Portugal ;  Frederick  the  Great 
of  Prussia ;  Frederick  William,  the  Great  Elector ;  Gustavus 
Adolphus  and  Gustavus  Vasa  of  Sweden ;  Margaret  of  Na 
varre;  Catherine  of  Russia;  Anne,  Mademoiselle  Mont- 
pensier ;  Anne,  Duchess  of  Longueville ;  Sophia  Electress, 
daughter  of  Frederick  V;  Louisa  Ulrica  of  Sweden;  and 
Isabella  of  Castile.  In  the  grading  of  moral  qualities,  it  is 
sufficient  to  say  that  Christian  VII  of  Denmark,  Catherine  II 
of  Russia,  and  George  IV  were  near  the  foot  of  the  list ; 
William  the  Silent,  Prince  Albert  (consort  of  Victoria),  Vic 
toria,  and  Isabella  of  Portugal  were  at  or  near  the  head  of 
the  list. 

The  significant  feature  of  Woods's  investigation  lies  in  the 
fact  that  the  highest  qualities  of  intellect  and  morality  are 
centered  about  a  very  few  hereditary  strains.  Among  the 
fifteen  families  that  he  studies,  four  furnish  practically  all  of 
the  most  eminent  individuals.  These  are  the  House  of  Or- 


THE   LIMITATIONS    OF   EDUCATIVE   FORCES  89 

ange,  represented  most  illustriously  by  William  the  Silent; 
the  Prussian  royal  family,  represented  by  Frederick  the  Great ; 
the  Castile  line,  represented  by  Isabella;  and  the  Swedish 
house,  represented  by  Gustavus  Adolphus.  Furthermore,  he 
shows  that  those  in  the  highest  grades  have  more  relatives  in 
the  better  and  more  capable  half  of  the  list  that/  in  the  worse 
and  less  competent  half.  Finally  his  results  show  that  certain 
families  are  almost  entirely  confined  to  the  limits  of  royal  me 
diocrity,  never  getting  very  far  above  Grade  VI,  and  never 
very  far  below  Grade  V.  Among  these  are  the  houses  of 
Hanover,  Saxe-Coburg,  Gotha-Mecklenburg,  Hapsburg,  Or 
leans,  and  Saxony,  and  the  ruling  families  of  Denmark  and 
modern  Portugal. 

Regarding  certain  influences  of  the  environment  that  are 
generally  supposed  to  be  peculiarly  "formative,"  Woods 
reaches  this  conclusion:  "If  conditions  of  turmoil,  stress, 
and  adversity  are,  as  some  believe  them  to  be,  strong  forces  in 
the  production  of  the  great  men,  there  is  no  evidence  from  the 
study  of  royalty  to  support  such  a  view.  Wars  have  been  in 
progress  during  much  of  the  period  [covered  by  the  investi 
gations].  Sometimes  the  royal  hero  has  made  his  appearance, 
but  more  often  he  has  not.  It  was  not  alone  in  the  days  of 
Henry  IV  of  France  and  Gustavus  Adolphus  of  Sweden  that 
the  times  called  for  great  men.  The  times  are  continually 
calling  for  great  men.  Never  did  a  dying  country  call  more 
urgently  than  Spain  in  the  last  three  centuries,  but  none  has 
yet  appeared.  Italy  had  to  wait  fifty  years  in  bondage  for  her 
deliverers, —  Cavour,  Garibaldi,  and  Victor  Emanuel.  Eng 
land  could  not  get  a  good  Stuart,  but  in  a  descendant  of  Wil 
liam  of  Orange,  she  found  a  hero  in  William  III.  .  .  . 

"Therefore  it  would  seem  that  we  are  forced  to  the  conclu 
sion  that  all  these  rough  differences  in  intellectual  activity 
which  are  susceptible  of  grading  on  a  scale  of  ten  are  due  to 
predetermined  differences  in  the  primary  germ-cells." 


90  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

(c)  Studies  of  Consanguineal  Resemblances  in  Mental 
Traits,  (i)  Pearson's  Investigations  of  Brothers.  The  refine 
ments  of  statistical  methods  have  made  possible  some  com 
parative  studies  of  heredity  and  environment  which  add 
interesting  testimony  to  the  conclusions  foreshadowed  by 
Galton's  early  studies  and  substantiated  in  large  measure 
by  Woods.  Karl  Pearson's  investigation  *  of  the  relation 
between  the  mental  and  physical  characteristics  of  brothers 
is  especially  significant.  Pearson's  "coefficient  of  correla 
tion"  is  a  mathematically  derived  symbol  which  indicates  the 
relationship  which  two  groups  of  individuals  bear  to  one  an 
other  in  any  trait  or  characteristic  which  can  be  measured. 
If,  for  example,  out  of  a  thousand  pairs  of  brothers  measured 
as  to  height,  it  were  found  that  the  two  tallest  individuals 
were  brothers  and  the  two  shortest  individuals  brothers, 
and  that  for  every  grade  between  the  tallest  and  the  shortest, 
brothers  fell  together,  then  the  index  of  correlation  for  height 
among  the  one  thousand  brothers  would  be  represented  by 
the  symbol  -f-  i.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  individuals  on 
the  "tall"  side  of  the  scale  invariably  had  brothers  who  fell 
at  corresponding  places  on  the  "short"  side  of  the  scale,  the 
index  of  correlation  would  be  —  i.  In  the  one  case  there 
would  be  a  perfect  direct  relation  of  brothers  as  to  height :  in 
the  second  case,  there  would  be  a  perfect  inverse  relation. 
On  its  surface,  such  an  outcome  of  measurement  would  be 
impossible.  It  might  well  be,  however,  that  between 
these  two  extremes,  a  coefficient  could  be  found  that 
would  express  accurately  the  relation  that  normally  ex 
ists  in  stature  between  brothers.  Thus  a  coefficient  of 
+.80  would  represent  a  high  degree  of  resemblance;  a 
coefficient  of  —.80,  a  high  degree  of  discrepancy  or  differ- 

1  K.  Pearson:  "On  the  Laws  of  Inheritance  in  Man,"  Biometrika, 
vol.  iii,  Pt.  II,  pp.  131-190. 


THE   LIMITATIONS   OF   EDUCATIVE   FORCES  91 

ence,  while  the  coefficient  o  would  mean  that  no  uniform 
relation  whatsoever  existed.1 

Pearson  utilized  this  method  in  comparing  the  mental  and 
physical  resemblance  of  two  thousand  pairs  of  brothers.  These 
brothers  were  graded  by  their  teachers  with  reference  to  cer 
tain  mental  characteristics.  The  grades  were  then  arranged 
in  order  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest,  and  the  relationship 
of  the  brothers  determined.  The  following  table  gives  the 
results : — 

Ability +.46 

Self-assertiveness 53 

Vivacity 47 

Conscientiousness 59 

Popularity 50 

Temper 51 

Self-consciousness .59 

Shyness 52 

Handwriting 53 

Average 52 

t 

These  figures  mean  that  in  the  average  of  a  thousand  cases, 
brothers  resemble  one  another  very  markedly  in  respect  of  the 
qualities  measured.  A  very  "capable"  individual  is  likely 
to  have  a  brother  whose  capability  is  much  above  the  aver 
age,  while  a  dull  or  mediocre  individual  is  likely  to  have  a 
brother  who  is  dull  or  mediocre.  Now  if  it  be  proved  that 
environmental  and  educative  influences  are  approximately  the 
same  for  brothers  and  will  consequently  produce  the  same 
results,  the  resemblance  is  not  due  to  inherited  traits,  but  to  a 

1  For  a  description  of  this  method  of  measuring  relationships,  see 
G.  M.  Whipple:  Manual  of  Mental  and  Physical  Tests,  Baltimore, 
1910,  ch.  i.  Thorndike  (Educational  Psychology,  1910,  p.  189)  seriously 
questions  the  accuracy  of  all  correlation  coefficients  calculated  prior  to 
Spearman's  critique  of  the  method  in  1904. 


92  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

similarity  in  environment.  The  significant  fact  in  Pearson's 
results  is  that  the  degree  of  resemblance  which  he  finds  be 
tween  the  mental  traits  of  brothers  is  almost  precisely  the 
same  as  the  degree  of  resemblance  between  physical  traits 
that  are  unquestionably  not  only  inherited  but  also  unmodi- 
fiable  by  external  influences.  Thus  the  average  of  the  coeffi 
cients  of  resemblance  of  brothers  in  respect  of  stature,  color  of 
the  hair,  size  of  the  head,  length  of  the  arm,  color  of  the  eyes, 
etc.,  is  +.517,  which  is  almost  the  same  as  the  average  of  the 
coefficients  for  mental  resemblance. 

Pearson's  work  has  been  criticized  by  Spearman  l  on  the 
ground  that  teachers'  gradings  are  peculiarly  liable  to  chance 
errors,  but  he  concludes  that,  if  these  errors  operate  as  he 
supposes  them  to,  the  coefficients  would  really  be  higher  than 
those  which  Pearson  has  published.  Thorndike2  also  criti 
cizes  Pearson  for  underestimating  the  importance  of  the  errors 
in  grading,  and  for  permitting  the  factor  of  suggestion  to  op 
erate  in  the  directions  given  to  the  teachers  who  did  the 
grading;  he  also  maintains  that  Pearson's  conclusions  from 
his  data  should  be  seriously  questioned  because  it  cannot 
be  determined  just  what  the  data  measure.3 

(2)  Studies  of  Twins.  That  light  upon  the  problem  of 
mental  inheritance  could  be  gained  by  a  comparison  of  the 
mental  resemblances  between  twins  first  suggested  itself  to 
Galton.4  He  secured  data  regarding  (i)  twins  who,  while 

1  C.  Spearman  :  American  Journal  of  Psychology,  vol.  xv.,  1904,  pp.  97  ff. 

2  E.  L.  Thorndike  :  op.  tit.,  pp.  80  ff. 

3  Cf.  Thorndike,  op.  tit.,  p.  84:   "To  prove  that  conscientiousness  is 
independent  of  training  is  to  prove  too  much.     One  fears  that  Professor 
Pearson  may  next  produce  coefficients  of  correlation  to  show  that  the 
political  party  that  a  man  joins,  the  place  where  he  lives,  and  the  dialect 
that  he  speaks  are  matters  of  pure  inheritance  uninfluenced  by  family 
training." 

4  F.  Galton :  Inquiries  into  Human  Facidty  and  its  Development,  Lon 
don,  1883,  pp.  226  ff. 


THE   LIMITATIONS   OF   EDUCATIVE   FORCES  93 

alike  in  childhood,  spent  their  mature  years  under  different 
environmental  conditions  and  (2)  twins  who,  dissimilar  at 
birth,  grew  up  under  practically  identical  environmental 
conditions.  He  believes  that  his  data  justify  the  conclusion 
that  mental  resemblance  persists  in  the  first  case,  and  that 
mental  resemblance  is  not  induced  by  similar  environments 
in  the  second  case.  He  reached  this  conclusion,  not  by 
actual  measurements,  but  by  comparing  statements  made  by 
parents. 

Thorndike's  more  recent  study  of  twins l  gives  evidence  that 
in  a  measure  confirms  this  conclusion.  Fifty  pairs  of  twins 
from  nine  to  fifteen  years  of  age  were  measured  with  reference 
to  mental  and  physical  resemblances.  Six  tests  were  em 
ployed  to  determine  mental  resemblance :  (i)  the  ability  of 
the  subject  to  detect  and  mark  A's  on  a  page  of  "  pied  "type ; 
(2)  the  ability  to  detect  and  mark  words  containing  a  and  / 
and  e  and  r  on  a  printed  page;  (3)  the  ability  to  detect 
misspelled  words  on  a  printed  page ;  (4)  ability  in  addition ; 
(5)  ability  in  multiplication ;  (6)  ability  to  give  the  word  op 
posite  in  meaning  to  a  stimulus  word  (good-bad,  false-true, 
and  the  like).  The  coefficients  of  correlation  in  these  capaci 
ties  were  found  to  be  as  follows :  — 

"A"  test +-73 

Word  test 75 

Misspelled  word  test 75 

Addition 75 

Multiplication 80 

"Opposites"  test 80- .90 

The  rather  close  parallelism  between  the  mental  resem 
blances  and  the  physical  resemblances  of  twins  is  shown  by 

1  E.  L.  Thorndike :  "Measurement  of  Twins,"  Archives  of  Philosophy, 
Psychology,  and  Scientific  Methods,  No.  i,  1905. 


94  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

comparison  of  the  foregoing  table  with  the  following  coefficients 
of  correlation  in  physical  traits :  — 

Height +.775 

Width  of  head 824 

Circumference  of  head 745 

Cephalic  index 74 

Forearm  length 66 

If  Pearson's  data  are  at  all  reliable,  and  if  they  may  be 
legitimately  compared  with  these  determinations  by  Thorn- 
dike,  it  would  seem  that  both  mental  and  physical  resemblances 
are  more  striking  in  twins  than  in  siblings,  and  that  the  un 
questioned  increase  of  physical  resemblance  between  twins 
over  the  amount  of  physical  resemblance  among  siblings  is 
paralleled  by  equal  increases  in  mental  resemblance. 

6.  There  seems  to  be  little  doubt  that  the  differences  in 
mental  capacity  shown  by  different  individuals  must  be 
attributed  very  largely  to  hereditary  influences,  —  to 
variation  in  the  germ-cells.  It  is  not  to  be  inferred  from 
this,  however,  that  educative  forces  have  no  significant 
function  in  modifying  human  conduct.  In  answer  to  the 
query,  what  can  education  accomplish  when  the  possi 
bilities  of  human  achievement  seem  to  be  fixed  so  rigidly 
by  heredity,  the  following  propositions  may  be  considered : 

(a)  As  pointed  out  above,  education,  in  the  largest 
sense  of  the  word,  can  and  must  furnish  every  individual, 
no  matter  what  his  native  capacity,  with  the  conduct- 
controls  that  are  represented  by  the  culture-materials  of 
the  race.  The  investigations  of  heredity  do  not,  at  any 
point,  controvert  this  principle.  Capacity  for  achieve 
ment  is  doubtless  inherited,  but  whether  that  achieve- 


THE    LIMITATIONS   OF   EDUCATIVE   FORCES  95 

ment  is  upon  a  low  or  a  high  plane,  —  whether  the  gifted 
individual  unwittingly  rediscovers  old  truths,  or  proceeds 
from  the  most  advanced  position  taken  by  past  achieve 
ment,  —  depends  upon  the  success  with  which  education 
fulfills  its  mission. 

Woods's  investigations  substantiate  this  principle.  The 
forces  of  heredity  express  themselves  most  clearly  in  royalty, 
in  part,  at  least,  because  royalty  may  be  said  to  provide  uni 
form  educational  opportunities  for  its  progeny.  The  educa 
tional  or  environmental  influences  being  practically  the  same, 
or  the  differences  being  of  such  a  nature  as  to  counterbalance 
one  another,  the  residue  of  differentiae  among  the  various  in 
dividuals  must  be  due  to  variations  in  the  germ-cells.  This 
does  not  minimize  the  importance  of  training.  It  simply 
acknowledges  that,  where  opportunities  for  training  are 
approximately  equal,  all  differences  will  be  hereditary 
differences. 

7.  (b)  While  differences  due  to  heredity  stand  out 
prominently  when  the  educational  or  environmental  in 
fluences  are  approximately  the  same  for  all  individuals,  it 
is  equally  true  that  much  more  striking  differences  may  be 
justly  ascribed  to  the  environment  where  environmental 
and  educational  influences  vary  with  different  individuals 
of  approximately  equal  mental  capacity.  Thus  the  sav 
age  infant,  taken  from  his  savage  environment  and 
reared  in  an  environment  of  civilization,  would,  if  returned 
to  his  primitive  environment,  at  maturity,  be  a  vastly 
different  individual  from  his  brothers  and  sisters  who  had 
missed  training  of  civilized  life.  Three  Fuegians  who 
had  spent  three  years  among  civilized  peoples  returned 


96  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

to  their  native  land  on  the  ship  Beagle  at  the  time  when 
Darwin  made  his  memorable  voyage.  Darwin  witnessed 
the  meeting  between  these  partially  civilized  Fuegians 
and  their  kinsmen.  The  differences  in  tastes,  attitudes, 
and  conduct  in  general,  due  to  even  three  years  in  an 
entirely  different  environment,  were  striking  in  the 
extreme.1 

8.  (c)  While  the  exceptional  capacity  which  expresses 
itself  in  discovery  and  invention  is  to  be  looked  upon  as 
hereditary  in  its  nature,  it  remains  to  education  to  pass  on 
to  future  generations  the  fruits  of  these  inventions  and 
discoveries,  and  thus  bring  the  mass  of  mankind  to  the 
level  that  genius  attains.  Newton  said  that  he  made  his 
discoveries  by  " intending  his  mind"  upon  the  problems 
that  he  wished  to  solve;  to  which  Huxley  adds  that 
"forty  lesser  men  might  have  intended  their  minds  until 
they  cracked"  without  achieving  like  results.  But  these 
forty  lesser  men  may,  nevertheless,  assimilate  the  ex 
periences  that  Newton  alone  was  able  to  undergo,  and 
profit  by  his  discoveries  just  as  effectively,  in  many 
respects,  as  if  they  themselves  had  made  them.  It  is 
in  this  power  to  bring  the  masses  of  the  race  up  to  the 
point  that  genius  has  reached  that  education  finds  an 
undisputed  function.  Native  capacity  or  genius,  through 
the  insight  and  the  Herculean  efforts  that  are  vouchsafed 
to  it  alone,  lifts  humanity,  notch  by  notch,  to  ever  higher 
and  higher  planes.  But  it  remains  for  education  to  place 

1  Cf.  Darwin:  Journal  of  Researches,  New  York,  1897  (Appleton's 
edition),  ch.  x. 


THE    LIMITATIONS    OF   EDUCATIVE    FORCES  97 

the  props  that  will  sustain  the  race  at  these  successive 
levels.  Let  education  fail  in  this,  and  the  lives  of  the 
masters  will  have  been  lived  in  vain. 

9.  (d)  While  it  is,  perhaps,  justifiable  to  speak  of  en 
vironmental  influences  as  merely  establishing  a  "thin 
veneer"  over  the  fundamental  substratum  of  native  en 
dowment,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  this  "  thin  veneer  " 
includes  everything  that  we  call  civilization.  It  was 
this  "thin  veneer"  that  made  Darwin's  half-civilized 
Fuegians  differ  from  their  untutored  brothers  and  sisters 
more  strikingly,  perhaps,  in  some  respects,  than  these 
brothers  and  sisters  differed  from  the  anthropoids. 
It  is  this  thin  veneer  that  has  made  the  difference 
between  the  German  of  to-day  and  his  savage  for 
bear  that  roamed  the  forest  in  the  days  of  Tacitus  and 
Caesar.  This  measure  of  advance  is  not  insignificant  ac 
cording  to  accepted  standards.  And  yet,  it  is  well  to 
remember  that,  after  all,  it  is  only  a  veneer,  and  that,  if  the 
veneering  process  which  we  call  education  should  fail  to 
operate,  three  generations  would  suffice  to  obliterate  its 
traces,  —  three  generations  in  which  every  educational  pro 
cess  ceased  to  function  would  take  the  race  back  to  the  level 
at  which  it  stood  at  the  dawn  of  recorded  history. 

It  may,  of  course,  be  urged  that  selection  has  worked  toward 
an  "improvement  in  the  human  breed"  during  all  these  gen 
erations,  and  that  even  a  total  loss  of  culture-materials  would 
not  mean  a  total  degradation  of  a  civilized  race  to  the  plane 
of  savagery.  -  One  cannot  question  the  possibility,  —  and  yet 
how  slowly  natural  selection  works  in  the  human  species  is 


98  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

strikingly  evidenced  by  the  ease  with  which  traits  that  seem 
to  be  a  part  of  native  endowment  are  transformed  through 
environmental  influences.  Witness,  for  example,  the  change 
that  two  generations  of  Western  culture  have  wrought  in  the 
character  of  the  Japanese  people,  and  the  even  more  remark 
able  transformation  which  Western  culture  is  working  in 
China  to-day.  If  natural  selection  ever  had  an  opportunity 
permanently  to  fix  race-characteristics,  it  certainly  had  that 
opportunity  in  China.  And  yet,  just  as  the  foot  of  the  Chi 
nese  girl,  if  left  unbound  from  birth,  grows  into  the  normal 
form,  even  though  generations  of  mothers  preceding  had  their 
feet  bound  from  infancy,  so  the  Chinese  mind,  cramped 
through  a  thousand  generations  by  Oriental  traditions,  as 
sumes  the  Occidental  characteristics  when  the  environment 
is  changed.  In  this  case  it  seems  fairly  certain  that,  not 
only  have  acquired  characteristics  failed  entirely  to  have  any 
influence  upon  heredity,  but  also  that  natural  selection  has 
failed  to  build  up  a  race  having  characteristics  that  would 
be  naturally  adapted  to  the  environment.  The  improve 
ment  of  the  human  race  through  breeding  is  doubtless  a  pos 
sibility,  but  the  opportunities  for  its  improvement  through 
education  are  still  far  from  realized,  and  these  promise  far 
richer  returns  in  a  generation  than  breeding  could  bring  in 
a  millennium.1 

1  There  is,  of  course,  no  reason  why  the  two  processes  should  not 
combine  to  form  a  better  race.  Cf.  the  following  conclusion  reached  by 
one  of  the  leading  contemporary  authorities  upon  heredity :  "If  there  is 
little  or  no  scientific  warrant  for  our  being  other  than  extremely  skeptical 
at  present  as  to  the  inheritance  of  acquired  characters  .  .  .  this  skepti 
cism  lends  greater  importance  than  ever,  on  one  hand,  to  a  good  'nature/ 
to  secure  which  is  the  business  of  careful  mating ;  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
to  a  good  'nurture,'  to  secure  which  for  our  children  is  one  of  our  most 
obvious  and  binding  duties ;  the  hopefulness  of  the  task  resting  especially 
upon  the  fact  that,  unlike  the  beasts  that  perish,  man  has  a  lasting  ex 
ternal  heritage,  capable  of  endless  modification  for  the  better,  a  heritage 


THE   LIMITATIONS    OF   EDUCATIVE   FORCES  99 

10.  (e)  With  regard  to  the  possibility  of  influencing  in 
any  significant  measure  by  training  and  education  such 
general  mental  characteristics  as  Pearson  measured  in  his 
study  of  brothers,  —  such  characteristics  as  shyness, 
conscientiousness,  vivacity,  popularity,  and  intelligence, 
—  it  is  perhaps  well  to  hold  judgment  in  abeyance  at  the 
present  time.  That  these  factors  can  be  less  readily  in 
fluenced  by  educative  forces  than  certain  more  specific 
characteristics,  there  can  be  no  doubt ;  but  that  syste 
matic  efforts,  undertaken  by  well-matured  methods,  may 
not  have  some  modifying  influence,  even  upon  these  fac 
tors,  the  experiments  that  we  have  reviewed  do  not  de 
monstrate  with  finality.  All  that  they  tell  us  is  that,  under 
the  conditions  of  education  under  which  the  individuals 
measured  have  grown  up,  the  effects  of  environment 
were  not  sufficiently  significant  either  to  increase  or  to 
decrease  the  force  of  heredity.  On  the  other  hand,  with 
regard  to  moral  character,  which  Woods  1  is  convinced  is 
almost  as  completely  determined  by  inheritance  as  is 
physical  form,  there  is  abundant  evidence  from  reforma 
tories,  and  especially  from  schools  for  delinquent  children, 
that  the  proper  sort  of  modifying  influences  can  turn  into 
law-abiding  citizens  individuals  who,  beyond  all  doubt, 
would  otherwise  go  to  swell  the  ranks  of  the  criminals. 

In  the  State  Industrial  School  for  Girls  at  Geneva,  Illinois, 
to  which  girls  between  the  ages  of  ten  and  eighteen  are  sen- 

of  ideas  and  ideals,  embodied  in  prose  and  verse,  in  statue  and  painting, 
in  cathedral  and  university,  in  tradition  and  convention,  and  above  all, 
in  society  itself."  —  J.  A.  THOMSON  :  Heredity,  New  York,  1908,  p.  249. 
1  Woods,  op.  cit.,  pp.  287  ff. 


100  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

tenced  for  varying  terms  of  years,  but  commonly  until  they 
have  at  least  reached  their  majority,  it  is  reported  that  80 
per  cent  of  all  persons  admitted  are  turned  from  lives  of  error 
and  become  efficient  members  of  the  social  order  upon  their 
release.  It  is  not  sufficient  for  the  advocate  of  heredity  to 
maintain  that  this  80  per  cent  of  salvage  represents  the  girls 
who  were  not,  upon  incarceration,  inherently  bad.  That 
is  simply  begging  the  question.  Unsubjected  to  the  reform 
ing  influence  of  the  school,  the  proportion  that  became  re 
spectable  and  law-abiding  members  of  society  would  be 
pitiably  small.  With  the  school's  influence,  80  per  cent  are 
saved.  If  their  inherent  characteristics  would  not  save  them 
and  their  acquired  characteristics  can  and  do  save  them, 
the  practical  moral  value  of  the  training  cannot  be  disputed.1 

ii.  (/)  That  external  forces  may  have  some  influence 
in  either  increasing  or  decreasing  the  factors  that  Galton 
urges  so  insistently  as  conditions  of  eminence,  —  zeal, 
ability,  and  capacity  for  hard  work,  —  there  is  evidence 
from  experimental  psychology,  particularly  with  respect 
to  zeal  and  the  capacity  for  work.  The  well-known  in- 

1  It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  in  spite  of  the  lack  of  statistical  evidence, 
the  authorities  upon  heredity  (with  the  possible  exception  of  Woods) 
cling  rather  tenaciously  to  the  view  that  moral  traits  are  more  readily 
modifiable  by  the  environment  than  are  intellectual  traits.  For  example, 
Thorndike  (Educational  Psychology,  ist  edition,  pp.  45  ff.) :  "The  im 
portant  moral  traits  seem  to  be  more  a  matter  of  the  direction  of  capacities 
and  the  creation  of  desires  and  aversions  by  environment  than  are  the 
important  qualities  of  intellect  and  efficiency.  Over  them,  then,  edu 
cation  has  greater  sway.  .  .  ."  Also  Thomson  (Heredity,  p.  248) : 
"The  fact  is  undoubted  that  the  initiatives  of  moral  character  are  in  some 
degree  transmissible,  though  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  the  influences 
of  education,  example,  environment,  and  the  like  are  here  more  potent 
than  in  regard  to  structural  features.  .  .  .  The  plasticity  of  character 
under  moral  nurture  is  a  fact  which  gives  us  all  hope." 


THE   LIMITATIONS    OF   EDUCATIVE 

fluence  of  pleasant  and  unpleasant  stimuli  upon  the 
amount  of  energy  which  can  be  directed  toward  a  given 
task,  —  the  fact  that  an  unpleasant  stimulus  decreases  the 
availability  of  energy,1  —  would  seem  to  speak  strongly 
against  Galton's  fatalistic  conclusion.  It  is  true  that 
geniuses  are  frequently  possessed  of  the  capacity  to  do 
strenuous  work  without  this  external  advantage,  and 
therein  perhaps  lies  their  chief  difference  from  the ''aver 
age  man"  ;  but  if  education,  by  a  control  of  the  environ 
ment,  can  enable  an  individual  to  give  more  energy  to  the 
task  than  would  otherwise  be  possible,  it  is  conceivable 
that  it  may,  in  some  instances,  overcome  a  disadvantage 
which  might  otherwise  prevent  a  man  who  is  talented  not 
quite  to  the  point  of  genius  from  doing  the  work  of  genius. 

No  little  confusion  in  the  discussion  of  heredity  has  arisen 
from  the  terminology.  One  commonly  speaks  of  " character" 
as  a  sum  of  the  tendencies  contributed  by  heredity  on  the 
one  hand  and  by  environment  on  the  other  hand.  It  has 
very  seldom  been  pointed  out  that  the  relationship  could  be 
much  more  helpfully  thought  of  as  a  product.  In  other  words, 
any  single  conduct-control  operating  in  adult  life  is  the  ex 
pression  of  an  inherited  tendency  times  an  acquired  tendency, 
rather  than  of  an  inherited  tendency  plus  an  acquired  tend 
ency. 

12.  (g)  That  education  may  work  very  radical  changes 
in  specific  characteristics,  there  can  be  no  doubt.  While 

1  Mayer  and  Orth  found  also  that  unpleasant  mental  states  lengthened 
reaction-times  in  their  association-tests.  (Cf.  Zeitschrift  fur  Psychologic, 
vol.  xxvi,  1901,  p.  n.)  In  other  words,  mental  activity  is  more 
sluggish  and  consequently  inefficient  under  these  conditions. 


>  :  EBUCATIONAL   VALUES 

the  investigations  indicate  that,  under  our  present  knowl 
edge  of  educative  forces  and  the  best  means  to  apply 
them,  such  a  thing  as  " general  efficiency"  seems  very 
little  affected  by  educational  influences,  special  efficiency 
is  very  highly  modified.1 

13.  On  the  whole,  the  limitations  under  which  educa 
tion  can  with  certainty  produce  desired  results  are  fairly 
clear.  It  can  bring  the  mass  of  mankind  up  to  the  level 
that  the  race  has  reached  by  furnishing  the  conduct-con 
trols  that  are  represented  by  the  culture-products. 
These  conduct-controls  will  probably  influence  adjust 
ment  in  specific  rather  than  in  general  directions. 

On  the  other  hand,  as  education  comes  to  have  a  more 
effective  control  over  the  methods  that  it  employs,  as  it  comes 
more  and  more  thoroughly  to  know  and  understand  its 
problems  and  the  materials  with  which  it  deals,  there  is 
large  reason  for  hope  that  its  sphere  of  influence  may  be 
extended  to  cover  many  of  the  factors  governing  adjust 
ment  that  now  seem  to  be  beyond  its  reach.2 

1  Specialized  professional  training,  for  example,  is  a  very  important 
factor    in     determining    "  general    merit "    among    elementary-school 
teachers.      Cf.  W.  C.  Ruediger  and  G.  D.  Strayer :  "  The  Qualities  of 
Merit  in  Teachers,"  Journal  of   Educational  Psychology,  1910,  vol.  i, 
pp.  272-278. 

2  With  this  important  qualification  (namely,  that  education  needs 
first  of  all  a  thoroughgoing  analysis  and  mastery  of  its  methods),  even 
Ward's  optimism  may  be  justified  :  — 

"The  trend  of  the  whole  investigation  has  been  in  the  general  direction 
of  showing  that  great  men  have  been  produced  by  the  cooperation  of 
two  causes,  genius  and  opportunity,  and  that  neither  alone  can  accom 
plish  it.  But  genius  is  a  constant  factor,  very  abundant  in  every  rank 
of  life,  while  opportunity  is  a  variable  factor  and  chiefly  artificial.  As 


THE   LIMITATIONS   OF   EDUCATIVE    FORCES          103 

Far  from  stimulating  a  pessimistic  outlook,  there  is  to 
the  writer's  mind  something  distinctly  inspiring  in  this 
challenge  which  the  biologists  and  the  students  of  hered 
ity  throw  down  before  the  educator.  If  the  latter  lets 
the  gauntlet  lie  untouched,  if  he  lies  back  supinely  under 
the  spell  of  fatalism,  it  is  simply  because  he  has  read  into 
the  results  of  the  heredity-investigations  vastly  more  than 
is  there.  Even  upon  their  face,  these  investigations  leave 
to  education  an  all-important  and  absolutely  essential 
task.  But  to  this  indisputed  field,  there  is  clear  evidence 
that  another  may  be  added  if  only  education  develops 
its  technique  a  little  farther.  Already  there  are  indica 
tions  in  the  work  of  Freud,1  Jung,2  and  other  investiga- 

such  it  is  something  that  can  be  supplied  practically  at  will.  The  actual 
manufacture,  therefore,  of  great  men,  of  the  agents  of  civilization,  of  the 
instruments  of  achievement,  is  not  a  Utopian  conception,  but  a  practical 
undertaking.  It  is  also  comparatively  simple,  and  consists  in  nothing 
but  the  extension  to  all  the  members  of  society  of  an  equal  opportunity 
for  the  exercise  of  whatever  mental  powers  each  may  possess.  There  are 
many  artificial  substitutes  for  the  various  kinds  of  favorable  environ 
ment,  but  since  .  .  .  these  are  effective  only  as  they  constitute  an  edu 
cational  environment,  it  is  obvious  that  this  is  the  real  factor  in  the  de 
velopment  of  genius  and  the  progress  of  civilization.  If,  therefore,  the 
educational  environment  can  be  supplied,  the  rest  may  be  dispensed  with, 
and  the  real  end  to  be  attained  is  simply  and  solely  the  establishment 
on  a  gigantic  and  universal  scale  of  an  educational  environment."  — L. 
F.  WARD  :  Applied  Sociology,  pp.  220  ff. 

1  S.  Freud:    "The  Origin  and  Development  of  Psycho-Analysis," 
American  Journal  of  Psychology,  vol.  xxi,  1910. 

2  C.  G.  Jung:  "The  Association  Method,"  American  Journal  of  Psy 
chology,  vol.  xxi,  1910.      Also  Emma  Fiirst :  "  Statistische  Untersuch- 
ungen  iiber  Wortassoziationen,  "  Journal  fur  Psychologie  und  Neurologic, 
vol.  ix,  1907,  pp.  243  ff.     Cf.  also  E.  Jones:   Journal  of  Educational 
Psychology,  vol.  i,  1910,  pp.  497-520. 


104  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

tors  that  the  dominant  motives  of  adult  life  are  con 
ditioned  far  more  narrowly  than  has  hitherto  been  sup 
posed  by  the  experiences  of  early  childhood  acting  upon 
the  fundamental  instincts.1  As  yet,  we  know  only  that 
this  hypothesis  is  highly  probable;  how  to  control 
these  experiences  so  that  the  bases  of  future  conduct  may 
be  accurately  and  effectively  established  must  be  left  for 
patient  investigation.  But  the  outlook  is  extremely 
hopeful.  The  crying  need,  then,  is  for  such  investigation, 
not  only  in  this  new  field  of  psycho-analysis  (which  has 
hitherto  been  cultivated  chiefly  by  the  alienist,  but  which 
promises  valuable  service  to  the  educator),  but  also  in 
the  field  of  formal  educational  methodology.  These 
chapters  are  presented  in  the  hope  that  they  may  con 
tribute  even  a  little  toward  the  recognition  of  this  need. 
14.  The  writer  has  purposely  emphasized  in  the  fore 
going  discussion  the  data  that  speak  most  strongly  against 
the  potency  of  experience  as  compared  with  that  of  hered 
ity.  The  educator  is  and  should  be  predisposed  to  a 
belief  in  the  importance  of  the  former  factor.  To  him 
the  writings  of  the  "environmental"  school  are  replete 
with  inspiration.  As  an  antidote  to  Galton,  Pearson,  and 
Woods,  the  works  of  Ward 2  and  Cooley 3  are  especially  to 

1  It  is  in  the  closer  similarity  of   associations   of  ideas  between 
mother  and  children  as  compared  with   the  father   and  children  that 
the  influence  of  constant  and  intimate  contact  is  most  clearly  shown. 
(Cf.  Fiirst,  op.  cit.}     Galton  found  marked  similarity  between  twins  in 
association  of  ideas,  but  attributed  it  to  hereditary  influences,      (in 
quiries  into  Human  Faculty,  p.  231.) 

2  L.  F.  Ward :  Applied  Sociology,  New  York,  1906. 

3  C.  H.  Cooley  :  Human  Nature  and  the  Social  Order,  New  York,  1902. 


THE    LIMITATIONS    OF   EDUCATIVE   FORCES          105 

be  recommended.1  The  present  writer  has  not  given  in 
detail  the  arguments  that  these  men  have  so  admirably 
presented,  for,  while  he  firmly  believes  that  a  strong  faith 
in  their  doctrines  is  essential  to  enthusiastic  service  in  the 
cause  of  education,  he  is  also  convinced  that  education 
stands  in  greatest  need  at  the  present  time  of  a  penetrat 
ing  study  of  its  chief  problem,  —  the  modification  of  hu 
man  conduct  through  experience ;  and  an  unchecked  faith 
in  the  power  of  education  is  likely  to  tempt  the  educator 
to  assume  that  such  a  study  is  needless.  Galton,  Woods, 
and  Pearson  have  thrown  down  a  challenge  that,  —  apart 
from  the  ultimate  truth  or  falsity  of  their  hypotheses,  - 
should  have  a  beneficial  influence  in  spurring  education 
to  this  investigation. 

1  F.  H.    Hayward's   Education  and   the  Heredity   Spectre    (London, 
1908)  is  likewise  very  stimulating  reading,  although  strongly  partisan. 


PART    II 

THE    CLASSIFICATION    OF   FUNC 
TIONS   AND   VALUES 

CHAPTER  VII 

THE  CRITERION  OF  VALUE 

1.  IN  the  preceding  chapters  a  classification  has  been 
proposed  for  the  conduct-controls  that  may  result  from 
the  processes  of  education.     The  question  now  arises, 
How  may  the  relative  worth  of  these  factors  be  deter 
mined  ?     Granted  that  certain  controls  may  result  from 
the  operation  of  educative  materials,  what  controls  are 
to  be  selected  as  worthy  of  perpetuation,  and  upon  what 
basis  shall  worth  be  determined  ? 

2.  The  following  discussions  will  employ  the  standard 
of  social  efficiency  as  the  norm  to  which  questions  of 
this  type  shall  be  referred.     The  writer  has,  in  another 
place,1  attempted  to  justify  this  standard  as  a  working 
guide  in  educational  theory.     In  connection  with  that 
discussion,  the  chief  characteristics  of  the  socially-effi 
cient  individual  were  summarized  as  follows :    (i)  eco 
nomic  efficiency,  or  ability  to  "pull  his  own  weight"  in 
economic  life;    (2)  negative  morality,  or  the  willingness 

1  Cf.  Educative  Process,  ch.  iii. 
107 


I0g  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

to  sacrifice  his  own  desires  when  their  gratification 
would  interfere  with  the  economic  efficiency  of  others ; 
(3)  positive  morality,  or  the  willingness  to  sacrifice  his 
own  desires  when  their  gratification  would  not  contribute, 
directly  or  indirectly,  to  social  progress. 

3.  The  social  aim  of  education  is  open  to  criticism 
from  several  points  of  view,  and  it  will  be  profitable  to 
examine  briefly  at  least  two  of  the  more  serious  objec 
tions  that  may  be  raised  against  its  acceptance.  — 

(a)  It  is  frankly  objective.  It  measures  educational 
values,  not  by  the  subjective  effects  of  educative  ma 
terials  upon  the  individual,  but  by  the  objective  effects 
of  these  materials,  —  by  their  conduct-outcome,  and 
even  by  their  conduct-outcome  only  in  so  far  as  this 
affects  society.1  The  inference  is  that  many  activities, 
recognized  by  the  individual  as  "good"  because  they 
promote  his  own  happiness,  may  not  receive  a  sanction 
from  the  standpoint  of  this  aim.  Thus  it  is  feared  that 
too  strong  an  insistence  upon  the  social  aim  will  place 

1  This  is' the  essence  of  Ruediger's  objection  to  the  aim  as  stated  in 
his  Principles  of  Education  (Boston,  1910,  pp.  60  ff.) :  "Strictly  inter 
preted,  the  social  aim  is  but  a  partial  statement  of  the  aim  of  education, 
the  truth  of  which  is  included  in  <  adjustment  to  life.'    '  Life '  is  a  broader 
term  than  'social,'  and  includes  it,  just  as  human  life  is  broader  than 
social  life,  including  the  latter.     Man  comes  in  contact  with  the  inanimate, 
the  plant,  and  animal  worlds  as  well  as  with  the  social,  and  these  contacts 
are  not  always  for  the  sake  of  the  social.     They  may  be  primar 
the  individual's  own  gratification.    In  actual  life  the  individual 
subordinated  to  society  in  the  extent  that  is  implied  by  Bagley. 
indulges  his  taste  in  music,  art,  literature,  philosophy,  and  even  s,;- 
largely  for  his  own  immediate  enjoyment,  without  any  thought  oi 
benefit,  and  it  is  conceivable  that  such  benefit  might  not  ensue." 


THE    CRITERION    OF   VALUE  IOQ 

economic  efficiency  at  a  premium  and  accomplishments 
in  art,  music,  and  literature  at  a  discount;  or,  in  a 
broader  way,  it  is  feared  that  the  objective  aim  of  social 
efficiency  may  lead  education  to  lose  sight  of  the  indi 
vidual  sanctions  and  rewards  which  are  to  be  expressed 
in  terms  of  pleasure,  happiness,  aesthetic  enjoyment,  and 
self-realization. 

4.  This  objection  may  be  answered  in  part  by  saying 
that  social  efficiency  does  not  preclude  the  cultivation 
of  those  tastes,  diversions,  and  proclivities  that  bring  to 
the  individual  their  own  subjective  rewards.  Indeed,  the 
social  aim  would  distinctly  sanction  the  cultivation  of 
such  controls  among  all  the  individuals  who  are  touched 
by  educative  forces,  —  provided  always,  of  course,  that 
the  indulgence  of  the  tastes  that  are  cultivated  does  not 
interfere  with  the  highest  efficiency  of  the  individual  as 
a  member  of  the  social  group.  Indeed,  it  is  one  of  the 
most  important  tasks  of  education  to  engender  tastes 
that  are  consistent  with  social  welfare;  for  recreation  and 
relaxation  are  essential  to  the  best  service,  and  recreation 
and  relaxation  must  be  upon  the  highest  possible  plane 
if  the  degenerating  effects  of  dissipation  and  prodigality 
are  to  be  counteracted.  Surely  what  is  of  the  highest 
benefit  to  society  in  this  connection  is  of  the  highest 
benefit  to  the  individual,  and  vice  versa.  There  is  no 
danger,  then,  that  a  rational  interpretation  of  the  social 
aim  will  not  find  abundant  room  for  art,  literature, 
music,  and  the  drama,  as  well  as  for  healthful  sport  and 
for  recreation  of  all  sane  and  wholesome  varieties. 


110  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

5.  But  even  if  this  were  not  true,  it  is  hard  to  see 
why  the  social  criterion  should  not  have  the  position  of 
primacy  in  a  rational  theory  of  education.  It  is  true 
that  the  race  is  composed  of  individuals,  but  it  is  also 
true  that  the  individual  has  always  been  subordinate  to 
the  race.  Subjectively,  the  sanction  of  pleasure,  happi 
ness,  or  enjoyment  may  seem  to  be  ultimate,  but  the 
slightest  objective  study  serves  to  show  that  this  sub 
jective  primacy  of  the  feeling-tone  is  an  illusion.  It  is 
true  that,  in  the  natural  history  of  mind,  the  pleasant 
affective  tone  (the  pleasure-signature)  has,  in  general, 
attached  to  experiences  that  were  biologically  good,  and 
.the  unpleasant  affective  tone  (the  pain-signature)  has 
attached  to  experiences  that  were  biologically  bad. 
But  "good"  and  "bad"  for  whom  or  for  what?  Cer 
tainly  primarily  for  the  race,  and  not  primarily  for  the 
individual.  Natural  selection  has  seen  to  it  that  adjust 
ments  which,  in  the  long  run,  are  beneficial  to  the  race 
are  pleasant  to  the  individual,  but  for  man  to  conclude 
from  this  subjective  sanction  that  the  pleasant  affective 
tone  is  the  ultimate  criterion  of  worth  is  a  species  of 
anthropocentricism  comparable  in  every  way  to  the 
naive  belief  that  the  grass  and  the  foliage  are  green  and 
the  sky  blue  because  man  finds  these  colors  pleasant  to 
the  eye.  Man  has  reached  the  point  of  intelligence 
where  he  sees  the  fallacy  of  this  latter  assumption,  — 
while  still  enjoying  the  colors  that  nature  so  lavishly 
provides.  He  has  not  yet  reached  the  point  where  he 
sees  that  the  pleasant  affective  tone  attaching  to  certain 


THE   CRITERION   OF   VALUE  III 

experiences  is  simply  nature's  way  of  indicating  that  the 
experiences  are,  on  the  whole,  good  for  the  race,  and 
that  the  accompanying  pleasure  to  the  individual  is 
only  incidental,  not  ultimate,  —  although,  as  in  the  other 
instance,  he  may  keep  on  enjoying  the  pleasures,  even 
though  he  knows  that  they  are  not  ultimate  sanctions. 

6.  Man  has  traveled  a  long  way  on  the  road  of  mental 
development  since  the  pleasure  and  pain  signatures  were 
first  produced  by  variation  and,  because  they  were  good 
for  the  race,  were  perpetuated  by  natural  selection. 
To-day  man  is  possessed  of  an  intelligence  which  has 
greatly  diminished  in  importance  many  of  the  immediate 
sanctions  of  instinct.  While  intelligence  was  feeble,  the 
organism  needed  the  clear  and  unequivocal  sanctions  of 
immediate  pleasure  and  pain  to  guide  it  in  its  adjust 
ments.  But  when  intelligence  became  stronger  and 
gained  a  clearer  insight  into  the  forces  that  played  upon 
the  organism,  it  discovered  that,  after  all,  nature  had 
done  its  work  only  in  the  rough.  A  great  many  things 
that  were  pleasantly  toned  were  found  to  be  bad ;  some 
things  that  were  unpleasantly  toned  were  found  to  be 
good;  and  man  gradually  reconstructed  his  scheme  of 
values  to  fit  these  new  insights,  —  and  to  fit  also  the 
changed  environment  which  the  elaborate  organization 
of  human  society  brought  about.  The  immediate  pleas 
ure  and  pain  sanctions  gave  way  to  rational  thought- 
constructions  which  indicated  with  much  greater  nicety 
and  precision  the  effects  of  adjustment.  But,  through 
all  these  changes,  the  fundamental  law  of  life  has  not 


112  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

been  repealed.  Just  as  the  primitive  sanctions  of  pleas 
ure  and  pain  were  selected  " naturally"  because  they 
promoted  the  welfare  of  the  species,  so  these  new  sanc 
tions  must  be  selected  " intelligently"  upon  the  same 
basis.  Natural  selection  has  lost  its  sway  in  the  human 
species  because  intelligent  selection  brings  about  the 
fortunate  results  much  more  quickly  and  certainly. 
But  " fortunate"  for  whom  or  for  what?  Certainly 
primarily  for  the  race,  just  as  in  the  ages  that  have 
passed;  certainly  secondarily  for  the  individual,  whose 
subordination  to  the  race  is  fundamental. 

Parallel  with  the  development  of  human  intelligence 
has  gone  the  development  of  what  may  be  called  the 
"social  conscience,"  —  that  ideal  which  impels  men  to 
judge  the  actions  of  others  in  the  light  of  the  social 
significance  of  these  actions.1  This  social  conscience 
represents  in  human  society  the  fundamental  law  of  all 
organic  life,  —  the  law  of  race-primacy.  As  a  final 
stage  in  the  readjustment  of  this  law  to  fit  the  newer 
conditions  there  is  the  present  tendency  to  make  this 
" social  conscience"  the  criterion  of  one's  own  acts  as 
well  as  of  the  acts  of  others,  —  to  do  away  entirely  with 
pleasure-  and  pain-signatures  as  unworthy  to  serve  as 
sanctions  for  intelligent  beings,  and  to  make  race-progress 
and  race-welfare  the  subjective  purpose  of  every  life. 

1  For  example,  the  social  stigma  that  attaches  to  those  convicted  or 
even  suspected  of  crime,  or  of  unsocial  practices.  The  often  pitiless  and 
sometimes  inequitable  and  unjust  application  of  this  standard  is  only 
society's  almost  instinctive  adjustment  toward  self-preservation. 


THE    CRITERION    OF   VALUE  113 

7.  (b)  This  naturally  leads  to  a  consideration  of  the 
second  objection  that  may  be  urged  against  the  social 
aim  of  education.  If  social  efficiency  is  admitted  as  the 
working  aim  of  education,  it  still  leaves  open  the  ques 
tion,  What  is  the  destiny  of  human  society?  Toward 
what  goal  should  education,  in  so  far  as  it  controls  the 
driving  forces,  attempt  to  direct  social  development? 
And  again  the  interests  of  the  individual  are  raised  to 
the  forefront  of  the  discussion.  Now  that  human  society 
has  sent  instinct  down  into  the  fire-hold  to  stoke  the 
furnaces  and  placed  intelligent  purpose  upon  the  bridge  to 
command  the  ship,  is  it  not  its  manifest  duty  to  lay  the 
course  toward  that  port  in  which  every  individual  of  the 
species  will  be  able  to  extract  the  largest  measure  of 
individual  happiness  from  life  ?  If  the  happiness  of  the 
individual  cannot  be  considered  as  an  ultimate  sanction 
for  individual  conduct,  is  it  not  justifiable  to  place  the 
greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number  as  the  ulti 
mate  sanction  for  individual  conduct? 

No  one  could  consistently  quarrel  with  this  solution 
of  the  problem  if  it  is  accepted  as  purely  objective,  - 
if,  in  other  words,  the  criterion  of  the  happiness  of 
others  does  not  lead  the  individual  to  infer  that  his  own 
individual  happiness  is  a  matter  of  proper  concern  for 
him.  To  work  for  the  happiness  of  others  is  an  indis 
pensable  factor  in  insuring  the  highest  measure  of  social 
efficiency.  If  I  say  to  myself,  "I  will  seek  my  own 
happiness  in  promoting  the  happiness  of  others,"  well 
and  good,  —  provided  that  any  failure  of  the  pleasure- 


114  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

signature  to  attach  to  my  own  efforts  does  not  impel 
me  to  face  about  and  seek  my  own  pleasure  in  a  narrower 
sense.  If  it  has  this  effect,  then  having  made  happiness 
explicitly  my  ultimate  aim  will  be  extremely  unfortunate. 
Under  such  conditions  (and  such  conditions  are  con 
ceivable),  it  would  have  been  far  better  for  me  to  forget 
all  about  my  own  happiness  and  set  my  mind  resolutely 
upon  the  accomplishment  of  some  purpose  that  will 
promote  social  progress.  Happiness  will  then  very 
likely  take  care  of  itself,  and,  in  any  case,  kind  nature 
will  see  to  it  that  pleasures  sufficient  to  the  tonic  needs 
of  life  are  enjoyed. 

8.  But  what  is  this  social  progress  for  which  one 
should  strive?  What  is  its  criterion?  In  the  writer's 
opinion,  the  only  rational  answer  to  this  question  is, 
Achievement.  That  conduct  is  worthy  which  pro 
motes  achievement ;  that  achievement  is  worthy  which 
promotes  among  all  men  the  possibilities  of  further 
achievement.  One  works  for  the  welfare  and  happiness 
of  others,  not  because  this  welfare  and  this  happiness  are 
ends  in  themselves,  but  because  what  we  term  happi 
ness  is  a  condition  of  achievement;  one  works  for  the 
race,  not  that  some  future  generation  may  spend  its 
days  in  contemplating  the  true,  the  beautiful,  and  the 
good,  —  but  rather  that,  so  long  as  the  human  species 
shall  exist,  it  may  continue  to  participate  in  that  great 
cosmic  process  which  we  call  evolution ;  and  that,  when 
the  end  comes,  and  the  scroll  is  at  last  rolled  up,  it  shall 
be  a  scroll  worthy  of  the  only  species  of  organic  life 


THE   CRITERION   OF   VALUE 

into  whose  keeping  has  been  intrusted  the  consciousness 
of  purpose. 

One  can  indeed  do  no  better  here  than  to  subscribe 
to  Thorndike's  formula : 1  "  .  .  .  the  real  work  of  man 
for  man  —  the  increase  of  achievement  through  the  im 
provement  of  the  environment." 

9.  All  this  is  very  far  from  saying  that  the  feelings 
and  emotions  can  or  should  be  read  out  of  life.  It  is 
very  far  from  saying  that  pleasure  and  enjoyment  are 
bad.  It  is  simply  insisting  that  the  purposeful  conduct 
of  life  shall  explicitly  recognize  these  forces  as  means  to 
ends  and  not  as  ends  in  themselves;  just  as,  in  the  in 
stinctive  conduct  of  life,  they  were  implicitly  means  to 
ends.  The  emotional  forces  must  be  sublimated,  ethe- 
realized,  —  but  they  will  still  remain  forces.  And  one 
may,  of  course,  identify  happiness  with  the  successful 
accomplishment  of  a  purpose  that  meets  these  social 
conditions.  One  may  insist  that  the  man  who  sacrifices 
the  most  imperious  desires  of  life  because  their  gratifica 
tion  is  inconsistent  with  the  "categorical  imperative" 
does  so  because  the  pleasant  consequences  of  consistency 
with  an  ideal  overtop  the  possible  pleasure  of  gratify 
ing  his  desires ;  this  (or  its  converse,  at  least)  may  be 
a  true  account  of  the  impelling  motive ;  but  it  certainly 
needs  the  testimony  of  a  frank  introspective  analysis 

1  E.  L.  Thorndike :  Educational  Psychology,  New  York,  1910,  p.  139. 

2  Kant's  famous  dictum,  "Act  so  that  the  maxim  of  thy  will  may 
always  and  at  the  same  time  hold  good  as  a  principle  of  universal  legis 
lation,"  is  the  clearest  formulation  of  the  social  criterion  of  conduct. 


Il6  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

of  the  volitional  consciousness  to  make  it  convincing. 
Logically,  it  may  seem  inevitable,  —  so  also  certain 
other  mental  processes  have  seemed  logically  inevitable, 
but  introspection  has  failed  to  find  them. 

10.  Have  we  not  in  this  sublimation  of  primitive 
feeling-tone,  attenuated  to  what  is,  in  effect,  its  vanish 
ing  point,  an  adequate  basis  for  the  development  in 
the  individual  of  the  ideal  of  Duty,  —  a  basis  for 
the  rational  conception  of  the  Moral  Law,  which  Kant 
placed  among  the  "given"  factors  in  mental  life? 
And  cannot  an  educational  theory  based  upon  an  em 
pirical  psychology  thus  find  in  its  system  a  natural  place 
for  the  word  "Duty"  which  it  has  so  long  neglected  ? 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  RUBRICS  OF  FUNCTION  AND  VALUE 

i.  THE  discussions  of  educational  values  have  not 
hitherto  distinguished  between  two  quite  different  types 
of  controverted  problems.  The  much-discussed  question 
of  formal  discipline,  for  example,  is  not,  strictly  speaking, 
a  question  of  educational  values ;  it  is  rather  a  question 
of  the_pQasibility_of^educative  materials  functioning  in_a 
certain  way.  No  one  would  question  for  a  moment  the 
value^iromthe  point  of  view  of  social  and  economic  effi 
ciency,  of  the  generalized  " powers"  and  " capacities" 
that  the  study  of  certain  subjects  has  been  assumed  to 
engender.  The  question  at  issue  relates  entirely  to  the 
possibility  of  these  subjects  fulfilling  the  functions  that 
their  advocates  maintain  may  be  fulfilled.  The  keen 
powers  of  reasoning  that  mathematics  is  supposed  to  de 
velop,  for  example,  would  be  of  unquestioned  value  if 
they  could  be  made  an  inevitable  outcome  of  mathemati 
cal  training. 

On  the  other  hand,  one  may  justly  inquire  as  to  the 
relative  value,  from  the  social  point  of  view,  of  geography 
and  manual  training  in  the  elementary  curriculum,  or  of 
history  and  commercial  arithmetic  in  the  secondary  curric 
ulum.  Properly  speaking,  these  are  questions  of  value, 

117 


Il8  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

for  they  must  be  answered  by  reference  to  the  standard  of 
evaluation.  The  problem  of  formal  discipline,  on  the 
other  hand,  cannot  be  solved  by  the  application  of  this 
standard.  It  is  fundamentally  a  scientific,  not  an  ethical, 
question.  It  must  be  solved  by  psychological  experimen 
tation,  and  the  task  of  such  experimentation  must  be  to 
demonstrate  conclusively  whether  the  supposed  transfer 
of  the  results  of  training  from  one  field  to  another  actually 
occurs  as  the  advocates  of  the  doctrine  assume. 

2.  In  the  subsequent  discussions  an  attempt  will  be 
made  to  distinguish  sharply  between  questions  of  Junction, 
—  positive  questions,  which  must  be  answered  by  an  ap 
peal  to  facts ;  and  questions  of  value,  —  normative  ques 
tions,  which  must  be  answered  by  an  appeal  to  norms  or 
ideals. 

This  dichotomy  is  quite  in  keeping  with  the  distinction 
that  was  drawn  between  knowledge  and  ideals  in  Chapters 
III  and  IV.  Ends  and  means  must  be  sharply  distinguished, 
especially  when  they  are  likely  to  be  confused  as  standards 
of  judgment.  Facts  and  principles  are,  as  has  been  said, 
interpolated  controls  of  conduct.  Ideals  and  norms  are  final 
or  ultimate  ends  of  conduct.  The  ultimate  end  of  education 
that  one  adopts  must  become  one's  standard  or  norm  for 
measuring  the  worth  of  the  materials  that  enable  one  to 
gain  this  end.  The  facts  and  principles  of  the  educative 
process  are  the  interpolated  guides  that  help  one  in  adjust 
ing  means  to  ends.  Educational  psychology  is  the  positive 
science  which  the  educator  must  utilize  in  this  adjustment; 
ethics  is  the  normative  science  which  supplies  the  standards 
or  ideals. 


THE   RUBRICS    OF   FUNCTION   AND   VALUE 

3.  In  so  far  as  functions  are  concerned,  the  key  to 
classification  is  inherent  in  the  analyses  presented  in  Part 
I.  Educative  materials  differ  in  function  according  to 
the  type  of  conduct-control  that  they  engender.  It  will 
be  useful,  however,  to  classify  the  functions  by  grouping 
together  related  types  of  controls.  This  suggests  the 
following  scheme :  — 

I.   The  Training  Function:  This  will  designate  the  opera 
tion  of  materials  that  are  to  result  in  specific  habits.1 
II.   The  Instructional  Function:   Designating  the  operation 
of  materials  that  are  to  result  in  facts,  principles,  ideas, 
concepts,  or  meanings,  or,  generically,  in  knowledge. 

III.  The  Inspirational  Function:   Designating  the  operation 

of  materials  that  are  to  result  directly  in  ideals  or 
emotionalized  standards. 

IV.  The  Disciplinary  or  Indirect  Training  Function:   Desig 

nating  the  operation  of  materials  that  are  to  result 
in  ideals  of  method  or  procedure,  or  prejudices  in  favor 
of  certain  habits,  as  an  indirect  result  of  the  formation 
of  such  habits. 

1  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  criterion  of  function  is  the  type 
of  conduct-control  that  the  materials  in  question  leave  with  the  individual 
at  the  conclusion  of  the  educational  unit  under  consideration.  Thus  a 
course  in  primary  reading  has  to  fulfill  a  direct  training  function  in  that 
it  must  leave  with  the  pupils  a  number  of  specific  habits.  A  school  exer 
cise  in  reading  may  have  a  training  or  an  instructional  or  an  inspirational 
function,  according  as  it  leaves  either  (a)  habits  already  fixed  or  well  on 
the  road  to  automatism ;  (b)  facts,  principles,  or  ideas ;  (c)  ideals.  But 
the  facts,  principles,  ideas,  and  ideals  may  later  work  over  into  habits.  Again 
a  course  in  mathematics  may  leave  with  the  pupil  ideals  of  mathematical 
method,  but  these  ideals  may  work  over  into  habits  in  the  pupil's  later 
life.  In  any  case,  it  is  the  type  of  conduct-control  that  is  left  at  the  con 
clusion  of  the  educational  unit  that  determines  the  place  of  that  unit  in 
our  classification. 


120  EDUCATIONAL    VALUES 

V.  The  Recreative  Function:  Designating  the  operation  of 
materials  that  are  to  result  in  tastes,  sentiments,  and 
interests. 

VI.  The  Interpretive  Function:  Designating  the  operation 
of  materials  that  are  to  result  in  attitudes,  "insights," 
or  perspectives. 

The  implications  of  these  six  rubrics  will  be  discussed  in 
detail  in  the  following  chapters. 

4.  The  classification  of  values  is  not  so  simple.  The 
difficulty  lies  in  selecting  a  principle  of  grouping  that  will 
have  sole  reference  to  the  social  criterion,  or  to  any  other 
single  standard  representing  the  ultimate  aim  of  educa 
tion.  In  order  not  to  multiply  terms  needlessly,  the  ru 
brics  of  value  that  have  been  commonly  employed  will 
be  used,  although  the  writer  will  not  attempt  to  justify 
them  upon  the  basis  of  any  rigid  principle  of  classification. 

(a)  The  Utilitarian  Value.  —  The  criterion  of  utili 
tarian  value,  as  the  term  will  be  used  in  the  subsequent 
discussions,  is  the  availability  of  the  conduct-controls 
resulting  from  the  operation  of  educative  materials  to  pro 
mote  the  economic  efficiency  of  the  individual.  By  eco 
nomic  efficiency  is  meant  the  capacity  of  the  individual 
to  meet  successfully  the  basic  problems  involved  in 
earning  a  livelihood,  —  the  problems  of  food,  shelter, 
clothing,  and  the  like. 

It  is  assumed  that  the  socially  efficient  individual  will 
be  economically  efficient,  —  that  he  will  be  able  to  "pull 
his  own  weight"  in  the  struggle  for  life,  either  directly  by 
engaging  in  a  productive  activity,  or  indirectly  by  inspir- 


THE    RUBRICS    OF   FUNCTION   AND    VALUE  121 

ing,  encouraging,  or  educating  others  to  increased  pro 
ductive  activity.  This  value  is  synonymous  with  what 
Ruediger1  terms  the  " practical"  value. 

5.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  any  one  of  the  types  of  func 
tion  discussed  above  may  realize  a  utilitarian  value. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  strict  utility,  however,  —  from 
the  point  of  view  of  meeting  the  immediate  needs  of  se 
curing  food,  clothing,  and  shelter,  —  the  two  types  of 
control  that  are  most  important  are  (i)  habits  (and  es 
pecially  habits  of  skill),  and  (2)  knowledge  (facts,  prin 
ciples,  ideas,  and  meanings) ;  consequently  the  important 
utilitarian  functions  are  the  training  and  the  instructional. 
Other  controls  are  certainly  contributory  to  the  ends 
named  in  greater  or  less  degree.  Ideals,  prejudices,  atti 
tudes,  and  perspectives  will  frequently,  in  the  following 
pages,  be  accorded  a  utilitarian  value.  In  general,  how 
ever,  the  value  of  these  controls  is  not  narrowly  utilitarian. 

The  pupil  learns  in  school  the  fundamental  number-facts. 
It  may  be  reasonably  predicted  that  he  will  find  almost  daily 
use  for  some  of  these.  The  value  of  the  habits  thus  formed 
is  consequently  utilitarian  in  the  narrow  sense.  Again,  the 
pupil  learns  to  associate  printed  symbols  with  their  sound 
equivalents,  and  here,  also,  the  utilitarian  value  is  obvious. 
In  geography,  he  learns  the  products  of  different  countries; 
here  the  value  may  be  utilitarian,  although  the  chances  are 
that  the  average  pupil  will  have  but  few  opportunities  to 
apply  such  knowledge  directly  to  the  economic  problems  of 
life.  Its  inclusion  among  the  subjects  of  common  school 
education  must,  therefore,  be  justified  upon  another  basis. 

1  Ruediger,  op.  cii.,  pp.  122-126. 


122  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

Utilitarian  values  can  be  ascribed,  therefore,  only  when  the 
habits  formed,  or  the  knowledge  imparted,  or  the  ideals  and 
prejudices  engendered,  can  be  clearly  shown  to  be  essential 
to  the  solution  of  some  economic  situation  which  the  pupil 
will  in  all  probability  face  in  later  life.  The  value  is  high  in 
proportion  as  the  situations  demanding  the  functioning  of 
the  conduct-controls  will  be  either  of  fundamental  signifi 
cance  or  of  frequent  occurrence  in  economic  life.  The  value 
is  small  when  the  chances  for  such  functioning  are  few  in 
number  and  when  the  situations  are  of  slight  economic  sig 
nificance. 

6.  Professor  J.  W.  A.  Young1  has  drawn  a  valuable 
distinction  between  direct  and  contingent  utilitarian  val 
ues,  —  direct  values  being  ascribed  to  materials  the  prod 
ucts  of  which  will  inevitably  find  a  useful  function ;  con 
tingent  values  being  ascribed  to  materials  the  products 
of  which  may  be  useful  if  one  chances  to  meet  situations 
where  their  functioning  is  demanded.     Thus  mechanical 
drawing  is  of  contingent  utilitarian  value  to  the  boy  who 
may  become  a  draughtsman ;  reading,  on  the  other  hand, 
may  be  assumed  to  be  of  direct  utility  to  every  one.    This 
distinction  will  be  referred  to  later,  although  the  discus 
sions  of  the  present  volume,  being  largely  limited  to  gen 
eral  as  distinguished  from  vocational  or  specialized  edu 
cation,  will  not  lay  great  stress  upon  contingent  values. 

7.  (b)  The  Preparatory  Value.  —  Controls  that  do  not 
function  directly  in  economic  situations  may  pave  the 
way  for  the  acquisition  of  controls  that  do  so  function. 
This  preparatory  value  is  generally  recognized  in  educa- 

1  J.  W.  A.  Young :  Teaching  of  Mathematics,  New  York,  1903,  chu  ii. 


THE   RUBRICS    OF   FUNCTION   AND   VALUE  123 

tipnal  literature  and  the  term  will  hereafter  be  used  in  its 
customary  significance.1 

8.  Naturally,  one  would  expect  to  find  the  preparatory 
value  represented  very  frequently  in  the  elementary  and 
secondary  curriculums,  and  this  proves  to  be  the  case. 
While  arithmetic  is  utilitarian  to  the  last  degree,   its 
preparatory  value  is  not  to  be  neglected.     Geography,  in 
opening  the  gate  to  history  and  to  the  natural  sciences, 
finds  one  of  its  chief  functions  to  be  of  this  type.     The 
language  studies  are  represented  in  the  preparatory  list 
chiefly  by  reading   and   grammar.     In    the    secondary 
school,  the  preparatory  values  become  even  more  pro 
nounced.     Algebra   and  geometry  find  ultimate  utility 
through  applied    science,   mechanics,    and   engineering. 
Physics,  while  it  possesses  no  small  degree  of  utilitarian 
value,  must  also  be  accorded    preparatory  value.     The 
languages,    however,    except    as    they   lead    to    higher 
university  study,  must  be  justified  upon  other  grounds. 

It  is  clear  that  the  justification  of  all  preparatory  values 
must  be  sought  in  the  materials  for  which  they  prepare.  Thus 
mathematics  and  physics  are  but  one  step  removed  from  a 
very  obvious  utilitarian  function.  If  Latin  and  Greek,  on 
the  other  hand,  are  justified  by  the  fact  that  they  prepare 
for  philology  as  a  university  study,  it  is  incumbent  upon  their 
advocates  to  establish  the  value  of  philology.  If  they  lead 
the  way  to  philosophy,  then  philosophy  must  be  justified,  and 
so  on. 

9.  The  Conventional  Value.     In  many  cases,  the  ma 
terials  of  education  can  lay  claim  to  no  other  value  than 

1  See  Ruediger,  op.  cit.,  pp.  120-122. 


124  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

simply  that  society  takes  it  for  granted  that  everyone  who 
is  to  be  classed  as  " educated"  must  undergo  instruction 
in  them. 

One  of  the  best  instances  of  a  subject  that  has  an  al 
most  exclusively  conventional  value  is  furnished  by  spell 
ing.  It  is  true  that  ability  to  spell  correctly  possesses  a 
measure  of  utilitarian  value ;  certainly  if  one's  spelling  is 
sufficiently  incorrect,  one's  meaning  is  quite  obscured. 
Incorrect  spelling,  however,  interferes  with  social  effi 
ciency  even  if  it  is  not  so  bad  as  to  obscure  the  meaning. 
There  seems  to  have  grown  up  in  English  speaking  coun 
tries,  at  least,  the  notion  that  incorrect  spelling  is  a  true 
index  of  illiteracy.  In  other  words,  the  one  thing  that 
any  one  who  pretends  to  " education"  must  not  do  is  to 
misspell  common  words. 

Grammar  furnishes  another  instance  of  a  value  that  is 
very  largely  conventional.  While  grammatical  correctness  is 
often  essential  to  clarity  of  expression,  it  is  not  always  so; 
yet  expressions  that  are  seriously  ungrammatical  mark  one 
as  illiterate  even  though  clearness  may  not  be  increased  in 
the  slightest  degree  by  the  corresponding  correct  form.  "I 
have  went "  is  just  as  clear  and  unequivocal  as,  "  I  have  gone  "  ; 
"It  is  me"  conveys  the  meaning  just  as  effectively  as,  "It 
is  I."  And  yet  the  person  who  habitually  uses  incorrect 
forms  is  taboo  socially.  Nor  is  "socially"  used  here  in  its 
narrower  connotation.  A  person's  opinions  are  discounted 
and  his  judgments  are  often  distrusted  if  he  fails  to  conform 
to  conventional  demands.  Consequently,  one's  efficiency  is 
measurably  lessened :  at  least,  the  same  ability  would  work 
under  a  much  slighter  handicap  if  the  conventional  demands 
were  fulfilled. 


THE    RUBRICS   OF   FUNCTION    AND   VALUE  125 

There  is  scarcely  a  subject  to  be  found  in  the  curriculum 
of  the  elementary  and  secondary  schools  that  does  not  possess 
at  least  a  modicum  of  value  from  the  conventional  point  of 
view.  Society  takes  it  for  granted  that  every  one  shall  know 
certain  facts  and  principles  of  geography  and  history.  The 
immediate  efficiency  of  a  given  individual  might  not  be  seri 
ously  impaired  even  if  he  were  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  the 
earth  is  round  or  of  the  fact  that  Columbus  discovered  Amer 
ica.  Such  an  individual  might  contribute  his  share  to  the 
world's  work  without  much  difficulty.  He  might,  in  other 
words,  adjust  himself  effectively  to  his  physical  environment. 
But  his  adjustment  to  his  social  environment  would  be  seri 
ously  hampered  by  the  mere  fact  of  his  ignorance,  and  this 
lack  of  social  harmony  would,  in  many  cases,  tend  to  decrease 
his  economic  efficiency.  It  becomes  of  paramount  impor 
tance,  therefore,  to  reckon  with  conventional  values  and  to 
take  the  steps  that  are  necessary  to  realize  them. 

It  may  be  that  society  is  too  prone  to  enlarge  mole-hills 
into  mountains  in  dealing  with  little  matters  of  spelling  and 
grammatical  construction,  and  education  can  probably  do 
much  in  the  course  of  time  to  make  public  opinion  rather 
more  rational  upon  this  matter.  And  yet  a  social  prejudice 
generally  has  back  of  it  some  basis  of  necessity.  If  a  fair 
degree  of  proficiency  in  spelling  and  a  fair  degree  of  gram 
matical  precision  in  verbal  expression  are  set  up  as  indis 
pensable  qualifications  of  an  educated  person,  we  may  be 
tolerably  certain  that  these  things  are  fairly  good  indices  of 
one's  general  mental  capacity.  This  is  not  to  say  that  one 
who  has  not  had  educational  advantages  is  to  be  considered 
as  mentally  incompetent  because  of  the  errors  that  one  may 
make  in  orthography  and  syntax.  It  is  simply  to  say  that, 
given  the  advantages,  the  average  individual  can,  without 
serious  difficulty,  learn  to  comply  with  the  standard  set. 
The  test  is  analogous  to  that  which  prescribes  ability  to  read 


126  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

as  an  indispensable  qualification  for  the  admission  of  foreign 
immigrants.  Reading  may  or  may  not  be  essential  to  the 
direct  efficiency  of  such  immigrants.  Some  who  are  unable  to 
read  might  make  very  excellent  citizens.  And  yet  some 
standard  is  obviously  necessary  and  the  reading  standard 
seems  to  be  the  most  efficient  in  the  long  run.  The  same  is 
true  of  the  "spelling  and  grammar"  standard  which  society 
sets  as  the  minimal  measure  of  efficiency  for  its  schools.  One 
can  scarcely  quarrel  with  it  so  far  as  it  goes.  The  trouble  is 
that  in  too  many  schools  it  becomes,  not  the  minimal,  but 
the  maximal  measure  of  efficiency.  In  other  words,  too  many 
schools  narrow  their  outlook  to  fit  this  tiny  aperture.  The 
aperture  is  central  and  fundamental,  it  is  true,  but  it  is  none 
the  less  tiny.  The  part  of  wisdom  seems  to  lie  in  recognizing 
the  conventional  values  and  realizing  them  as  far  as  possible 
in  connection  with  the  realization  of  other  more  significant 
and  vital  values;  but,  when  this  is  impossible,  then  solely 
for  their  own  conventional  sake  and  with  the  least  expenditure 
of  time  and  energy  consistent  with  meeting  the  conventional 
requirements. 

10.  The  Socializing  Value.  It  is  in  the  socializing  of 
the  individual  that  the  conduct-controls  developed  by 
general  education  have  their  greatest  significance.  Social 
efficiency,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  implies  economic  effi 
ciency,  but  it  also  implies  something  far  more  comprehen 
sive  than  the  ability  of  the  individual  either  directly  or  in 
directly  to  provide  for  himself  food,  shelter,  and  clothing. 
It  means  more  than  that  he  should  simply  fulfill  the  con 
ventional  standards  imposed  by  society  upon  all  of  its 
members.  It  implies  fundamentally  that  he  participate 
in  the  social  conscience,  and  that  he  apply  the  dictates  of 


THE    RUBRICS    OF   FUNCTION   AND   VALUE  127 

that  conscience  to  his  own  life  as  well  as  to  the  lives  of  his 
fellows. 

While  the  instructional  and  training  functions  are  not 
unimportant  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  socializing 
values,  it  is  here  especially  that  the  other  functions  come 
into  their  own.  It  will  be  the  task  of  the  following  chap 
ters  to  indicate  especially  the  increments  of  social  value 
that  may  be  realized  in  fulfilling  these  various  functions. 


CHAPTER  IX 

VALUES  TO  BE  REALIZED  IN  FULFILLING  THE  TRAINING 
FUNCTIONS 

i .  IF  one  analyzes  the  automatic  adjustments  made  in 
the  course  of  an  average  day,  three  large  types  of  conduct 
are  readily  recognized.  In  the  first  place,  there  are  the 
habitual  responses  of  dressing,  eating,  walking,  and  talk 
ing,  which  are  common  to  all ;  in  the  second  place,  there 
are  the  special  habits  of  skill  that  constitute  so  large  a  part 
of  one's  waking  life,  and  which,  obviously,  are  individual 
and  technical  in  their  character ;  and,  in  the  third  place, 
there  are  the  habitual  adjustments  which  one  makes  dur 
ing  the  leisure  or  nonworking  periods  of  the  waking  day, 
which  are  also  largely  individual  in  character. 

Each  element  of  these  three  types  of  conduct  represents 
a  certain  form  of  training  in  the  largest  sense  of  the  term, 
—  represents,  in  other  words,  a  learned  as  distinguished 
from  an  instinctive  adjustment.  And  yet  it  is  surprising, 
at  first  glance,  to  note  how  small  a  part  the  formal  train 
ing  of  the  school  has  apparently  played  in  the  learning  of 
these  adjustments.  Adjustments  of  the  first  type  have 
been  acquired  largely  through  imitation  and  home  in 
struction  ;  adjustments  of  the  second  type  have  been 
initiated  during  the  early  years  of  apprenticeship  to  one's 

128 


FULFILLING   THE    TRAINING   FUNCTIONS  1 29 

trade  or  profession,  and  if  any  school  has  contributed 
significantly  toward  their  acquisition,  it  is  the  professional 
school,  the  technical  school,  or  the  trade  school,  not  the 
common  school ;  in  adjustments  of  the  third  type,  the  in 
fluences  of  general  education  may  be  much  more  readily 
recognized,  although  even  here,  there  is  a  large  residuum 
that  must  be  attributed  to  the  operation  of  nonscholastic 
factors. 

It  would  be  fallacious  to  conclude,  however,  that  gen 
eral  education  fails  entirely  to  influence  life  from  this 
standpoint,  although  the  very  slightest  investigation  will 
reveal  a  much  smaller  degree  of  direct  influence  than  is 
usually  attributed  to  the  formal  work  of  the  school.  To 
approach  the  question  from  the  other  side,  it  may  be 
profitable  to  examine  the  various  subjects  of  school 
instruction  and  see  what  training  functions  tend  to  realize 
the  different  types  of  value  discussed  in  the  last  chapter. 

2.  (a)  The  Utilitarian  Value.  Of  the  training  subjects 
of  the  elementary  curriculum,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
those  concerned  with  language  are  the  most  fundamental 
from  the  standpoint  of  utility  in  general  education.  A 
mastery  of  the  commonly  employed  media  of  communica 
tion  is  essential  to  economic  efficiency,  and,  in  this  case, 
effective  mastery  means  automatic  mastery.  Oral  speech 
is  ineffective  when  attention  must  be  divided  by  the 
speaker  between  thought  and  form.  Written  speech  is 
uneconomical  when  the  writer  must  make  a  similar  trans 
fer  of  attention.  In  fact,  the  utilitarian  value  that  at 
taches  to  the  rules  and  principles  of  grammar  lies  mainly 


130  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

in  the  initiation  of  habits.  If  actual  expression  were  con 
sciously  to  be  governed  by  continual  direct  application  of 
rule  and  principle,  it  is  clear  that  the  efficiency  of  expres 
sion  would  be  greatly  curtailed. 

From  the  standpoint  of  direct  utility,  however,  the 
mere  matter  of  correctness  of  form  cannot  be  allotted  a 
maximum  of  value.  Fluency  and  spontaneity  of  lan 
guage  are  vastly  more  important  than  mere  conventional 
correctness.  Grammatical  precision  influences  adjust 
ment,  it  is  true,  but  the  controls  that  it  establishes 
must  be  justified  upon  the  conventional  rather  than 
upon  the  narrowly  utilitarian  basis. 

3.  The  habits  that  are  involved  in  reading  are,  of 
course,  fundamental  from  the  point  of  view  of  direct 
application.  The  elaborate  organization  of  social  life 
makes  the  ability  to  translate  printed  and  written  sym 
bols  of  words  into  their  vocal  equivalents  absolutely 
essential  to  efficient  adjustment.  To-day,  even  the 
laborer  who  cannot  read  is  handicapped  in  his  daily 
work.  The  directions  that  he  must  follow,  the  rules  of 
his  union,  the  advertisements  that  enable  him  to  find 
the  best  market  for  his  labor,  —  all  of  these  factors  are 
introducing  formal  educational  qualifications  into  even 
the  humblest  of  human  occupations. 

As  contrasted  with  the  other  phases  of  language  training 
in  the  school,  reading  must  be  accorded  supreme  importance 
from  the  point  of  view  of  direct  utility.  The  habits  of  oral 
expression,  —  which  are  the  educative  materials  that  have 
widest  applicability  in  this  connection,  —  can  be,  and  usually 


FULFILLING   THE    TRAINING   FUNCTIONS  131 

are,  acquired  with  a  fair  degree  of  proficiency  through  in 
formal  education.  To  learn  to  read,  however,  requires  sys 
tematic  instruction  of  a  rather  strenuous  nature.  It  is  prob 
able  that  certain  exceptional  individuals  would  acquire  the 
associations  involved  in  the  mechanics  of  reading  without 
such  training,  as  recent  authorities  l  suggest ;  but  that  this 
method  can  ever  be  depended  upon  for  universal  results  is 
seriously  to  be  doubted,  no  matter  how  constantly  children 
may  be  brought  into  contact  with  an  environment  that 
emphasizes  reading  as  a  basic  social  process. 

4.  The  automatisms  that  are  developed  by  the  study 
of  arithmetic  have  a  high  value  from  the  point  of  view 
of  utility.     In  an  elaborately  organized  society,  where 
labor  is  minutely  differentiated  and  where  the  com 
ponent  social  elements  are  thoroughly  interdependent  in 
respect  of  the  necessities  and  luxuries  of  life,  the  measur 
ing  of  commodities  of  all  sorts  and  the  computation  of 
values  in  terms  of  a  unit  of  common  measure  are  ob 
viously  prime  necessities. 

5.  That  the  automatic  adjustments  involved  in  the 
mastery  of  music  and  drawing  have  a  utilitarian  value 
to  the  majority  of  pupils  is  seriously  to  be  doubted. 
Drawing,  it  is  clear,  may  have  a  contingent  utility  for 
pupils  who  enter  certain  specialized  trades  and  profes 
sions,  but  the  average  pupil  seems  to  put  to  very  slight 
use  the  skill  that  the  drawing  instruction  of  the  ele 
mentary  school  may  be  supposed  to  have  given  him. 
Closer  correlation  of  drawing  with  manual  training  and 

1  For  example,  E.  B.  Huey  :  Psychology  and  Pedagogy  of  Reading,  New 
York,  1908,  p.  311. 


132  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

with  other  forms  of  school  work  might  lead  the  pupil 
more  frequently  to  employ  drawing  as  a  means  of  ex 
pression  and  communication.1 

6.  The  adjustments  that  are  made  automatic  in 
manual  training  in  its  various  forms  should  find  direct 
application  in  later  economic  life,  and  this  value  is  not 
only  large  but  also  general  in  its  nature.  It  is  a  value 
that  is  important  to  all  who  live  the  civilized  life,  for 
the  ability  to  use  the  common  tools  of  wood  working 
and  metal  working  is  something  the  lack  of  which  the 
average  man  will  feel  very  quickly,  whatever  may  be 
his  vocation ;  and  this  becomes  increasingly  true  as 
machinery  comes  to  do  more  and  more  of  the  drudgery  of 
everyday  life.  The  utilitarian  value  is  not  the  only, 
nor  is  it  the  leading,  value  of  manual  training,  but  it  is 
a  value  that  is  perhaps  important  enough  to  justify  the 
subject  in  the  elementary  and  secondary  curriculums,  even 
if  other  values  are  not  granted. 

It  needs  but  the  slightest  reflection  to  appreciate  the  sig 
nificance  of  this  subject  in  the  curriculum  of  the  twentieth 
century.  If  there  is  one  factor  that  dominates  the  civiliza 
tion  of  to-day,  it  is  the  application  of  physical  and  chemical 
principles  to  the  problem  of  generating,  transmitting,  trans 
forming,  and  utilizing  mechanical  energy.  The  nineteenth 

1  In  remarking  upon  the  high  average  of  intelligence  among  the  rank 
and  file  of  the  Japanese  army  during  the  war  with  Russia,  General  Kuro- 
patkin  mentions  particularly  their  skill  in  drawing :  "  Many  of  them  could 
draw  maps  skilfully,  and  one  common  soldier  [a  prisoner]  was  able  to 
show  accurately,  by  means  of  a  plan  sketched  in  the  sand,  the  relative 
position  of  the  Japanese  forces  and  ours." —  (McClure's  Magazine,  1908, 
vol.  xxxi,  p.  649.) 


FULFILLING   THE   TRAINING   FUNCTIONS  133 

century  left  us  with  a  rich  heritage  of  principles  and  devices 
by  which  the  forces  of  nature  may  be  controlled  and  directed 
toward  the  improvement  of  human  life.  It  remains  for  the 
education  of  the  twentieth  century  not  only  to  transmit 
carefully  these  principles  and  the  ideals  that  made  them 
possible,  but  also  to  disseminate  in  as  wide  a  circle  as  may 
seem  profitable  the  habits  of  skill  which  are  essential  to  the 
effective  use  of  mechanical  devices  through  which  these 
principles  and  ideals  affect  the  workaday  life. 

7.  (b)  Preparatory  Value  of  Habits.    The  language- 
habits,  and  especially  those  connected  with  reading,  are 
of  obvious  significance  from  the  preparatory  point  of 
view.     To  teach  the  child  to  read  and  write  is  to  put 
him  in  command  of  the  implements  through  which  a 
large  part  of  his  later  education  is  obtained.     To  insure 
the  immediate  association  of  ideas  with  written  and 
printed  symbols  is  one  of  the  most  important  tasks  that 
the  elementary  school  has  to  perform. 

8.  The  number  arts  possess  a   smaller  measure  of 
preparatory  value,   although  by  no  means  an  unim 
portant  measure.     The   efficiency  of   the  quantitative 
work  in  the  sciences  depends  more  fundamentally  upon 
the  elementary  number  arts  tharunpon  the  mastery  of 
the  more  advanced  mathematical  subjects.     The  pre 
paratory  value  is  not  large  enough,  however,  to  over 
shadow  the  utilitarian  value  of  elementary  arithmetic. 

9.  The  skill  that  is  represented  by  the  ability  to  draw 
is  more  important  from  the  preparatory  than  from  the 
utilitarian  point  of  view.     The  use  to  which  this  skill 
may  be  put  in  clarifying  the  pupil's  conceptions  of  the 


134  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

objective  sciences  is  recognized  by  the  teachers  of  these 
sciences.  One  may  well  believe  that  there  should  be, 
in  the  teaching  of  drawing  in  the  lower  schools,  a  more 
explicit  recognition  of  this  preparatory  value. 

10.  Manual  training,  like  drawing,  may  be  made  to 
possess  a  goodly  measure  of  preparatory  value  in  general 
education.     Aside  from  the  contingent  value  that  it  has 
for  the  pupil  who  is  to  enter  one  of  the  engineering  pro 
fessions,  the  ability  to  manipulate  tools  and  materials 
efficiently  will  be  of  service  in  the  study  of  the  physical 
sciences,  and  in  the  constructive  activities  which,  like 
drawing,  serve  admirably  to  clarify  one's  conceptions  in 
various  other  subjects.    Again,  what  is  needed  is  a  more 
explicit  recognition  of  this  value  and  an  attempt  to 
utilize  in  other  subjects  the  skill  which  the  teacher  of 
manual  training  has  gone  to  such  pains  to  develop  in  his 
pupils. 

11.  The   training   subjects  of   the  secondary  curric 
ulum   are  chiefly  English  composition,  the  elementary 
stages  of  foreign  language  study,  and  certain  stages  in 
the    mastery    of    secondary    mathematics.    While  the 
habit-fomir£  activities  in  the  composition  and  mathe- 
rcatics  classes  can  probably  be  more  equitably  justified 
upon  another  basis,  the  drill  in  early  language  study  is 
primarily   preparatory   in   its   value.     This   means,    of 
course,  that  the  ultimate  justification  must  be  sought 
in  the  value  of  the  subjects  for  which  it  prepares.     There 
is  good  reason  to  believe  that  much  of  this  work  does 
not  lead,  with  the  average  pupil,  to  that  appreciation 


FULFILLING   THE    TRAINING   FUNCTIONS  135 

of  the  literatures  of  foreign  language  which  would  be 
the  most  obvious  source  of  value.  In  the  case  of  Latin, 
as  will  be  pointed  out  later,  contemporary  opinion  seems 
to  lean  toward  identifying  secondary  Latin  with  Eng 
lish  composition  in  so  far  as  its  value  is  concerned. 
That  is,  the  justification  for  Latin  in  the  high  schools 
and  as  a  subject  of  general  education  is  largely  to  be 
found  in  the  practice  in  English  composition  which  the 
work  of  the  Latin  classes  involves. 

12.  (c)  The  Conventional  Value  of  Habits.  The  im 
portance  of  forming  the  conventional  habits  of  language, 
particularly  with  reference  to  spelling  and  grammatical 
correctness,  was  referred  to  in  the  last  chapter.  In 
addition  to  these  obvious  conventional  requirements,  a 
group  of  habits  equally  important  from  the  conventional 
point  of  view  is  represented  by  what  is  termed  "  eti 
quette"  or  good  manners.  The  precedence  which  is 
accorded  to  old  age  and  to  womanhood  could  have  no 
justification  from  the  point  of  view  of  pure  utility.  When 
I  stand  aside  to  let  a  lady  or  an  older  man  precede  me 
through  a  doorway,  I  do  not  do  it  because  the  person 
in  question  could  not  get  through  just  as  effectively  if  I 
went  first.  My  standing  aside  is  a  conventional  adjust 
ment  sanctioned  by  society  as  a  mark  of  respect. 

But  there  is  a  vast  difference  between  the  conven 
tions  of  etiquette  and  the  conventions  of  language.  It 
is  true  that  the  former,  like  the  latter,  indirectly  in 
fluence  one's  social  and  economic  efficiency,  since  failure 
to  comply  with  conventional  custom  would  seriously 


136  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

influence  the  attitude  that  others  take  toward  one. 
But  the  adjustments  of  good  etiquette  have  another  and 
a  more  fundamental  sanction.  They  crystallize  the 
ideals  of  social  behavior  that  the  race  has  accumulated 
and  sifted  through  its  long  experience.  Respect  for  old 
age  and  respect  for  womanhood  are  ideals  or  prejudices 
which  constitute  a  most  important  part  of  our  social 
heritage.  One  sometimes  thinks  of  these  as  purely 
formal  requirements;  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  attitudes 
and  ideals  that  they  express  are  among  the  most  precious 
parts  of  the  race  inheritance;  they  have  cost  pain  and 
struggle  and  suffering;  they  are  conquests,  even  as  the 
great  scientific  principles,  even  as  the  most  inspiring 
creations  of  art,  are  conquests. 

13.  (f)  The  Socializing  Value  of  Habits.  The  con 
ventional  value  of  the  habits  of  etiquette  and  gentle 
manners  really  represents  socializing  values.  Much 
more  important  in  this  immediate  connection,  however, 
are  the  numberless  little  habits  that  are  termed  "moral." 
These  include  the  various  automatic  responses  that  may 
be  summed  up  under  the  general  heads  of  cleanliness, 
honesty,  regard  for  the  rights  and  feelings  of  others, 
obedience  to  law  and  to  constituted  authority,  and  the 
like.  The  specific  adjustments  representing  these  vir 
tues  must  be  made  thoroughly  automatic  early  in  child 
hood  if  the  virtues  themselves  are  later  to  be  general 
ized  as  ideals  and  prejudices.  It  is  in  connection  with 
ideals  and  prejudices,  however,  that  these  virtues  may 
be  most  profitably  discussed,  hence  we  may  leave  them 


FULFILLING   THE    TRAINING   FUNCTIONS  137 

for  the  present  with  the  understanding  that  the  effective 
generalization  of  the  virtues  depends  primarily  upon  the 
thoroughly  automatic  character  of  the  specific  responses 
that  represent  them. 

14.  The  work  of  habit-building  must  always  be 
accorded  the  most  important  place  in  elementary  edu 
cation.  That  habits  formed  in  the  school  may  not 
function  in  the  situations  of  later  life  is  clearly  apparent. 
That  training  may  not  "spread"  beyond  the  limits  of 
the  specific  function  trained  suggests  the  advisability  of 
limiting  the  strenuous  processes  of  habit-building  (i)  to 
those  automatic  responses  that  will  be  of  unquestioned 
service,  and  (2)  to  those  responses  that  may  serve  as 
concrete  bases  for  the  later  development  of  concepts  and 
ideals  of  conduct. 

There  are  certain  respects  in  which  reaction  ought, 
from  the  earliest  possible  moment,  to  be  thoroughly 
automatic  and  mechanical.  It  is  to  the  formation  of 
these  specific  habits  that  elementary  education  especially 
must  direct  its  energies.  The  fault  of  American  schools 
to-day  lies,  not  in  the  mechanical  grind  that  they  are 
popularly  supposed  to  represent,  but  in  the  inadequacy 
of  the  really  small  measure  of  drill  work  that  is  attempted. 
It  is  here  that  American  schools  are  weak  as  compared 
with  the  schools  of  foreign  countries,  and  notably  those 
of  Germany.  In  the  basic  training  which  must  stand 
as  the  foundation  of  all  future  advancement,  the  progress 
that  is  made  year  to  year  in  American  common  schools 
is  discouragingly  small. 


138  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

The  cause  of  this  condition  is  probably  to  be  sought  in  the 
material  prosperity  of  America  during  the  last  three  decades. 
The  relaxation  from  the  strain  and  effort  that  characterized 
the  life  of  an  earlier  period  has  found  one  expression  in  the 
demand  for  shortened  hours  and  less  "drill,"  less  strain,  and 
less  insistence  upon  adequate  habit-building  in  school  work. 
The  public  protests  against  anything  approaching  the  rigor 
of  German  common-school  methods,  and  yet  America  must 
either  adopt  methods  of  training  that  are  equally  effective, 
or  consent  to  take  second  rank  in  both  industrial  and  cul 
tural  achievement.  In  education  as  in  all  other  departments 
of  life,  you  cannot  make  bricks  without  straw;  and  among 
nations  as  among  individuals,  success  and  preeminence  can 
be  attained  only  by  those  that  are  willing  to  "pay  the  price." 


CHAPTER  X 

VALUES  TO  BE  REALIZED  IN  FULFILLING  THE  INSTRUC 
TIONAL  FUNCTIONS 

1.  (a)  Utilitarian  Values  of  Ideas,  Facts,  and  Princi 
ples.     If  the  elementary  and  secondary  curriculums  are 
examined  with  reference  to  the  economic  value  of  the 
facts  and  principles  that  they  comprise,  a  condition  is 
revealed  that  is  somewhat  similar  to  that  discovered  in 
connection  with  habit.     Certain  ideas,  facts,  and  prin 
ciples  are  directly  applied  to  life-situations  by  a  majority 
of  the  pupils  undergoing  school  instruction ;    but  these 
are  comparatively  few  in  number,  when  considered  in 
relation  to  the  range  of  subject-matter  taught. 

2.  The  instructional  subject  of  greatest  utility  in  the 
elementary    curriculum    is    doubtless    arithmetic.     The 
pupil  who  has  mastered  the  principles  of  percentage, 
for  instance,  is  enabled  to  meet  adequately  certain  situa 
tions  in  life  that  might  otherwise  baffle  him.     The  em 
phasis  here  is,  of  course,  upon  the  word  "principles," 
and  we  are  speaking  of  the  conscious  application  of  such 
principles  through  a  judgment-process.     The  so-called 
"facts"  of  arithmetic,  as  was  indicated  in  the  last  chap 
ter,  are  very  largely  automatisms,  the  operation  of  which 
requires  a  minimum  of  judgment ;  in  fact,  they  operate 
the  more  effectively  the  less  judgment  is  involved. 

139 


140  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

3.  Upon    the    side    of    language-instruction,    it    has 
already  been  pointed  out  that  many  of  the  materials 
employed  function  mainly  through  the  medium  of  habit. 
There  are  some  grammatical  and  rhetorical  principles, 
however,    that    undoubtedly    help    one    in    expression. 
Grammatical  expression,  generally  speaking,  is  efficient 
expression,  —  efficient    in    that    it    conveys    meanings 
effectively.     But  the  number  of  grammatical  principles 
that  are  thus  consciously  applied  is  probably  compara 
tively  small,  —  for  the  average  educated  man  (speaking 
English)  perhaps  not  more  than  eight  or  ten. 

4.  The    subject   of   geography   seems    to   present   a 
similar  paucity  of  economically  usable  facts  and  prin 
ciples.     If  the  average  man  should  enumerate  the  occa 
sions   upon   which   he   applies   geographical  knowledge 
(beyond  the  few  simple  facts  which  he  would  easily 
gain  without  formal  instruction)  he  would  be  surprised 
to  find  how  small  a  part  geography  plays  in  his  worka 
day  life.     When  he  travels,  or  when  business  interests 
lead  him  to  deal  with  remote  sections  of  the  country, 
he   may   find   himself  recalling   map  images,   or  stim 
ulating    his    memory    for    place    and    location    data. 
But  under  ordinary  conditions,  as  far  as  direct  appli 
cation  is  concerned,  there  is  very  little  that  he  really 
needs. 

5.  The  situation  with  regard  to  history  is  similar  to 
that  with  regard  to  geography,  —  perhaps  even  more 
marked  with  reference  to  the  narrow  field  in  which  facts 
may  be  applied  to  economic  situations  by  the  average 


FULFILLING   THE   INSTRUCTIONAL   FUNCTIONS       141 

individual.  Spencer,1  it  is  true,  maintained  that  the 
study  of  history  ought  to  be  especially  valuable  from 
this  point  of  view.  He  criticized  severely  the  customary 
methods  of  teaching  history  on  the  ground  that  they 
failed  to  establish  "  principles  of  conduct,  which  is  the 
chief  use  of  facts."  He  contended  that  historical  facts, 
as  presented  in  the  schools  of  his  time,  were  not  made 
the  basis  for  inducing  such  principles.  "Read  them, 
if  you  like,  for  amusement,"  he  suggests,  "but  do  not  flat 
ter  yourself  that  they  are  instructive." 

Although  historical  teaching  has  been  greatly  improved 
since  Spencer  wrote  his  Essays  in  Education,  it  can  hardly 
be  maintained  that  the  improvement  has  followed  the 
line  suggested  by  his  criticism.  The  materials  of  history, 
as  history  is  taught  in  the  elementary  and  secondary 
schools  to-day,  have  very  little  direct  value  in  yielding 
generalizations  that  may  be  consciously  applied  to  the 
solution  of  economic  problems.  There  are,  it  is  true,  a 
few  great,  universal  truths  that  may  safely  be  drawn  from 
historical  data,  but  there  are  few  authorities  upon  the 
teaching  of  history  who  maintain  that  the  development 
of  these  few  truths  constitutes  the  chief  value  of  the  study. 
Indeed,  the  authorities  are  practically  agreed  that  it 
would  be  unwise  to  attempt  the  teaching  of  history  from 
this  point  of  view. 

For  example,  Langlois  and  Seignobos  2  strongly  emphasize 
this  point :  "It  is  an  illusion  to  suppose  that  history  supplies 

1  Spencer:  Education,  New  York,  1895  (Appleton's  ed.),  pp.  64  ff. 

2  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  History,  pp.  319  f. 


142  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

information  of  practical  utility  in  the  conduct  of  life,  lessons 
directly  profitable  to  individuals  and  peoples ;  the  conditions 
under  which  human  actions  are  performed  are  rarely  suffi 
ciently  similar  at  two  different  moments  for  the  'lessons  of 
history*  to  be  directly  applicable.  ...  It  has  an  indirect 
utility." 

Froude  l  also  expresses  himself  very  skeptically  with  regard 
to  the  utilitarian  value  of  history.  "It  often  seems  to  me 
as  if  history  was  like  a  child's  box  of  letters  with  which  we 
can  spell  any  word  that  we  please.  We  have  only  to  pick 
out  such  letters  as  we  want,  arrange  them  as  we  like,  and  say 
nothing  about  those  that  do  not  suit  our  purpose." 

Logic  warns  us  that  an  inference  from  analogy  is  always 
likely  to  be  misleading  unless  one  is  certain  that  conditions  are 
identical  in  the  two  cases.  One  might,  for  example,  main 
tain  that  the  history  of  Rome  is  a  warning  against  our  pres 
ent  tendency  toward  luxury  and  extravagance.  Luxury  and 
extravagance,  it  may  be  urged,  caused  the  downfall  of  Rome ; 
consequently,  let  us  look  well  to  the  same  symptoms  in  our 
national  life  to-day.  The  danger  may  be  real  enough,  but 
the  analogy  alone  does  not  prove  it.  In  Rome  extravagance 
and  luxury  were  founded  upon  the  institution  of  slavery, 
slavery  begets  idleness,  and  it  is  idleness  that  enervates. 
But  the  luxury  of  modern  life  is  founded  not  upon  slavery,  but 
upon  strenuous  achievement.  With  all  of  our  prosperity, 
there  has  been  no  visible  tendency  toward  idleness.  Thus 
what  seems  to  be  a  prime  controlling  condition  in  Roman 
degeneration  does  not  exist  in  any  appreciable  measure  in 
the  situation  that  now  confronts  us. 

Again,  one  might  infer  from  the  facts  of  English  history 
that  the  policy  of  free  trade,  which  has  unquestionably  pro 
moted  the  commercial  prestige  of  England,  would  similarly 

1  J.  A.  Froude :  The  Science  of  History,  p.  66. 


FULFILLING   THE   INSTRUCTIONAL   FUNCTIONS       143 

advance  the  commercial  prestige  of  any  other  country.  But 
one's  opponent  could  easily  point  to  the  commercial  progress 
that  Germany  has  made  in  a  much  shorter  period  under 
a  policy  of  high  protection.  This  does  not  mean  that  free 
trade  is  either  good  or  bad  from  an  economic  standpoint. 
It  simply  means  that  one  is  unable  to  draw  final  conclusions 
from  historical  data. 

It  is  not  to  be  inferred  from  what  has  been  said  that  a 
knowledge  of  history  has  no  place  in  education  for  citi 
zenship.  Some  historical  knowledge  does  influence 
political  development,  and  influences  it  profoundly. 
But  the  transition  from  theory  to  practice  is  not  through 
a  direct  channel,  —  is  not  a  matter  of  direct  application  of 
principles  and  generalizations  to  existing  situations. 

6.  In  Spencer's  arrangement  of  the  subjects  of  in 
struction,  following  what  he  considers  to  be  the  order  of 
their  importance,  physiology  stands  first.1  "  We  assert," 
he  says,  "that  such  a  course  of  physiology  as  is  needful 
for  the  comprehension  of  its  general  truths  and  their 
bearings  on  daily  conduct,  is  an  all-essential  part  of  a 
rational  education."  Certainly  one  might  assume  that, 
if  any  knowledge  imparted  by  the  schools  should  be 
frequently  applied  by  all  who  receive  the  school's  in 
struction,  it  is  the  knowledge  of  physiological  principles, 
especially  the  knowledge  of  those  principles  that  are 
primarily  concerned  with  the  preservation  of  health. 
And  yet  the  fatuity  of  most  of  the  instruction  in  physiol 
ogy  and  hygiene  is  a  by-word  among  educators.  Recent 

1  Spencer,  op.  tit.,  p.  43. 


144  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

improvements  in  the  methods  of  teaching,  and  especially 
in  the  content,  have  done  something  toward  the  realiza 
tion  of  Spencer's  ideal,  but  the  most  important  results 
have  been  gained  either  in  the  field  of  specific  habit- 
building,  or  in  connection  with  the  social  rather  than  with 
the  purely  utilitarian  values. 

One  of  the  most  noteworthy  attempts  to  effect  a  change 
in  human  conduct  through  the  direct  inculcation  of  facts 
and  principles  is  represented  by  the  almost  universal  require 
ment  of  ''temperance  physiology"  in  American  schools. 
The  failure  of  "temperance  physiology"  to  work  temperance 
reform  is  one  of  the  most  damaging  evidences  against  the 
efficiency  of  didactic  methods  of  instruction.  Men  can  be 
made  to  see  the  effects  of  intemperance  in  a  way  that  will 
influence  their  conduct.  John  B.  Gough  and  other  temper 
ance  reformers  certainly  knew  the  secret.  The  agitation  of 
the  past  few  years  in  the  South  and  Middle  West  has  been 
startlingly  efficient.  What  is  the  difference  between  these 
successful  movements  and  the  miserable  failure  of  "temper 
ance  physiology"  in  the  schools?  It  will  be  the  problem  of 
a  later  chapter  to  seek  an  answer  to  this  question. 

7.  In  the  other  instructional  subjects  commonly 
taught  in  the  elementary  school  curriculum,  there  seems 
to  be  scarcely  a  trace  of  direct  utilitarian  value,  in  so  far 
as  the  immediate  application  of  facts  and  principles  is 
concerned.  Music,  drawing,  and  manual  training  are 
(as  now  taught)  primarily  habit-building  subjects. 
Nature  study  in  rural  schools,  where  it  can  be  closely 
related  to  practical  problems  in  agriculture,  may  be 
made  to  have  a  direct  value ;  as  taught  in  the  majority 


FULFILLING   THE   INSTRUCTIONAL   FUNCTIONS       145 

of  schools,  however,  its  value,  whatever  it  may  be,  is 
certainly  not  of  this  type. 

8.  On  the  whole,  then,  the  subject-matter  of  the  con 
temporary  elementary  curriculum,  in  so  far  as  it  lays 
the  foundations  for  the  application  of  facts  and  principles 
through  judgment  processes,  cannot  be  said  to  possess 
direct  utilitarian  value  in  marked  degree.     Aside  from  a 
relatively  few  important  principles  of  arithmetic  and 
formal  grammar,  and  the  very  simplest  facts  of  geography, 
the  only  subject  that  is  distinctly  utilitarian  in  its  nature 
is  physiology,  and  in  this,  as  we  have  seen,  the  direct 
value  is  very  infrequently  realized. 

9.  With  regard  to  the  secondary  curriculum,  the  situa 
tion  is  more  complicated.     The  subjects  of  instruction 
are  more  numerous,  there  is  a  differentiation  of  courses 
that  prevents  all  pupils  from  undergoing  the  same  in 
struction,  and,  under  the  present  organization  of  second 
ary  schools,  there  are  many  subjects  which  are  technical 
and  vocational  in  their  character  and  which,  consequently, 
possess  a  large  measure  of  utilitarian  value.     Aside  from 
the  latter  courses,  however,  it  would  seem  that  direct 
applicability  is  quite  as  rare  a  characteristic  of  the  facts 
and  principles  composing  the  secondary  curriculum  as  it 
is  of  the  elementary  subjects. 

10.  The  teaching  of   the  mother- tongue  in  the   high 
school   commonly   includes   rhetoric,   composition,   and 
literature.     The  science  of  rhetoric  attempts  to  develop 
principles  that  may  be  directly  applied  in  improving  the 
efficiency  of  expression ;   consequently,  this  subject  may 


146  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

be  said  to  possess  utilitarian  value.  Composition  aims 
at  fixing  habits,  and  its  materials  are,  therefore,  not  to  be 
included  in  our  present  discussion.  Literature  is  not 
taught  for  the  purpose  of  impressing  facts  and  principles, 
and  is  likewise  excluded  from  present  consideration. 

11.  The  teaching  of  modern  foreign  languages  is  im 
portant  from  the  utilitarian  standpoint  in  England  and 
especially  upon  the  continent.     In  the  United  States  the 
practical  advantage  of  a  speaking  mastery  of  an  alien 
tongue  is  not  great.     For  some  students,  a  reading  mas 
tery  would  be  extremely  valuable,  and  yet,  if  the  teaching 
of  modern  languages  is  justified  solely  by  this  factor,  it 
can  safely  be  said  that  a  vast  amount  of  time  and  energy 
and  money  is  being  expended  for  a  very  slight  return. 
It  is  very  rare  for  university  instructors  to  assign  reading 
in  French  or  German,  even  to  advanced  undergraduate 
classes,  although  practically  every  member  of  such  classes 
has  had  at  least  two  years  of  instruction  in  one  or  the 
other  of  these  languages.     It  would  be  interesting  to 
determine    how    much    reading    in    foreign    languages 
will  be  done  during  the  next  five  years  by  the  students 
who  receive  baccalaureate  degrees  at  the  next   com 
mencement  from  the  typical  American  universities.     If 
this  is  true  of  the  modern  languages,  it  is  scarcely  prob 
able  that  the  ancient  languages  can  establish  a  claim  to  a 
direct  function,  except  through  the  practice  that  they 
involve  in  English  composition. 

12.  Secondary  mathematics  has  an  obvious  contingent 
value  to  a  proportion  of  its  students,  —  for  those,  namely, 


FULFILLING   THE   INSTRUCTIONAL   FUNCTIONS      147 

who  will  have  need  to  apply  the  facts  and  principles 
gained  to  the  various  branches  of  engineering.  The 
average  secondary  pupil,  however,  will,  in  all  probabil 
ity,  never  use  the  specific  knowledge  of  algebra,  geometry, 
and  trigonometry  after  he  has  left  the  school.  New  and 
improved  organization  of  secondary  sciences  may  per 
haps  make  it  possible  to  turn  much  of  the  mathematical 
proficiency  developed  in  algebra  and  geometry  classes 
to  the  solution  of  everyday  economic  problems  arising 
in  the  life  of  the  average  individual,  but  so  effective  a 
correlation  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  high  schools  of  to-day. 
13.  At  first  thought,  secondary  science  would  seem  to 
be  a  most  favorable  field  for  the  realization  of  direct 
economic  values.  The  problem  of  science  is  to  reduce 
the  phenomena  of  the  world  about  us  and  within  us  to 
the  operation  of  law,  —  to  bring  the  forces  that  consti 
tute  our  environment  under  the  control  of  comprehensive 
principles.  What  is  more  natural  than  to  assume  that  a 
mastery  of  these  principles  would  enable  one  to  adjust 
oneself  to  these  forces  more  effectively  than  would 
otherwise  be  possible?  One  must  deal  constantly  with 
physical  forces,  whatever  be  the  type  of  life  that  one 
leads,  —  and  yet  how  many  men  and  women  who  have 
completed  courses  in  secondary  physics  ever  apply  the 
principles  that  have  been  gained  to  the  conduct  of  their 
affairs  ?  For  the  average  man,  the  adjustments  which  in 
volve  an  acquaintance  with  physical  principles  are  made 
on  the  basis,  not  of  principles  gained  in  formal  study, 
but  of  those  which  are  either  derived  empirically  from 


148  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

experience,  or  gained  through  imitation.  For  all  ordi 
nary  purposes  the  empirical  or  imitative  acquaintance 
with  the  lever,  the  wheel,  the  pump,  and  the  other  de 
vices  that  illustrate  physical  principles  seems  to  be  quite 
sufficient.  Similarly  with  the  other  sciences.  One 
learns  empirically  the  phenomena  of  combustion,  fer 
mentation,  and  the  like,  without  reference  to  their  under 
lying  chemical  principles.  One  may  plant  seeds,  and 
grow  crops,  and  reap  harvests,  with  obvious  success, 
without  understanding  the  biology  of  the  processes.  So 
far  as  the  influence  of  scientific  knowledge  upon  such 
adjustments  is  concerned,  it  has  been,  under  the  prevail 
ing  methods  of  teaching  secondary  science,  practically 
nil.  Aside  from  Spencer,  indeed,  very  few  of  the  author 
ities  who  have  discussed  the  values  of  secondary  science 
have  emphasized  direct  utility  as  a  leading  aim.1 

There  is,  at  the  present  time,  however,  a  marked  tend 
ency  so  to  reorganize  the  scientific  work  of  the  high 
schools  that  a  direct  utilitarian  value  will  be  more  fre 
quently  realized.  The  introduction  of  specialized  courses 
in  agriculture,  mechanics,  and  household  science  cannot 
fail  to  have  a  reflex  influence  upon  the  teaching  of  the 
basic  sciences,  emphasizing  their  practical  phases,  show 
ing  at  every  point  the  large  improvement  and  economy 
that  come  from  a  rational  rather  than  from  an  empirical 
procedure,  and,  above  all,  giving  the  pupils  actual  prac- 

1  Cf.  Huxley:  Science  and  Education  (Appleton'sed.,  1899),  pp.  38-65, 
134-159;  Lloyd  and  Bigelow:  The  Teaching  of  Biology,  New  York, 
1907,  Ft.  I,  ch.  iii,  Pt.  II,  ch.  i. 


FULFILLING   THE   INSTRUCTIONAL   FUNCTIONS       149 

tice  in  the  application  of  principles  to  everyday  problems. 
As  will  be  pointed  out  in  a  later  chapter,  there  are  good 
reasons  for  predicting  that  the  secondary  sciences  of  the 
near  future  will  be  quite  different  in  organization  and 
content  from  what  they  are  to-day,  and  that,  in  this 
readjustment,  the  ends  of  utility  will  secure  a  more 
effective  recognition. 

This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  the  utilitarian  value 
will  come  to  be  considered  the  exclusive  or  even  the  domi 
nant  value  of  secondary  science.  It  means  rather  that 
the  potential  applicability  of  the  sciences  will  be  brought 
into  function  just  as  far  as  it  is  possible  to  fulfill  this  end 
without  interfering  with  the  realization  of  the  more 
important  values. 

14.  The   non-vocational    subjects  of    the    secondary 
curriculum,  —  history  and  civics,  —  may  be  dismissed 
briefly.     The  utilitarian  value  of  history  has  already 
been  found  to  be  slight.  ;  \Civics,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
commonly  justified  solely  upon  the  basis  of  its  utility 
in  actual  adjustment;    but   this  justification   depends 
upon  the  socializing  value  of  civics  rather  than  upon  the 
direct  economic  value. 

15.  This  brief  review  can  scarcely  fail  to  impress  one 
with  the  very  slight  direct  economic  value  of  the  great 
mass  of  facts  and  principles  that  are  taught  in  the  ele 
mentary  and  secondary  schools.     It  would  be  folly  to 
conclude  that  these  materials  are  devoid  of  value;  but 
their  value,  whatever  it  may  be,  must  be  sought  in  another 
source.     In  view,  however,  of  the  admitted  paucity  of 


150  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

directly  applicable  facts  and  principles  in  the  curriculum, 
the  following  propositions  may  be  laid  down  as  possible 
guides  to  practice. 

(a)  If  the  facts  and  principles  that  are  applied  directly 
to  the  economic  situations  of  life  are  gained  principally 
either  through  the  forces  of  informal  education,  or  through 
the  type  of  formal  education  that  we  term  vocational  or 
technical,  it  is  extremely  likely  that  these  facts  and  prin 
ciples  are  highly  specialized.  Consequently,  any  attempt 
to  limit  the  curriculum  of  general  education  to  those 
subjects  possessing  indisputable  utility  will  result  in 
giving  to  many  individuals  specialized  knowledge  for 
which  they  will  have  no  practical  use,  while,  at  the  same 
time,  such  individuals  will  miss  those  values,  not  utili 
tarian,  but  none  the  less  important,  which  may  be  realized 
by  a  curriculum  of  another  sort. 

(6)  General  education,  however,  has  another  duty  with 
regard  to  direct  economic  values  in  addition  to  imparting 
those  facts  and  principles  that  will  be  applied  by  all  of 
its  pupils.  Although  education  for  utility  must  be  largely 
specific,  general  education  can  influence  specialized 
efficiency  in  three  ways :  (i)  it  may  train  pupils  in  the 
art  of  finding  the  specific  facts  and  principles  that  may  be 
of  value  in  solving  the  problems  of  their  lives ;  (2)  it  may 
train  pupils  in  the  art  of  mastering  such  facts  and  prin 
ciples  once  they  have  been  found ;  and  (3)  it  may  train 
them  in  the  art  of  applying  such  facts  and  principles  once 
they  have  been  mastered.  In  other  words,  general  edu 
cation  should  teach  pupils  how  to  use  books  and  other 


FULFILLING    THE   INSTRUCTIONAL    FUNCTIONS       151 

sources  of  information ;  how  to  study ;  and  how  to  apply. 
If  it  concentrates  upon  these  problems,  making  use  of 
every  possible  means  of  impressing  useful  knowledge 
without  forgetting  that  most  utilitarian  information  is 
very  specific  in  its  character,  it  will  do  vastly  more  to 
enhance  the  utilitarian  values  than  by  loading  its  curric 
ulum  with  materials  that  have  either  a  temporary  appli 
cability  or  an  applicability  that  is  limited  to  compara 
tively  few  individuals. 

1 6.  (b)  The  Conventional  Value  of  Knowledge.  Very  few 
facts,  principles,  and  meanings  are  exclusively  conven 
tional  in  their  value.  Certain  groups  of  principles,  such 
as  those  forming  the  subject-matter  of  formal  grammar, 
may  be  justified  because  it  is  expected  that  they  will 
ultimately  work  over  into  habits  which  are  important 
chiefly  from  the  conventional  point  of  view.  The  facts 
of  geography  and  history  have  also  a  large  measure  of 
conventional  importance,  but  there  are  comparatively 
few  conventionally-important  facts  relating  to  these 
subjects  that  cannot  be  included  in  the  realization  of 
other  and  more  important  values.  Certain  facts  usually 
acquired  in  the  study  of  literature  (dates  and  places  of 
birth  of  authors,  names  of  important  books  and  charac 
ters)  have  a  goodly  measure  of  conventional  value ;  but 
these  facts  may  also  be  made  to  realize  other  values; 
hence  the  fulfillment  of  the  conventional  demands  be 
comes  only  an  incident  and  not  an  explicit  aim  in  their 
acquisition.  The  conventional  value  of  mathematics, 
beyond  the  merest  rudiments,  is  admittedly  slight. 


152  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

17.  (c)  The  Preparatory   Value  of  Knowledge.     This 
rubric  is  very  much  more  important.     The  development 
of  concepts  or  meanings  in  the  elementary  stages  of 
teaching  any  subject  is  obviously  justified  very  largely 
because  of   the  preparatory  value   of  these   concepts. 
Thus  in  all  of  the  content  subjects  of  the  elementary 
curriculum,  the  question  of  preparing  for  later  study  is  of 
paramount  importance.     The  development  of  adequate 
meanings  makes  possible  the  short-circuiting  of  the  later 
educative   processes,  —  makes   possible    what   may   be 
aptly     termed     "  vicarious     experience."       Instruction 
through  language  is  the  most  effective  and  economical 
method  of  transmitting  race-experience,  —  provided,  of 
course,  that  the  words  which  language  employs  actually 
work  back  into  the  experience  of  the  individual.     Unless 
this  precaution  is  taken,  such  instruction  is  worse  than 
useless.1    A  very  important  part  of  the  teacher's  function 
in  the  elementary  stages  of  instruction,  then,  is  to  seek 
out  these  fundamental  concepts  that  the  subject  employs 
and,  by  bringing  them  down  to  the  level  of  actual  expe 
rience,  gradually  to  develop  the  meanings  which  con 
structive  thinking  and  vicarious  experience  will  later 
employ. 

1 8.  (d)  The   Socializing    Value   of  Knowledge.    This 
has  been  so  adequately  treated  by  Ruediger  2  that  an 
extended  discussion  would  be  superfluous  in  this  place. 
The  educative  materials  that  have  fundamental  impor 
tance  from  the  social  point  of  view  are  obviously  ideals  and 

1  Cf.  Chapter  III.  2  Cf.  Ruediger,  op.  cit,,  pp.  127  ff. 


FULFILLING   THE    INSTRUCTIONAL   FUNCTIONS       153 

prejudices.  But,  as  was  shown  in  Chapter  IV,  ideals 
and  prejudices  function  predominantly  in  supplying  aims 
and  purposes.  Guides  to  the  realization  of  these  purposes 
must  be  furnished  by  knowledge  and  it  is  in  this  connec 
tion  that  the  socializing  value  of  knowledge  is  of  funda 
mental  importance. 

The  distinction  that  has  been  made  between  knowledge 
and  ideals  is  nowhere  more  clearly  apparent  than  in  this 
connection.  One  might  acquire  information  regarding  civic 
organization,  social  hygiene,  good  government,  and  a  host  of 
other  socially  important  topics,  but  unless  one  were  inspired 
with  powerful  socializing  ideals,  the  knowledge  would  be 
a  luxury  without  a  purpose.  Similarly,  one  might  be  pos 
sessed  of  the  strongest  social  motives,  and  still  be  unable  to 
realize  one's  aims  because  one  lacked  the  facts  and  principles 
that  must  be  interpolated  as  means  to  ends.  The  failure 
of  mere  knowledge  to  work  social  reforms  is  too  obvious  to 
need  discussion.  The  failure  of  unintelligent  enthusiasm 
has  been  painfully  apparent  in  connection  with  the  well- 
meaning  but  often  futile  attempts  that  have  been  made  to 
eliminate  the  undesirable  conditions  represented  by  polit 
ical  corruption,  child  labor,  the  miscarriage  of  justice,  and 
the  social  evil. 

There  is  no  subject  of  instruction  in  either  the  ele 
mentary  or  the  secondary  curriculum  as  at  present  con 
stituted  that  cannot  be  made  to  realize  a  rich  socializing 
value.  Geography  may  develop  the  laws  that  govern  the 
distribution  of  population,  the  growth  of  cities,  the  sources 
of  the  supply  of  economic  necessities ;  it  may  make  the 
pupils  acquainted  with  the  conditions  under  which  the 
people  of  other  countries  live  and  work ;  it  may  lay  down 


154  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

the  fundamental  principles  governing  commerce,  agri 
culture,  and  other  industries.  These  principles  may  be 
quite  without  value  in  the  narrowly  economic  adjust 
ments  of  the  pupil's  later  life;  it  will  depend  upon  the 
presence  or  absence  of  social  ideals  whether  the  process 
of  instruction  will  repay  the  time  and  the  effort  which  it 
involves.  The  facts  of  history  will  probably  find  a  more 
equitable  justification  in  connection  with  the  interpre 
tive  function,  but  in  so  far  as  fundamental  principles  of 
social  life  may  be  drawn  from  historical  data,  their  social 
izing  value  may  be  richly  realized.  But  again  the  realiza 
tion  of  this  value  depends  upon  the  effective  functioning 
of  the  socializing  ideals. 

Physiology  and  hygiene  find  their  most  important 
justification  under  this  rubric.  Cleanliness  and  health 
are  of  economic  importance  to  every  individual,  but  this 
importance  is  quite  overshadowed  by  their  social  sig 
nificance. 

In  connection  with  the  study  of  arithmetic,  there  is  an 
important  socializing  value  that  has  not  hitherto  been 
sufficiently  realized.  The  chapters  of  commercial  arith 
metic  that  give  the  pupil  an  acquaintance  with  such  com 
mercial  activities  as  banking,  insurance,  taxes,  stocks 
and  bonds,  partnerships,  corporations,  and  the  like,  are 
vastly  more  important  from  the  socializing  point  of  view 
than  merely  from  the  narrowly  utilitarian  aspect.  The 
recent  tendency  to  eliminate  many  of  the  chapters  of 
elementary  arithmetic  has  been  dictated  by  a  short 
sighted  policy.  Because  the  principles  treat  w  hese 


FULFILLING   THE   INSTRUCTIONAL   FUNCTIONS      155 

chapters  are  of  questionable  direct  utility  to  the  average 
pupil,  it  has  been  assumed  that  they  possess  no  value. 
This  point  will  be  referred  to  under  the  discussion  of  the 
interpretive  functions. 

19.  In  spite  of  the  wealth  of  socializing  materials  in  the 
present  elementary  and  secondary  curriculum,  there  is  a 
need  for  changes  that  will  still  more  strongly  emphasize 
this  factor.  The  study  of  agriculture,  for  example,  is 
primarily  significant  because  of  its  socializing  value. 
The  principle  of  conservation  lies  at  the  very  root  of  social 
welfare,  and  this  principle  can  be  nowhere  more  effec 
tively  developed  than  in  connection  with  agriculture. 
From  this  point  of  view,  the  inhabitant  of  the  city,  as 
well  as  the  farmer,  needs  a  knowledge  of  agriculture. 
The  present  emphasis  upon  the  importance  of  utilizing 
the  educative  materials  of  the  child's  immediate  environ 
ment  is  dictated  very  largely  by  economic  rather  than 
by  social  considerations,  but  even  here  the  clearest 
justification  of  such  a  policy  is  social.  So  long  'as  this 
emphasis  does  not  tend  to  create  sectionalism  or  in  any 
way  to  unfit  the  individual  to  adapt  himself  to  a  changed 
environment  (and  this  danger  is  very  slight)  the  move 
ment  is  an  important  step  in  the  right  direction. 


CHAPTER  XI 

VALUES  TO  BE  REALIZED  IN  FULFILLING  THE  INSPIRA 
TIONAL  FUNCTIONS 

i.  IN  discussing  the  remaining  functions  of  educative 
materials,  the  emphasis  will  be  very  largely  upon  the 
socializing  values  that  the  fulfillment  of  these  functions 
may  realize.  This  is  not  to  imply  that  these  functions 
are  unimportant  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  utilitarian 
and  preparatory  values.  Aims,  motives,  prejudices, 
tastes,  attitudes,  and  perspectives  certainly  influence 
profoundly  one's  economic  adjustments,  and  certainly 
influence  profoundly  one's  acquisition  of  other  subjects. 
But  it  is  in  connection  with  their  socializing  values  that 
the  subjects  now  to  be  discussed  must  make  their  chief 
appeal  for  recognition  in  the  curriculum  of  general  public 
education. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  inspirational  and  instruc 
tional  functions  have  not  hitherto  been  explicitly  differ 
entiated  in  the  educative  process,  the  present  chapter 
will  attempt  a  rather  more  detailed  analysis  of  the  in 
spirational  function,  as  such,  than  was  attempted  in 
connection  with  the  training  and  instructional  functions. 
This  will,  in  a  measure,  amplify  the  more  cursory  treat 
ment  of  ideals  which  was  presented  in  Chapter  IV. 

156 


FULFILLING  THE   INSPIRATIONAL   FUNCTIONS       157 

2.  It  will  be  remembered  that  an  ideal  or  an  emotional 
ized  standard  was  denned  as  an  idea  which  was  highly 
emotionalized.  In  essence,  it  is  an  idea  that  controls 
conduct  in  virtue  of  its  emotional  " warmth"  rather  than 
in  virtue  of  its  intellectual  clearness,  or  in  virtue  of  the 
accuracy  with  which  it  mirrors  some  environmental 
condition. 

The  distinction  is  difficult  to  define  in  accurate  terms, 
but  it  is  clear  enough  from  the  practical  standpoint.  A 
man  may  know  or  believe,  as  a  matter  of  intellectual  judg 
ment,  that  civic  purity,  for  example,  is  essential  to  the 
highest  type  of  civic  life ;  but  even  with  fraud  and  cor 
ruption  rife  in  the  local  politics  of  his  community,  he 
may  not  make  the  slightest  effort  toward  remedying 
conditions ;  in  other  words,  the  intellectual  belief  is  not 
sufficient  in  itself  to  spur  him  to  action.  Suppose,  how 
ever,  that  civic  corruption  menaces  some  fundamental 
interest  of  his  life,  —  threatens  to  destroy  his  business, 
or  reduce  the  value  of  his  real  estate,  or  invade  his  home ; 
immediately  his  idea  of  its  evil  character  becomes  a  strong 
positive  ideal  in  favor  of  civic  virtue  which  incites  him 
to  effort  toward  its  realization.  The  emotional  force 
engendered  by  the  stimulation  of  a  fundamental  instinct 
(in  this  case  some  form  of  the  instinct  of  self-preservation) 
has  gathered  about  the  idea  and  turned  it  into  a  definite, 
dynamic  standard,  —  a  positive  prejudice  in  favor  of  a 
virtue,  the  rationality  of  which  he  has  always  admitted.1 

1  "Compare  the  purely  intellectual,  parrot-like  belief  of  the  citizens 
of  any  French  town  with  the  faith  of  a  Dominican  monk.  The  latter, 


158  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

One  of  the  best  examples  of  this  vitalizing  of  an  idea  is 
to  be  seen  in  the  temperance  movement,  especially  in  the 
South.  Through  a  combination  and  summation  of  circum 
stances  revealing  very  clearly  the  menace  to  business  inter 
ests,  to  the  welfare  of  the  home,  and  even  to  life  itself  which 
is  involved  in  the  wide  extension  of  the  saloon  influences, 
a  very  forcible  prejudice  in  favor  of  prohibition  has  grown  up. 
This  has  been  increased  by  many  other  factors,  of  course, 
but  there  is  little  doubt  that  its  effective  appeal  came  first 
through  the  stimulation  of  certain  fundamental  instincts 
and  the  emotional  effects  which  followed. 

3.  An  ideal  or  a  prejudicial  attitude  may  be  engen 
dered  through  forces  of  different  types,  but  this  vitalizing 
emotional  element  is  always  the  essential  ingredient. 
Self-interest  is  probably  the  most  effective  source  of  such 
standards,  because  self-interest  is  only  another  expression 
for  the  most  fundamental  and  basic  of  all  instincts,  and 
every  emotion  must  have  its  instinctive  core.  That  the 
more  refined  and  etherealized  ideals  may  influence  con- 

because  he  feels  a  religious  truth,  is  able  to  sacrifice  himself  utterly,  de 
prive  himself  of  everything  that  the  world  holds  dear,  accept  poverty 
and  humiliation,  and  lead  a  severe,  hard  life.  The  citizen  whose  belief 
is  merely  intellectual  goes  to  mass,  but  feels  no  sense  of  repugnance  at 
his  egregious  selfishness.  He  is  rich,  but  he  works  a  poor  servant  piti 
lessly  hard,  and  gives  her  scarcely  enough  to  eat  while  demanding  the 
utmost  of  her  service. 

"  Compare  the  lightly  uttered  socialistic  opinions  uttered  by  a  demagog, 
who  denies  himself  no  pleasure  and  spares  no  expense  to  gratify  his  van 
ity,  with  the  socialism  felt  by  a  Tolstoi  who,  though  possessed  of  every 
gift,  —  noble  birth,  fortune,  and  genius,  —  yet  lives  the  life  of  a  Russian 
peasant. 

"...  Ideas  by  themselves  do  not  constitute  a  force  .  .  .  they  are 
obliged  to  borrow  from  feelings  the  force  which  they  lack."  —  J.  PAYOT  : 
The  Education  of  the  Will,  trans.  S.  E.  Jelliffe,  New  York,  1909,  pp.  62  f. 


FULFILLING   THE   INSPIRATIONAL   FUNCTIONS        159 

duct  profoundly,  there  can  be  no  doubt ;  but  that  their 
operation  is  comparatively  rare  as  compared  with  the 
more  primitive  standards,  is  equally  clear. 

4.  Next  to  the  individualistic  instincts  as  effective 
agencies  in  forming  ideals,  are  to  be  ranked  the  sex- 
instincts  and  the  parental  instincts.  Ideas  vitalized 
by  these  fundamental  feelings  are  directive  over  conduct 
in  a  most  imperious  manner.  Such  words  as  fidelity, 
honor,  chastity,  self-sacrifice,  and  the  like,  are  packed 
with  content  which  it  is  difficult  to  formulate  in  definitions 
for  the  very  reason  that  definitions  express  intellectual 
analyses ;  the  meaning  of  these  words  is  bound  up  very 
largely  in  affective  or  emotional  factors.  Nevertheless, 
they  have  an  intellectual  content.  One  knows  that  con 
jugal  fidelity  means  a  certain  control  of  conduct ;  one 
is  perhaps  ready  to  admit,  from  the  purely  intellectual 
point  of  view,  the  necessity  of  conjugal  fidelity  to  the 
integrity  of  the  home,  and  the  necessity  of  the  home  to 
civilized  life ;  but  one  might  know  these  things  and  still 
fail  to  idealize  fidelity.  The  effective  ideal,  again,  must 
have  back  of  it  a  powerful  feeling. 

The  instinctive  core  of  sympathy  that  runs  through  the 
higher  types  of  social  ideals  is  probably  closely  related  to 
the  sex  and  parental  instincts.  It  is  clear,  at  least,  that 
such  ideals  do  not  function  freely  prior  to  adolescence, 
although  the  sporadic  instances  of  impulsive  sympathy 
in  even  very  young  children  would  prevent  one  from  iden 
tifying  the  sympathetic  instinct  completely  with  the  sex 
and  parental  instincts. 


160  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

This,  however,  does  not  prevent  us  from  raising  the 
question,  What  are  the  ingredients  of  effective  social 
ideals  from  the  standpoint  of  the  intellectual  elements 
involved?  Given  the  necessary  instinctive  basis  for 
patriotism  (whatever  that  basis  may  be)  the  important 
thing  for  education  is  to  know  how  the  ideal  of  any  spe 
cific  sort  of  patriotism  can  be  developed. 

5.  The  more  general  instincts  of  curiosity,  play,  and 
imitation  (the  " adaptive"  instincts)  lie  at  the  basis  of 
ideals  that  possess  fundamental  social  value.     It  is  a 
proverb   that  curiosity  is   the  root  of  all  knowledge. 
Another  way  of  formulating  the  same  truth  is  to  say  that 
the  impulse  of  curiosity  grows  into  the  love  for  investi 
gation  —  the  "passion  for  truth."     The  influence  of  this 
ideal  is  clearly  seen  in  the  work  of  the  great  scientists. 
Again  it  is  hard  to  determine  how  much  of  its  force  is 
due  to  the  strength  of  the  original  impulse,  and  how 
much  is  due  to  the  modifying  influence  of  instruction 
and  training.     Certain  it  is  that  some  men  are  "born" 
investigators,  and  that  no  accidental  circumstancing  of 
environments  could  keep  them  from  following  in  one 
field  or  another  the  career  of  investigation.     But  while 
these  may  be  the  greatest  investigators,  it  does  not 
follow  that  education  and  training  may  not  make  effi 
cient  investigators  out  of  those  who  have  but  a  moderate 
capital  of  inherited  inquisitiveness. 

6.  The  instinct  of  play  unquestionably  lies  at  the  basis 
of  the  ideals  of  sportsmanship  which  have  no  unimportant 
function  in  the  scheme  of  civilized  life.    Here,  too;  the 


FULFILLING   THE   INSPIRATIONAL   FUNCTIONS        l6l 

strength  of  the  instinct  may  vary.  Some  men  have  it  in 
only  a  weakened  form ;  with  others  it  seems  to  be  quite 
satisfied  with  the  pastimes  of  childhood ;  but  there  still 
remain  a  large  majority  who  carry  play  in  one  or  more  of 
its  idealized  forms  over  into  adult  life. 

The  transition  from  play  instincts  to  play  ideals  illustrates 
in  a  typical  manner  what  is  probably  the  genesis  of  all  ideals. 
The  play  impulse,  as  seen  in  its  instinctive  form  in  early 
childhood,  expresses  itself  in  the  making  of  certain  adjust 
ments  that  have  been  useful  in  the  history  of  the  race  (the 
fighting  adjustments,  the  hunting  adjustments,  the  hiding 
adjustments,  etc.)  without  consciousness  of  their  purpose, 
and  for  no  other  end  than  the  gratification  of  the  impulse  as 
felt.  It  is  clear  that  an  instinct  impelling  the  child  to  make 
such  adjustments  would  be  extremely  valuable  in  preparing 
the  individual  for  life  under  primitive  conditions.  It  was  in 
this  vicarious  fashion  that  the  child  was  in  part  trained  for 
the  essential  pursuits  of  adult  life.  With  the  passing  of 
primitive  conditions,  the  pressing  need  for  this  training  has 
been  greatly  diminished,  but  the  instincts  still  persist,  and 
demand,  generation  after  generation,  the  same  form  of  grati 
fication.  Civilized  life,  however,  finds  that  they  still  sub 
serve  an  important  social  purpose :  they  impel  the  individual 
to  vigorous  exercises  on  the  one  hand  and  to  recreative  re 
laxation  upon  the  other,  and  these  factors  do  much  to  coun 
teract  the  unhealthful  tendencies  of  the  indoor  life  and  the 
sustained  concentration  demanded  by  civilization.  But 
with  a  perception  of  this  end,  the  activity  loses,  of  course, 
its  instinctive  and  spontaneous  character.  An  intellectual  ele 
ment  has  been  superimposed  upon  the  basic  substratum  of  feel 
ing.  It  is  the  combination  of  these  two  forces  that  constitutes 
an  ideal.  The  intellectual  elements  furnish  the  meaning  of 
the  ideal ;  the  core  of  instinct  gives  it  force  and  vitality. 

M 


1 62  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

7.  The  ideals  that  grow  out  of  the  instinct  of  imitation 
are  less  easily  to  be  identified.     Doubtless  the  imitative 
impulse  contributes  no  small  share  to  the  effective  force 
of  the  ideals  of  sport.     In  its  own  right  instinctive  imi 
tation  may  justly  claim  to  be  the  parent  of  ideals  of 
constructive    imitation.     Instinctive    imitation    is    ex 
pressed  in  the  impulse  to  copy  the  adjustments  that  others 
make  without  reference  to  the  purpose  of  these  adjust 
ments.     But  when  the  blind  impulse  is  illuminated  by  the 
consciousness  of  purpose,  —  when  the  individual  sees 
that  the  imitated  movement  gains  some  result  valuable 
in  itself  apart  from  the  mere  pleasure  of  making  it,  —  an 
intellectual  element  is  introduced  and  the   transition 
from  impulse  to  ideal   has   begun.     The  instinct   still 
furnishes  the  force,  but  the  idea  determines  the  meaning 
—  changes,  transforms,  the  reference  of  the  adjustment. 
This  imitation  becomes  the  basis  of  that  class  of  ideals 
which  is  represented  by  the  higher  forms  of  emulation  and 
example.     It  expresses  itself  concretely  in  the  adoles 
cent's  personal  ideals,  —  in  the  selection  of  individuals 
(generally  adults)  whom  he  strives  to  resemble.1 

8.  There  are  still  many  ideals  for  which  it  is  very  hard 
to  find  basic  instincts,  and  some  instincts  for  which  corre 
sponding  ideals  are  not  readily  suggested.     The  ideal  of 
reverence,  for  example,  may  be  traced  back  to  the  instinct 
of  fear,  but  the  explanation  of  reverence  merely  in  terms 
of  fear  (no  matter  how  highly  one  may  idealize  fear) 

1  Cf .  E.  A.  Kirkpatrick :   Fundamentals  of  Child  Study,  New  York, 
1907,  p.  195. 


FULFILLING   THE   INSPIRATIONAL   FUNCTIONS        163 

seems  hardly  satisfactory.  One  may,  perhaps,  be  justi 
fied  in  assuming  a  basic  instinctive  reverence,  —  a  vague 
feeling  of  helplessness  and  dependence,  —  out  of  which, 
through  intellectual  accretions,  the  highest  ideals  of 
reverence  are  developed.  Whatever  the  explanation, 
the  powerful  influence  that  these  ideals  exert  is  plainly 
apparent.  Religious  education  needs  especially  to  gain 
light  on  this  problem,  for  religious  education  in  the  past 
has  not  always  developed  these  ideals  effectively;  in 
fact,  it  is  hardly  too  much  to  say  that  negative  ideals  have 
frequently  issued  as  a  result  of  shortsighted  methods. 

9.  The  ideal  of  achievement,  —  the  unreasoned  im 
pulse  which  drives  one  to  complete  a  task  that  has  once 
been  undertaken,  —  must  be  ranked  as  one  of  the  most 
powerful  and  effective  of  all  controls  of  conduct.     It  is 
difficult  to  determine,  however,  what  instincts  furnish 
the  impelling  force.     It  is  probably  to  be  considered  as 
an  outgrowth  of  the  individualistic  instincts,  although 
the  sex  impulses  and  the  instinct  of  emulation  doubtless 
add  important  increments. 

10.  What  is  the  relation  of  the  materials  of  education 
to  the  development  of  ideals?    It  is  reasonable  to  be 
lieve  that  ideals  are  influenced  by  educative  forces  in 
two   ways,  —  directly   and  indirectly.     Certain  ideals, 
in  other  words,  may  be  impressed  and  developed  as  ideals ; 
others  come  into  function  as  an  indirect  result  of  instruc 
tion  or  training  that  has  for  its  immediate  purpose  some 
thing  that  may  have  little  superficial  relation  to  the  ideals 
in  question.    As  an  example  of  the  first  class,  one  may 


164  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

instance  the  ideal  of  patriotism,  which  may  be  developed, 
or  at  least  strengthened,  through  the  study  of  national 
history.  In  the  second  class  are  the  ideals  of  method 
which  generalize  specific  disciplines.  The  present  chap 
ter  will  consider  only  ideals  of  the  first  class. 

ii.  History,  biography,  literature,  art  in  any  of  its 
forms,  and  religion  are  the  chief  sources  of  materials 
for  the  direct  development  of  ideals.  The  ideals  that 
history  embodies  are  of  two  types,  —  national  ideals  and 
universal  ideals.  Both  are  fundamental  controls  of 
conduct,  operating  almost  daily  in  common  life.  The 
community  of  conduct  in  any  group  of  civilized  people 
is  evidence  of  the  potency  of  national  ideals. 

Instances  illustrating  this  point  will  come  readily  to  the 
minds  of  those  who  have  traveled  in  different  countries. 
The  Englishman  has  standards  of  conduct  differing  from 
those  of  the  American,  the  German  standards  differ  from 
those  of  the  Englishman,  the  French  standards  from  the 
German,  and  so  on.  The  Englishman,  for  example,  has  a 
certain  contempt  for  free  schools ;  the  American  stakes  his 
nation's  future  on  free  schools.  This  difference  in  educa 
tional  ideals  is  a  controlling  factor  in  the  life  of  the  two  coun 
tries.  The  German  has  an  ideal  of  frugality  and  national 
economy  that  neither  Americans  nor  Englishmen  attain. 
He  willingly  obeys  laws  with  regard  to  property  that  Ameri 
cans  at  least  would  not  respect.  The  Parisian  has  ideals 
of  home  life  and  family  relations  that  are  not  acceptable  to 
the  Anglo-Saxon  mind. 

These  differences  may  have  some  basis  in  the  natural 
constitution  of  different  peoples;  but  that  this  basis  is,  at 
best,  very  slight,  is  evident  from  the  ease  with  which  ideals 


FULFILLING   THE   INSPIRATIONAL  FUNCTIONS       1 6$ 

are  changed  when  people  of  one  nationality  take  up  their 
residence  in  a  foreign  land.  This  is  especially  to  be  noted  in 
the  European  immigrants  who  have  settled  in  America.  In 
two  generations,  at  most,  almost  every  trace  of  the  Euro 
pean  ideals  and  prejudices  is  completely  eradicated. 

Among  the  national  ideals  which  distinguish  Americans  from 
other  peoples  are  those  of  individual  self-reliance  and  equal 
ity  of  opportunity.  There  are  other  ideals  which  we  hold  in 
common  with  other  nations  —  especially  England :  civil 
liberty,  local  self-government,  national  unity,  and  representa 
tive  democracy.  These  national  ideals  control  the  conduct 
of  the  component  members  of  the  body  politic  not  only  in 
those  adjustments  that  have  reference  to  government,  but 
also  in  many  little  matters  that  concern  only  the  individual 
himself.  In  virtue  of  his  national  ideals,  the  American  sends 
his  children  to  a  free  public  school,  and  sometimes  permits 
the  public  to  supply  them  with  books  and  other  materials, 
even  though  he  himself  may  be  far  better  able  to  make  the 
purchases  than  many  of  those  who  are  taxed  for  the  purpose. 
He  may  not  always  reason  out  carefully  why  he  does  this, 
but  sometimes  he  does,  and  then  his  reasoning  might  con 
ceivably  run  something  like  this :  "  Education  opens  oppor 
tunities  that  must  be  equally  offered  to  all  children.  I  can 
easily  afford  to  pay  for  the  education  of  my  children,  but  to 
do  so  would  be  to  place  the  free  schools  upon  a  charity  basis. 
I  may  be  able  to  purchase  books  for  my  children,  but  to  do 
so  would  be  to  place  free  books  for  indigent  children  upon  a 
charity  basis.  In  either  case,  I  should  be  interposing  an  ob 
stacle  between  the  mass  of  children  and  the  education  which 
is  their  right,  for  I  have  in  effect  pauperized  one  class  at  the 
expense  of  another.  Therefore,  to  equalize  opportunity,  I 
send  my  children  to  free  schools  and  let  them  accept  free 
text-books  and  supplies."  This  is  conduct  that  is  controlled 
by  an  ideal.  The  ideal  is  "equality  of  opportunity."  This 


1 66  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

ideal  is  undoubtedly  realized  in  America  in  far  richer  measure 
than  in  any  other  country,  and  it  is  this  ideal  that  America 
stands  for  as  it  stands  for  nothing  else. 

Again,  in  virtue  of  his  ideal  of  local  self-government,  the 
American  citizen  undergoes  certain  disadvantages  that  would 
not  be  his  lot  were  he  to  adopt  a  centralized  system  of  govern 
ment.  He  taxes  himself  for  innumerable  bits  of  govern 
mental  machinery,  —  legislatures,  executive  staffs,  judiciaries, 
—  the  function  of  which  could  be  much  more  economically 
fulfilled  by  fewer  centralized  officials  and  representative 
bodies.  He  does  this  willingly,  and  often  with  a  full  knowl 
edge  of  the  disadvantages  involved,  because  he  not  only 
believes  but  feels  that,  in  spite  of  the  cumbrous  system, 
certain  priceless  liberties  are  retained  by  him  that  would 
otherwise  be  abrogated. 

In  virtue  of  his  ideal  of  representative  democracy,  the 
American  citizen  intrusts  his  government  to  the  hands  of 
many  individuals,  although  he  knows  that  governmental 
efficiency  is  best  subserved  by  concentrating  its  functions  in 
a  few  individuals.  The  ideal  determines  his  conduct,  impels 
him  to  sacrifice  a  certain  measure  of  efficiency  in  order  that 
he  may  feel  that  his  own  interests  have  the  chance  of  repre 
sentation. 

12.  It  is  one  function  of  the  study  of  national  history 
to  impress  these  national  ideals  upon  each  succeeding 
generation.  Certainly  other  forces  are  operative  in  the 
conservation  and  perpetuation  of  these  ideals.  They 
are  expressed  in  the  life  about  us,  —  in  the  institutions 
of  society;  and  imitation  and  suggestion,  unaided  by 
formal  education,  would  tend  to  perpetuate  them.  But 
their  vitality  and  stability  may  be  greatly  increased  and 
strengthened  by  the  study  of  history,  for  history  may 


FULFILLING   THE   INSPIRATIONAL   FUNCTIONS        167 

lead  the  child  vicariously  to  repeat  the  experiences  through 
which  the  ideals  have  developed.  It  was  said  in  a  former 
section  that  the  direct  utilitarian  value  of  history  was 
inconsiderable,  inasmuch  as  the  facts  and  generaliza 
tions  of  history  were  only  infrequently  applied  to  existing 
situations  and  then  with  no  certainty  that  the  predicted 
results  would  follow.  It  is  not  the  facts  and  principles 
of  history  that  the  present  and  future  generations  will 
apply;  it  is  rather  the  emotions  and  sentiments  which 
these  facts  of  history  evoke  in  the  mind  of  the  student 
that  will  operate  to  determine  future  events.1 

13.  But  the  value  of  history  is  not  limited  to  the 
national  ideals  that  its  study  develops.  Historical  per- 

1  "If  a  boy  be  told  to  love  his  country,  he  might  properly  inquire, 
What  is  my  country  ?  It  would  not  be  enough  to  show  him  a  list  of  the 
States,  or  the  flag,  or  to  name  the  leading  politician  who  happened  to 
be  President.  His  real  country  has  much  that  is  invisible  built  into  its 
very  structure.  It  is  Washington's  long  struggle  to  found  and  organize 
the  republic ;  it  is  Jefferson's  dreams  of  democratic  equality ;  it  is  the  deeds 
and  words  of  men  who  from  period  to  period  guided  public  opinion  and 
settled  the  national  policy,  of  those  who  spread  civil  communities  from 
the  Alleghanies  to  the  Pacific,  who  built  up  our  industries  and  laid  the 
foundations  of  our  intellectual  life.  Each  act  in  all  the  great  drama 
has  added  its  bit  to  the  reality  of  the  whole.  .  .  .  Physical  blindness  is 
no  more  unfortunate  than  any  dimness  of  sight  that  shuts  out  half  and 
more  of  what  such  parts  of  the  world  really  are."  —  H.  E.  BOURNE  : 
The  Teaching  of  History  and  Chics,  New  York,  1909,  p.  81. 

"Why  does  'nobility  oblige'?  Simply  because  the  boy  or  man  has 
entered  into  a  larger  realization  of  what  he  is  through  his  knowledge 
of  the  traditions  of  the  house.  In  the  same  way  the  honorable  record 
of  a  regiment,  of  a  ship  of  the  line,  the  traditions  of  even-handed  justice 
that  surround  certain  courts,  elevate  and  clarify  the  consciousness  of  the 
men  who  make  up  their  personnel.  So  the  boy  and  girl  may,  through 
the  proper  study  of  history,  learn  better  to  know  themselves  in  relation 
to  their  community,  their  State,  and  their  country."  —  Ibid.,  pp.  84  f.  ^ 


1 68  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

sonages  and  historical  events  constantly  typify  certain 
universal  ideals,  —  certain  ideals  that  function  irrespec 
tive  of  national  or  ethnic  bonds.  Courage,  fortitude, 
initiative,  efficiency,  foresight,  —  in  fact  every  conceiv 
able  human  virtue  may  be  given  a  surer  footing  in  the 
individual  mind  through  the  study  of  history  and  biog 
raphy  ;  although  here,  also,  the  suggestion  of  the  imme 
diate  social  environment  exerts  a  powerful  influence, 
-  and  an  influence  that  often  needs  to  be  counter 
acted. 

14.  From  what  source  is  the  emotional  force  essential 
to  the  vitality  of  these  ideals  to  be  derived  ?  In  national 
history,  unquestionably,  the  instincts  that  are  stimulated 
by  kinship,  or  blood-relation,  form  an  important  factor. 
The  virtues  of  Lincoln's  character  appeal  with  stronger 
force  to  Americans  than  to  Germans  because  Americans 
recognize  that  Lincoln  was  one  of  them.  Needless  to 
say,  the  feeling  of  kinship  can  be  stimulated,  even 
though  the  actual  blood-tie  be  non-existent.  Com 
munity  of  interest  is  afforded  by  national  life,  and  this 
gives  rise  to  emotional  factors  almost  as  powerful  as  those 
that  are  afforded  by  actual  blood-relationship.  The 
figures  in  world-history  whose  sphere  of  activity  lies 
outside  of  our  own  race  or  nation  appeal  to  us  less  strongly 
than  do  our  own  heroes;  the  ideals  represented  by 
Napoleon  or  Bismarck  will,  in  general,  lack  the  emotional 
force  of  those  represented  by  Lincoln;  nevertheless, 
conspicuous  virtues  and  abilities  excite  admiration,  it 
matters  not  in  whom  they  may  be  found. 


FULFILLING   THE   INSPIRATIONAL   FUNCTIONS       169 

15.  Perhaps  even  more  important    than  history  in 
affording  a  medium  for  the  transmission  of  powerful 
ideals  is  literature.     There  can  be  little  doubt  that  con 
duct  has  been  profoundly  modified  by  the  drama  and  the 
novel.     The  influence  of  such  writers  as  Voltaire  and 
Rousseau  upon  the  French  people  in  the  eighteenth 
century;    the  influence  of  Dickens  upon  certain  phases 
of  English  life;    the  influence  of  " Uncle  Tom's  Cabin" 
upon  the  American  Civil  War,  —  these  are  but  few  in 
stances  of  the  recognized  power  of  literature. 

The  peculiar  influence  of  a  dramatic  portrayal  upon  the 
emotions  cannot  be  discussed  at  this  point.  The  solution 
must  be  sought  in  part  at  least  in  the  form  or  structure  that 
is  fairly  constant  throughout  the  realm  of  art ;  particularly, 
in  the  unity  of  composition  and  the  subordination  of  all  ma 
terials  to  one  central  theme.  That  this  form  fulfills  in  some 
way  the  conditions  that  are  essential  to  an  emotional  appeal, 
there  can  be  no  doubt. 

16.  From  the  standpoint  of  content,  however,  it  is 
clear  that  the  basic  themes  with  which  the  drama  and 
the  novel  commonly  deal  are  closely  related  to  funda 
mental  instincts.     Love,  war,  struggle,  failure,  achieve 
ment,    and    triumph    have    the    closest   possible    rela 
tions    with     individualistic    and     sex     instincts.      The 
novel  and  the  drama,  utilizing  the  form  that  is  best 
adapted   to   reach   these   wellsprings    of    conduct,   are 
eminently  adapted  to  provide  what  may  be  termed  a 
vicarious    satisfaction    or    gratification    of    instinctive 
desires  that  cannot  be  realized  directly.     The  boy  who 


1 70  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

is  forced  by  circumstances  to  live  the  urban  life,  with  its 
numerous  restrictions  which  prevent  the  expression  of 
his  primitive  impulses,  finds  a  vicarious  though  weakened 
satisfaction  in  the  perusal  of  stories  of  fighting  and  hunt 
ing.  The  maiden  finds  analogous  gratification  of  the 
vicarious  order  in  novels  and  love  stories.  Situations 
that  are  vividly  imaged  become,  in  effect,  real  situations. 
Actual  adjustment  to  them  is  often  initiated,  —  the  boy's 
muscles  become  tense  as  he  reads  of  the  excitements  of 
the  chase;  his  nostrils  dilate;  his  breathing  is  quick 
ened;  the  physiological  conditions  of  emotion  are  per 
fectly  fulfilled.  Ideas  that  are  absorbed  at  this  time 
will  tend  to  become  emotionalized,  —  to  become  ideals. 
Courage,  perseverance,  magnanimity,  courtesy,  charity, 
and  a  host  of  other  virtues  may,  in  this  way,  be  endowed 
with  sufficient  emotional  force  to  carry  them  through 
life  as  effective  controls  of  conduct. 

This,  of  course,  is  but  a  suggestion  of  what  may  happen. 
In  a  large  way,  the  potency  of  literature  over  conduct  can 
scarcely  be  doubted.  In  individual  cases,  —  that  is,  in  cases 
where  men  and  women  are  themselves  certain  that  they  owe 
their  ideals  to  literature,  —  a  hundred  other  sources  may 
have  contributed  as  much  or  more.  As  with  other  environ 
mental  forces,  it  is  difficult  to  determine,  in  every  case,  the 
precise  influence  exerted.  A  man  may  be  absolutely  certain 
that  his  appreciation  of  "The  Tale  of  Two  Cities,"  for  exam 
ple,  led  to  the  formation  in  his  mind  of  a  powerful  ideal  of 
self-sacrifice  which  modified  his  conduct  in  later  situations. 
And  yet  his  ideal  of  self-sacrifice  might  have  been  developed 
independently  of  this  stimulus.  It  seems  tolerably  certain, 


FULFILLING   THE   INSPIRATIONAL    FUNCTIONS        1 71 

however,  that  even  granting  an  innate  or  hereditary  basis 
for  self-sacrifice,  environmental  stimulus  of  some  sort  is  essen 
tial  to  its  development  as  an  effective  ideal.  Unless  this  is 
true,  moral  education,  —  all  education,  in  fact,  —  becomes 
a  luxury  without  a  purpose  —  a  mere  epiphenomenon. 

17.  Ideals  are  crystallized  in  other  forms  of  art  as 
well  as  in  literature,  —  in  painting,   music,   sculpture, 
and  architecture.     The  use  of  these  materials  in  formal 
education,  however,  has  hitherto  been  limited  largely 
to  the  study  of  pictures,  and  this  has  been  prosecuted  in  a 
way  that  is  generally  far  from  satisfactory  or  effective. 
It  is  possible  that  a  method  may  be  devised  through 
which  the  inspirational  value  that  pictures  possess  can 
be  realized  in  the  schoolroom.     Certainly  one  of  the  first 
steps  toward  the  devising  of  such  a  method  will  be  a 
selection  of  the  pictures  that  embody  ideals  appealing 
to  children.     Under  present  conditions,  the  function  of 
pictorial  art  in  elementary  education  is  largely  limited 
to  the  intangible  and  rather  uncertain  effect  which  the 
presence  of  good  pictures  in  one's  environment  has  upon 
the  development  of  that  quality  that  we  term  "good 
taste." 

18.  The  same  restrictions  apply  to  the  ideals  that  are 
embodied  in  musical  masterpieces,  —  except  that  here 
the  baneful  effects  of  what  appears  to  be  a  most  irrational 
method  must  first  be  counteracted.     If   there  is  any 
idealism  in  music,  the  methods  of  instruction  that  are 
commonly  employed  in  the  "teaching"  of  this  subject 
are  eminently  adapted  to  destroy  it.     Music,  like  litera- 


172  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

ture,  is  something  to  be  appreciated,  and  appreciation 
in  both  cases  may  involve  a  certain  mastery  of  technique. 
But  what  seems  to  be  needed  in  music  is  not  so  exclu 
sively  training  in  the  technique  of  singing  as  is  now  the 
case ;  some  of  this  is  possibly  essential  to  musical  appre 
ciation,  just  as  some  acquaintance  with  the  technique 
of  style  is  essential  to  literary  appreciation;  but  to 
attempt  to  develop  an  appreciation  for  the  best  music 
through  the  type  of  instruction  common  in  the  schools 
is  about  as  futile  as  to  attempt  to  cultivate  literary  appre 
ciation  through  drill  courses  in  composition  alone. 
What  is  needed  in  both  cases  is  (to  speak  in  a  quasi- 
figurative  fashion)  a  training  of  the  receptive  capacities 
rather  than  an  exclusive  training  of  the  expressive 
capacities.  The  child  should  hear  the  best  music  over 
and  over  again  until  it  has  sunk  into  his  soul,  and  fortified 
him  forever  against  the  seductive  wiles  of  the  tin-pot 
jingles  and  the  sentimental  songs  of  the  music  halls. 
But  here,  too,  as  in  the  case  of  picture-study,  the  direct 
development  of  ideals  is  governed  by  laws  which  are  very 
inadequately  understood  and  hence  is  subject  to  control 
in  a  very  limited  degree. 

19.  Concerning  religion  as  a  medium  for  the  direct 
development  of  ideals,  little  need  be  said.  That  the 
" religious  experience"  marks  the  genesis  of  some  of  the 
most  important  controls  of  conduct,  one  can  scarcely 
doubt.  The  keynote  of  the  powerful  influence  that 
religion  exerts  must  be  sought  in  its  emotional  appeal. 
In  other  words,  a  moral  standard  that  is  supported  by 


FULFILLING   THE    INSPIRATIONAL   FUNCTIONS        173 

religion  possesses,  in  virtue  of  this  support,  an  emotional 
force  that  very  greatly  increases  its  control  over  conduct. 
The  Ten  Commandments  are  fundamental  rules  of  social 
life.  They  are  absolutely  essential  to  the  stability  and 
perpetuation  of  society.  If  they  were  simply  stated  in  a 
didactic  fashion  —  as  principles  or  rules  —  the  sphere 
of  their  influence  would  be  almost  negligible.  But  give 
them  concreteness  and  vitality  by  telling  the  dramatic 
story  of  their  origin ;  put  them  forth  as  the  imperative 
commands  of  an  all-powerful  Deity;  clothe  them  with 
the  impressive  vestments  of  rite  and  ritual ;  associate 
with  failure  to  comply  with  their  restrictions  the  most 
drastic  penalties,  —  and  their  appeal  becomes  universal. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  religion  exists  simply  or  prin 
cipally  as  a  handmaiden  to  morality ;  it  is  simply  to  say 
that  one  very  vital  function  of  religion  is  to  support  and 
vitalize  moral  standards  and  ideals.  It  is  this  very  vi 
tal  function  that  has  given  religion  in  the  past  its  social 
sanction,  for  society  must  always  give  an  effective  sanc 
tion  to  the  institutions  that  are  essential  to  its  survival. 

Beyond  this  function,  of  course,  religion  answers  a  funda 
mental  need  of  the  individual,  —  a  need  for  comfort,  faith, 
hope,  and  inspiration.  Whether  it  manifests  itself  in  a  crude, 
animistic,  or  anthropomorphic  form,  or  in  a  form  the  most 
rarely  refined  and  highly  idealized,  religion  is  always  found 
to  subserve  these  ends.  It  is  the  native  and  original  need  for 
these  " things  of  the  spirit"  that  constitutes  the  basis  of  the 
religious  nature. 

20.  As  a  medium  for  the  direct  development  of  ideals, 
then,  religion  can  exert  a  tremendous  influence  through 


174  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

the  powerful  emotional  forces  that  it  may  enlist  in  its 
service.  There  is  scarcely  a  fundamental  human  im 
pulse  that  is  not  subject  in  one  way  or  another  to  th< 
stimulus  that  religion  offers.  The  basic  individualistic 
instincts  (desire  for  life,  fear  of  death,  hope  of  reward 
fear  of  punishment,  yearning  for  happiness,  dread  o: 
misery) ,  the  imperious  sex,  parental,  and  social  instinct; 
(desire  of  approbation,  fear  of  disapproval,  desire  for  the 
companionship  of  those  that  are  near  and  dear,  fear  o: 
banishment  and  ostracism),  the  adaptive  instincts  (de 
light  in  imitating  forms  and  ceremonies,  the  pleasure  o; 
participating  in  the  drama  of  ritualism,  the  comfort  o: 
satisfying  instinctive  curiosity  concerning  the  mysteries 
of  life  and  death),  —  all  of  these  may  be  seized  upon  anc 
turned  to  account  by  the  institutions  of  religion.  Anc 
perhaps  the  feeling  of  reverence,  which  is  the  crux  of  th< 
religious  experience,  is  to  be  looked  upon  as  a  resultan 
of  these  more  fundamental  impulses  and  emotions. 

21.  To  summarize:   The  materials  of  education  tha' 
may  function  in  impressing   ideals  are  chiefly  history 
biography,  literature  and  other  forms  of  art,  and  religion 
Through   these  media   standards   and  prejudices   of   i 
definite  sort  are  impressed  upon  the  mind  of  the  individ 
ual;    they  may  become  important  controls  of  conduct 
and  their  fundamental  significance  in  the  developmen 
of  the  socially-efficient  individual  is  unquestionable. 

22.  The  preceding  pages  have  not  attempted  an  evalu 
ation  of  all  possible  ideals  in  terms  of  the  ultimate  enc 
of  education.     This  is  a  task  that  might  well  occupy 


FULFILLING   THE   INSPIRATIONAL   FUNCTIONS        175 

the  attention  of  the  philosopher  of  education  for  a  life 
time,  —  and  even  then  his  evaluations,  however  nicely 
adjusted,  would  be  subject  to  constant  revision;  for 
social  needs  change  with  changing  conditions,  and  the 
great,  driving  forces  of  human  life  must  be  adapted  to 
these  changing  needs.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no 
doubt  that  the  development  of  the  socially-efficient  indi 
vidual  is  absolutely  dependent  upon  the  possibility 
of  engendering  effective  ideals,  and  there  is  also  no  doubt 
that  to  certain  ideals  must  be  ascribed  a  permanent  value, 
-  a  value  that  persists  through  all  forms  of  social  change, 
a  value  that  is  inherent  in  the  very  nature  of  society. 
The  following  list,  embodying  both  ideals  of  this  perma 
nent  type  and  ideals  that,  while  of  questionable  perma 
nent  value,  have  at  least  important  functions  in  present- 
day  society,  is  given  as  suggestive  of  some  of  the  types 
that  a  thoroughgoing  classification  should  include. 

I.    Ideals  that  are  absolutely  essential  to  the  stability  and 
progress  of  human  society. 

(a)  Respect  for  the  feelings  of  others. 

(b)  Respect  for  the  rights  of  others. 

1.  Property  rights. 

2.  Equality    of    opportunity    (including    universal 

free  education). 

3.  Tolerance  in  religion  and  politics. 

(c)  Ideals  essential  to  the  integrity  of  the  home. 

1.  Chastity  (conjugal  fidelity). 

2.  Monogamy. 

3.  Parental   love    (an   instinct   which   justifies   an 

almost  complete  confirmation,  the  only  quali 
fication  being  that  the  impulse  to  protect  and 


176  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

shield  the  child  be  checked  by  a  recognition 
that  "character"  is  often  best  developed  by 
a  reasonable  degree  of  hardship). 

(d)  Respect  for  age. 

(e)  Respect  for  womanhood. 

(/)    Sympathy  with  suffering  and  affliction. 

(g)  Self-sacrifice,  self-denial  (the  disposition  to  think 
of  one's  own  pleasures  as  worth  seeking  does 
not  need  the  sanction  of  education;  instinct 
will  take  care  of  this  abundantly  well). 

(ti)  Personal  integrity  (honor,  honesty). 

(i)   Loyalty. 

(y)  Friendship. 

(k)  Cleanliness,  personal  purity  (aversion  to  pruriency, 
indecency,  etc.). 

(/)  Altruism  (on  the  negative  side,  freedom  from  the 
dominance  of  motives  that  have  merely  an 
individual  and  selfish  reference;  willingness 
particularly  to  work  for  the  common  good). 

(m)  Achievement  (expressing  itself  in  willingness  to  put 
forth  effort  and  undergo  discipline). 

(n)  Truth  (the  spirit  of  the  "scientific  method"  as  the 
'  most  effective  guide  in  testing  the  validity  of 
facts  and  principles  and  the  social  value  of 
ideals,  prejudices,  tastes,  and  attitudes;  the 
disposition  to  accept  the  findings  of  science 
irrespective  of  their  effects.  This  is  socially 
justified  by  the  experience  of  the  race,  which 
shows  clearly  that  permanent  progress  has  never 
been  made  by  accepting  dogmas  that  stand 
directly  opposed  to  demonstrated  truth). 

(0)  Simplicity  (an  aversion  to  luxury  for  its  own  sake). 

(p)  Work  (an  aversion  to  idleness). 

(q)  Health  (temperance,  healthful  recreation). 


FULFILLING   THE   INSPIRATIONAL   FUNCTIONS        177 

(f)  Initiative  (the  desire  to  search  for,  and  accept  when 
found,  any  new  conduct-control  that  will 
promote  social  welfare). 

(5)   Independence,  self-reliance  (economic). 
II.  Ideals  that  are  particularly  important  at  the  present 
stage  of  social  evolution,  but  which  later  de 
velopments  may  render  less  important. 

(a)  Patriotism  (reverence  for  the  ideals  which  represent 

the  national  life ;  it  is  conceivable  that  social 
evolution  may  do  away  with  present  differences 
between  nations,  and  that  the  national  ideals 
of  the  present  may  sometime  be  replaced  by 
universal  ideals,  made  up  of  those  national 
ideals  which  experience  shall  show  to  be  most 
worthy  of  general  acceptance ;  this,  of  course, 
is  far  in  the  future). 

(b)  National  unity  (may  be  replaced  by  world-unity). 

(c)  Local  self-government  (while  there  is  little  doubt 

that  local  initiative  in  governmental  affairs 
will  always  be  essential  to  the  optimum  of 
social  development,  it  is  conceivable  that  social 
evolution  will  produce  a  type  of  government 
that  will  safeguard  local  and  individual  inter 
ests  and  still  effect  the  economies  that  go  with 
centralized  government). 

III.  Ideals  that  are  important  in  the  present  stage  of  social 
development,  but  which  need  particular  atten 
tion  from  education  in  the  direction  of  control 
and  partial  inhibition ;  this  limitation  is  due 
to  the  fact  that  these  ideals  are  very  closely 
related  to  strong  instinctive  impulses,  and, 
unlike  the  weaker  social  instincts,  need  direc 
tion  rather  than  encouragement. 
(a)  Property  (a  carefully  qualified  confirmation  of  the 


178  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

native  instinct  to  acquire  material  wealth  is 
essential  in  education ;  to  crush  entirely  this 
instinct  would,  under  present  social  conditions, 
spell  disaster).1 

(b)  Sexual  love  (the  problem  here  is  to  develop  ideals 

that  will  ennoble  and  etherealize  the  operation 
of  the  sex  instincts). 

(c)  Ambition  (the  operation  particularly  of  the  powerful 

instinctive  forces  of  emulation  and  rivalry  must 
be  controlled,  chiefly  through  the  influence  of 
socializing  ideals) . 

(d)  War  (all  ideals  that  grow  out  of  the  fighting  instinct 

must  be  modified  by  the  operation  of  socializing 
factors ;  under  present  conditions  at  least  — 
and  it  may  be,  permanently  —  the  entire 
suppression  of  the  fighting  instinct  would  un 
doubtedly  operate  against  social  progress,  — 
assuming  that  social  progress  means  social 
achievement). 

(e)  Authority  (to  accept  the  dictates  of  authority  seems 

to  be,  for  most  people,  the  line  of  least  resist 
ance,  but  for  a  large  minority  the  very  word 
is  a  bugbear.  It  would  seem  that  a  certain 
measure  of  respect  for  the  experience  of  the 
ages  is  sanctioned  by  reason,  and  that  those 
who  lack  this  respect  are  likely  to  consume 
valuable  time  and  energy  in  rediscovering  truths 
that  have  already  been  adequately  demon 
strated  and  formulated,  and  particularly  in 

1  The  skeptic  may  deny  the  power  of  educative  forces  to  crush  so 
fundamental  an  instinct,  but  the  skeptic  forgets  that  powerful  ideals 
have  been  developed  in  the  past  which  have  effectually  crushed  out, 
not  only  the  property  instinct,  but  also  the  sex  instincts,  which  are  far 
more  imperious  and  fundamental. 


FULFILLING   THE   INSPIRATIONAL   FUNCTIONS       179 

looking  upon  such  truths  as  the  result  of  their 
own  unaided  effort,  and  of  transmitting  them 
to  others  under  that  impression.  It  is  well, 
then,  to  impress  upon  each  generation  the  es 
sential  principle  that  most  of  our  "thoughts" 
have  been  thought  before,  and  that  whatever 
any  individual  has  to  offer  in  the  way  of  con 
tribution  should  be  carefully  viewed  in  the  light 
of  what  has  gone  before  —  to  the  end  that  the 
periodic  rediscovery  of  obvious  facts  be  less 
in  evidence,  and  that  each  individual  so  dis 
posed  may  add  a  real  and  positive  increment 
to  the  sum  total  of  human  knowledge). 


CHAPTER  XII 

VALUES  TO  BE  REALIZED  IN  FULFILLING  DISCIPLINARY 
FUNCTIONS 

i.  THE  status  of  the  "  disciplinary "  functions  in 
modern  education,  and  especially  among  American  edu 
cators,  is  far  from  settled.  The  reaction  against  the  older 
notion  of  "formal  discipline"  1  has  probably  reached  its 
extreme  point,  and  a  counter-reaction  seems  to  be  set 
ting  in.  On  the  other  hand,  the  prevailing  tendencies  in 
American  schools  are  almost  exclusively  in  the  direction 
of  recognizing  no  materials  of  education  that  cannot  be 
justified  on  their  intrinsic  instructional  or  training  merits, 
and  without  reference  to  their  virtues  in  developing 
generalized  habits,  tendencies,  or  attitudes  that  are 
supposed  to  influence  conduct  in  unrelated  fields.  This 
is  only  another  way  of  saying  that  the  reaction  against  the 
dogma  of  formal  discipline  has  just  now  reached  the  level 
of  actual  school  practice;  the  new  curriculums.  and 
programs  are  just  beginning  to  feel  its  influence.  The 
c'ounter-reaction  is  limited  to  the  theoretical  side  as  yet. 

1  The  notion  of  formal  discipline  originated  with  the  Greeks.  (See 
F.  P.  Graves:  History  of  Education,  New  York,  1909,  vol.  i,  p.  189.) 
Its  important  position  in  modern  educational  doctrine  is  due,  in  part, 
to  the  writings  of  John  Locke,  and  in  greater  measure  perhaps  to  the 
teachings  of  the  "  faculty  "  psychology. 

180 


FULFILLING  DISCIPLINARY   FUNCTIONS  l8l 

The  wide  extent  of  the  reaction  against  formal  discipline 
is  probably  due,  in  large  measure,  to  the  new  demands  that 
have  been  made  upon  education  for  instruction  and  training 
that  shall  be  definitely  and  unequivocally  "practical."  The 
wide  dissemination  of  the  facilities  for  education  has  imposed 
a  heavy  burden  of  taxation.  This,  in  turn,  has  led  to  a  more 
and  more  insistent  demand  that  the  costly  machinery  which 
has  been  set  in  motion  shall  make  an  adequate  return  upon  the 
investment  in  the  way  of  increased  social  and  industrial  effi 
ciency.  As  Spencer  so  clearly  points  out,  conventional  edu 
cation,  when  it  was  confined  to  the  well-to-do  and  supported 
entirely  by  private  endowment,  emphasized  the  ornamental 
at  the  expense  of  the  useful.  Direct  taxation,  especially  in 
America,  does  not  respond  readily  when  the  stimulus  is  a 
proposed  provision  for  something  that  is  merely  ornamental. 
Tangible  results  of  an  economic  nature  are  demanded  and 
education  must  train  for  economic  efficiency  or  education 
will  lose  popular  support. 

It  has  been  under  the  spur  of  this  condition  that  practical 
standards  have  been  applied  with  ever-increasing  rigidity 
to  the  methods  and  processes  and  products  of  education; 
and  this  condition  has  operated  very  strongly  toward  pre 
paring  the  minds  of  both  laymen  and  professional  educators 
for  the  repudiation  of  the  doctrine  of  formal  discipline.  A 
formal  discipline  is  an  intangible  process  at  best ;  the  manner 
through  which  it  works  over  into  conduct  has,  until  recently, 
been  more  or  less  problematical,  not  certain  and  indisputable. 
Small  wonder,  then,  that  the  direct,  practical  American  mind 
should  have  eagerly  embraced  the  rather  hastily  drawn  and 
certainly  inadequately  tested  conclusion  that  disciplinary 
values  are  conventional  values  under  another  name. 

2.  Although  the  followers  of  Herbart  very  early 
rejected  the  notion  of  formal  discipline  as  inconsistent 


1 82  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

with  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  Herbartian  psy 
chology,1  the  first  really  effective  attack  upon  the  doc 
trine  in  this  country  followed  in  the  wake  of  James's 
assertion,  in  his  "Principles  of  Psychology,"  that  one's 
native  retentiveness  is  unchangeable,  and  that  any 
exercises  that  seem  to  increase  one's  ability  to  memorize 
really  train  different  specific  capacities  and  not  a  single 
general  capacity.2  This  authoritative  expression  from 
a  competent  psychologist,  and  supported  by  some  plaus 
ible  experimental  evidence,3  was  immediately  taken  up 
by  educators  and  extended  to  include  all  forms  of  ca 
pacity  that  had  hitherto  been  considered  amenable  to 
formal  training  of  a  general  nature.  The  reaction  may 
be  said  to  have  gained  a  lasting  foothold  in  the  presenta 
tion  of  a  paper  by  B.  A.  Hinsdale  4  before  the  National 
Educational  Association  in  1894.  Hinsdale  argued 
strongly  and  cogently  for  a  repudiation  of  the  doctrine 
of  formal  discipline  with  respect  to  the  training  of  ap 
prehension,  memory,  imagination,  logical  thought,  and 

1  Cf.  De  Garmo  :  Principles  of  Secondary  Education,  New  York,  1907, 
vol.  i,  p.  32  :  "Since  all  mental  exercise  takes  its  rise  in  a  definite  mental 
content,  its  character  is  necessarily  determined  by  its  origin,  so  that  it 
would  be  absurd  to  assume  that  thinking  power  developed  by  the  study 
of  mathematics,  for  instance,  would  as  such  have  any  validity  in  that, 
say,  of  biology." 

2  W.  James:  Principles  of  Psychology,  New  York,  1890,  vol.  i,  p.  667. 

3  See  S.  S.  Colvin  (Some  Facts  in  Partial  Justification  of  the  So-called 
Dogma  of  Formal  Discipline,  Urbana,  Illinois,  1910,  p.  9)  for  a  discussion 
and  criticism  of  James's  crude  experiments. 

4  B.  A.  Hinsdale:    "The  Dogma  of  Formal  Discipline,"  Proceedings 
N.  E.  A.,  1894;  also  published  in  Educational  Review,  1894,  vol.  viii, 
pp.  128  ff. 


FULFILLING  DISCIPLINARY  FUNCTIONS  183 

volition,  although  he  admitted  the  possibility  of  an 
"overflow"  of  training  into  congruent  channels,  "just 
as  exercise  of  the  muscles  of  any  part  of  the  body  prob 
ably  strengthens  somewhat  the  whole  muscular  system." 
3.  The  most  important  factor  in  the  disintegration 
of  the  dogma  came,  however,  seven  years  later,  when  the 
problem  was  first  subjected  to  careful  experimental  inves 
tigation  by  Thorndike  and  Woodworth  of  Columbia 
University.1 

The  method  employed  in  these  investigations  was  ingen 
ious.  The  following  "sample  experiment"  will  illustrate 
its  chief  characteristics:  " There  was  a  series  of  about  125 
pieces  of  paper  cut  in  various  shapes.  (Area-test  series.) 
Of  these,  13  were  rectangles  of  almost  the  same  shape  and  of 
sizes  from  20  to  90  square  centimeters  (series  i),  27  others 
were  triangles,  circles,  irregular  figures,  etc.,  within  the  same 
limits  of  size  (series  2).  A  subject  was  given  the  whole  series 
of  areas,  and  asked  to  write  down  the  area  in  square  centi 
meters  of  each  one.  In  front  of  him  was  a  card  on  which 
three  squares,  i,  25,  and  100  square  centimeters,  respectively, 
were  drawn.  He  was  allowed  to  look  at  them  as  much  as  he 
pleased  but  not  to  superpose  the  pieces  of  paper  on  them. 
No  other  means  of  telling  the  areas  were  present.  After  being 
thus  tested,  the  subject  was  given  a  series  of  paper  rectangles, 
from  10  to  100  square  centimenters  in  area  and  of  the  same 
shape  as  those  of  series  i.  These  were  shuffled  and  the  sub 
ject  guessed  the  area  of  one,  then  looked  to  see  what  it  really 
was  and  recorded  his  error.  This  was  continued  and  the 
pieces  of  paper  were  kept  shuffled  so  that  he  could  judge  their 

1  E.  L.  Thorndike  and  R.  S.  Woodworth  :  "The  Influence  of  Improve 
ment  in  One  Mental  Function  upon  the  Efficiency  of  Other  Functions," 
Psychological  Review,  1901,  vol.  viii,  pp.  247-261,  384-395. 


184  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

area  only  from  their  intrinsic  qualities.  After  a  certain 
amount  of  improvement  had  been  made  he  was  re-tested  with 
the  '  area  test  series '  in  the  same  manner  as  before." 
xThe  results  of  this  "sample  experiment"  are  typical  of  all  of 
the  results  of  the  investigation  and  may  be  briefly  noted :  — 
The  mental  function  that  underwent  training  was  the 
capacity  for  estimating  the  sizes  of  areas  varying  from  10 
to  100  square  centimeters.  The  " training"  consisted  in 
correcting  the  errors  by  ascertaining,  after  each  estimate, 
the  true  area.  This  training  resulted  in  a  certain  improve 
ment.  The  amount  of  error  after  the  training  was,  in  all  of 
the  subjects  tested,  less  than  the  amount  of  the  error  before 
the  training.  In  one  case  it  was  56  per  cent  as  much  after 
training  as  before  training;  in  another  case  53  per  cent; 
in  another  13  per  cent,  etc.  Now  what  influence  did  this 
training  have  upon  the  capacity  to  estimate  areas  of  the  same 
magnitude  but  differing  in  shape  ?  (In  this  case,  it  will  be 
seen,  the  situation  is  somewhat  different;  can  the  training 
"spread"  to  this  different  situation?)  In  some  of  the  sub-  • 
jects,  it  was  found  that  the  training  did  spread  in  some  > 
measure,  but  in  only  one  subject  was  the  increase  in  capacity 
at  all  comparable  with  the  increase  in  the  function  trained; 
while  in  two  cases,  the  capacity  for  estimating  areas  of  differ 
ent  shape,  far  from  being  improved  by  the  training  on  areas 
of  the  same  shape,  was  actually  diminished. 

Experiments  following  a  similar  method  investigated 
the  transfer  of  training  in  estimating  weights,  in  perceiv 
ing  words  containing  certain  letters,  and  in  picking  out 
different  parts  of  speech  from  a  printed  page.  The 
results  of  all  of  the  experiments  are  summarized  by 
Thorndike  1  as  follows :  — 

1  Educational  Psychology  (ist  edition),  New  York,  1903,  p.  90. 


FULFILLING  DISCIPLINARY  FUNCTIONS  185 

"Individuals  practiced  estimating  the  areas  of  rectangles 
from  10  to  100  square  centimeters  in  size  until  a  very  marked 
improvement  was  attained.  The  improvement  in  accuracy 
for  areas  of  the  same  size  but  of  differejitjshapes,  due  to  this 
training,  was  only  44  per  cent  as  great  as  that  for  areas  of 
the  same  shape  and  size.  For  areas  of  the  same_shape,  but 
from  140-300  square  centimete£s_iii_size,  the  improvement 
was  30  per  cent  as  great.  For  areas  of  different  shape  and 
from  140-400  square  centimeters  in  size,  the  improvement 
was  52  per  cent  as  great. 

"Training  in  estimating  weights  of  from  40-100  grams  re 
sulted  in  only  39  per  cent  as  much  improvement  in  estimat 
ing  weights  from  1 20  to  1800  grams.  Training  in  estimating 
lines  from  0.5  to  1.5  inches  long  (resulting  in  a  reduction  of 
error  to  25  per  cent  of  the  initial  amount)  resulted  in  no 
improvement  in  the  estimation  of  lines  6-1 2  inches  long. 

"Training  in  perceiving  words  containing  e  and  s  gave  a 
certain  amount  of  improvement  in  speed  and  accuracy  in 
that  special  ability.  In  the  ability  to  perceive  words  con 
taining  i  and  /,  5  and  p,  c  and  a,  e  and  r,  a  and  n,  I  and  o, 
misspelled  words  and  A's,  there  was  an  improvement  in 
speed  of  only  39  per  cent  as  much  as  in  the  ability  specially 
trained,  and  in  accuracy  of  only  25  per  cent  as  much. 
Training  in  perceiving  English  verbs  gave  a  reduction  in 
time  of  nearly  21  per  cent  and  in  omissions  of  70  per  cent. 
The  ability  to  perceive  other  parts  of  speech  showed  a  re 
duction  in  time  of  3  per  cent,  but  an  increase  of  omissions 
of  over  100  per  cent." 

4.  Thorndike's  inferences  from  the  results  of  his 
experiments  have  been  frequently  cited  in  educational 
literature,  and  have  had  large  influence  in  determining 
the  present  attitude  toward  formal  discipline.  They 
are  important  enough  to  warrant  quoting  them  in  full :  — 


1 86  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

"Improvement  in  any  single  mental  function  need  not 
improve  the  ability  in  functions  commonly  called  by  the  same 
name.  It  may  injure  it. 

"  Improvement  in  any  single  mental  function  rarely  brings 
about  equal  improvement  in  any  other  function,  no  matter 
how  similar,  for  the  working  of  every  mental  function  group 
is  conditioned  by  the  nature  of  the  data  in  each  particular 
case. 

"The  very  slight  amount  of  variation  in  the  nature  of  the 
data  necessary  to  affect  the  efficiency  of  a  function  group 
makes  it  fair  to  infer  that  no  change  in  the  data,  however 
slight,  is  without  effect  on  the  function.  The  loss  in  the 
efficiency  of  a  function  trained  with  certain  data,  as  we  pass 
to  data  more  and  more  unlike  the  first,  makes  it  fair  to  infer 
that  there  is  always  a  point  where  loss  is  complete,  a  point 
beyond  which  the  influence  of  the  training  has  not  extended. 
The  rapidity  of  this  loss  —  that  is,  its  amount  in  the  case  of 
data  very  similar  to  the  data  on  which  the  function  is  trained 
—  makes  it  fair  to  infer  that  this  point  is  nearer  than  has  been 
supposed. 

"The  general  consideration  of  the  cases  of  retention,  or 
of  loss  of  practice  effect,  seems  to  make  it  likely  that  spread 
of  practice  occurs  only  where  identical  elements  are  con 
cerned  in  the  influencing  and  influenced  function."  1 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  Thorndike  admits  the  possi 
bility  of  a  partial  "spread"  of  training  in  cases  where 
there  are  some  elements  of  identity  between  the  situation 
to  which  repose  is  trained  and  the  new  situation.  In  a 
later  work2  he  recognizes  two  types  of  identity :  (a)  iden 
tity  of  substance,  and  (6)  identity  of  procedure.  Identity 

1  Educational  Psychology  (ist  edition),  1903,  p.  91. 

2  Principles  of  Teaching,  New  York,  1906,  ch.  xv. 


FULFILLING   DISCIPLINARY   FUNCTIONS  187 

of  substance  is  illustrated  by  the  relation  between 
mathematics  and  physics;  identity  of  procedure  is 
illustrated  by  the  relation  between  the  subjects  employ 
ing  similar  types  of  laboratory  procedure.  Thus,  train 
ing  in  mathematics  will  be  likely  favorably  to  affect 
one's  mastery  of  physics,  and  proficiency  in  the 
laboratory  methods  in  chemistry  may  be  carried  over  to 
laboratory  work  in  botany.  It  should  also  be  noted 
that  the  Thorndike-Woodworth  experiments,  as  the  in 
vestigators  pointed  out  in  their  first  publication  of  re 
sults,1  concerned  only  the  influence  of  training  on  effi 
ciency,  "on  ability  as  measured  by  a  single  test,"  not 
on  ability  to  improve  in  the  field  to  which  the  transfer 
was  made.2 

5.  The  attention  drawn  to  the  experimental  study  of 
the  problem  through  the  Thorndike-Woodworth  inves 
tigations  led  to  further  attempts  to  gain  light  by  the 
application  of  methods  more  or  less  similar.  Dr.  Naomi 
Norsworthy  3  tested  several  hundred  school  children  in 
multiplication,  in  observing  misspelled  words,  in  mark 
ing  words  containing  e  and  r,  in  perceiving  the  word 
boy  on  the  printed  page,  and  in  marking  semicircles 
scattered  amongst  all  sorts  of  geometrical  forms.  Tak- 

1  Psychological  Review,  vol.  viii,  1901,  p.  249. 

2  This  admission  obviously  rules  the  investigations  out  of  court  in 
so  far  as  they  speak  against  the  transfer  of  training  through  ideals  of 
method.     It  should  also  be  noted  that  these  investigations  were  not 
"checked"  by  a  control  test,  as  in  many  of  the  more  recent  experiments. 

3  Naomi    Norsworthy:     "Formal   Training,"    New   York  Teachers' 
Monographs,  vol.  iv,  1902,  pp.  96-99. 


EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

*ng  the  results  of  one  of  these  tests  as  a  standard,  she 
correlated  with  them  the  results  of  the  others  in  an 
effort  to  determine  whether  a  high  grade  of  efficiency  in 
one  function  means  necessarily  a  high  grade  of  efficiency 
in  other  functions.  Finding  very  little  direct  correla 
tion  in  these  functions,  she  concluded  that  there  are  no 
such  things  as  general  abilities,  and  consequently  that 
it  is  "folly  to  pretend  to  train  them/7 

6.  Experiments  undertaken  in  the  Montana  State 
Normal  College  seemed  to  substantiate  these  conclu 
sions.  These  experiments  tested  very  crudely  the  ability 
to  transfer  the  results  of  training  in  neatness  and  ac 
curacy.  The  conclusions  were  published  in  the  writer's 
"Educative  Process,"  without  attempting  to  give  the 
data  from  which  they  were  drawn.  Inasmuch  as  these 
conclusions  have  been  cited  since  that  book  appeared, 
it  may  be  well  to  give  rather  more  definite  information 
concerning  the  experiments  at  this  time.  It  should  be 
noted  that  these  tests  were  made  by  normal  school  stu 
dents,  and,  although  they  were  carefully  planned  and 
supervised  by  a  trained  psychologist,1  it  was  not  in 
tended  in  the  publication  of  their  results  to  present 
anything  more  than  an  interesting  commentary  upon 
the  earlier  experiments.  Indeed  the  extent  to  which 
they  have  been  generalized  is  quite  unjustified.  For 
this  the  writer  must  assume  full  responsibility  because 
of  the  brevity  with  which  the  test  was  described  in  his 
earlier  book. 

1  Dr.  Carrie  Ranson  Squire. 


FULFILLING  DISCIPLINARY  FUNCTIONS  189 

The  test  consisted  simply  in  insisting  on  neatness  and 
accuracy  in  the  preparation  of  arithmetic  papers  by  pupils 
in  the  latter  half  of  the  third  grade.  Nothing  was  said  of 
either  neatness  or  accuracy  in  connection  with  the  rest  of  the 
school  work  during  the  period  covered  by  the  tests.  The 
papers  in  language  and  spelling  were,  however,  saved,  and 
later  these  were  graded  and  the  marks  of  each  pupil  com 
pared  with  his  corresponding  mark  in  the  arithmetic  test. 
In  the  subject  emphasized  (arithmetic)  it  was  found  that 
three  weeks'  persistent  drill  upon  the  preparation  of  neat  and 
accurate  papers  resulted  in  the  initiation  of  very  effective 
habits.  The  papers  were  all  graded  by  the  same  three  in 
dividuals  (the  student-investigators).  Out  of  thirteen  pupils 
tested,  all  showed  this  improvement  in  arithmetic  save  one, 
whose  last  paper  fell  0.02  behind  the  first  paper  in  accuracy, 
although  it  was  improved  in  neatness.  The  average  gain 
for  the  thirteen  rmnils  was  3.69  per  cent  in  accuracy,  and 
4.9  per  cent  in  r  •  (reckoning  the  increase  on  the  mark 

ings  of  the  papers  i  was  upon  the  ordinary  scale  of  100). 

When  the  lang  id  spelling  papers  were  graded  and 

averaged,  however,  i  was  found  that  there  was  in  every  case 
save  one  a_de  in  both  accuracy  and  neatness.  This 

one  pupil,  CUIT  ough,  was  the  exception  to  the  general 

result  in  the  £ .-  thmetic  test.  The  language  papers  showed 
an  average  de,  •  on  of  3.2  per  cent  in  accuracy  and  2.1 
per  cent  in  neatne*  the  spelling  papers  a  deterioration  of 
3  per  cent  in  £  and  2.3  per  cent  in  neatness.  Whether 

this  deteriora  uld  have  continued  with  a  continuance 

of  the  same  c  ,  .s,  there  is,  of  course,  no  means  of  telling. 
There  is  not  •  the  results  to  show  that  the  virtues  of 

the  specific  were  even  beginning  to  be  transferred, 

and,  in  view  0  narked  deterioration,  it  was  thought  best 

to  stop  the  The  procedure  throughout,  it  should  be 

noted,  emp  only  specific  habits. 


I QO  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

7.  The  Thorndike-Woodworth  data,  combined  with 
inferences  of  a  more  theoretical  nature,  operated  to  place 
the  older  form  of  the  doctrine  of  formal  discipline  in  a 
dubious   light.     On  the  other  Iiand,~ohry  a~few  oFtKe 
more  radical    educators   were   willing   to   repudiate   it 
entirely.     The  fact  that,  in  many  of  the  experiments,  a 
transfer  was  to  be  noted  in  individual  cases,  suggested 
that,  after  all,  there  might  be  a  way  out  of  the  difficulty. 
The  virtues  of  the  doctrine  might  be  retained,  even  if 
its  dogmatic  form  and  its  supposed  universal  validity 
were  repudiated. 

8.  In  the  "  Educative  Process,"  after  reviewing  the 
experimental  evidence  then  available,  the  writer  sug 
gested  that  the  transfer  of  the  results  of  training  could 
be  accomplished,  in  some  measure,  through  a  process 
of  judgment.'  -That  is,  functions  may  be  improved  by 
the  application__oL&fe<3Wr-er  procedure  and  method  gained 
in  other  fields  r  or,  inasmuch  as  the  effective  employ 
ment  of  any  idea  as  a  goal  or  aim  of  adjustment  depends, 
as  has  been  suggested  in  previous  sections,  upon  the 
emotional  coloring  of  the  idea,  it  is  better  to  use  the 
term  ideal  to  designate  the  agency  that  usually  accom 
plishes  the  transfer.     For  example,  the  close  thinking 
that  is  trained  in  mathematics  may  come  to  function  in 
other  fields,  —  in  political  economy  or  in  psychology  or 
even  in  the  work  of  practical,  everyday  life,  —  provided 
that  one  has  gained  from  the  study  of  mathematics  a 
certain  respect  or  perhaps  even  reverence  for  the  rigid, 
clear-cut    mathematical    method.    If    rrathematics    is 


FULFILLING   DISCIPLINARY    FUNCTIONS  IQI 

taught,  however,  in  a  purely  mechanical  fashion,  with 
no  attempt  to  make  its  methods  conscious  to  pupils  or 
to  give  them  an  appreciation  of  the  virtues  of  the  method, 
the  "spread"  will  manifestly  be  an  uncertain  quantity. 
Indeed,  one  may  very  easily  be  prejudiced  against  a 
method  by  poor  teaching,  and  so  resist  any  temptation 
to  apply  it  to  other  situations. 

9.  That  there  is  something  in  this  point  of  view  aside 
from  a  theoretical  inference  has  been  recently  shown 
by  Ruediger  l  in  a  series  of  tests  that  took  their  "cue" 
from  the  studies  on  neatness  and  accuracy  described 
above. 

Ruediger  limited  his  study  of  the  influence  of  ideals  of  neat 
ness  in  improving  the  written  work  of  seventh-grade  school 
children.  His  tests  covered  a  period  of  three  months  and  were 
conducted  simultaneously  in  three  schools,  —  one  in  New 
York  City,  one  in  Washington,  D.C.,  and  one  in  the  same 
Montana  school  that  had  furnished  the  data  for  the  earlier 
study.  As  in  the  earlier  experiments,  he  insisted  upon  neat 
ness  in  the  preparation  of  the  papers  in  one  school  study.  In 
the  remaining  studies,  nothing  was  said  about  neatness,  but 
during  the  exercises  in  which  the  specific  training  was  being  under 
taken,  it  was  attempted,  by  talks  and  discussions  about  neat 
ness  in  general,  to  develop  an  ideal  of  neatness  among  the  pu 
pils.  The  papers  of  two  unemphasized  subjects  were  preserved, 
together  with  the  papers  in  the  subject 'emphasized.  All  of 
the  papers  were  graded  by  three  experienced  persons  who  had 
been  in  no  way  connected  with  giving  the  tests  (except  that 
one  of  them  was  Dr.  Ruediger  himself,  who  had  planned  the 

1  W.  C.  Ruediger:  "The  Indirect  Improvement  of  Mental  Function 
through  Ideals,"  Educational  Review,  vol.  xxxvi,  1908,  pp.  364-371. 


192  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

tests,  but  who  had  taken  no  part  in  collecting  the  data). 
The  grading  was  upon  the  scale  of  100  and  the  estimates 
placed  independently  by  the  three  examiners  were  sufficiently 
similar  to  indicate  that  the  judgment  of  experienced  teachers 
in  grading  papers  for  neatness  can  be  thoroughly  trusted. 
On  comparing  the  marks,  it  was  found  that  while  the  gain  was 
the  greatest  in  the  subject  emphasized,  there  had  been  a 
very  perceptible  gain  in  the  subjects  unemphasized.  For  ex 
ample,  in  one  of  the  schools,  the  average  grade  for  neatness 
in  the  subject  emphasized  increased  during  the  three  months 
of  the  test  from  85.3  per  cent  to  90.3  per  cent,  —  a  gain  of  5 
per  cent.  In  the  two  subjects  unemphasized,  the  gain  was 
from  84.5  per  cent  to  88.5  per  cent  and  from  83.6  per  cent 
to  87  per  cent  respectively,  —  or  gains  of  4  per  cent  and  3.4  per 
cent,  as  contrasted  with  the  5  per  cent  gain  in  the  subject  em 
phasized.  These  gains  were  general  among  all  the  pupils 
tested  (eighty-three  pupils  in  all)  and  no  instance  of  deteriora 
tion  is  noted. 

Ruediger  concludes  from  these  data  that  neatness 
"made  conscious  as  an  ideal  or  aim  in  connection  with 
one  school  subject  does  function  in  other  school  sub 
jects."  Regarding  the  use  of  the  term  "ideal"  to  desig 
nate  the  agency  of  transfer,  he  has  this  to  say:  "The 
experiment  touches  the  question  of  ' generalized  habits' 
which  has  been  a  disturbing  factor  in  the  problem  of 
formal  discipline  from  the  beginning.  According  to  psy 
chological  analysis,  habits  are  specific  —  they  cannot 
well  be  anything  else  —  but  according  to  common  obser 
vation,  certain  so-called  habits  appear  unquestionably 
to  be  generalized.  Such  habits  are  industry,  perse 
verance,  self-reliance,  and  the  like.  The  cause  of  the 


FULFILLING   DISCIPLINARY   FUNCTIONS  1 93 

difficulty  here  is  no  doubt  largely  a  verbal  one.  If, 
instead  of  the  word  'habits/  we  should  use  the  word 
'ideals,'  much  of  the  difficulty  would  disappear.  Where 
such  a  function  as  perseverance  is  generalized,  it  is  done 
so  partly,  at  least,  through  conscious  effort." 

Ruediger  indorses  Thorndike's  classes  of  identities 
which  condition  the  transfer  of  training,  but  he  would 
add  a  third  to  cover  the  operation  of  this  factor  of  ideals. 
He  calls  this  third  identity,  " identity  of  aim." 

10.  It  would  seem,  however,  that  the  conscious  factor 
that  we  have  designated  by  the  term  "ideal"  has  a 
wider  significance  than  Ruediger  is  willing  to  admit. 
What  is  trained  by  a  specific  discipline  is  a  definite 
response  to  a  definite  situation.  All  will  admit  that, 
where  another  situation  possesses  elements  similar  to 
those  involved  in  the  situation  to  which  the  response 
has  been  trained,  the  same  response  may  be  called 
forth.  Under  what  conditions  will  it  be  called  forth? 
Obviously,  where  the  similarity  is  consciously  recognized. 
This  does  not  exclude  response  upon  "assimilation"  or 
marginal  recognition,  or  even  thoroughly  unconscious 
and  mechanical  response;  but  the  experiments  seem  to 
indicate  that  these  are  negligible  factors,  —  that  a  very 
slight  change  in  the  situation  will  frequently  break  up 
a  pure  habit.  The  problem,  from  the  practical  point  of 
view,  then,  becomes  this  :  How  may  we  assure  ourselves 
that  the  pupil  will  make  an  effort  consciously  to  search 
out  similarities  which  may  be  present  but  which  do  not 
catch  attention  at  the  outset  ?  If  we  have  trained  pupils 


194  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

to  think  rigidly  in  geometry,  for  example,  how  shall  we 
insure  an  application  of  rigid  thinking  to  situations  that 
lack  the  geometrical  elements?  If  we  have  trained 
pupils  to  employ  certain  effective  methods  in  learning 
their  lessons  in  spelling  or  in  geography,  how  shall  we 
insure  the  application  of  these  effective  methods  to  situa 
tions  that  lack  the  spelling  "cues"  or  the  geography 
"cues"?  Shall  we  not  have  the  greatest  assurance  of 
such  transfer,  if  the  method  has  been  made  to  appeal 
to  the  pupil  as  something  thoroughly  worth  while, 
thoroughly  reliable,  thoroughly  likely  to  produce  results 
that  he  is  anxious  to  secure  ?  And  when  a  method  ap 
peals  to  a  pupil  in  this  way,  is  not  the  appeal  emotional 
in  its  nature  ? 

ii.  It  is  this  conscious  factor,  then,  that  needs  em 
phasis  in  all  teaching  that  attempts  to  do  what  the 
older  doctrine  assumed  that  formal  discipline  would  do. 
This  conclusion  is  confirmed  by  all  of  the  recent  experi 
ments  in  the  transfer  of  training.  Reference  to  the 
more  important  of  these  will  be  sufficient  at  this  time. 

(a)  The  Ebert-Meumann  Experiments.1  Ebert  and  Meu- 
mann  first  tested  the  capacity  of  their  subjects  to  memorize 
meaningless  syllables,  series  of  letters,  series  of  numbers,  series 
of  one-syllabled  nouns,  series  of  foreign  words  (Italian),  stan 
zas  of  poetry,  visual  signs,  and  prose.  The  subjects  were 

1  E.  Ebert  and  E.  Meumann:  "Ueber  einige  Grundfragen  der 
Psychologic  der  Uebimgsphanomene  im  Bereiche  des  Gedachniss. 
(A).  Untersuchungen  der  Wirkung  einseitig  mechanischer  Uebung  auf  die 
Gesamtgedachtnisfunktion,"  Archil)  fur  die  gesamte  Psychologic,  vol.  iv, 
1904,  pp.  1-232. 


FULFILLING   DISCIPLINARY   FUNCTIONS  195 

then  subjected  to  a  thorough  training  upon  one  of  these  sets 
of  material  —  meaningless  syllables.  Upon  the  completion  of 
this  training,  the  capacity  for  memorizing  the  other  varieties 
of  material  was  tested.  It  was  found  that  there  was,  in 
every  case,  an  improvement  of  capacity.  This  improvement 
was  most  marked  in  the  case  of  the  material  most  closely  re 
lated  to  nonsense  syllables,  —  that  is,  in  the  series  of  letters, 
numbers,  and  single  words,  and  least  marked  in  the  case  of  the 
materials  having  least  resemblance  to  nonsense  syllables  — 
poetry,  prose,  and  visual  signs.  The  increase  in  capacity  for 
the  latter  class  of  materials,  however,  is  much  greater  than 
one  would  expect.  The  capacity  for  retaining  philosophic 
prose  was  increased  70  per  cent,  and  the  memory  for  visual 
signs  was  increased  55  per  cent.  The  authors  maintain  that 
the  transfer  is  due  to  the  sympathe-ticjyactice-efTect  of  allied^ 
unctions  through  the  me^mfn_oT^_lryr3othetical  psycho- 
physicn.1  factor.  Critics  l  of  this  explanation,  however,  are 
agreed  that  this  hypothetical  element  is  unnecessary  to  ex 
plain  the  phenomenon,  maintaining  that  the  increased  ability 
to  concentrate  the  attention,  increased  familiarity  with  and 
habituation  to  the  general  laboratory  conditions,  increase 
of  effort  to  improve  the  memory,  decrease  in  feelings  of  dis 
comfort  and  tedium,  and  conscious  improvement  of  technique 
of  learning  are  sufficient  to  account  for  the  transfer  noted. 

(b)  The  Coover- Angell  Experiments.  Coover  and  Angell 2 
selected  for  experimentation  a  set  of  capacities  in  which  the 
factor  of  identity  of  elements  was  much  mor^thoroughly  elim 
inated  than  in  the  Ebert-Meumann  tests.  TheirTirst  series 

1  For  example,  G.  E.  Miiller :   Zeitschrift  fur  Psychologic,  vol.  xxxix, 
1905,  pp.  in  ff. ;  R.  S.  Woodworth:  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology, 
and  Scientific  Methods,  vol.  ii,  1905,  pp.  137  f. ;  W.  F.  Dearborn  :  School 
Review,  vol.  xviii,  1910,  p.  702. 

2  J.  E.  Coover  and  F.  Angell:    "General  Practice  Effect  of  Special 
Exercises,"  American  Journal  of  Psychology,  vol.  xviii,  1907,  pp.  328-340. 


ig6  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

of  experiments  was  undertaken  to  determine  the  influence  of 
training  in  discriminating  sounds  upon  the  capacity  to  discrim 
inate  brightness  differences  (shades  of  gray).  The  tests  for 
sound  were  given  with  a  sound-pendulum ;  the  tests  for  bright 
ness  were  given  by  means  of  a  Marbe  color-mixer.  A  control 
experiment  was  introduced  to  determine  the  influence  of  the 
preliminary  tests  and  of  the  time-interval  in  any  improve 
ment  that  might  be  noted.  Out  of  four  subjects  trained  in  the 
discrimination  of  sounds,  three  showed  that  some  of  this  train 
ing  had  been  carried  over  to  the  discrimination  of  brightness. 
One  did  not  improve  at  all  in  discriminating  sounds,  and  his 
second  brightness-test  showed  a  deterioration  from  his  first 
brightness-test. 

A  second  series  of  experiments  was  undertaken  to  deter 
mine  what  influence  training  in  sorting  cards  would  have 
upon  ability  to  react  properly  upon  a  typewriter  to  certain 
letters  which  were  exposed  to  the  subject's  view.  A  control 
experiment  was  also  carried  on  to  eliminate  the  factor  of  the 
hibernation"  period.  It  was  found  that  the  time  of  the 
typewriter  reaction  was  decreased  by  the  training  in  sorting 
cards,  but  that  the  errors  were  increased. 

Coover  and  Angell  explain  the  transfer  of  training  in  the 
first  series  of  experiments  as  a  divesting  of  the  essential  process 
of  its  unessential  factors,  a  freeing  of  judgments  from  illusions, 
and  the  attaining  of  a  more  uniform  state  of  attention  which  is 
less  than  the  maximum.  The  more  economic  adaptation  of 
attention  is  especially  emphasized.  It  should  be  noted  that 
all  of  the  experiments  were  accompanied  by  introspective 
reports,  consequently  the  cause  of  the  improvement  could  be 
determined  with  much  greater  certainty  than  in  the  case  of 
most  of  the  experiments  on  transfer.  The  improvement  dis 
covered  by  the  second  series  of  experiments  is  explained  by 
three  factors :  (i)  the  formation  of  a  habit  of  reacting  directly 
to  a  stimulus  without  useless  kinaesthetic,  acoustic,  and  motor 


FULFILLING   DISCIPLINARY   FUNCTIONS  197 

accompaniments  of  recognition,  which  results  (2)  in  an  equi 
table  distribution  of  attention  to  the  various  possible  reactions 
so  as  to  be  about  equally  prepared  for  all ;  and  (3)  the  conse 
quent  power  of  concentrating  the  attention  throughout  the 
whole  series  without  distraction. 

(c)  Winch's  Experiments.  W.  H.  Winch,  an  English  psy 
chologist,  has  been  one  of  the  most  ardent  advocates  of  the 
older  view  that  memory  is  a  general  function  and  that  it  can  be 
trained  by  appropriate  formal  exercises.  In  1904,  he  published 
the  results  of  a  series  of  experiments  which  to  his  mind  sub 
stantiated  this  position.  He  had  children  memorize  lists  of 
12  consonants  which  were  exposed  to  view  for  25  seconds,  and 
which  they  were  to  reproduce  immediately  afterward.  Ten 
lists  were  learned  on  one  day,  ten  more  a  week  later,  and  ten 
more  three  weeks  after  the  first.  Improvement  from  week  to 
week  was  shown  by  most  of  the  children,  and  the  author  con 
cluded  from  this  that  their  general  power  of  memory  was  in 
creased.  (It  seems  clear,  however,  that  better  methods  of 
learning  and  better  adaptation  to  the  conditions  of  the  experi 
ment  and,  perhaps,  the  influence  of  the  incubation  period, 
could  have  accounted  for  the  improvement.  % 

More  recently,  however,  Winch  has  undertaken  some  ex 
periments  which  were  much  more  carefully  planned  and  exe 
cuted.1  He  tested  pupils  in  the  early  adolescent  period  — 
pupils  ranging  in  age  from  eleven  years  to  fifteen  years, 
averaging  thirteen  years.  Instead  of  testing  the  same  group 
of  pupils  before  and  after  training  and  so  determining  the  in 
fluence  of  the  training,  Winch  introduced  a  new  method  of 
making  this  determination.  He  divided  the  pupils  into  two 
groups  of  approximately  equal  ability  in  memory.  This  di- 

1  W.  H.  Winch:  "The  Transfer  of  Improvement  in  Memory  in 
School  Children,"  British  Journal  of  Psychology,  vol.  ii,  pt.  Ill,  1908, 
pp.  284-293.  ....  


198  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

vision  was  made  partly  on  the  basis  of  an  actual  test,  partly 
on  the  basis  of  the  teacher's  judgment  of  their  abilities.  Both 
groups  contained  the  same  number  of  pupils.  Both  were 
tested  on  their  ability  to  memorize  a  passage  from  an  histori 
cal  reading  book,  their  ability  being  measured  by  the  amount 
that  could  be  reproduced  immediately  after  fifteen  minutes  of 
study.  Members  of  the  first  group  were  trained  during  the 
next  week  or  two  in  memorizing  poetry,  the  members  of  the 
second  group  being  occupied  at  the  same  time  with  problems 
in  arithmetic.  Otherwise  the  school  work  was  the  same 
for  both,  ^fter  the  period  of  training  was  completed,  the 
two  groups  were  brought  together  and  subjected  to  a  second 
test  in  memorizing  a  selection  from  an  historical  reader.  It 
was  found  that  the  first  group  that  had  received  the  training 
in  memorizing  poetry  did  much  better  in  this  final  test  than 
the  second  group  who  had  missed  this  training.  The  author 
comes  to  the  following  conclusion :  "Improvement  gained  by 
practice  in  memorizing  one  subject  is  transferred  to  memory 
work  in  other  subjects  whose  nature  is  certainly  diverse  from 
that  in  which  the  improvement  was  gained." 

It  will  be  noted,  however,  that  the  nature  of  subject-matter 
is  not  so  diverse  as  to  exclude  altogether  the  operation  of 
identical  elements,  nor  is  the  difference  between  the  two  groups 
in  memory  capacity  at  the  close  of  the  test  so  great  that  one 
needs  to  assume  that  a  "general"  function  of  memory  has  been 
trained.  The  factors  emphasized  v-v  M tiller  and  Woodworth 
in  connection  with  the  Eb  mann  tests  apply  with 

even  greater  force  to  the  concl;  f  Winch. 

(d)  Fracker's  Experiments.  investigations  were 

made  at  the  University  of  Iowa.1  lining  series  consisted 

in  memorizing  the  order  of  four  tones  The  test  series  were 

1  G.  C.  Fracker :    "On  the  Transfer  , 'raining  in  Memory," 

Monograph  Supplement,  Psychological  Rei  'x,  1909,  pp.  56-102. 


FULFILLING   DISCIPLINARY   FUNCTIONS  199 

eight  in  number,  as  follows :  (i)  memory  for  poetry ;  (2)  mem 
ory  for  the  order  of  four  shades  of  gray ;  (3)  memory  for  the 
order  of  nine  tones ;  (4)  memory  for  the  order  of  nine  shades 
of  gray ;  (5)  memory  for  the  order  of  four  tones ;  (6)  mem 
ory  for  the  order  of  nine  geometrical  figures;  (7)  memory 
for  the  order  of  nine  numbers ;  (8)  memory  for  the  extent 
of  arm  movement.  The  results  of  this  investigation  show 
very  clear  evidence  of  a  transfer  of  training,  the  improvement 
in  the  second  test-series  appearing  to  be  dependent  upon  the 
conscious  control  of  the  best  methods  of  memorizing.  To 
quote  from  the  author's  summary :  "Improvement  seems  to 
depend  upon  the  consistent  use  of  some  form  of  i  nagery.  ... 
The  rate  of  improvement  seems  to  depend  directly  upon  the 
conscious  recognition  of  the  imagery,  and  upon  attention  to  its 
use.  ...  It  seems  .  .  .  that  a  conscious  effort  to  use  the 
elements  of  training  in  a  different  task  assists  in  making  the 
transfer."  l 

(e)  Ruger's  Experiments.  From  the  Columbia  University 
psychological  laboratory  we  have  a  very  interesting  series  of 
experiments  reported  by  H.  A.  Ruger.2  The  investigation 
aimed  at  an  analysis  of  "human  methods  of  meeting  relatively 
novel  situations  and  of  reducing  their  control  to  acts  of  skill." 
The  method  employed  was  an  introspective  account  of  the 
observers'  mental  processes  in  solving  mechanical  puzzles. 
The  investigation  had  a  much  wider  purpose  than  merely  to 
throw  light  upon  the  problem  of  transfer,  but  several  series  of 
tests  were  employed  with  this  specific  end  in  view.  The 
author  reached  the  following  conclusions:  "In  general,  the 
value  of  specific  habits  under  a  change  of  conditions  depended 
directly  on  the  presence  of  a  general  idea  which  would  serve  for 

1  G.  C.  Fracker,  op.  cit.,  pp.  101-102.     (Italics  mine.) 
2H.  A.  Ruger:    "The  Psychology  of  Efficiency,"  Archives  of  Psy 
chology,  No.  15,  1910. 


200  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

their  control.  .  .  .  No  evidence  was  secured  in  favor  of 
an  automatic  change  in  the  level  of  attention,  but  there  were 
indications  of  its  indirect  control  by  means  of  ideals  of  what 
constituted  an  efficient  state  of  attention.  .  .  .  The  great 
significance  of  ideals  of  method  has  perhaps  been  suffi 
ciently  emphasized.  This  significance  was  especially  striking 
in  proportion  as  the  situation  in  question  was  distinctly  novel. 
The  ideal  of  efficiency  as  a  goal  to  be  reached,  the  ideals  of 
scientific  method,  and  the  ideal  of  an  optimum  personal 
attitude  were  among  the  most  important  of  these."  1 

12.  In  all  of  these  experimental  investigations,  then, 
it  is  the  factor  of  conscious  transfer  tha-t  fita.ndg  out 
sharp  and  clear  as  the  determining  agent  in  whatever 
" spread"  of  the  results  of  training  may  be  detected. 
So  convincing  is  this  evidence  that  both  Heck 2  and 
Ruediger 3  —  even  prior  to  the  publication  of  Ruger's 
results  —  acknowledged  unreservedly  the  probability 
that  conscious  transfer  is  the  most  satisfactory  solution  of 
the  problem  of  formal  discipline,  although,  very  curiously, 
both  of  these  writers  subscribe  to  the  narrow  doctrine  of 
specific  discipline;  that  is,  while  they  admit  the  possi 
bility  of  transfer,  they  maintain  that  the  subjects  of 
the  elementary  and  secondary  curriculums  should  be 
chosen  primarily  on  the  basis  of  the  value  of  the  facts 
and  principles  represented,  rather  than  upon  the  basis 
of  the  ideals  that  may  be  indirectly  engendered.  Heck  4 

1  H.  A.  Ruger,  op.  ciL,  pp.  19-20. 

2  W.  H.  Heck  :  Mental  Discipline  and  Educational  Values,  New  York, 
1909.     (An  excellent  discussion  of  the  conscious  factor.) 

s  W.  C.  Ruediger:  Principles  of  Education,  Boston,  1910,  ch.  vi. 
4  Op.  cit.,  ch.  vi. 


FULFILLING   DISCIPLINARY   FUNCTIONS  2OI 

also  objects  to  the  importance  that  the  present  writer 
placed  upon  the  emotional  element  in  insuring  transfer. 
He  prefers  to  call  the  agency  of  transfer  a  "  concept  of 
method  "  rather  than  an  ideal.  This  criticism  has  already 
been  answered  in  the  foregoing  discussion,  and,  in  any 
case,  Ruger's  results  effectually  invalidate  it.  Colvin,1 
while  admitting  the  primacy  of  conscious  transfer,  still 
holds  to  the  possibility  of  a  generalized  habit,  but  he 
has  not,  as  yet,  adduced  experimental  evidence  in  sup 
port  of  this  contention. 

13.  There  may  be  some  mysterious  factor  involved 
which  would  work  toward  a  transfer  of  training,  even  if 
the  organism  were  reduced  to  the  basis  of  an  automa 
ton;  the  convenient  category  of  the  subconscious 
may,  if  one  wishes,  be  brought  in  to  obscure  our  view, 
and  justify  conclusions  that  would  otherwise  be  un 
tenable  ;  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  in  what  way  educational 
practice  would  profit  by  either  of  these  solutions  of  the 
problem.  On  the  other  hand,  the  recognition  of  the 
SQnscious  factor  as  the  chief  agency  in  the  transfer  of 
training  leaves  us  in  a  very  much  more  favorable  situa 
tion  than  that  which  confronted  us  when  we  expressed 
the  disciplinary  value  in  general  and  indefinite  terms. 
In  other  words,  this  formulation  furnishes  a  "cue  for  con 
duct"  in  that  it  indicates  very  clearly  the  method  that  must  be 
pursued  if  the  chances  of  transfer  are  to  be  made  worth  con 
sidering.  The  controversy  over  formal  discipline  has,  con 
sequently,  resulted  in  an  important  practical  suggestion. 

1  Colvin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  23  ff. 


202  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 


For  example,  it  would  be  quitenconsistent  from  thjs 


explicit  steps  to  insure  upon  the  part  of 
tEe  pupil  an  appreciation  of  mathematical  method.  It  is  in 
this  precision  of  analysis  that  the  disciplinary  value  of  mathe 
matics  admittedly  inheres,  but  one  might  master  mathematics 
through  all  its  branches  without  becoming  conscious  of  the 
worth  of  this  virtue.  As  Young  l  so  clearly  points  out,  the 
common  method  of  teaching  algebra  and  geometry,  while  it 
may  issue  in  a  conventional  mastery  of  the  facts  and  principles, 
does  very  little  to  realize  the  disciplinary  value  that  inheres  in 
mathematical  study. 

Similarly  in  the  teaching  of  natural  science,  unless  the  pupil 
or  the  student  is  led  to  see  the  worth  of  scientific  procedure 
through  which  laws  are  finally  established,  it  is  not  to  be  ex 
pected  that  his  "training"  in  science  will  protect  him  from 
hasty  generalizations  and  unfounded  inferences  in  other 
fields. 

Certainly  one  of  the  most  unfortunate  results  of  the  "fin 
ished"  form  in  which  both  mathematical  and  scientific  truths 
are  presented  lies  in  the  very  fact  that  the  methods  through 
which  these  results  have  been  gained  are  seldom  or  never 
made  conscious  to  the  student.  The  narrowly  utilitarian 
values  may  be  sufficiently  realized  by  their  mastery  :  as  far 
as  the  direct  application  of  facts  and  principles  is  concerned, 
the  direct  presentation  of  the  facts  and  principles  may  suffice. 
But  the  unique  values  of  these  subjects  are  of  a  different  order, 
and  require  a  different  procedure  if  they  are  adequately  to 
be  realized. 

14.  The  method  and  especially  thesjjirjtjoXJ^struc^. 
tion  and  training  are  the  alFimportant  factors  in  the 

1  J.  W.  A.  Young  :  The  Teaching  of  Mathematics,  New  York,  1907, 
P-  39- 


FULFILLING  DISCIPLINARY  FUNCTIONS  203 

fulfillment  of  disciplinary  functions.  The  aim  in  such 
instruction  and  training  must  be  to  make  conscious  to 
the  student  or  the  pupil  the  characteristic  virtues  of  the 
methods  through  which  the  facts  are  discovered,  the 
principles  induced,  the  situations  solved,  and  the  habits 
formed.  The  value  of  carrying  the  pupil  through  the 
discipline  must  be  looked  upon  as  chiefly  giving  him  a 
clear-cut  demonstration  of  the  virtues  that  the  method 
possesses.  This  will  not  be  inconsistent,  of  course,  with 
fulfilling  other  functions.  The  materials  of  mathe 
matics,  for  example,  used  primarily  to  promote  the  ends 
of  discipline,  may,  at  the  same  time,  be  intrinsically 
valuable  to  the  individual  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  instructional,  the  training,  the  interpretive,  or  the 
recreative  function;  but  if  mental  discipline,  in  this 
revised  meaning  of  the  term,  is  the  thing  that  is  sought, 
then  all  other  functions  must,  of  course,  be  subordinate 
to  the  disciplinary  function,  and  methods  inconsistent 
with  fulfilling  this  function,  however  well  they  may  ful 
fill  any  or  all  of  these  other  functions,  must  be  rigidly 
excluded. 

15.  This  leads  to  what  is  perhaps  the  crux  of  the 
problem  of  disciplinary  values,  once  it  is  admitted  that 
such  values  may  be  realized.  The  question  has  often 
been  raised :  Are  there  any  subjects  in  the  curriculum 
in  which  the  function  may  be  said  to  be  predominantly 
disciplinary?  In  other  words,  can  we  justify  in  the 
curriculum  materials  that  fulfill  a  disciplinary  function 
and  that  alone  ?  This  question  is  of  paramount  impor- 


204  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

tance  at  the  present  time  because,  as  has  already  been 
suggested,  the  school  is  being  subjected  to  a  most  per 
sistent  demand  for  the  inclusion  in  its  curriculum  of 
facts  and  principles  that  fulfill  a  clearly  apparent  in 
structional  function.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  a  most 
troublesome  conflict  between  opposing  functions  is  likely 
to  occur  if  one  answers  the  above  question  affirm 
atively. 

Granting  for  the  moment  that  ideals  of  close  and  rigid 
thinking  may  emerge  from  the  study  of  pure  mathe 
matics,  and  granting  for  the  moment  that  the  value  of 
the  facts  and  principles  gained  from  such  study  is  neg 
ligible  so  far  as  the  average  pupil  is  concerned,  is  it 
possible  to  justify  the  teaching  of  mathematics  upon  a 
disciplinary  basis  pure  and  simple?  A  similar  question 
may  legitimately  be  raised  in  connection  with  pure 
science  and  with  the  "dead"  languages.  What  light 
will  the  principles  proposed  in  the  present  chapter  throw 
upon  this  problem  ? 

1 6.  It  will  be  profitable  to  put  the  arguments,  pro 
and  con,  in  the  form  of  "briefs"  which  summarize  the 
results  of  applying  to  these  questions  the  principle  of 
transfer  through  ideals.  The  contention  between  the 
advocates  of  pure  science  on  the  one  hand  and  of 
applied  science  upon  the  other  hand  may  be  chosen  as 
typical.  The  brief  for  pure  science  may  be  stated  in 
the  following  propositions. 

(a)  When  the  general  welfare  and  progress  of  human  society 
is  made  the  ultimate  criterion  for  measuring  educational 


FULFILLING   DISCIPLINARY   FUNCTIONS  205 

values,  it  is  clear  at  once  that  the  facts  and  principles  of  science, 
important  as  they  are,  do  not  approach  in  significance  the 
spirit  and  the  ideals  of  the  scientific  method,  (i)  The  appli 
cability  of  facts  and  principles  to  economic  problems  is  very 
largely  dependent  upon  the  specialized  function  that  one  is 
called  upon  to  fulfill  in  the  division  of  labor.  (2)  Facts  and 
principles  stand  in  no  danger  of  "missing  a  link"  in  trans 
mission  from  generation  to  generation ;  they  are  crystallized 
in  books,  in  inventions,  and  in  other  culture-products.  On  the 
\yther  hand,  (i)  the  method  and  spirit  of  science  are  uni- 
ver sally  applicable ;  every  individuaTmay  profitably  approach 
the  problems  that  he  has  to  solve,  no  matter  in  what  field  he 
may  work,  with  the  scientific  attitude  of  mind.  And  (2) 
while  facts  and  principles  stand  in  no  danger  of  "missing  a 
link"  in  transmission,  the  ideals  and  spirit  of  science  must 
be  kept  alive  from  generation  to  generation. 

(b)  The  point  of  view  in  applied  science  is  primarily  utili 
tarian.     This  "practical"  attitude  undoubtedly  tends  to  color 
every   other   consideration.     The   virtues   of   the   scientific 
method  are  not  practiced  for  their  own  sake,  but  for  an  ulte 
rior  motive ;  consequently  the  emotional  force  that  is  essential 
to  animate  those  virtues  —  to  make  them  ideals  that  will  be 
"carried  over"  to  other  fields  —  will  attach  rather  to  the 
narrower  ideals  of  utility  and  economic  expediency.     "  Short 
cuts"  and  propositions  accepted  upon  authority  are  often 
effectively  applied  to  economic  problems,  and  the  existence 
of  such  a  condition  cannot  fail  to  militate  against  the  fulfill 
ment  of  the  unique  disciplinary  functions.  ttA 

(c)  Applied  science,  emphasizing  as  it  does  the  utilitarian 
values,  will  inevitably  demand  quantity  rather  than  quality 
in  the  work  demanded  of  students.     With  the  better  and  more 
capable  students,  the  discipline  may  come  in  spite  of  haste. 
With  the  average  student,  the  longer  and  more  penetrating 
processes  from  which  the  perception  of  the  unique  value  of 


206  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

scientific  method  will  emerge  with  the  greatest  certainty 
will  be  omitted.  The  mastery  will  be  upon  the  basis  of  the 
synthetic  method  (which  may  very  well  serve  utilitarian 
ends)  rather  than  upon  the  basis  of  the  analytic  or  heuristic 
method  (from  which  alone  the  recognition  of  the  true  worth 
of  the  ideals  of  science  can  emanate). 

(d)  Finally  the  organic  structure  of  a  pure  science  is  much 
better  adapted  to  the  engendering  of  ideals  of  method  than 
the  unsystematic  character  of  the  applied  science,  —  unsystem 
atic  in  that  the  organization  is  imposed  from  without,  and  is 
not  a  logical  development  from  within.  The  applied  science 
is  often  a  "  hodge-podge "  of  facts  and  principles  that  are 
related  to  one  another  only  through  their  application  to 
certain  phases  of  industrial  life.  The  pure  science  is  a  coher 
ent  body  of  facts  and  principles,  each  of  which  is  naturally 
or  inherently  related  to  all  the  others.  As  the  student  pro 
gresses  gradually  from  unit  to  unit,  he  should  pass  through  a 
series  of  experiences  which  have  a  cumulative  effect.  The 
long  process  of  gradual  mastery  finally  leaves  him  with  a  com 
pletely  organized  system,  and  the  respect  that  he  has  acquired 
for  the  method  (and  which  is  so  important  in  the  development 
of  an  effective  ideal)  will  be  a  function,  in  part  at  least,  of  the 
coherence  and  logical  completeness  of  the  system,  as  well  as  of 
the  time  and  effort  that  he  has  put  into  the  mastery.  The 
situation  is  not  unlike  that  which  is  presented  in  the  apprecia 
tion  of  art.  The  soul  of  art  is  its  organic  unity, — its  complete 
subordination  of  details  to  the  central  theme.  The  keenest 
joys  of  appreciation  come  when  one  has  paid  the  price  of  effort, 
and  has  worked  through  the  successive  steps  of  analyzing  the 
details  until  the  beauty  of  the  work  as  a  whole  dawns  upon 
one.  Pure  science  is  a  similar  organic  unity,  and  its  gradual 
mastery  will  induce  similar  emotional  effects  and  thus  con 
tribute  essentially  to  the  vitalizing  of  the  ideals  of  scientific 
method. 


FULFILLING   DISCIPLINARY   FUNCTIONS  207 

17.  In  what  way  will  the  advocate  of  applied  science 
answer  these  arguments?  In  the  first  place,  let  us 
assume  that  he  will  grant  the  social  importance  of  dis 
seminating  in  as  wide  a  circle  as  possible  the  ideals  of 
scientific  procedure.  The  argument  in  this  case  seems 
incontestable,  and  the  efforts  of  this  advocate  must  be 
to  prove  that  a  curriculum  of  science  in  which  the  factor 
of  economic  application  is  emphasized  may  at  the  same 
time  fulfill  the  disciplinary  function  as  well  as,  or  per 
haps  better  than,  a  curriculum  of  pure  science. 

(a)  Obviously  the  first  attack  will  be  against  the  assump 
tion  that  an  emphasis  of  economic  applications  necessarily 
precludes  the  development  of  effective  ideals  of  scientific 
procedure.  This  is  a  question  of  fact,  and  the  recourse  must 
be  to  cases  which  show  that  utility  and  the  scientific  spirit  are 
not  inconsistent.  There  is  at  least  one  investigation  of  this 
question,  the  results  of  which,  while  not  at  all  conclusive,  are 
sufficiently  significant  to  warrant  shifting  the  burden  of  evi 
dence  to  the  other  side.  J.  P.  Gilbert1  divided  a  class  in  sec 
ondary  zoology  into  two  sections.  One  of  these  sections  he 
subjected  to  instruction  of  the  pure-science  type ;  the  other  to 
instruction  in  which  the  economic  applications  of  the  science 
were  persistently  and  systematically  emphasized.  At  the 
close  of  the  semester,  both  sections  were  subjected  to  several 
tests  which  were  designed  to  determine  whether  one  section 
had  made  greater  progress  in  the  appreciation  of  and  control 
over  scientific  method  than  had  the  other  section.  While 
both  sections  were  small,  and  while  other  conditions  were  such 
as  to  preclude  the  drawing  of  general  inferences,  the  results 

1  J.  P.  Gilbert :  "An  Experiment  on  Methods  of  Teaching  Zoology," 
Journal  of  Educational  Psychology,  vol.  i,  1910,  pp.  321  ff. 


208  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

for  the  pupils  tested  were  unequivocally  in  favor  of  an  applied- 
science  approach,  even  when  the  desired  outcome  is  an  appre 
ciation  of  scientific  method. 

(6)  A  possible  explanation  of  this  probability  will  serve 
as  an  answer  to  the  argument  that  the  emotional  force  neces 
sary  to  vitalize  the  ideals  is  most  effectively  furnished  by  a 
course  that  is  coherent  and  logically  arranged,  and  thus  pro 
vides  an  Esthetic  appeal.  While  this  contention  may  be  theo 
retically  justified,  it  is  much  more  probable  that  the  emphasis 
of  economic  applications  will  make  a  much  more  forcible 
and  a  much  more  general  appeal,  and  thus  serve  more  ef 
fectively  to  give  point  and  vitality  to  the  ideas  of  method  and 
procedure  and  thus  turn  them  into  ideals.  After  all,  the 
prime  source  of  emotional  factors  is  the  fundamental  needs  of 
the  individual,  and  the  next  most  prolific  source  is  humanity 
and  its  needs.  When  a  high-school  pupil  finds  that  a  rigidly 
controlled  method  of  procedure,  coupled  with  a  rigorous 
exclusion  of  irrelevant  factors,  including  his  own  prejudice 
and  bias,  gains  results  that  are  of  service  to  him  and  to  the 
race,  it  is  likely  that  he  will  have  much  more  effective  respect 
for  the  method  and  its  rigorous  qualities  than  he  would  gain  if 
it  were  attempted  to  carry  him  through  a  series  of  experiences 
ending  in  the  contemplation  of  a  logical  and  coherent  body  of 
facts  and  principles. 

(c)  And  this  leads  to  another  objection  to  the  assumption 
of  the  first  advocate.     The  average  student,  undergoing  a  pro 
cess  of  general  education,  is  not  likely  to  pursue  the  study  of 
any  one  science  long  enough  to  gain  the  results  hypothesized. 
What  is  food  for  strong  men  is  not  easily  assimilated  by  in 
fants,  and  materials  abstracted  from  the  warmth  and  vigor 
of  human  relationships  are  likely  to  engender  negative  rather 
than  positive  prejudices  in  respect  of  the  methods  which  they 
represent. 

(d)  To  the  argument  that  an  economic  emphasis  will  de- 


FULFILLING   DISCIPLINARY   FUNCTIONS  2OQ 

mand  quantity  rather  than  quality,  the  second  advocate  may 
well  reply  that  this  condition  is  not  inevitable,  and  that  the 
point  and  vitality  furnished  by  the  economic  emphasis  will, 
if  rightly  directed,  make  analytic  and  heuristic  teaching  much 
easier  and  much  more  effective  than  it  would  be  otherwise. 

1 8.  At  every  point,  the  advocate  of  applied  science 
seems  to  have  the  better  of  the  argument,  —  so  long  as 
he  limits   his  plea  to  the  approach,  and  so  long  as  he 
recognizes  the  immanence  of  the  method  and  spirit  of 
science  as  compared  with  its  facts  and  principles.     He 
may  well  maintain  that  the  method  and  spirit  have  no 
meaning  except  as  productive  of  facts  and  principles, 
and  that  if  such  facts  and  principles  can  be  so  chosen 
as  to  represent  a  maximum  of  utility  without  at  the  same 
time  interfering  with  the  fulfillment  of  the  disciplinary 
functions,  it  is  economy  to  make  the  choice  on  this  basis. 

19.  The  arguments  adduced  above  might  be  applied 
to  the  question  concerning  the  justification  of  mathe 
matics  as  materials  of  general  education.     It  is  evident, 
however,  that  the  two  cases  are  not  precisely  parallel. 
In  the  first  place,  it  may  be  maintained  that  the  unique 
character  of  mathematical  discipline  lies  in   the  very 
fact  of  its  abstractness ;   in  the  second  place,  it  may  be 
maintained  that  the  logical  coherence  of  mathematical 
reasoning  is  much  more  obvious  than  that  of  science, 
and  that  the  sanction  which  the  contemplation  of  a 
coherent  body  of  facts  and  principles  may  give  to  the 
ideals  of  method  and  procedure  will  attach  to  the  study 
of  mathematics  much  more  readily  than  to  a  study  of 


210  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

the  natural  sciences.  On  the  other  hand,  there  can  be 
little  doubt  that,  even  here,  the  factor  of  concrete  and 
economic  application  would  add  vitality  to  the  pupil's 
conception  of  the  method.  The  danger  would  lie  in  an 
overemphasis  of  the  applied  phases  and  a  failure  to 
draw  attention  consciously  and  explicitly  to  the  funda 
mental  fact  that  it  is  the  rigid  "clear-cut-ness"  of  the 
method  that  makes  the  results  possible.  This,  after  all, 
is  the  important  step  if  disciplinary  functions  are  ade 
quately  to  be  fulfilled  either  in  science  or  in  mathe 
matics. 

20.  It  may  safely  be  concluded,  then,  that  the  dis 
ciplinary  and  instructional  functions  of  science  and 
mathematics  are  not  entirely  inconsistent  with  one  an 
other.  The  solution  of  the  problem  lies  very  largely  in 
the  attitude  of  teacher  and  pupil  toward  the  materials 
in  question.  The  practical  phases  may  be  emphasized 
in  the  course  of  a  treatment  that  will  satisfactorily  meet 
the  cultural  and  disciplinary  demands.  On  the  whole, 
this  is  perhaps  the  safer  policy.1  But  even  if  applied 
science  is  taught  as  such,  there  are  numerous  methods 
by  means  of  which  many  of  the  virtues  inherent  in  the 
pure  forms  may  still  be  represented.  An  insistent 
attempt  to  keep  the  broad  outlook  will  mitigate  in  a 
measure  the  tendency  of  industrial  science  to  become 

1  T.  J.  McCormack,  in  an  admirable  paper  (Why  Do  We  Study  Mathe 
matics?  Cedar  Rapids,  Iowa,  The  Torch  Press,  1910),  suggests  that  both 
the  pure  and  the  applied  forms  of  mathematics  should  receive  emphasis 
in  the  schools,  —  the  former  to  meet  "intellectual  needs,"  the  latter  to 
meet  "economic  needs." 


FULFILLING   DISCIPLINARY  FUNCTIONS  211 

immersed  in  narrowing  and  sordid  motives.  The  quali 
tative  aspect  of  the  work  can,  under  the  proper  direction, 
be  made  to  appeal  to  the  pupil  as  a  much  more  im 
portant  factor  than  the  quantitative  aspect.  And 
finally,  coherent  organization,  while  not  approaching  the 
measure  of  perfection  that  the  pure  forms  present,  is 
still  possible  in  a  degree  that  will  insure  some  of  the 
advantages  named  above. 

21.  The  unique  disciplinary  functions  that  are  sup 
posed  to  be  fulfilled  by  the  study  of  the  ancient  lan 
guages  are  distinguished  from  those  assumed  for  pure 
mathematics  and  pure  science  in  at  least  one  important 
particular.  They  are  much  more  difficult  to  fulfill  with 
the  average  pupil  taught  by  the  average  teacher.  The 
nice  distinctions  that  are  made  possible  by  the  highly 
inflected  character  of  Latin  and  especially  Greek  are,  in 
the  literature  of  those  languages,  made  the  vehicles  of 
equally  subtle  distinctions  of  thought.  There  can  be  no 
reasonable  doubt  that  the  right  kind  of  training  in 
recognizing  these  distinctions  may,  as  the  classicists 
maintain,  be  transferred  to  other  varieties  of  mental 
activity.  If  our  hypothesis  is  correct,  however,  —  if 
the  possibility  of  transfer  is  conditioned  by  a  recog 
nition  on  the  part  of  the  pupil  of  the  vital  worth  of  V 
the  process,  —  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  average 
teacher  does  not  accomplish  the  desired  end  with  the 
average  pupil  in  nearly  so  marked  a  measure  as  the 
analogous  end  is  accomplished  in  mathematics  and 
science.  The  reason  is  not  far  to  seek.  The  apprecia- 


212  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

tion  of  the  value  of  the  distinctions  can  come  effectively 
only  when  one  sees  the  relation  between  the  content  and 
the  form.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  proportion  of  pupils 
who  ever  come  to  an  adequate  appreciation  of  the 
literary  content  of  the  ancient  languages  is  admitted  by 
the  classicists  themselves  to  be  deplorably  low. 

22.  Another  factor  must  also  be  considered  in  this 
connection.  With  the  organization  of  the  sciences,  a 
vast  amount  of  culture  material  has  been  introduced 
into  the  educational  curriculum  which  is  recognized  as 
possessing  unquestioned  value  and  which  demands 
a  large  amount  of  the  pupils'  time  and  energy  in 
its  mastery.  Much  of  this  is  now  coming  to  be  de 
manded  from  a  conventional  point  of  view ;  its  value 
is  clearly  apparent  to  the  pupil  at  an  early  stage  of 
the  instruction.  On  the  other  hand,  the  period  of 
time  that  must  elapse  before  a  pupil  can  appreciate 
classic  literature  in  a  degree  sufficient  to  permit  a  reali 
zation  of  its  unique  values  is  inordinately  long  and  the 
requisite  effort  is  inordinately  severe.  The  question  is 
really  not  one  of  the  absolute  worth  of  classical  study; 
it  is  rather  one  of  relative  worth.  If  the  intrinsic  values 
of  the  classics,  —  that  is,  the  values  accruing  to  the  in 
structional  and  inspirational  functions  of  the  thought- 
content  itself,  —  can  be  gained  in  some  measure  through 
translations  as  well  as  through  the  originals,  the  unique 
disciplinary  function  will  be  left  as  the  last  support  of 
extended  classical  study.  Place  this  discipline  as  high 
as  one  will,  it  still  seems  quite  impossible  to  make  it 


FULFILLING   DISCIPLINARY   FUNCTIONS  213 

justify  any  extended  study  of  the  classics  in  their  original 
form  as  a  necessary  part  of  general  education.  As  has 
been  indicated,  some  study  of  Latin  may  be  made  to 
fulfill  an  important  training  function  in  improving  one's 
control  of  the  mother-tongue,  and  from  the  pupils  who 
undergo  this  training,  some  will  be  selected  who  will 
have  the  taste  and  capacity  to  pursue  the  subject  to  a 
point  where  its  unique  and  important  disciplinary  possi 
bilities  will  be  richly  realized. 

It  is  well,  however,  to  suspend  judgment  upon  this 
question  until  it  is  definitely  proved  that  the  inspira 
tional  and  instructional  functions  noted  above  either 
can  or  cannot  be  adequately  fulfilled  through  transla 
tions.  The  a  priori  contentions  against  this  possibility 
are  not  convincing ; l  but  the  ideals  and  standards  which 
the  Greeks  and  Romans  wrought  out  of  their  experience 
and  crystallized  so  clearly  in  their  literature  are  too 
important  a  part  of  the  culture  heritage  of  the  race  to 
permit  education  to  incur  any  risk  in  their  transmission. 
The  relative  worth  of  "translations"  and  "originals" 
should  be  subjected  to  a  most  careful  and  extended 
experimental  study.  This  problem  is  far  from  insoluble 
by  the  methods  that  experimental  education  even  now 
possesses. 

23.  At  the  close  of  Chapter  XII,  a  tentative  list  of 
the  ideals  that  may  be  directly  engendered  by  educative 

1  Cf.  W.  T.  Harris,  Proceedings,  N.  E.  A.,  1901,  pp.  145  ff. ;  also 
P.  Shorey,  "  The  Case  for  the  Classics,"  School  Review,  vol.  xviii,  1910, 
pp.  585-617,  especially  p.  590.  Professor  Shorey's  contention,  however, 
touches  only  the  disciplinary  function. 


214  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

materials  was  presented.  Some  of  these  will  probably 
be  more  effectively  fixed  through  the  more  indirect 
disciplinary  processes,  and  some  not  included  in  the 
former  list  may  be  assumed  to  require  the  disciplinary 
process  for  their  adequate  development.  It  will  be 
well,  therefore,  to  add  another  tentative  list  which  will 
include  many  of  the  valuable  ideals  and  prejudices  that 
may  result  from  the  fulfillment  of  disciplinary  functions. 

I.  Ideals  of  scientific  method. 

(a)  Unprejudiced   observation   and   induction.     (The 

term  "unprejudiced"  is  certain  to  confuse  when 
used  in  so  close  a  juxtaposition  with  the  term 
"prejudice,"  which  represents  the  very  desirable 
outcome  of  a  disciplinary  process ;  this  antithesis, 
however,  is  only  apparent ;  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
every  true  scientist  is  "prejudiced"  in  favor  of 
the  scientific  method ;  the  problem  is  always,  not 
to  read  prejudice  out  of  life,  —  this  were  impos 
sible  even  if  we  wished  to  do  so,  —  but  to  select 
our  prejudices  with  due  caution,  and  judge  their 
worth  just  as  we  judge  the  worth  of  ideas  and 
habits;  and  the  kind  of  prejudice  that  science 
reads  out  of  its  procedure  is  simply  the  kind  that 
experience  has  shown  to  interfere  with  the  desired 
results ;  personal  bias  for  or  against  the  possible 
outcome  of  an  experiment  is  accordingly  prohib 
ited,  but  the  scientist  is  not  obliged  to  discard 
all  prejudices,  —  to  do  this  would  be  to  commit 
mental  suicide.) 

(b)  Rigidity  of  reasoning. 

(c)  Logical  procedure.     (The  ideal  schemata  of  logical 

analysis  obviously  belong  here.) 


FULFILLING   DISCIPLINARY   FUNCTIONS  215 

(d)  Caution  in  making  inferences  and  drawing  conclu 

sions. 

(e)  The  disposition  to  accept  what  is  proved  to  be  true 

no  matter  how  ruthlessly  it  may  upset  one's 

previous    conceptions,    or    override    one's    most 

cherished  hopes. 
(/)  Ideals  of  validity  (especially  engendered  through 

practice  in  weighing  evidence). 

II.  Ideals  of  method  and  procedure  which  are  not  to  be  identi 
fied  especially  with  the  scientific  method  but  which  may 
obviously  result  from  the  operation  of  specific  disci 
plines. 

(a)  Neatness. 

(b)  Promptness. 

(c)  Accuracy. 

(d)  Application,  diligence,  effort. 

(e)  Ideals  of  methods  of  study. 
(/)  Initiative. 

(g)  Self-confidence. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

VALUES  TO  BE  REALIZED  IN  FULFILLING  RECREATIVE 
FUNCTIONS 

i.  A  SOCIAL  value  that  materials  of  education  may 
possess  is  that  in  virtue  of  which  the  individual  is  led 
to  seek  pleasure  and  relaxation  upon  a  plane  higher 
than  he  would  be  able  to  attain  without  the  aid  of  an 
educative  process.  While  one  cannot  wholly  disagree 
with  Spencer's  assertion  1  that  the  activities  that  make 
for  self-preservation  should  be  first  considered  in  con 
structing  the  curriculum,  the  relation  between  the  two 
types  of  activity  seems  to  be  much  closer  and  more 
intimate  than  Spencer  recognized.  Enjoyment  is  more 

1  Cf.  Education,  pp.  74  f. :  "We  yield  to  none  in  the  value  we  attach 
to  aesthetic  culture  and  its  pleasures.  Without  painting,  sculpture, 
music,  poetry,  and  the  emotions  produced  by  natural  beauty  of  every 
kind,  life  would  lose  half  its  charm.  So  far  from  thinking  that  the  train 
ing  and  gratification  of  the  tastes  are  unimportant,  we  believe  that  the 
time  will  come  when  they  will  occupy  a  much  larger  share  of  human 
life  than  now.  .  .  .  But  it  is  one  thing  to  admit  that  aesthetic  culture 
is  in  a  high  degree  conducive  to  human  happiness,  and  another  thing  to 
admit  that  it  is  a  fundamental  requisite  to  human  happiness.  However 
important  it  may  be,  it  must  yield  precedence  to  those  kinds  of  culture 
which  bear  more  directly  upon  the  duties  of  life.  .  .  .  Accomplishments, 
the  fine  arts,  belles  leitres,  and  all  those  things  which,  as  we  say,  constitute 
the  efflorescence  of  civilization,  should  be  wholly  subordinate  to  that 
knowledge  and  discipline  on  which  civilization  rests.  As  they  occupy  the 
leisure  part  of  life,  sc  should  they  occupy  the  leisure  part  of  education." 

216 


FULFILLING   RECREATIVE   FUNCTIONS  217 

than  an  accessory  in  life.  It  is  a  necessity ;  and  it  is  a 
necessity  because  efficiency  in  economic  and  social  adjust 
ments  depends  in  no  small  measure  upon  the  tastes, 
sentiments,  and  prejudices  that  control  the  adjustment 
of  one's  leisure  moments. 

2.  The  justification  of  fulfilling  recreative  functions 
may  take  several  forms,  of  which  two  may  be  instanced 
as  typical :  (a)  The  relation  between  efficiency  of  adjust 
ment  and  the  amount  of  available  energy  that  is  at  the 
disposal  of  the  organism  is  obviously  direct  and  un 
equivocal.  That  a  pleasurable  state  of  mind,  —  a  con 
dition  of  relative  happiness  and  buoyancy,  —  increases 
the  availability  of  energy  is  adequately  proved  by  psy 
chological  experiment.  Even  a  slightly  pleasant  stimu 
lus  will  measurably  increase  pulse-rate,  blood-flow,  and 
depth  of  breathing,  and  consequently  augment  me 
tabolism  ;  while  a  slightly  unpleasant  stimulus  will  de 
crease  these  activities  and  consequently  diminish  me 
tabolism.  Hence,  anything  that  will  make  for  increased 
buoyancy  will,  other  things  equal,  make  for  increased 
efficiency. 

The  limitation,  however,  is  apparent,  and  it  is  in  the 
limitation  that  the  justification  of  recreative  values  in 
heres.  One  may  seek  pleasures  of  a  low  order  or  pleas 
ures  of  a  high  order.  One  may  follow  the  dictates  of 
primitive  impulse,  or  one  may,  if  means  of  higher 
pleasure  have  been  developed,  turn  to  these  for 
relaxation  from  the  workaday  activities.  The  gratifi 
cation  of  primitive  impulses  will,  if  persisted  in,  defeat 


2l8  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

the  purpose  of  relaxation;  instead  of  increasing  the 
availability  of  energy,  sensual  pleasures  will,  in  the  long 
run,  tend  in  the  opposite  direction.  On  the  other  hand, 
while  the  delights  that  inhere  in  the  higher  aesthetic 
enjoyment  of  art  and  literature  and  nature  may  be  in 
dulged  to  excess  and  so  come  to  be  ends  in  themselves, 
the  danger  is  manifestly  less  than  in  the  case  of  sensual 
pleasures.  The  employment  of  educational  forces  in  the 
development  of  the  higher  types  of  pleasure  and  recrea 
tion  is  consequently  thoroughly  justified,  even  upon  the 
basis  of  the  crassest  "practical"  philosophy. 

3.  (b)  A  second  type  of  justification  leads  through 
rather  more  devious  channels.  The  social  life  demands 
a  readjustment  of  individual  tastes,  appetites,  and 
desires,  —  a  readjustment  for  which  the  organism  has 
not  as  yet  become  "naturally"  adapted.  That  is,  man 
has  instinctive  tendencies  that  need  a  certain  degree  of 
gratification  in  their  own  right,  and  irrespective  of  any 
bearing  that  they  may  have  upon  social  life,  save  that 
denying  the  gratification  will  render  the  social  and 
practical  adjustments  less  efficient  than  they  would  be 
otherwise.  Just  as  religion  is  justified  for  other  reasons 
than  simply  that  it  is  a  moral  agency,  —  just  as  religion 
answers  a  deep  and  fundamental  human  need,  irre 
spective  of  its  broader  socializing  tendencies,  —  so  the 
higher  forms  of  enjoyment  satisfy  a  need  that  is,  in 
some  individuals,  just  as  fundamental.  The  social  cri 
terion  need  not  be  disregarded  even  in  this  justifica 
tion,  which  seems  so  largely  an  individualistic  matter. 


FULFILLING   RECREATIVE   FUNCTIONS  21 9 

As  has  been  pointed  out  above,  social  and  economic 
adjustments  would  be  less  efficient  if  this  value  were 
not  realized.  While  the  individual  must  live  for  the 
race,  and  while  individual  action  must  be  consistent 
with  social  welfare,  this  principle  would  defeat  its  own 
purpose  were  it  blind  to  the  fact  that  the  individual 
must  live  his  own  life  and  that  the  rewards  of  this  life 
must  be  individually  as  well  as  socially  worth  while. 
The  task  of  socializing  education  is  to  see  to  it  that  the 
individual  develops  tastes,  the  gratification  of  which  is 
consistent  with  social  welfare,  and  that,  through  lack 
of  stimulus  and  exercise,  the  tastes  that  are  inconsistent 
with  this  welfare  be  allowed  to  atrophy. 

It  is  an  acute  observation  that  the  real  test  of  a  man's 
character  is  not  the  way  in  which  he  does  his  daily  work,  but 
the  manner  in  which  he  spends  his  leisure.  Like  all  aphorisms, 
it  probably  overshoots  the  mark,  but  it  certainly  reveals  a  very 
important  factor  that  is  likely  to  be  neglected  in  education, 
especially  when  education  labors  under  the  stress  of  increas 
ingly  heavy  demands  for  "practical"  instruction  and  training. 
There  can  be  little  doubt  that  some  forms  of  social  ineffi 
ciency  owe  their  existence  to  the  neglect  of  this  factor.  The 
almost  incredibly  large  amount  of  money  that  is  annually 
expended  in  providing  amusement  for  the  "masses"  must  be 
regarded  on  the  whole  as  an  economic  waste.  Certainly  it 
does  not  return  in  heightened  buoyancy  and  increased  effi 
ciency  an  adequate  dividend  upon  the  investment.  The 
spectacular  methods  of  enjoyment  always  tend  to  be  demor 
alizing,  —  to  degenerate  rather  than  to  uplift.  The  appeal 
to  the  lower  instincts  is  profitable  because  the  lower  instincts 
are  the  common  property  of  all.  The  appeal  to  cultivated 


22O  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

tastes  is  far  less  profitable  because  cultivated  tastes 
are  both  specialized  and  uncommon.  The  task  of  educa 
tion  is  to  cultivate  tastes  of  the  higher  orders,  but  appreci 
ably  to  raise  the  standard  of  the  masses  is  a  Herculean  under 
taking.  Certainly  the  forces  of  education  seem  so  far  to  have 
had  little  influence  in  this  direction. 

4.  What  materials  of  education  are  available  for  the 
purpose  of  fulfilling  appreciative  and  recreative  func 
tions?  Literature,  art,  and  music  naturally  come  first 
to  mind.  If  tastes  can  be  developed  that  will  be  satisfied 
by  the  best  (and  only  by  the  best)  that  art  in  any  of  its 
forms  can  provide,  a  long  step  has  been  taken  in  the  right 
direction.  With  respect  to  art,  literature,  and  music,  it 
cannot  be  said  that  educational  activities  having  as  their 
purpose  the  development  of  such  tastes  have  been  emi 
nently  successful.  Literature  has  been  "taught"  with 
this  end  in  view  for  a  generation,  at  least ;  and,  while 
some  success  has  undoubtedly  crowned  the  efforts  of  ex 
ceptionally  capable  teachers,  it  is  hardly  to  be  doubted 
that  as  many  pupils  have  been  turned  in  quite  the  opposite 
direction  from  that  desired.  For  the  time,  energy,  and 
money  expended  in  the  teaching  of  music  in  American 
schools,  there  has  been  a  very  small  return  in  musical  ap 
preciation.  Art,  as  we  have  already  intimated,  does  not 
lend  itself  to  the  ordinary  methods  of  presentation,  as  do 
literature  and  music,  and  hence  has  seldom  been  seriously 
attempted  from  the  point  of  view  of  appreciation.  Where 
it  has  been  " taught"  with  this  purpose,  the  results  have 
perhaps  been  more  encouraging. 


FULFILLING   RECREATIVE   FUNCTIONS  221 

5.  The  reasons  that  lie  back  of  these  admitted  inade 
quacies  cannot  be  exhaustively  treated  in  this  place,  but 
certain  broad  principles  may  be  noted,  (a)  The  tech 
nique  of  teaching  has  hitherto  concerned  itself  almost  ex 
clusively  with  that  phase  of  the  educative  process  that 
we  have  termed  "instruction"  rather  than  with  the  phase 
of  "appreciation."  The  orthodox  methods  of  presenta 
tion  are  didactic  and  "intellectual ";  their  essence  lies  in 
the  very  fact  that  the  emotional  factors  are  placed  in 
the  background.  While  methods  of  instruction  that  are 
measurably  effective  in  promoting  the  ends  of  instruction 
have  been  developed  and  applied,  it  has  not  been  gen 
erally  recognized  that  these  methods  are  valid  only  with 
reference  to  the  subjects  that  are  instructional  in  their 
function.  They  have  been  extended  to  cover  every  other 
possible  phase  or  aspect  of  the  educative  process.  Con 
sequently,  when  the  demand  came  for  the  teaching  of  liter 
ature  and  art,  the  first  recourse  was  to  apply  the  methods 
with  which  teachers  were  already  familiar  and  which  they 
had  used  successfully  in  other  fields.  The  recreative 
functions  of  music,  literature,  and  art  can  never  be  ade 
quately  fulfilled  until  teachers  have  mastered  the  tech 
nique  of  teaching  for  appreciation.  Unfortunately,  this 
variety  of  technique  has  not  yet  been  reduced  to  an  organ 
ized  body  of  principles;  consequently  it  is  difficult  to 
train  teachers  in  this  phase  of  their  work.  A  beginning 
has  been  made,  however,  in  the  mere  recognition  that 
there  is  such  a  form  of  school  exercise  as  an  "apprecia 
tion  lesson,"  l  and  there  are  certain  principles  of  technique 
1  Cf.  p.  63  above. 


222  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

that  can  be  derived  merely  from  the  implications  of  this 
name. 

6.  (b)  Another  factor  that  has  militated  against  the 
realization  of  the  recreative  values  has  its  basis  in  an  un 
justifiable  extension  of  a  principle  which,  if  limited  to  its 
proper  sphere,  is  thoroughly  valid.  It  is  true  that  school 
tasks  must  not  appeal  to  the  pupil  as  "soft"  or  "easy." 
If  they  do,  his  respect  for  them  is  lessened,  and  whatever 
he  may  gain,  he  is  likely  to  look  upon  them  as  possessing 
little  value.  There  is  no  principle  of  education  upon 
which  experienced  teachers  are  more  thoroughly  agreed 
than  this.  On  the  other  hand,  when  school  tasks  are 
given  an  artificial  difficulty  because  of  this  principle,  it  is 
equally  certain  that  one's  purpose  will  be  defeated.  The 
teaching  of  the  subjects  that  should  fulfill  recreative  func 
tions  has  suffered  from  this  factor.  In  the  high  schools 
and  colleges,  particularly,  the  competition  among  the 
various  departments  often  impels  the  teachers  of  litera 
ture  and  art  to  place  unnecessary  difficulties  in  the  pupil's 
way  to  the  end  that  these  subjects  may  command  the 
respect  that  readily  accrues  to  mathematics,  the  sciences, 
and  other  subjects  intrinsically  "harder."  These  diffi 
culties  consist  sometimes  in  the  compilation  of  elaborate 
notebooks,  at  other  times  in  a  tedious  tracing  out  of  al 
lusions  and  hidden  meanings  by  the  aid  of  "notes," 
"glossaries,"  and  "annotations" ;  but  perhaps  the  method 
most  disastrous  to  the  realization  of  recreative  values  is 
the  giving  of  long  assignments  under  the  impression, 
evidently,  that  the  effort  involved  in  overcoming  quanti- 


FULFILLING   RECREATIVE   FUNCTIONS  223 

tative  difficulties  has  the  same  educative  or  disciplinary 
value  as  the  effort  involved  in  overcoming  qualitative 
difficulties. 

The  fallacy  of  this  argument  is  obvious.  Whatever 
educative  value  may  inhere  in  the  difficulty  of  a  task  is 
surely  dependent  upon  a  recognition  by  the  pupil  of  the 
worthiness  of  thejesult  that  comes  out  of  the  effort.  In 
other  words,  a  series  of  tasks  upon  which  the  pupil  con 
centrates,  but  from  which  he  emerges  without  the  con 
sciousness  of  conquest,  can  do  little  to  confirm  in  his  mind 
the  value  of  persistence  and  effort.  Unless  striving  is 
sues  in  results  of  one  sort  or  another  that  appeal  to  the 
pupil  as  worth  while,  he  will  hardly  be  encouraged  to 
idealize  striving.  Now  with  science  and  mathematics, 
the  overcoming  of  difficulties  does  (or  may)  lead  to  a 
result  that  the  pupil  recognizes  as  thoroughly  worth 
while.  There  are  also  certain  kinds  of  effort  and  con 
centration  that  are  essential  to  the  enjoyment  of  litera 
ture  and  art,  but  it  is  hardly  to  be  assumed  that  uncon 
scionably  long  assignments  issue  in  anything  but  weari 
ness  and  perhaps  disgust. 

7.  (c)  A  third  factor  that  interferes  with  the  fulfillment 
of  recreative  functions  inheres  in  the  very  inconsistent 
and  anomalous  assumption  that  every  teacher  and  every 
pupil  can  come  to  admire  every  form  of  art.  This  assump 
tion  expresses  itself  in  the  rigid  prescription  of  the  "  mas 
terpieces"  that  are  to  be  studied  during  each  year  or 
semester  of  the  course.  Doubtless  most  pupils  can  be 
aroused  to  the  point  of  interest  if  they  have  some  one 


* 

224  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

from  whom  to  "catch"  the  enthusiasm.  But  when  the 
teacher  himself  fails  to  appreciate  the  beauty  of  the  selec 
tion  that  he  is  "  teaching,"  it  is  futile  to  hope  that  his 
pupils  will  do  so.  If  appreciation  is  to  be  "taught"  (or 
perhaps  better,  "caught "),  the  teacher  must  at  least  limit 
himself  to  those  materials  that  he  himself  appreciates. 

At  this  point  it  is  evident  that  there  may  be  a  conflict  of 
values.  The  conventional  demands  must  be  met,  and  these 
demands  may,  and  often  do,  necessitate  the  teaching  of  certain 
literary  masterpieces  for  which  teachers  have  little  liking. 
It  is  beside  the  question  to  say  that  they  "ought  to  like  them." 
One  cannot  force  appreciation,  and  one  cannot  often  lead 
pupils  to  appreciate  what  is  presented  by  an  unappreciative 
teacher.  The  problem  can  be  solved  only  by  giving  up  the 
conventional  value  entirely,  or  by  permitting  it  to  be  realized 
through  the  most  superficial  kind  of  an  acquaintance  with  the 
masterpieces  in  question.  The  fulfillment  of  recreative  and 
inspirational  functions  will  richly  justify  an  expenditure  of 
time  and  energy  that  would  be  quite  unjustified  in  realizing  a 
value  that  is  merely  conventional.  In  the  latter  case,  as 
has  been  pointed  out  before,  the  more  quickly  the  task  is  com 
pleted,  the  better,  —  provided,  of  course,  that  the  value  is 
limited  to  the  conventional  type;  where  a  great  deal  is  at 
stake,  the  problem  assumes  a  different  aspect,  —  although 
even  here  it  is  doubtful  whether  inspiration  can  come  without 
admiration. 

8.  Recreative  functions  are  not  limited  to  art,  music, 
and  literature,  but  may  come  to  inhere  in  any  subject  of 
the  curriculum  —  although  the  aesthetic  disciplines  are 
peculiar  in  that  their  chief  functions  are  inspirational  and 
recreative.  History,  however,  possesses  large  possibili- 


FULFILLING   RECREATIVE   FUNCTIONS  225 

ties  from  the  recreative  point  of  view.  Again  there  is 
danger  of  a  conflict  with  the  conventional  and  inspira 
tional  demands.  History  as  usually  taught  leaves  with 
many  of  its  immature  students  something  that  is  akin  to 
a  prejudice  against  history  as  a  recreative  study.  The 
fulfilling  of  conventional  demands  frequently  encourages 
the  most  barren  kinds  of  methods.  Some  of  the  blame 
must  also  be  attributed  to  the  factor  that  was  found  to 
operate  so  disastrously  in  the  teaching  of  the  aesthetic 
subjects;  in  the  desire  to  make  history  "difficult,"  the 
fact  has  been  overlooked  that  difficult  tasks,  if  they  are 
to  appeal  to  the  pupil  as  worth  while,  must  issue  in  re 
sults  that  are  clearly  commensurate  with  the  difficulties. 
Long  assignments  of  collateral  reading  in  history  do  not 
always  or  often  issue  in  such  results ;  nor  does  the  elabo 
ration  of  voluminous  notebooks,  nor  the  ineffective  source 
work  that  is  sometimes  attempted  in  elementary  and  sec 
ondary  schools.  Whatever  may  be  the  cause,  however, 
there  can  be  little  doubt  of  the  inadequacy  of  some  of  the 
teaching  of  history  in  the  lower  schools  from  the  stand 
point  of  realizing  its  recreative  values. 

9.  The  recreative  value  that  may  inhere  in  manual 
training  should  not  be  overlooked,  although  it  has  not 
been  strongly  urged  by  those  who  have  been  most  ardent 
in  introducing  the  subject  into  the  elementary  and  sec 
ondary  curriculum.  For  the  business  or  professional 
man,  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  a  means  of  recreation 
that  would  tend  more  effectively  to  turn  the  mind  from 
the  worries  of  the  day's  work  than  the  recreative  practice 
Q 


226  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

of  some  handicraft.  The  realization  of  this  value,  how 
ever,  will  be  dependent  upon  the  methods  that  are  em 
ployed  by  the  teacher  of  manual  training.  Negative 
prejudices  may  be  developed  in  the  shop  just  as  they  may 
be  developed  in  the  classroom.  And  again  there  is  the 
danger  of  conflict  among  different  types  of  value.  If 
manual  training  is  conducted  because  of  its  assumed 
disciplinary  function,  it  is  quite  likely  to  fail  in  develop 
ing  recreative  tastes. 

It  should  not  be  inferred  from  this,  nor  from  former  criti 
cisms  of  the  same  tenor,  that  the  realization  of  recreative 
values  is  always  to  be  considered  as  inconsistent  with  the 
realization  of  disciplinary  and  utilitarian  possibilities.  It  is 
not  true  that  a  subject  that  is  to  appeal  to  the  pupil  as  a 
means  of  recreation  or  diversion  from  the  daily  work  of  life 
must,  for  that  reason,  appeal  to  him  as  easy.  It  must,  how 
ever,  leave  him  with  an  unequivocal  liking  for  the  pursuit.  If 
it  appeals  to  him  at  first  as  difficult,  the  gradual  solution  of 
the  difficulties  must  result  in  products  that  are  essentially  and 
unequivocally  worth  while.  We  have  seen  that  disciplinary 
functions  are  probably  to  be  realized  only  under  the  same 
conditions;  consequently  the  two  functions  are  not  incon 
sistent.  It  still  remains  true,  however,  that  they  may  work 
in  opposition  to  each  other  in  actual  practice,  for  the  pleasant 
terminus  of  a  disciplinary  process  is  not  always  recognized 
as  essential  to  the  fulfillment  of  the  disciplinary  function. 

10.  The  subject  of  the  elementary  curriculum  that  has 
perhaps  been  most  extensively  taught  with  a  recreative 
purpose  in  mind  is  nature  study.  Practically  all  authori 
ties  agree  that  one  purpose  of  nature  study  is  to  reveal  to 


FULFILLING   RECREATIVE   FUNCTIONS  227 

pupils  the  phenomena  of  nature  in  such  a  way  that  they 
will  find  the  future  observation  and  investigation  of  these 
phenomena  a  source  of  unvarying  delight.  No  one  can 
deny  that  the  attempts  of  teachers  to  develop  a  sym 
pathetic  attitude  toward  nature  have  been  very  fre 
quently  not  only  futile,  but  quite  disastrous,  as  far  as  the 
realization  of  their  chief  aim  is  concerned.  In  other 
words,  nature  study  has  only  too  often  prejudiced  the 
child  against  natural  phenomena  as  a  source  of  recreative 
enjoyment.  Exceptional  teachers,  themselves  imbued 
with  an  enthusiasm  for  observation  and  experimentation, 
have  been  able  to  communicate  their  own  tastes  to  their 
pupils ;  but  these  teachers  are  not  numerous.  Here,  as 
in  the  case  of  literature,  the  enthusiasm  must  be  "caught," 
it  cannot  be  "taught."  But  here,  also,  as  in  the  case  of 
literature,  the  teachers  themselves  may  be  led  to  acquire 
this  indispensable  qualification.  Even  possessing  it, 
however,  they  may  still  fail  of  the  desired  goal.  In 
all  subjects  in  which  the  fulfillment  of  function  is 
dependent,  obviously  and  directly,  upon  emotional 
factors,  the  line  of  least  resistance  is  toward  methods 
that  smack  of  "  sentimentalism."  No  doubt  much  of 
the  failure  in  teaching  nature  study  has  been  due  to  a 
premature  attempt  to  "force"  appreciation,  —  to  "rave" 
over  beauties  that  the  pupil  cannot  see,  or  —  what  is  still 
more  disastrous  —  to  couple  nature  study  with  "goody- 
goody"  sermonizing  on  kindness  to  animals  and  other 
virtues,  which,  however  important  in  themselves,  are 
often  irrelevantly  forced  upon  the  pupil. 


228  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

1 1 .  Concerning  the  other  materials  of  the  curriculum,  it 
is  probable  that  the  dominant  values  are  not  of  the  rec 
reative  type.  Arithmetic  has,  in  times  past,  been  oc 
casionally  taught  as  a  source  of  recreation.  Geography 
may  certainly  lend  itself  very  effectively  to  the  develop 
ment  of  recreative  interests  (such  as  an  interest  in  the 
history  of  exploration),  but  its  chief  value  must  be  iden 
tified  with  another  type.  The  more  formal  subjects,  such 
as  grammar  and  spelling,  seem  to  be  far  removed  from  a 
general  recreative  functioning.  Certainly  if  any  of  these 
subjects  could  be  made  to  appeal  to  the  pupil  as  sources 
of  recreation,  the  procedure  would  be  thoroughly  justified 
in  so  far,  of  course,  as  it  did  not  interfere  with  the  realiza 
tion  of  their  more  important  values. 

That  the  study  of  foreign  languages  in  the  secondary 
schools  leaves  with  the  average  pupil  a  positive  prejudice 
in  favor  of  such  study  as  a  recreative  pursuit  would  be 
an  absurd  contention.  Whenever  pupils  can  be  properly 
led  to  the  appreciation  of  the  literature  of  these  languages, 
the  recreative  function  should  perhaps  be  considered  of 
prime  importance,  but  the  situation,  in  so  far  as  the  pres 
ent-day  teaching  in  the  high  schools  is  concerned,  seems 
well-nigh  hopeless.  Certainly  other  functions  are  ade 
quately  fulfilled,  but  no  one  of  these  would  be  inconsistent 
with  such  teaching  as  should  leave  with  some  of  the  pu 
pils,  at  least,  an  unequivocal  liking  for  foreign-language 
study. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

VALUES  TO  BE  REALIZED  IN  FULFILLING  INTERPRETIVE 
FUNCTIONS 

i.  IT  will  be  recalled  that  " attitudes"  and  "perspec 
tives"  were  recognized  in  an  earlier  chapter  as  represent 
ing  an  important  type  of  conduct-controls,  and  that 
the  educative  materials  engendering  these  controls 
were  ascribed  an  "interpretive"  function.  As  was  there 
suggested,  this  rubric  is  of  paramount  importance  to  edu 
cational  theory.  It  has  been  difficult  hitherto  to  account 
satisfactorily  for  the  recognized  value  of  a  large  group  of 
educative  materials,  —  a  group  so  large,  indeed,  that  it 
constitutes  the  major  part  of  the  curriculum  of  general 
education.  In  many  cases,  these  materials  have  been 
justified  because  of  their  "culture  "  value,  but  this  justi 
fication  has  been  very  unsatisfactory :  in  the  first  place, 
the  word  "culture"  itself  is  very  far  from  unequivocal 
and  definite ;  in  the  second  place,  the  word  is  associated 
in  many  minds  with  luxury  and  a  certain  measure  of 
freedom  from  the  cares  and  responsibilities  of  economic 
life ;  and  in  the  third  place  the  idea  of  culture  is  not 
easily  harmonized 1  with  the  ultimate  aim  of  social  achieve- 

1  Ruediger,  for  example,  rejects  the  social  aim  of  education  chiefly 
because  it  justifies  the  cultural  and  aesthetic  subjects  "only  indirectly." 
(Principles  of  Education,  p.  60.) 

229 


230  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

ment  without  virtually  implying  an  individualistic  cri 
terion,  and  thus  effectually  repudiating  the  social 
standard. 

2.  The  influence  of  attitudes  and  perspectives  upon 
economic  and  social  adjustment  may  be  made  clear  by 
the  differences  in  quality  of  conduct  between  the  "lib 
erally  educated"  man  and  the  narrowly  educated  man. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  adjustment,  one  virtue  of 
"liberal"  knowledge  lies  in  its  relation  to  the  detection 
of  situations.  In  other  words,  it  is  not  alone  the  solution 
of  situations  that  is  important;  before  a  situation  can 
be  solved,  it  must  be  recognized  as  a  situation.  One  may 
be  thoroughly  conversant  with  the  principles  of  hygiene, 
for  example,  and  have  the  will  to  apply  them  to  the  bet 
terment  of  one's  life,  and  yet  fail  to  detect  the  point  or 
points  where  the  application  "fits."  The  perspective 
in  which  one  views  the  situation  gives  it  the  unique 
coloring  which  largely  dictates  the  nature  of  one's  adjust 
ment.  This  perspective  is  the  conduct-con trol^that  is 
particularly  likely  to  be  determined  by  general  educa 
tion. 

This  is  clearly  shown  in  an  instance  cited  by  Pillsbury  .*  "  A 
large  part  of  what  we  ordinarily  call  a  good  memory  consists  in 
.  .  .  this  ability  to  think  of  the  right  thing  at  the  right  time. 
The  invention  of  the  steam  engine  was  assured  when  a  possible 
use  for  its  energy  was  suggested  by  the  force  that  the  steam 
from  the  mouth  of  a  teakettle  exerted.  Many  men  knew  of 
the  value  of  force  in  general,  and  many  men  had  observed  that 

1  W.  B.  Pillsbury :   Attention,  London,  1908,  p.  145.     (Italics  mine.) 


FULFILLING   INTERPRETIVE   FUNCTIONS  23! 

a  straw  would  be  bent  by  the  steam  from  the  spout,  but  no  man 
had  analyzed  the  characteristic  of  force,  and  had  the  sugges 
tion  of  a  practical  application  at  the  same  time.  All  other 
elements  were  present  in  the  mental  content  except  the  right 
conditions  of  attention  to  bring  about  that  analysis,  and  to  di 
rect  the  train  of  associations  into  that  particular  path.  This 
hung  upon  the  presence  of  just  the  right  knowledge  and  just 
the  right  attitude  toward  the  problem  at  that  time.  Being  in 
possession  of  the  fact  is  not  sufficient.  .  .  .  Even  in  the 
schoolroom  inability  to  answer  questions  is  not  so  much  lack 
of  proper  knowledge  as  inability  to  see  in  the  question  the 
proper  cue  to  the  answer,  and  lack  of  the  proper  related  knowl 
edge  that  will  direct  the  associations  to  the  particular  fact 
desired.  All  this,  of  course,  depends  upon  earlier  experiences, 
upon  knowledge  in  general  .  .  . ;  it  is  not  lack  of  the  par 
ticular  bit  of  knowledge  in  question,  but  of  the  more 
indefinite  and  widely  distributed  general  knowledge,  that  shall 
make  the  particular  effective  at  this  time  and  in  this 
connection." 

It  would  seem  that  the  type  of  control  that  Pillsbury  has  in 
mind  here  is  quite  identical  with  what  we  have  just  termed  the 
attitude  or  perspective,  and  it  is  clear  from  his  analysis  that 
general  education  is  well  adapted  to  furnish  these  important 
factors. 

3.  Another  relation  between  " general  knowledge" 
and  social  and  economic  efficiency  is  suggested  by  what 
may  be  described  as  " negative  adjustment."  It  is 
natural  to  think  of  conduct  or  adjustment  as  limited  to 
the  positive  direction  of  energy.  We  reflect  this  notion 
in  our  national  ideal  of  the  strenuous  life.  Action  is 
associated  primarily  with  movement,  although,  psycho 
logically,  action  may  be  the  inhibition  of  movement. 


232  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

Both  economic  efficiency  and  social  efficiency  are  as 
thoroughly  dependent  upon  "negative"  as  upon  "posi 
tive"  adjustment.  To  the  man  of  liberal  education,  the 
environment  is  reduced  to  a  certain  measure  of  law  and 
order  and  system.  Situations  which  the  ignorant  are 
led  by  fear  or  curiosity  or  imitation  to  attempt  to  solve, 
and  which  are  frequently  solved  most  inadequately, 
either  do  not  appeal  to  the  educated  man  as  having 
immediate  reference  to  his  needs,  or  are  quickly  and  ade 
quately  put  out  of  the  way,  —  subsumed  under  the  ap 
propriate  concept  or  principle  that  covers  them. 

Thus  one  who  has  mastered  the  fundamental  principles  of 
the  natural  sciences  may  say  quite  confidently  that  he  can 
find  in  the  special  vocation  of  his  life  no  opportunities  to  apply 
the  knowledge  that  he  acquired  at  the  cost  of  so  much  time 
and  effort.  And  yet  in  the  course  of  his  workaday  life,  this 
knowledge  is  certainly  functioning,  not  in  judgment-processes, 
it  is  true,  but  in  attitudes  and  perspectives,  which  influence 
profoundly  his  adjustment.  The  phenomena  which  puzzle, 
irritate,  confuse,  or  bewilder  the  ignorant  and  unenlightened 
do  not  trouble  him.  Where  the  former  see  situations  which  are 
not  significant  to  their  economic  and  social  needs,  but  which 
simply  hark  back  to  a  primitive  instinct,  he  is  oblivious  to  the 
stimuli ;  and  where  they  fail  to  see  situations  which  are  sig 
nificant  to  their  economic  and  social  needs,  he  detects  such 
situations. 

A  personal  example  may  serve  to  clarify  this  conception. 
More  than  once  the  writer  has  seen  "ghosts" ;  that  is  to  say, 
he  has  had  the  experience  which,  if  he  had  not  been  able  to 
interpret  it  rationally,  would  have  stimulated  him  to  a  mystic 
and  supernatural  explanation.  He  has  recognized  as  an  hal- 


FULFILLING   INTERPRETIVE   FUNCTIONS  233 

lucination  what  another  man  might  call  a  ghost.  He  would 
now  be  a  firm  believer  in  spiritism  and  its  attendant  supersti 
tions,  had  not  his  knowledge  of  psychological  laws  furnished 
him  with  the  rational  explanation.  Nor  is  the  explicit  sub- 
sumption  of  the  phenomenon  under  a  general  principle  or 
concept  essential  to  the  functioning  of  his  psychological  knowl 
edge  in  situations  of  this  sort.  Occasionally  the  judgment 
may  be  explicitly  made ;  but  more  frequently  the  knowledge 
functions  as  attitude  or  perspective  either  in  decreeing  that 
the  phenomenon  shall  not  become  a  situation  demanding  ad 
justment,  or  in  making  the  adjustment  quite  different  from 
what  it  would  be  were  a  similar  phenomenon  presented  to  one 
lacking  the  knowledge. 

4.  The  fundamental  social  significance  of  general 
education  in  freeing  man's  mind  from  the  incubus  of 
fear,  dread,  superstition,  fraud,  and  error  has  often  been 
noted,  but  its  clear  relation  to  efficient  conduct  has  never 
been  sufficiently  emphasized.  Both  fear  and  curiosity 
must  always  be  reckoned  with  in  determining  the  ma 
terials  that  are  to  be  utilized  in  the  educative  process. 
The  human  mind  craves  knowledge,  —  craves  to  know 
the  deepest  meanings  and  significances  of  the  forces 
that  operate  upon  the  organism.  And  even  if  these 
forces  have  no  immediate  significance  to  life  or  adjust 
ment,  nature  has  wisely  implanted  the  instinct  that 
impels  man  to  seek  them  out,  to  identify  them,  to  classify 
them,  to  arrange  them  in  system  and  order  in  case  they 
should  happen,  under  some  future  condition,  to  prove 
significant.  The  need  for  "pure"  science  is  just  as 
fundamental  and  vital  as  the  need  for  "applied"  science. 


234  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

Curiosity  is  as  truly  an  instinct  as  hunger,  and  the  spur 
of  curiosity  has  been  perhaps  as  powerful  a  force  in  the 
progress  of  the  human  race  as  the  spur  of  hunger.  Fear 
is  stimulated  by  the  strange  and  the  unknown,  and  its 
depressing  and  energy-wasting  influences  are  just  as 
marked  when  the  unknown  is  innocuous  as  when  it  is 
fraught  with  danger.  It  behooves  man,  therefore,  to 
push  his  investigations  into  the  unknown  and  the  mys 
terious,  even  if  there  is  no  promise  of  an  economic  equiva 
lent  for  the  time  and  energy  thus  employed.  It  behooves 
him  to  make  artificial  situations  where  no  real  situations 
exist,  —  to  attend  to  a  minute  distinction  for  the  sake 
of  the  distinction,  even  though  it  may  never  become  a 
cue  for  positive  action.  The  fact  that  it  has  been 
explained  and  relegated  to  its  proper  place  will,  in  the 
end,  justify  the  trouble  of  explaining  it;  for  even  if  it 
does  not  furnish  a  cue  to  positive  action,  it  will,  in  any 
case,  furnish  a  cue  to  negative  adjustment,  —  it  will 
no  longer  perplex  and  confuse,  it  will  no  longer  be 
enshrouded  in  an  irritating  mysticism,  or  furnish  a  stimu 
lus  for  superstition  and  its  attendant  evils. 

A  typical  example  of  this  craving  for  knowledge  is  to  be 
found  in  the  history  of  Arctic  exploration.  That  men  seem  to 
be  somewhat  ashamed  of  their  instinct  of  curiosity  which  has 
done  so  much  for  their  advancement  is  evidenced  by  the 
excuses  that  each  successive  explorer  in  the  Far  North  puts 
forth  as  a  cloak  to  his  real  motive.  Kane  would  seek  for 
records  of  the  Franklin  party.  The  motive  appears  upon  the 
title-page  of  his  journal,  but  little  evidence  can  be  found  in  the 
record  itself  that  he  did  aught  but  strive  for  knowledge  of  the 


FULFILLING   INTERPRETIVE   FUNCTIONS  235 

unknown  lands  and  waters  through  which  he  attempted 
the  conquest  to  the  Pole.  Nansen  asserts  emphatically  that 
the  location  of  the  North  Pole  is  but  a  subsidiary  object  of  his 
trip.  Only  with  a  few  of  the  adventurers  into  these  for 
bidding  regions  has  the  attempt  to  reach  the  Pole  been  ac 
knowledged  as  the  primary  aim.  Why  it  should  not  always 
have  been  a  laudable  ambition,  it  is  hard  to  see.  The  North 
Pole  undiscovered  would  always  have  been  an  irritation.  Any 
unknown  area  of  the  earth's  surface  stimulates  the  spirit  of  dis 
covery  and  exploration,  and  it  is  well  for  mankind  that  it  should. 
It  is  true  that  the  discoveries  that  are  made  may  give  but 
small  financial  returns  for  the  labor  and  expense  of  making 
them,  but  this  disadvantage  is  not  limited  to  investigations 
undertaken  from  the  motive  of  pure  discovery.  The  long 
series  of  attempts  to  discover  the  Northwest  Passage  were  im 
pelled  by  economic  motives,  and  yet  they  were  thoroughly 
futile  from  the  standpoint  of  positive  commercial  results. 
Nevertheless,  their  history  forms  one  of  the  most  priceless 
chapters  in  the  record  of  human  achievement.  Nor  is  their 
value  limited  to  the  fact  that  they  demonstrated  the  im 
practicability  of  the  Northwest  Passage  as  a  commercial 
route,  —  a  negative  "cue"  to  adjustment  that  alone  would 
perhaps  justify  the  labor  and  suffering  that  they  involved. 
The  stimulating  example  of  human  endurance  and  persistence 
against  heavy  odds  for  the  realization  of  a  set  purpose  is 
not  the  least  important  among  the  results  that  have  ac 
crued  to  the  work  of  Franklin,  Parry,  McClintock,  and 
Amundsen. 

5.  Among  the  materials  of  the  curriculum  that  fulfill 
most  effectively  these  interpretive  functions  and  thus 
realize  fundamental  social  and  economic  values,  the 
natural  sciences  stand  preeminent.  It  is  the  chief  func 
tion  of  science  as  taught  in  the  elementary  and  high 


236  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

schools  to  reduce  the  material  environment  to  law  and 
order  in  the  minds  of  the  pupils.  It  is  in  this  sense  par 
ticularly  that  the  task  of  education  is  "enlightenment." 
It  is  in  the  sense  that  it  is  "liberalizing."  As  a  climax 
of  this  process  of  reduction  stands  the  study  of  phi 
losophy,  which  attempts  to  correlate  all  sciences  and  to 
find  the  ultimate  principle  of  unification.  And  the 
valuable  resultant  in  every  case  is  not  primarily  that 
mastery  of  facts  and  principles  which  will  enable  one 
to  solve  technical  problems,  although  there  is  no  reason 
why  such  a  mastery  should  not  be  gained  in  so  far  as  is  con 
sistent  with  realizing  the  more  important  functions ;  the 
important  resultant,  however,  is  a  system  of  attitudes 
and  perspectives  which  implies,  as  has  been  suggested,  a 
systematic  and  rational  mastery  rather  than  merely  that 
empirical  mastery  which  is  often  sufficient  for  economic 
purposes,  and  which  so  often  identifies  itself  with  pure 
habit. 

6.  It  is  not  true,  however,  that  the  interpretive  func 
tions  are  limited  to  the  sciences.  In  the  sense  that  they 
represent  organized  and  coherent  systems  of  human 
experience,  all  school  disciplines  possess  these  values  in  a 
larger  or  smaller  measure:  every  art  has  its  unique 
body  of  principles  back  of  it ;  every  art,  in  other  words, 
has  its  science.  The  laws  underlying  literature,  the 
principles  that  explain  the  potency  of  art  over  the  emo 
tions,  the  great  universal  principles  that  govern  the 
development  of  civilization,  —  all  these  answer  certain 
cravings  of  the  human  mind  to  know  and  understand. 


FULFILLING   INTERPRETIVE   FUNCTIONS  237 

7.  The  interpretive  function  of  history  is  of  primary 
importance  in  the  phases  of  historical  instruction  that 
are  represented  by  the  advanced  elementary  and  second 
ary  courses.  As  was  suggested  in  an  earlier  chapter,1 
the  viewing  of  present  situations  in  the  light  of  their 
genesis,  —  through  a  perspective  of  the  events  that 
have  led  up  to  them,  —  modifies  in  a  marked  degree 
one's  adjustment  to  these  situations.  The  emphasis 
upon  causal  relations  which  is  the  central  feature  of  the 
teaching  of  history  in  the  upper  grades  and  in  the  second 
ary  school  has  for  its  function  the  furnishing  of  such  a 
perspective. 

This  interpretive  function  is  emphasized  by  most  of  the 
recent  writers  upon  the  teaching  of  history.  Thus  J.  W.  Allen 2 
contends  that  any  real  knowledge  of  history  "should  help  us 
with  all  those  speculations  and  inquiries  which  turn  upon 
matters  social  and  political.  Such  knowledge  should  enable 
us  finally  to  rid  ourselves  of  many  superstitions,  —  of  modern 
superstitions  concerning  authorities  and  majorities,  as  well 
as  of  antique,  surviving  superstitions  concerning  nobility  and 
claims  of  right.  It  will  help  us  to  reckon  progress  from  the 
Stone  Age  instead  of  from  the  day  before  yesterday.  It  will 
help  us  to  separate  the  idea  of  progress  from  the  idea  of  me 
chanical  achievement  and  from  any  particular  forms  of  prog 
ress  which  happen  to  be  immediately  familiar  to  us.  It  will 
assist  in  altogether  destroying  the  ludicrous  superstition  of  our 
own  immense  superiority  as  compared  with  those  who  have 

1  See  above,  pp.  67  f. 

2  J.  W.  Allen :    The  Place  of  History  in  Education,  New  York,  1910, 
pp.  1 60  ff . ;  cf.  also  H.  E.  Bourne :   The  Teaching  of  History  and  Civics, 
New  York,  1909,  pp.  87  f. 


238  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

gone  before.  ...  It  will  show  us  institutions  in  the  light 
of  their  origin.  .  .  .  It  should  help  us  to  see  all  social  facts 
in  a  due  proportion." 

And  just  as  each  specific  art  has  its  science,  —  has  its 
body  of  underlying  principles  which  make  meaningful 
the  practices  that  it  embodies,  —  so  each  art  has  its 
history,  a  proper  knowledge  of  which  will  provide  one 
with  a  time-perspective  upon  the  work  that  one  is  doing. 
How  important  these  historical  perspectives  are  to 
specialized  efficiency  can  be  determined  only  by  careful 
experimentation,  but  it  is  safe  to  hazard  a  guess  that 
one's  conduct  is  appreciably  modified  in  the  direction 
of  enhanced  efficiency  by  viewing  each  problem  that  one 
confronts  in  the  light  of  its  genesis,  and  in  the  light  of 
its  relations  to  human  life  in  general.  Again  it  should 
be  urged  that  this  does  not  always  or  often  involve  a 
judgment  process.  The  function  of  a  perspective,  as 
has  already  been  urged,  is  to  modify  one's  interpretation 
of  the  situation,  and  this  is  accomplished  by  the  presence 
of  an  attitude  rather  than  by  the  explicit  recall  of  ideas 
and  principles.  But  these  important  attitudes  are  the 
resultants  of  explicitly  understood  ideas  and  principles. 

8.  Nor  are  interpretive  functions  confined  to  science 
and  history.  Literature  as  such  provides  a  perspective 
upon  human  life  that  nothing  else  can  give.  It  is  per 
haps  the  chief  educational  function  of  literature  to  crys 
tallize  the  ideals  that,  after  all  has  been  said,  must  form 
the  pillars  upon  which  society  rests.  But  in  the  assimi 
lation  of  these  ideals,  youth  also  gains  a  perspective  upon 


FULFILLING   INTERPRETIVE    FUNCTIONS  239 

human  life  that  may  serve  very  profoundly  to  modify 
his  conduct.  Social  situations  are  different  to  him  than 
they  would  be  otherwise.  Men  and  women  may  even  be 
classed  into  types,  of  each  of  which  some  character, 
sketched  by  the  master  hand  of  the  dramatist  or  the 
novelist,  stands  as  a  representative.  Shylock  and  King 
Lear,  Faust  and  Wilhelm  Meister,  Becky  Sharp  and 
Hester  Prynne,  Colonel  Sellers  and  Mr.  Micawber,  - 
these  and  the  other  great  characters  that  stalk  through 
the  pages  of  imaginative  literature  form  the  centers  about 
which  may  be  grouped  the  men  and  women  of  real  life. 
And  the  youth  who  has  the  power  to  read  human  nature 
through  this  perspective  is  profiting  by  the  experience  of 
the  few  great  students  of  humanity,  who  have  left  in 
these  characters  the  results  of  their  investigations, 
just  as  the  youth  who  reads  the  principle  of  gravitation 
or  the  principle  of  evolution  into  natural  phenomena 
profits  by  the  experiences  that  only  a  Newton  or  a  Darwin 
were  competent  initially  to  undergo. 

It  is  in  the  light  of  so  sweeping  a  generalization  as  this  that 
one  is  likely  to  ask :  "If  everything  that  can  possibly  be  taught 
possesses  some  sort  of  value,  why  waste  time  in  analysis  and 
classification  ?  Why  not  take  value  for  granted  and  let  edu 
cation  work  out  its  salvation  unhampered  by  finely  spun 
theories?"  It  has  already  been  suggested  that  such  a  study 
should  throw  light  upon  the  problems  of  method,  but  now  we 
have,  in  the  discussion  just  completed,  a  justification  for  the 
study  of  values  irrespective  of  any  possible  influence  over  spe 
cific  and  technical  adjustments.  Like  workers  in  other  depart 
ments  of  life,  the  educator  must  reduce  his  world  to  system  and 


240  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

order.  As  in  other  arts,  so  in  education,  one  must  recognize 
the  essential  worth  of  unifying  principles,  even  though  the 
direct  influence  of  these  principles  may  be  called  into  ques 
tion.  The  factor  of  "negative  adjustment"  and  the  craving 
to  know  and  understand  are  as  fundamental  to  the  teacher's 
work  as  they  are  to  other  departments  of  human  activity. 

9.  There  is  still  another  aspect  of  the  interpretive 
function  that  demands  recognition  and  emphasis.  The 
realization  of  what  the  writer  once  termed  "theoretical 
values"  1  really  depends  upon  the  development  of  atti 
tudes  and  perspectives.  The  effective  recall  and  appli 
cation  of  facts  and  principles  has  been  proved  by  the 
investigations  upon  memory  to  be  dependent  very  largely 
upon  the  degree  in  which  these  facts  and  principles  have 
been  "organized,"  —  upon  the  unity  of  "meaning" 
which  binds  them  together.  In  other  words,  the  recall 
and  application,  even  of  the  specific  facts  that  are  to 
function  in  specific  judgments,  depend  in  no  small  meas 
ure  upon  the  "matrix"  of  attitude  in  which  they  are 
embedded.  One  does  not  always  distinctly  recall  the 
concrete  experiences  from  which  have  been  derived  the 
general  principles  that  one  employs  when  these  principles 
are  used  in  judgment  processes,  but  the  possibility  of 
recalling  these  principles  and  of  applying  them  effectively 
is  dependent  upon  the  fact  that  they  have  at  one  time 
or  another  been  explicitly  based  upon  concrete  experiences. 
And  the  inverse  relation  similarly  holds :  one  recalls 
specific  and  concrete  facts  the  more  readily  if  these  have 

1  Cf.  Educative  Process,  p.  233. 


FULFILLING   INTERPRETIVE   FUNCTIONS  241 

been  grouped  and  organized  about  the  large  units 
of  meaning,  —  about  penetrating  and  comprehensive 
principles. 

This  value  of  organization  and  unity  in  promoting  recall 
and  application  is  so  clearly  evident  from  the  memory  in 
vestigations  that  it  may  be  looked  upon  as  firmly  established. 
The  ease  with  which  "meaningful"  materials  are  fixed,  re 
tained,  and  recalled  as  contrasted  with  "nonsense"  materials, 
the  superiority  of  the  "total"  as  contrasted  with  the  "frag 
mentary"  methods  of  memorizing,  and  the  increased  efficiency 
which  is  afforded  by  any  factor  that  will  group,  organize,  and 
relate  the  materials  that  are  being  "learned,"  —  all  these 
facts  go  to  show  the  fundamental  significance  of  this 
"matrix"  of  meaning  and  unity  which  we  have  identified 
with  attitude. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  SCHOOL  ENVIRONMENT  AS  A  SOURCE  OF  EDUCATIVE 
MATERIALS 

i.  IN  the  foregoing  chapters,  reference  has  most 
frequently  been  made  to  the  curriculum  of  the  schools 
as  the  source  of  educative  materials.  It  must  not  be 
assumed,  however,  that  the  formal  curriculum  is  the  only 
source  of  such  material,  nor  is  it  the  only  source  that 
the  educator  can  control. 

One  of  the  most  important  movements  in  modern 
education  has  been  the  increasingly  explicit  recognition 
of  the  educative  influence  of  the  life  of  the  school  itself, 
apart  from  the  content  of  the  formal  curriculum.1  This 
recognition  has  been  due,  in  part,  to  the  abandonment 
of  the  older  conception  of  education  as  essentially  a 
process  of  instruction  in  knowledge,  and  the  develop 
ment  of  the  broader  conception  of  education  as  a  process 
of  adjustment  to  the  social  life.  It  has  also  been  influ 
enced  by  the  spirit  of  the  great  English  public  schools, 
which,  in  answer  to  the  demand  placed  upon  them  for 
a  particular  type  of  product,  have  met  this  demand 

1  Cf.  J.  Dewey :  The  School  and  Society,  Chicago,  1899 ;  C.  B.  Gilbert : 
The  School  and  Its  Life,  New  York,  1908 ;  M.  V.  O'Shea :  Social  Develop 
ment  and  Education  Boston,  1909;  C.  A.  Scott:  Social  Education, 
Boston,  1908. 

242 


THE    SCHOOL   ENVIRONMENT  243 

through  the  development  of  a  unique  type  of  school 
life  rather  than  through  a  change  in  the  formal  curricu 
lum.1  And  finally,  the  example  of  the  higher  institu 
tions  in  developing  student-organizations  has  been 
imitated  in  the  lower  schools  with  the  result  that  second 
ary  education,  especially,  must  reckon  with  the  educative 
influence  of  school  life  if  it  would  not  have  the  influence 
of  its  formal  curriculum  stand  in  grave  danger  of  at  least 
partial  nullification. 

2.  The  controls  of  conduct  for  which  the  general  life 
of  the  school  must  stand  sponsor  are  to  be  included  almost 
exclusively  under  the  two  rubrics,  habits  and  ideals. 
For  the  most  part,  however,  the  habits  are  the  products 
of  the  ideals,  and  consequently  will  demand  little  direct 
attention  in  their  own  right. 

That  the  ideals  formed  by  companionship  and  social 
contagion  during  the  years  of  early  adolescence  are 
among  the  most  effective  and  influential  conduct-con 
trols  of  early  maturity,  there  can  be  little  doubt.  The 
standards  of  courage,  endurance,  hardihood,  truth, 
chastity,  personal  honor,  and-  moral  rectitude,  as  well 
as  the  more  specific  ideals  of  cleanliness,  industry,  accu 
racy,  and  the  like,  formed  during  these  years  are  almost 
certain  to  be  the  directive  forces  of  conduct,  at  least  until 

1  Cf.  J.  J.  Findlay :  "The  Corporate  Life  of  the  School,"  School  Review, 
vol.  xv,  pp.  744  ff. ;  vol.  xvi,  pp.  601  ff. ;  H.  B.  Smith :  '  Methods  of 
Moral  Instruction  and  Training  in  English  Public  Schools,"  in  Moral 
Instruction  and  Training  in  Schools  (Ed.  M.  E.  Sadler),  London,  1909, 
ch.  xii;  J.  Welton  and  F.  G.  Blandford:  Principles  and  Methods  of 
Moral  Training,  London,  1909,  ch.  vi. 


244  EDUCATIONAL  VALUES 

the  struggles  of  gaining  a  livelihood  lead  to  their  modi 
fication.  The  "illusions"  of  youth  may  have  little 
justification  in  the  conditions  of  adult  life,  but  it  still 
remains  true  that  they  have  been,  and  doubtless  always 
will  be,  controlling  factors  in  the  destiny  of  human 
society.  They  furnish  a  perspective  through  which  the 
most  vital  situations  of  life  are  viewed,  and  while  it  is 
true  that  this  perspective  may  sometimes  distort  reality, 
it  is  also  true  that  the  distortion  may  indicate  more 
clearly  than  anything  else  the  condition  into  which  man 
should  strive  to  mold  reality.  The  hope  of  the  future 
must  lie  in  the  character  of  the  ideals  with  which  youth 
is  inspired,  and  since  these  come  probably  more  numer 
ously  and  certainly  more  effectively  out  of  the  social 
environment  of  youth  than  out  of  the  formal  instruction 
to  which  youth  is  subjected,  the  importance  of  the  social 
life  of  the  school  can  scarcely  be  overestimated. 

3.  It  is  true,  of  course,  that  the  educator  is  here 
brought  face  to  face  with  a  problem  over  the  conditions 
of  which  he  seems  to  have  little  control.  Every  overt 
attempt  to  force  adult  standards  prematurely  upon  the 
young  is  bound  to  be  abortive,  and  the  educator  is  thrown 
back  upon  indirection,  —  and  indirection,  from  its  very 
nature,  is  fraught  with  uncertainty.  We  are  here  beyond 
the  range  of  the  reasonably  predictable :  the  indefinite 
and  unmeasurable  factors  of  "personality"  control  the 
situation,  and  the  best-laid  plans  may  miscarry  at  a 
juncture  that  could  never  have  been  anticipated  as 
critical. 


THE   SCHOOL   ENVIRONMENT  245 

The  success  of  the  English  secondary  school  in  dealing 
with  this  problem  is  doubtless  due  in  some  measure  to  the 
minimal  degree  in  which  overt  adult  direction  has  entered  into 
the  non-scholastic  activities  of  the  school  life.  And  yet,  there 
is  little  doubt  that  there  has  been  some  indirect  control.  The 
problem  is  somewhat  simplified  by  the  fact  that  the  typical 
English  secondary  schools  are  boarding-schools,  and  conse 
quently  make  possible  an  elimination  of  parental  indulgence, 
and  the  creation  of  an  esprit  de  corps  that  is  only  with 
difficulty  reproduced  in  a  day  school.  The  instincts  which  lie 
at  the  basis  of  the  ideals  of  virility  and  hardihood  are  conse 
quently  given  a  range  of  freedom  in  expression  which  would 
not  be  possible  under  American  conditions.  The  checks  to 
this  freedom  are  "natural"  rather  than  artificial,  in  the  sense 
that  they  develop  through  the  individual's  recognition  of  the 
fact  that  freedom  must  be  controlled  if  social  welfare  is  to  be 
preserved.  The  type  of  leadership  that  encourages  such  con 
trol  is  consequently  given  an  effective  social  sanction.  The 
ideals  for  which  these  leaders  stand  come  to  be  adopted  as 
standards  of  conduct  by  the  followers,  and  the  result  is  the 
development  of  a  mass  of  traditions  and  prejudices  which  are 
the  direct  outcome  of  generations  of  school  life  and  which  the 
pupils  recognize  as  products  of  that  life,  and  consequently  as 
belonging  essentially  to  their  own  order. 

Among  the  pressing  problems  of  genetic  psychology  there 
is  none  more  significant  to  secondary  education  than  to  for 
mulate  the  laws  that  govern  the  development  of  these  stand 
ards.  There  seems  to  be  almost  an  instinctive  tendency 
among  youth  to  resent  the  implication  that  they  have  any 
thing  to  learn  from  the  experience  of  their  elders.  Whether 
this  is  a  variant  of  that  strong  individualistic  instinct  which 
resents  an  intrusion  into  the  sphere  of  the  self  (as  if  youth 
felt  that  its  own  experiences  were  its  own  property  and  that 
replacing  them  by  the  experiences  of  others  invaded  property 


246  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

rights),  or  whether  the  impulse  is  merely  the  result  of  educa 
tive  efforts  that  have  been  misdirected,  there  can  be  little 
doubt  either  of  its  universality  or  of  its  profound  significance 
to  the  problems  of  adolescent  education. 

4.  So  much,  at  least,  is  true  —  the  dislike  of  youth  for 
adult  direction  in  its  activities  is  prominent  among  the 
"given  "  factors  of  the  problem  under  discussion.  What 
other  factors  can  be  included  in  this  list?  First  of  all, 
Vthe  strong  and  effective  group-impulses,  —  impulses 
toward  organization,  —  demand  recognition.  It  is  these 
that  constitute  the  most  hopeful  elements  of  the  situa 
tion.  The  adolescent  is  primarily  a  social  animal,  and 
he  will  organize  his  fellows  into  clubs,  teams,  or  gangs 
if  a  significant  measure  of  freedom  is  allowed  him. 
From  these  self-organized  groups,  the  natural  leader 
will  inevitably  emerge,  and  this  natural  leader  will 
dominate  and  color  the  standards  and  ideals  of  his  fol 
lowing  in  a  degree  that  is  seldom  realized  in  adult  groups, 
-  except  perhaps  in  abnormal  instances,  such  as  the 
rise  of  a  new  sect  in  religion,  or  the  appearance  of  a 
"one-man"  party  in  the  political  field.  From  the  prac 
tical  point  of  view  of  school  management,  therefore, 
almost  everything  lies  with  the  indirect  influence  which 
the  teacher  or  the  principal  can  exert  over  the  leaders. 
Occasionally,  perhaps,  this  influence  may  be  direct, 
and  in  this  case  the  situation  presents  no  difficulties; 
but,  unfortunately  for  the  teacher's  peace  of  mind,  this 
condition  is  met  with  very  infrequently.  The  men  and 
women  who  have  the  peculiar  personality  to  influence 


THE    SCHOOL   ENVIRONMENT  247 

the  natural  leaders  of  youth  are  rarely  found  in  the 
schools. 

5.  A  third  factor  which  enters  into  the  problem  is 
the  desire  of  the  adolescent  to  be  considered  as  "grown 
up,"  and  to  be  accorded  the  privileges  that  he  considers 
the  prerogative  of  manhood.  That  privileges,  in  the 
normal  course  of  social  life,  are  always  at  least  counter 
balanced  by  responsibilities,  is  a  lesson  that  only  experi 
ence  can  teach.  The  adult  well  knows  that  the  respon 
sibilities  in  most  cases  far  outweigh  the  privileges,  and 
many  who  "enjoy"  privileges  under  these  conditions 
would  willingly  surrender  them  if  by  so  doing  they  could 
escape  the  responsibilities  that  go  with  them.  But 
youth  sees  only  one  side  of  the  picture.  It  is  all  part  and 
parcel  of  the  "illusions"  to  which  the  adolescent  is 
subject,  and  which  he  must  correct,  often  through  pain 
ful  experience. 

It  is  this  factor  which  renders  the  high-school  fraternity 
question  so  difficult  of  solution.  The  social  scheme  of 
adult  life  is  governed  by  certain  standards  which,  however 
much  one  may  deplore  them,  must  be  admitted  to  fulfill 
certain  very  essential  functions.  However  much  it  may 
be  abused,  there  is  a  need  for  that  disapproval  of  unsocial 
and  disintegrating  tendencies  which  is  expressed  by  the 
social  ostracism  of  those  individuals  who  do  not  conform 
to  the  essential  conventions.  Because  such  ostracism  all 
too  frequently  works  a  grave  injustice,  it  is  not  to  be  con 
cluded  that  it  fulfills  no  useful  function.  There  is  also  a 
need  for  maintaining  a  certain  social  stability,  and  this 


248  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

need  requires  that  a  man  or  a  woman  must  merit  recog 
nition  before  it  is  accorded  him.  "  Exclusiveness "  has 
its  part  to  play  in  maintaining  this  stability,  although 
again  no  one  will  deny  that  this  specific  factor  frequently 
operates  in  a  most  blundering  and  inequitable  fashion. 
But  such  forces  as  social  ostracism  and  social  exclusive- 
ness  can  be  justified  only  in  an  adult  society  where  a 
multitude  of  conflicting  forces  tend  to  equalize  opportu 
nity,  and  where  the  ability  to  achieve  distinction  of  some 
sort  can,  in  a  bare  majority  of  cases,  at  least,  come  into 
its  own.  In  the  school,  the  operation  of  ostracism  and 
exclusiveness  is  commonly  based  upon  a  non-reflective 
imitation  of  adult  forms;  consequently  the  "snobbery" 
that  is  engendered  by  the  high-school  fraternity  becomes 
a  pitiable  caricature.  It  has  no  purpose,  no  function ;  it 
merely  copies  the  form  and  misses  the  meaning. 

As  suggested  above,  the  English  secondary  school  escapes 
the  baneful  influence  of  the  high-school  fraternity,  or  whatever 
its  analogue  would  be  under  English  conditions,  by  developing 
a  social  institution  within  the  school  that  really  has  a  function 
of  its  own.  Feelings  do  not  always  escape  unhurt  in  English 
secondary  schools  any  more  than  they  do  in  the  American 
high  school,  but  the  hurt  feelings  of  the  English  boy  are  not  a 
useless  by-product  of  a  still  more  useless  process  as  is  the  case 
with  us.  Social  distinction  there  depends  upon  some  form  of 
achievement  in  activities  closely  limited  to  the  school  life. 
The  field  is  free  and  favoritism  is  at  a  discount.  Capacity 
alone  decides  whether  a  boy  shall  be  eminent  among  his  fellows, 
or  whether  he  shall  be  an  outcast.  Nor  does  the  contrast 
cease  at  this  point.  With  the  English  boy,  social  distinction 
carries  with  it  social  responsibility,  just  as  it  does  under  the 


THE   SCHOOL   ENVIRONMENT  249 

conditions  of  normal  adult  life.  In  the  American  high  school, 
on  the  contrary,  social  distinction  carries  with  it  a  still 
wider  license,  —  a  responsibility,  if  you  will,  to  "make  good" 
in  unsocial  and  disintegrating  activities.1 

It  is  perhaps  unfair  to  single  out  the  high-school  fraternity 
for  criticism  of  this  sort,  without  including  in  the  indictment 
its  prototype,  the  college  fraternity.  And  yet  there  is  a 
difference  between  the  two  cases,  and  this  difference  bears 
directly  upon  the  point  at  issue.  The  college  fraternity,  like 
the  social  organizations  of  the  English  public  schools,  fulfills 
a  certain  function,  which,  if  not  indispensable,  is  at  least  use 
ful.  There  have  been  periods  in  its  development  when  it  was 
open  to  the  same  charges  that  now  confront  the  high-school 
fraternities.  There  are  doubtless  many  college  "  chapters  " 
to-day  that  could  be  justly  indicted  on  the  same  grounds. 
But,  on  the  whole,  the  college  fraternity  has  found  its  place. 
In  spite  of  its  tendencies  toward  social  snobbery,  and  in  spite 
of  its  encouragement  of  ideals  that  are  often  un-American  (to 

1  The  deplorable  moral  conditions  in  many  American  high  schools 
have  been  very  important  factors  in  the  crusade  against  the  fraternity 
evil,  and  yet,  in  spite  of  the  revelations  that  have  been  made  public,  the 
worst  has,  so  far  as  the  writer  is  aware,  never  seen  the  light  of  print.  At 
an  executive  session  of  the  Council  of  the  Religious  Education  Associa 
tion,  held  in  Cleveland,  July,  1908,  a  report  was  submitted  by  a  special 
investigator  who  had  spent  a  year  in  probing  into  the  student-life  of  some 
of  the  best  known  American  high  schools.  The  conditions  that  were 
revealed  were  not  only  shocking  in  the  extreme,  but  far  more  general 
and  widely  spread  than  is  ordinarily  believed.  In  the  great  majority 
of  instances,  the  very  existence  of  these  disintegrating  and  depraving 
forces  was  entirely  unknown  to  the  officials  of  the  schools  in  question. 
That  the  situation  in  the  English  public  schools  in  this  regard  is  not  above 
criticism/one  may  infer  from  the  writings  of  Ellis  and  other  authorities 
upon  sex-hygiene,  but  it  is  doubtful  whether  even  with  the  boarding- 
system,  the  conditions  are  so  alarming  as  in  some  American  schools. 
Certainly  the  danger  of  venereal  infection  and  its  consequent  evils  is 
not  so  great. 


250  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

say  the  best  for  them),  the  college  fraternity  commonly  stands 
for  decency,  fair-dealing,  and  the  recognition  of  real  merit.  It 
is  not  so  proud,  perhaps,  of  its  honor-men  as  of  its  football 
heroes,  but  it  places  a  premium  upon  achievement,  and  even  if 
it  fails  to  satisfy  completely  the  needs  of  social  life  in  the  col 
leges,  it  is,  on  the  whole,  a  positive  rather  than  a  negative 
factor  in  that  life,  and  in  this  respect  it  stands  in  marked  con 
trast  to  its  analogue  in  the  high  school. 

6.  It  is  fair  to  assume  that,  out  of  the  social  life  of  the 
school,  certain  very  effective  ideals  and  standards  may 
emerge.  What  are  some  of  these  standards  and  ideals  ? 
First  and  most  important,  perhaps,  is  the  prejudice  in 
favor  of  social  conduct  itself.  When  men  and  women 
dwell  together  in  a  close  community  of  interests,  social 
welfare  and  progress  demand  the  sacrifice  of  individual 
caprice  and  whim.  School  life  can  and,  even  under  other 
wise  unfortunate  conditions,  usually  does,  impress  clearly 
upon  the  pupils'  minds  this  fundamental  standard.  The 
spirit  of  hospitality  is  the  unerring  sign  of  gentle  breeding. 
One  of  the  finest  and  most  priceless  products  of  effective 
home  training  is  the  willingness  of  the  individual  to  spare 
himself  no  pains  in  courtesy  toward  those  who  seek  en 
tertainment  under  his  rooof.  One  of  the  most  impor 
tant  products  of  school  life  is  somewhat  analogous  to  this. 
It  is  the  disposition  to  put  forth  the  effort  that  is  essential 
to  make  oneself  a  welcome  member  of  the  group.  School 
life  normally  affords  innumerable  opportunities  to  teach 
this  lesson  in  the  most  effective  way,  —  that  is,  by  the 
actual  practice  of  the  virtue  itself.  It  does  not  need  to  be 
forced ;  indeed,  it  scarcely  can  be  forced  without  defeat- 


THE    SCHOOL   ENVIRONMENT  251 

ing  the  desired  end.  But  the  spontaneous  tendency  to 
ward  forming  groups  will,  if  given  the  slightest  freedom  in 
which  to  operate,  'supply  the  essential  conditions,  and  the 
development  of  the  standard  will  follow  as  a  matter  of 
course. 

This  is  not  to  say  that  the  teacher  can  leave  the  matter 
to  work  itself  out.  The  necessary  stimulus  must,  of  course, 
be  provided  in  the  wa)  of  a  certain  measure  of  freedom  ;  and 
here,  as  elsewhere,  there  is  abundant  scope  for  the  direct  in 
fluence  of  adult  example.  In  the  metropolitan  high  school, 
especially,  the  avenues  through  which  socializing  influences 
may  issue  in  most  praiseworthy  results  are  innumerable.  It 
may  not  be  necessary  to  arrange  for  social  gatherings  of  pupils 
in  the  evenings,  but  if  this  can  be  done,  and  if  the  gatherings 
can  be  made  to  preserve  a  simple  and  democratic  form,  the 
opportunities  for  training  are  of  inestimable  value.  If  public 
opinion  in  the  community  is  not  strongly  against  it,  the  organi 
zation  of  school  dances,  held  in  the  building  under  the  patron 
age  and  supervision  of  the  teachers,  will  teach  the  social  ameni 
ties  in  a  way  that,  so  far  as  effectiveness  of  result  is  concerned, 
can  hardly  be  equaled.  The  delight  in  rhythm  is  one  of  the 
fundamental  traits  of  youth,  and  the  dance  is  a  world-old 
educative  force  that  modern  civilization  can  hardly  afford 
to  cast  aside.  Experience  points  strongly  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  evils  associated  with  dancing  are  not  at  all  inherent 
in  its  nature,  but  are  rather  to  be  considered  as  perverted 
products  which  owe  their  poison  entirely  to  extraneous 
factors.  It  is  as  unfair  to  associate  them  necessarily  with 
dancing  as  it  is  to  hold  any  other  basic  human  impulse  re 
sponsible  for  its  perverted  and  unwholesome  expressions.1 

1  Cf.  M.  V.  O'Shea :  Social  Development  and  Education,  Boston,  1909, 
pp.  341  ff.,  particularly  with  reference  to  the  dangers  of  narrow  range  of 
dances  sanctioned  by  present-day  "society." 


252  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

7.  Another  set  of  standards  that  may  be  encouraged  by 
appropriate  social  conditions  in  school  life  are  those  that 
involve  the  ideals  of  self-government.  It  is  in  providing 
opportunity  for  the  effective  development  of  these  ideals 
that  the  English  secondary  schools  are  superior,  and,  as 
suggested  above,  it  is  the  element  of  responsibility  that  is 
the  important  factor.  School  life,  if  it  is  to  form  an  ade 
quate  training-ground  for  adulthood,  must  always  asso 
ciate  freedom  and  individual  initiative  with  a  rigid  re 
sponsibility  for  results.  The  doctrine  of  spontaneity  has 
too  often  been  applied  without  this  essential  qualifica 
tion.  Under  such  conditions,  its  outcome  in  school  life, 
as  in  the  larger  social  life  of  adult  society,  can  spell  noth 
ing  else  than  anarchy. 

The  essential  condition  for  the  development  of  these 
ideals  seems  to  depend  upon  the  degree  in  which  the  situa 
tion  appeals  to  the  individual  as  a  real  situation.  Per 
haps  when  this  condition  is  best  realized,  the  situation 
may  be  vastly  more  "real"  than  it  will  ever  become  to  the 
average  pupil  in  later  life.  That  is,  the  functions  of 
adult  self-government,  except  at  critical  junctures,  are 
notoriously  mechanical  and  often  quite  abortive  of  the 
ends  sought.  The  average  citizen  feels  very  lightly  his 
responsibilities  in  these  matters,  as  every  investigation 
into  the  phenomena  of  corrupt  politics  abundantly  testi 
fies.  But  the  development  of  self-government  in  the 
smaller  circle  of  the  school  may  do  much  to  reform  this 
defect  of  our  institutional  life.  Certainly  the  well-tested 
results  of  the  experiment  as  worked  out  in  the  George 


THE    SCHOOL   ENVIRONMENT  253 

Junior  Republic  and  similar  schools  seem  sufficient  to 
warrant  a  hopeful  outlook.1 

How  this  reality  of  the  situation  maybe  brought  about  in  the 
average  American  high  school  is  a  difficult  question  to  answer. 
Certainly  it  will  not  be  brought  about  effectively  simply  by 
surrendering  the  conduct  of  school  affairs  into  the  hands  of  the 
pupils.  This  introduces  an  artificial  element  at  the  very  out 
set,  for  the  pupils  soon  appreciate  the  fact  that  the  school 
officials  have  only  set  them  a  game  to  play,  and  that  these 
officials  will  step  in  and  assume  control  if  matters  are  not  ar 
ranged  to  their  satisfaction.  The  game  pleases  for  a  time, 
like  other  games,  but  it  soon  loses  its  novelty,  and  the  routine 
that  was  so  fascinating  at  the  outset  quickly  begins  to  pall. 

Even  under  the  best  conditions,  the  same  enemies  of  good 
government  that  work  havoc  in  adult  society  make  a  very 
early  appearance  in  the  self-governing  groups  of  pupils. 
Political  chicanery,  log-rolling,  ballot-box  frauds,  and  all  the 
well-known  attendants  of  popular  government  quickly  begin 
their  deadly  work,  —  the  more  deadly  because  pupils  are  likely 
to  see  how  easily  the  machine  may  be  manipulated  for  private 
profit,  and  so  gain  a  permanent  first  impression  which  is  likely 
to  defeat  the  very  end  that  is  desired.  But  the  situation 
would  not  be  "real"  without  these  factors,  and  the  question 
naturally  arises,  Is  it  wise  to  risk  the  premature  forma 
tion  of  negative  ideals  and  undesirable  standards  for  the 
sake  of  subjecting  pupils  to  a  training,  the  positive  results  of 
which  are  so  much  a  matter  of  doubt  ?  2 

1  Cf.,  however,  the  discussion  of  this  problem  by  C.  A.  Scott,  op. 
cit.,  ch.  iv. 

2  It  is  only  fair  to  say  that  the  writer's  attitude  toward  self-govern 
ment  in  schools  is  prejudiced  by  his  own  experience  as  a  student-par 
ticipant  in  such  an  experiment.     The  conditions  of  this  experiment  were, 
on  the  surface,  most  favorable  for  the  development  of  a  feeling  of  respon- 


254  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

It  seems  quite  rash  at  the  present  time  to  pass  judg 
ment,  favorable  or  unfavorable,  upon  the  experiment  of 
pupil  self-government  in  elementary  and  secondary 
schools.  It  may  be  that  something  akin  to  the  English 
system  may  be  worked  out  and  found  adaptable  to 
American  day-school  conditions.  The  proposals  of 
Principal  Findlay  1  are  extremely  suggestive  in  this  con 
nection.  Until  definite  results  are  assured,  judgment 
should  he  held  in  abeyance. 

There  is  still,  however,  one  group  of  school  activities 
which  satisfy  the  conditions  in  a  reasonable  measure, 
and  in  which  experience  has  proved  beyond  the  shadow 
of  a  doubt  that  wholesome  results  can  be  obtained.  The 
literary  and  athletic  societies  form  a  field  for  the  exercise 
of  pupil-initiative  that  is  sufficiently  wide,  it  would  seem, 
for  all  practical  purposes.  These  societies  may  either 

sibility  for  law  and  order  upon  the  part  of  the  students.  The  situation 
was  as  thoroughly  "real"  as  could  be  imagined,  for  a  real  need  existed 
for  government,  and  the  students  took  the  matter  into  their  own  hands 
very  largely  in  self-protection.  For  the  majority,  however,  —  and  the 
writer  confesses  membership  in  this  class,  —  the  responsibility  was  far 
too  great.  From  a  sober  attempt  to  solve  a  real  problem  (and,  at  the 
beginning,  a  most  successful  attempt)  the  movement  degenerated  into 
a  disgraceful  competition  for  office,  accompanied  by  a  relaxation  of  all 
discipline.  The  "  administration  of  justice"  became  a  travesty,  and  the 
whole  movement  quickly  assumed  the  character  of  opera-boujje.  The 
case  may  be  quite  exceptional,  but  to  the  writer  it  seems  to  typify  the 
inevitable  result  of  placing  real  authority  in  the  hands  of  adolescents,  who 
are  not  sufficiently  experienced  to  appreciate  the  trust.  Perhaps  if  it 
had  lasted  a  little  longer,  a  counter-reform  would  have  done  away  with 
its  unfortunate  accompaniments,  but  there  are  obvious  limitations  to 
the  risk  that  it  is  wise  to  incur,  no  matter  how  desirable  the  possible  out 
come. 

1  School  Review,  vol.  xvi,  1908,  pp.  601  ff. 


THE    SCHOOL   ENVIRONMENT  255 

be  formed  spontaneously  as  an  expression  of  the  organiz 
ing  impulse  of  adolescence,  or  encouraged  and  initiated  by 
adult  direction.  The  former  type  fulfills  best,  of  course, 
the  conditions  of  a  real  situation.  The  college  fraternity 
illustrates  this  spontaneous  grouping  developed  by  tradi 
tion  into  something  quite  different  from  its  original  form. 
Its  function  is  social  in  the  narrow  sense,  rather  than  liter 
ary  or  athletic,  but  there  is  no  reason  why  the  same  rule  of 
growth  might  not  operate  with  organizations  of  the  latter 
class.  As  the  spontaneously  formed  organization  gathers 
a  mass  of  tradition  back  of  it  with  successive  generations 
of  students,  it  acquires  much  of  the  dignity  of  age  and 
experience,  while,  at  the  same  time,  the  individual  initia 
tive  and  responsibility  of  its  active  membership  are  in  no 
wise  diminished.  In  other  words,  the  organization,  while 
ripened  by  generations  of  experience,  still  appeals  to  the 
individual  active  member  as  essentially  his  own  —  as 
something  in  which  he  may  have  the  pride  of  copartner 
ship  which  is  entirely  foreign  to  the  organizations  initiated 
and  controlled  by  adult  influences. 

8.  Finally,  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  emphasize  the  im 
portance  of  the  social  life  of  the  American  public  school  as 
an  agency  in  perpetuating  and  strengthening  the  ideals 
of  democracy  and  equality  of  opportunity  which  our  edu 
cational  system  represents  and  expresses  more  faithfully 
than  does  any  other  institution  that  our  national  life  has 
developed.  If  these  ideals  are  to  be  kept  alive  as  dynamic 
factors  in  the  control  of  conduct,  each  generation  must  be 
imbued  with  them,  not  only  through  vicariously  reliving 


256  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

the  past  in  the  study  of  the  historical  events  which  led  to 
their  initiation,  but  also,  and  far  more  fundamentally, 
through  feeling  their  worth  and  appreciating  their 
strength  as  they  operate  in  contemporaneous  experience. 
In  spite  of  the  criticism  that  the  American  system  of  mass 
education  levels  down  rather  than  up,  no  good  American 
is  willing  to  deny  that  the  net  result  is  a  gain  rather  than 
a  loss.  The  continental  policy  of  separate  schools  for  the 
various  strata  of  society  may,  on  the  whole,  permit  a 
more  effective  employment  of  the  factor  of  competition. 
If  we  assume  that  the  better-fed  and  better-bred  children 
are,  on  the  whole,  more  capable  of  rapid  progress,  a  system 
of  education  which  places  these  children  in  separate 
schools  will  necessarily  permit  higher  standards  of  scholar 
ship  and  attainment  than  a  system  in  which  children  of  all 
classes  are  massed  together.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the 
progress  of  a  class  is  measured  by  the  progress  of  those 
members  that  are  below  rather  than  above  the  average 
in  ability.  The  brighter  pupils  are  thus  forced  to  mark 
time,  and  encouraged  to  rest  upon  very  easy  laurels.  If 
the  ability  of  the  average  can  be  raised,  as  may  well  be 
the  case  in  segregating  pupils  in  "select''  schools,  the 
brighter  pupils  will  have  a  proportionately  increased  ad 
vantage  in  the  fact  that  the  level  of  competition  is  nearer 
their  own  capacities.  But  even  admitting  this  conten 
tion  (and  it  may  easily  be  disputed),  it  is  still  legitimate 
to  inquire  whether  the  added  advantage  in  the  way  of  in 
creased  stimulus  counterbalances  the  inevitable  encour 
agement  of  aristocratic  ideals. 


THE    SCHOOL   ENVIRONMENT  257 

v 

Under  the  present  organization  of  American  elementary 
and  secondary  schools,  the  pupil  is  immersed  for  twelve 
years  in  an  environment  where  class-distinctions  are  not 
recognized,  and  where  every  individual,  whatever  station 
in  life  his  parents  may  occupy,  has  an  equal  share  of 
attention  from  his  teachers,  an  equal  right  to  enjoy  the 
material  advantages  that  the  community  so  liberally  pro 
vides,  an  equal  opportunity  to  achieve  whatever  distinc 
tions  may  result  from  diligence  and  application.  The 
ideals  and  prejudices  in  favor  of  democracy  which  grow 
out  of  this  experience  represent  the  most  precious  heri 
tage  of  our  national  life,  and,  as  has  been  suggested,  the 
surest  way  to  guarantee  the  perpetuation  of  this  heritage 
is  systematically  and  institutionally  to  surround  youth  with 
an  environment  through  reaction  to  which  the  ideal  is 
born  anew  with  each  generation.  It  may  be  true  that 
some  of  our  brightest  pupils  surfer  from  the  lack  of  com 
petition  with  their  equals  in  mental  capacity,  but  it  is  also 
true  that  others  equally  bright,  but  less  favored  by  the 
conditions  of  birth,  are  receiving  a  much  more  effective 
stimulus  than  would  be  possible  under  European  con 
ditions.  In  the  last  analysis,  then,  probably  more  talent 
is  trained  by  our  system,  although  it  may  be  true  that 
markedly  superior  talent  will  stop  at  a  slightly  lower  level. 

The  philosophy  of  American  idealism  as  represented  by  the 
public-school  system  is,  of  course,  only  vaguely  conscious  to  the 
average  citizen  who  has  never  had  the  stimulus  to  think  the 
matter  through  consistently.  And  yet,  at  least  a  dim  mar 
ginal  consciousness  of  its  deeper  meaning  is  evident  in  the  op- 


258  EDUCATIONAL   VALUES 

position  which  immediately  meets  any  proposal  to  provide  spe 
cialized  schools  for  the  children  of  the  working  classes.  The 
problem  of  industrial  education  must  certainly  be  met,  but  it  is 
generally  agreed  that  it  is  not  likely  to  be  met  at  the  expense 
of  the  ideal  of  equality  of  opportunity.  If  industrial  educa 
tion  means  the  establishment  of  trade-schools  that  will  shut 
the  door  of  possible  advancement  at  an  early  age,  our  present 
system,  with  all  its  defects,  is  vastly  to  be  preferred.  Eco 
nomic  conditions  may  demand  the  specialized  training  of  a  pre 
destined  proletariat,  but  the  duty  of  determining  whether  this 
demand  is  in  line  with  the  ultimate  progress  of  the  nation 
will  not  be  left  entirely  in  the  hands  of  those  whose  private 
interests  would  naturally  predispose  them  to  see  the  immedi 
ate  advantages  of  such  training,  and  overlook  its  ultimate 
dangers. 

9.  As  stated  earlier  in  this  chapter,  the  organic  life  of 
the  school,  in  so  far  as  this  life  is  a  positive  educative 
force,  may  be  counted  upon  to  develop  two  important 
types  of  conduct-controls,  —  habits  and  ideals.  This  dis 
cussion  has  hitherto  been  concerned  with  the  socializing 
ideals  that  may  result  from  school  life.  It  is  scarcely 
necessary  to  say  that  these  ideals  or  prejudices  issue  very 
largely  from  specific  habits,  and  in  turn,  initiate  specific 
habits  of  the  same  modality.  The  discussion  of  these 
habits,  therefore,  need  not  detain  us  long.  From  the 
objective  point  of  view,  however,  one  principle  requires 
emphasis.  It  is  manifestly  essential  to  social  welfare 
that  the  component  individuals  of  any  social  group  re 
semble  one  another  in  certain  significant  characteristics. 
It  is  well  to  lay  stress  upon  developing  individuality  (pro 
vided  that  we  have  some  definite  conception  of  what  we 


THE    SCHOOL   ENVIRONMENT  259 

mean  by  such  a  process),  but  an  educational  system  that 
would  differentiate  individuals  in  any  wide  measure  would 
be  socially  disastrous.  An  American  child,  reared  in  a 
Chinese  environment,  by  Chinese  foster-parents,  would 
find  himself  very  inadequately  adapted  to  meet  the  con 
ditions  of  American  life.  Placed  at  maturity  in  an  Amer 
ican  environment,  he  would  possess  an  "  individuality " 
that  would  quite  preclude  an  effective  social  adjustment. 
In  other  words,  social  stability  demands  a  certain  "like- 
mindedness,"  -  or,  better,  a  rather  complete  resemblance 
among  individuals  in  respect  of  dominant  conduct-con 
trols.  Especially  important  is  a  " habit-likeness." 

It  is  a  peculiar  function  of  the  organic  life  of  the  school 
to  fulfill  this  condition.  The  more  closely  schools  re 
semble  one  another  in  certain  important  particulars,  the 
more  homogeneous  and  compact  will  be  the  body-politic. 
Here  as  elsewhere,  of  course,  it  is  easy  to  see  the  danger 
that  such  condition  involves.  But  here  as  elsewhere, 
the  existence  of  the  danger  should  not  blind  one  to  the 
manifest  advantages  that  inhere  in  the  condition.  The 
task  should  be  to  determine  the  points  where  similarity 
is  essential.  Among  these,  the  habits  of  morality,  eti 
quette,  speech,  and  the  like,  are  clearly  to  be  listed.  Again, 
this  harks  back  to  the  discussion  of  ideals  and  prejudices, 
for,  after  all,  from  the  educational  point  of  view,  it  is 
upon  these  factors  that  education  must  place  its  chief 
reliance. 


INDEX 


Ability,  and  genius,  83  f. 

Achievement,  capacity  for,  94 ;  as  ulti 
mate  goal,  114  ff. ;  ideal  of,  176;  in 
stinctive  basis  for,  163. 

Acquired  characters,  non-inheritance 
of,  ii  f.,  14,  98  n. 

ADAMS,  J.,  50,  53. 

Adaptive  instincts,  5  ff . ;  and  ideals, 
160;  function  of  in  education,  7  ff. 

Adjustment,  i  ff. ;  negative,  231  f. 

Adolescent  characteristics,  246  ff . 

Adopted  sons,  Popes',  84. 

Ages,  ideals  of  respect  for,  136,  176. 

Agriculture,  as  school  subject,  148,  154, 

202. 

Aim  of  education,  social,  108  ff. 

Algebra,  123,  146  f.  (See  also  Mathe 
matics.) 

ALLEN,  J.  W.,  237. 

Altruism,  ideals  of,  176. 

Ambition,  as  an  ideal,  178. 

American  schools,  weaknesses  of,  in 
drill,  137  f.;  idealism  of,  165;  social 
life  of,  255  ff. 

Amusement,  economic  value  of,  219  f. 

Analogy,  danger  of,  in  history,  142. 

Ancient  languages,  211  ff.  (See  also 
Latin.) 

ANDREWS,  B.  R.,  25. 

ANGELL,  F.,  195,  196. 

Annotations,  use  of,  in  teaching  litera 
ture,  222. 

Application,  training  in,  150. 

Applied  science  vs.  pure  science,  204  ff. 

Appreciation  lesson,  63,  209. 

Approach,  economic,  in  teaching,  209. 

Arithmetic,  as  school  subject,  121,  123, 
131,  133,  138,  IS4-,  228. 

Art,  as  school  subject,  171,  220,  236; 
as  source  of  ideals,  164. 

Assimilation,  37. 

v.  ASTER,  E.,  66. 


Attention,  in  habit-building,  18. 

Attitudes,  xviii,  24,  65  ff . ;  of  con 
sciousness,  24,  31,  65  ff.,  74,  229  ff . ; 
and  habits,  69 ;  psychology  of,  66  ff . 

Authority,  ideals  of,  178. 

BALDWIN,  J.  M.,  7. 

Behavior,  i  ff . ;  human  contrasted  with 
animal,  3. 

BENTLEY,  I.  M.,  38. 

Bewusstseinslagen,  66;  as  thought  ele 
ment,  31;  genesis, of,  35  n. 

BIGELOW,  F.  E.,  148. 

Biography,  as  source  of  ideals,  164. 

Biology,  as  school  subject,  147  ff.,  202, 
235  f- 

BLANDFORD,  F.  G.,  243. 

BOOK,  W.  F.,  35. 

Botany,  as  school  subject,  147  ff.,  187, 
202,  235  f. 

BOURNE,  H.  E.,  167,  237. 

Bright  pupil,  problem  of,  256. 

Brothers,  Pearson's  study  of,  90  ff. 

de  Candolle,  A.,  85. 

Capacity,     100 ;     and    heredity,    94 ; 

generalized,  117. 
Categorical  imperative,  115. 
CATTELL,  J.  McK.,  86. 
Caution,  as  an  ideal,  215. 
Charters,  W.  W.,  60. 
Chemistry,  147  ff.,  187,  202,  235  f. 
China,  influence  of  education  in,  98. 
Circular  reaction,  7. 
Civics,  149. 

College,  fraternities  in,  249. 
COLVIN,  S.  S.,  182,  201. 
Composition,   as  school  subject,    134, 

146,  147. 
Concept,  definition  of,  35 ;   genesis  of, 

34.     (See  also  Idea  and  Meaning.) 
Concept-building,  law  of,  50. 


261 


262 


INDEX 


Concrete  teaching,  virtues  and  limita 
tions  of,  49. 

Conduct,  xvii,  i  ff . ;  evolution  of, 
in  ff. ;  types  of,  128;  and  inaction, 
44;  and  happiness,  113. 

Conduct-controls,  xvii,  107;  instinc 
tive,  i  ff . ;  acquired,  14  ff. ;  specific 
habits  as,  14  ff . ;  ideas  and  meanings 
as,  27  ff. ;  facts  and  principles  as, 
27  ff. ;  ideals  and  standards  as,  54 
ff . ;  attitudes  and  prejudices  as,  64  ff. 

Conquest,  consciousness  of,  223. 

Consanguineal  resemblances,  90  ff. 

Conscience,  social,  112,  126. 

Conscious  factor  in  transfer,  194  ff. 

Consciousness,  constituents  of,  28  ff. 

Contingent  values,  122. 

Continuation  schools,  49  n. 

Conventional  value,  123  ff. ;  recogni 
tion  of,  126;  of  habits,  135  f. ;  of 
knowledge,  151. 

COOLEY,  C.  H.,  104. 

COOVER,  J.  E.,  195,  196. 

Correctness,  grammatical,  value  of,  130. 

Correlation,  coefficient  of,  90,  91  n. 

Cultural  values,  229  ff. 

Culture,  as  a  technical  term  in  educa 
tion,  229  f. 

Curiosity,  instinct  of,  6,  234. 

Dancing,  as  an  educative  agency,  251. 

DARWIN,  C.,  96. 

DEARBORN,  W.  F.,  195. 

DE  GARMO,  C.,  582. 

Deductive  development,  52. 

Democracy,  ideal  of,  166,  235  f. 

Development  lesson,  inductive,  52 ; 
deductive,  52. 

DEWEY,  J.,  35,  242. 

DICKENS,  C.,  169,  I'/o. 

Direct  values,  contrasted  with  contin 
gent,  122. 

Disciplinary  functions,  iSoff. ;  defined, 
119. 

Disciplinary  "values,"  117. 

Discipline,  formal,  doctrine  of,  180  ff. 

Domestic  science,  as  school  subject, 
148. 

Dramatic  portrayal,  and  ideals,  169. 

Drawing,  as  school  subject,  131,  133, 
145;  mechanical,  122. 


Dreams,  Freud's  theory  of,  39  n. 
Drill,  138;   instinctive  basis  for,  7. 
Duty,  ideal  of,  u6. 

EBERT,  E.,  194. 

Economic  efficiency,  148,  154,  181,  205, 
208,  235;  and  attitudes,  230;  and 
ideals,  156;  and  enjoyment,  217. 

Education,  and  genius,  78  ff. ;  and 
habit,  43;  and  instinct,  12  f.;  as 
conservation  of  experience,  14 ;  and 
psychology,  116,  118;  functions  of, 
96  ff . ;  general,  and  attitudes,  70  ; 
general  functions  of,  150  f.,  230  ff. ; 
limitations  of,  78  ff .,  102  ff. ;  religious, 
and  ideals,  163. 

Efficiency,  psychology  of,  199;  of 
ideals,  60.  (See  Economic  Efficiency 
and  Social  Efficiency.) 

Eminence,  conditions  of,  82. 

Emotions,  as  ingredient  of  ideals,  55 
ff . ;  and  conduct,  115;  and  ideals, 
167 ;  and  religion,  172. 

Emulation,  162. 

England,  as  source  of  national  ideals, 
165. 

English  composition  as  school  subject, 
134,  146,  147- 

English  history,  lessons  from,  142  f. 

English  public  schools,  242  ff.,  245  ff., 
248  f. 

Environment,  as  factor  in  conduct,  3  ; 
and  heredity,  78  ff. ;  as  reflected  in 
knowledge,  28;  influence  of,  85  f., 
89,  93  f .,  95,  99,  101 ;  school, 
as  source  of  educative  materials, 
242  ff. 

Equality  of  opportunity,  as  ideal,  165  ; 
development  of  by  school  life,  255  ff. 

Etiquette,  habits  of,  135. 

Ethics,  and  education,  118. 

Eugenics,  98  n. 

Evolution,  of  conduct,  2  ff. ;  in  ff. 

Exceptions,  prevention  of  in  habit- 
building,  19. 

Experience,  as  a  factor  in  control  of 
conduct,  3 ;  reaction  of,  upon  con 
sciousness,  36  ff.;  religious,  172; 
vicarious,  152,  167,  170. 

Exposition,  in  teaching,  51. 

Expository  lesson,  52,  53. 


INDEX 


263 


Facts,  as  conduct-controls,  xix,  27, 
35  ff.,  47,  1 19  n.,  139  ff. ;  definition 
of,  35;  genesis  of,  46;  specialized 
utility  of,  150;  utility  of,  139  ff. 

Fear,  instinct  of,  162. 

FlNDLAY,  J.  J.,   243,  254. 

Focalization,  in  habit-building,  17. 
Focus,  of  consciousness,  and  meaning, 

33- 

Formal  discipline,  69,  117,  180  ff. ; 
origin  of  doctrine  of,  180  n. 

FRACKER,  G.  C.,  198. 

Fraternity,  college,  249;  high  school, 
247  ff. 

French,  as  school  subject,  146,  228. 
(See  also  Languages.) 

FREUD,  S.,  9,  39,  103. 

FROUDE,  J.  A.,  142. 

FUERST,  EMMA,  103,  104. 

Functions,  classification  of,  119  f. ; 
defined,  1 18 ;  contrasted  with  values, 
117;  educational,  117  ff. ;  training, 
119,  128  ff. ;  instructional,  119,  139 
ff. ;  inspirational,  119,  156  ff., 
180  ff . ;  recreative,  120,  216  ff. ;  in 
terpretive,  120,  229  ff. 

GALTON,  F.,  82,  83,  84,  85,  92,  100,  104, 
105. 

General  education,  functions  of,  43, 150 
f.,  230  ff.,  233. 

Geneva,  Illinois,  Industrial  School,  99. 

Genius,  and  education,  78  ff . ;  as 
organic  variation,  81  f . ;  and  envi 
ronment,  85  f . ;  and  health,  100  f. 

Geography,  as  school  subject,  41,  42, 
117,  123,  140,  151,  153,  228. 

Geometry,  as  school  subject,  123. 
(See  also  Mathematics.) 

George  Junior  Republic,  252. 

Germ-cells,  variations  in,  94. 

German,  as  school  subject,  146,  228. 
(See  also  Languages.) 

German  history,  lessons  from,  143. 

German  schools,  138. 

GILBERT,  J.  P.,  207. 

Glossaries,  use  of,  222. 

Good  manners,  training  in,  135. 

GOUGH,  J.  B.,  144. 

Grammar,  as  school  subject,  124,  129  f., 
140,  228. 


GRAVES,  F.  P.,  180. 

Greek,  as  school  subject,  123,  211  ff. 

GROOS,  K.,  5. 

Group  instincts  in  adolescence,  246. 

Habit-likeness,  in  society,  259. 

Habits,  xviii,  73,  119  n.,  243  ;  definition 
of,  23 ;  distinguished  from  ideas, 
40  ff.;  characteristics  of,  15  ff . ;  in 
education,  20  ff. ;  of  skill,  21;  of 
manner,  21  ff . ;  and  spelling,  16; 
and  manual  training,  21;  general 
ized,  23  ;  of  thought,  23 ;  and  judg 
ment,  26;  as  related  to  attitudes, 
69;  as  controls  of  conduct,  15  ff. ; 
utility  of,  121,  129  ff . ;  preparatory 
value  of,  133  ff . ;  conventional  value 
of,  135  f. ;  socializing  value  of,  136  f., 
259- 

Habit-building,  40;  law  of,  17  ff.;  im 
portance  of,  137 ;  in  activities  of 
school  life,  258. 

HALL,  G.  S.,  6. 

Happiness,  and  social  evolution,  113; 
and  conduct,  113;  as  sanction,  no 
ff. 

HARRIS,  W.  T.,  213. 

HAYWARD,  F.  H.,  105. 

HECK,  W.  H.,  200. 

HERBART,  J.  F.,  50,  181. 

Heredity,  and  environment,  101 ;  as 
factor  in  conduct,  3 ;  of  modifica 
tions,  ii  f.;  in  royalty,  87  ff.,  95; 
in  twins,  92  ff . ;  in  brothers,  90  ff . 

High  school,  curriculum  of,  134  f.,  145 

ff.,    153   ff.,    202,    204  ff.,    207,    212    f., 

221  ff.,  224f.,  228,  235  f.,  237  ff. ; 
organization  of,  245  ff. ;  pupil  self- 
government  in,  252  ff. ;  fraternities 
in,  247  ff. 

HINSDALE,  B.  A.,  182. 

History,  as  a  school  subject,  73,  117, 
140  f.,  148,  151,  154,  164  ff.,  224  ff., 
237  f . ;  as  engendering  attitudes,  67, 
237  f. ;  as  engendering  ideals,  164 
ff. ;  utility  of,  140  ff. 

Household  science,  as  a  school  subject, 
148. 

HUEY,  E.  B.,  131. 

HUXLEY,  T.  H.,  96,  148. 

Hygiene,  143  f.,  154. 


264 


INDEX 


Ideals,  xviii,  53,  54  fL,  74,  n8,  136, 
152,  156  ff. ;  compared  with  ideas, 
53,  55  ff. ;  definition  of,  58;  and 
economic  efficiency,  156;  and  emo 
tions,  158;  and  knowledge,  153;  as 
agents  in  transfer,  190  ff . ;  method 
ology  of,  62 ;  and  instincts,  56  ff., 
158;  nature  of,  55  ff. ;  national, 
164  f. ;  utility  of,  121;  transmission 
of,  163  ff. ;  derived  from  school  life, 
243  ff.;  lists  of,  175  ff.,  214  f. 

Ideas,  xviii,  26  ff.,  74;  definition  of, 
33 ;  formation  of,  41 ;  as  conduct- 
controls,  27  ;  compared  with  habits, 
40  ff. ;  compared  with  ideals,  53, 
55  f.,  57  ff.,  157;  methodology  of, 
48  ff. ;  value  of,  139  ff. 

Identity,  of  substance,  186,  193;  of 
procedure,  186,  193;  of  aim,  193. 

Illusions,  of  youth,  244. 

Image,  and  meaning,  33. 

Imageless  thought,  35  n. 

Imagination,  constructive,  38 ;  passive, 

38. 
Imitation,  as  an  instinct,  7  ;  and  ideals, 

162. 
Individualism,  fallacies  of,  no,  113  f., 

259- 

Individualistic  instincts,  9  ff.,  169;  and 
ideals,  159. 

Induction,  in  concept-building,  51  f.; 
limitations  of ,  51. 

Inductive  development  lesson,  52. 

Initiative,  in  habit-building,  18,  19; 
ideals  of,  177. 

Inspirational  functions,  156  ff. ;  de 
fined,  119. 

Instincts,  xvii,  3  ff.,  104;  defined,  4; 
as  controls  of  conduct,  3  ff. ;  as  basis 
of  habit,  17;  and  ideals,  56  ff.,  158; 
relation  of,  to  education,  12  f. ;  adap 
tive,  5  ff.,  13 ;  individualistic,  9  ff., 
158  f.,  169;  sex  and  parental,  10,  13, 
158,  169;  social,  10  ff.;  in  man  as 
compared  with  animals,  n. 

Instruction,  spirit  of,  202. 

Instructional  functions,  139  ff. ;  de 
fined,  119. 

Integrity,  ideals  of,  176. 

Intelligence,  and  conduct,  no  ff. 
general,  functions  of,  230  ff. 


interpretive  functions,  229  ff. ;  de 
fined,  120. 

AMES,  W.,  182. 

[apan,  influence  of  education  in,  98; 

intelligence  of  soldiers,  132  n. 
[ENNINGS,  H.  S.,  2. 
[ONES,  E.,  10,  103. 
TUDD,  C.  H.,  66,  67.  ^ 
Judgment,  as  process  in  transfer,  190  ff. 
JUNG,  C.  G.,  70,  103. 

KANT,  I.,  115,  116. 

Kinaesthetic  sensations,  in  perception, 

28;  in  meaning,  32  n. 
Kinship,  as  a  factor  in  ideals,  168. 
KIRKPATRICK,  E.  A.,  6,  7,  132. 
Knowledge,  xviii,  27  ;  functions  of,  68 ; 

tentative  definition  of,   27 ;    utility 

of,  121,  139  ff. ;  functions  of,  139  ff. ; 

relativity  of,  43;    as  a  guide,   153; 

liberal,  functions  of,  230  ff. 
KUROPATKIN,  132. 

LANGLOIS,  C.  V.,  141. 

Language,  habits  of,  22;  as  medium 
of  instruction,  152;  as  school  sub 
ject,  123,  133,  14°.  145-  (See  also 
English,  Latin,  etc.) 

Languages,  ancient,  211  ff. ;  modern 
foreign,  134,  147,  228.  (See  also  Eng 
lish,  Latin,  etc.) 

Latin,  123,  135,  211  ff. 

Leadership,  as  determining  ideals,  245. 

Lessons,  types  of,  52  f. 

Liberal  knowledge,  functions  of,  230  f. 

Liberalizing  functions,  232  ff. 

LINCOLN,  A.,  81,  168. 

Literature,  146,  147,  151,  164,  169  ff., 
220  ff.,  236,  238  ff. 

LLOYD,  M.  A.,  148. 

LOCKE,  J.,  1 80. 

Logical  procedure,  as  ideal,  214. 

Love,  parental,  175;  as  ideal,  178. 

Manual  training,  habits  in,  21;  as 
school  subject,  117, 132, 134, 145,  225. 

MARBE,  K.,  66. 

Margin,  of  consciousness,  and  mean 
ing,  32  n. 

Mathematics,  117,  146  f.,  151,  187, 
190  f.,  202,  203,  204,  209  f.,  228. 


INDEX 


265 


MAYER,  A.,  31,  66,  xoi. 

McCORMACK,  T.  J.,  210. 

McMuRRY,  C.  A.,  50. 

McMuRRY,  F.  M.,  50. 

Meanings,  xviii,  74,  152,  240;  defini 
tion  of,  34;  simple,  41;  nature  of, 
31;  as  conduct-controls,  27  ff. ;  and 
ideas,  31;  genesis  of,  31  f . ;  kin- 
aesthetic  factors  in,  32  n. 

Memory,  transfer  of,  194  ff.,  197 ;  sig 
nificance  of  experiments  on,  241. 

Method,  concepts  of,  201 ;  importance 
of,  202. 

Methodology,  of  habits,  17  ff. ;  of 
knowledge,  48  ff. ;  of  ideals,  71;  of 
attitudes  and  prejudices,  62. 

Methods,  of  teaching,  17  ff.,  48  ff.,  62, 
71,  76. 

MEUMANN,  E.,  194. 

MILL,  J.  S.,  82. 

Moral  law,  116. 

Morality,  and  heredity,  87  ff.,  99,  100 
n. ;  ideals  of,  243  ff . ;  habits  of,  136. 

MUELLER,  G.  E.,  195,  198. 

Music,  as  a  school  subject,  131,  145, 
171  ff.,  220. 

Nature   study,   as   a   school    subject, 

226  f. 

Negative  adjustment,  231  f. 
Nervous  system,  in  control  of  conduct, 

2f. 

NEWTON,  I.,  96. 

Nonsense  syllables,  experiments  with, 

194  ff- 
Normative  vs.  positive  sciences,  118. 

NORS WORTHY,  NAOMI,  187. 

Number  arts.     (See  Arithmetic.) 

Objective  teaching,  50  ff . 
Observation,  ideals  of,  214. 
ODIN,  A.,  85. 
Oral  expression,  130  f. 
Organization,  value  of,  206. 
ORTII,  J.,  31,  66,  101. 
O'SnEA,  M.  V.,  242,  251. 

Pain,  and  conduct,  no  ff. 
Parental  instincts,  10,  13,  158,  175. 
Patriotism,  ideals  of,  177. 
PAYOT,  J.,  158. 


PEARSON,  K.,  90, 91,  92, 94, 99, 104, 105. 

PEARY,  R.  E.,  55. 

Perception,  definition  of,  28,  33 ;  mean 
ing  in,  30  f. 

Perspectives,  24,  68,  74,  229  ff.,  244; 
as  control  of  conduct,  65  ff. ;  his 
torical,  238. 

Philosophy,  236. 

Physical  geography,  as  a  school  sub 
ject,  147  ff.,  202,  235. 

Physics,  as  a  school  subject,  42,  123, 

147   ff.,    187,    202,    235   f. 

Physiology,  as  a  school  subject,  143  f., 

154- 

PlLLSBURY,  W.  B.,   230. 

Play,  instinct  of,  5  ff . ;   theories  of,  6 ; 

and  ideals,  161. 
Pleasure,  and    conduct,  no   ff.,  114; 

and  efficiency,  217  ff. 
Popes'  adopted  sons,  84. 
Practical  values,  121. 
Prejudices,  xviii,  24,  74, 136, 153 ;  defi 
nition  of,  74;   nature  of,  64  f. ;    as 

controls    of    conduct,    64    f . ;     and 

habits,  69. 
Preparatory  values,  122  f.;   of  habits, 

133;  of  knowledge,  152. 
Principles,    xviii ;     nature   of,    47 ;     as 

conduct-controls,    47,    118,    119   n.; 

utility  of,  139  ff . ;  specialized  utility 

of,  150. 

Progress,  human,  12;   social,  114  ff. 
Propensity,  24,  64,  69. 
Property,  ideals  of,  177. 
Psycho-analysis,  10,  104. 
Psychology,    of    meaning,    30    ff . ;     of 

ideals,  245  f. ;    of  transfer,  183  ff . ; 

as  furnishing  explanatory  principles 

of  function,  118. 
Pure  science  vs.  applied  science,  204  ff ., 

233- 
Purpose,  ideals  as  determining,  59,  153. 

Race,  primacy  of,  112;  improvement 
of,  through  breeding,  98  n. ;  as  cri 
terion  of  value,  no. 

Racial  differences,  in  ideals,  164. 

Reading,  as  a  school  subject,  130,  131. 

Reasoning,  ideals  of,  202,  208,  214. 

Recreative  functions,  216  ff. ;   defined, 


266    . 


INDEX 


Reflex  movement,  4. 

REIN,  W.,  50. 

Religion,    as    source    of    ideals,    172; 

function  of,  173. 
Religious  Education  Association,  report 

on  high  school  morals,  249  n. 
Religious  education,  and  ideals,  163. 
Religious  experience,  172. 
Repetition,  instinct  of,  7  f. ;   in  habit 

building,  18  f. 
Reverence,  instinctive  basis  for,  162; 

ideals  of,  163. 

Rhetoric,  as  school  subject,  146. 
Rome,  lessons  from  history  of,  142. 
ROUSSEAU,  J.  J.,  9,  20. 
ROWE,  S.  H.,  6,  1 8,  25. 
Royalty,  heredity  in,  87  ff.,  95. 

RUEDIGER,  W.  C.,  102,  108,  121,  123, 
IS2,  191,  IQ2,  193,  2OO,  22Q. 

RUGER,  H.  A.,  18,  199,  200,  201. 

SADLER,  M.  E.,  243. 

School  environment,  as  source  of  edu 
cative  materials,  242  ff . 

Schools,  habit-building  in,  137  f.; 
habits  trained  in,  128  ff. 

Science,  pure  vs.  applied,  204  fL,  233 ; 
as  a  school  subject,  73,  147  ff.,  202, 
232,  235  f. 

Scientific  method,  ideals  of,  204  ff.,  214. 

SCOTT,  C.  A.,  242,  253. 

Secondary  schools,  life  in  English,  242, 
245  f.  (See  also  High  Schools.) 

Seignobos,  C.,  141. 

Selection,  natural,  in  human  race,  97  f . ; 
in  mind,  112. 

Self-denial,  ideals  of,  60. 

Self-government,  ideals  of,  166,  177; 
in  schools,  245  ff.,  252  ff.,  253  n. 

Self-reliance,  ideals  of,  177. 

Self-sacrifice,  as  ideal,  176. 

Sensations,  as  elements  of  conscious 
ness,  28. 

Sex,  instincts  of,  10,  13,  158,  169;  and 
ideals,  159. 

Sexual  love,  ideals  of,  178. 

SHOREY,  P.,  213. 

Skill,  habits  of,  21,  128. 

SMITH,  H.  B.,  243. 

Social  aim  of  education,  xviii,  107  ff., 
120. 


Social  achievement,  114  f. 
Social  conscience,  112,  126. 
Social  efficiency,  as  aim  of  education, 

xviii,  107  ff.,  120,  235;    and  ideals, 

156   ff. ;     and   enjoyment,    216   ff.; 

characteristics  of,  107. 
Social  heredity,  14. 
Social  ostracism,  247  f 
Social  stigma,  112. 
Socializing  values,   126  f. ;    of  habits, 

136  ff.,  258  f. ;  of  knowledge,  152  f. ; 

of  ideals,  156  ff .,  180  ff.,  242  ff . ;   of 

attitudes,  229  ff . ;   of  tastes,  216  ff. 
Societies,  in  high  schools,  254  f. 
Society,  destiny  of,  113  ff. 
SPEARMAN,  C.,  91  n.,  92. 
Spelling,  as  illustrating  habit,  16;    as 

school  subject,  124,  228. 
SPENCER,  H.,  5,  50,  141,  143,  144,  148, 

181,  216. 

Spread  of  training,  180  ff. 
SQUIRE,  CARRIE  R.,  188. 
Standards,    developed   in    school   life, 

250  f. ;  emotionalized,  74. 
STOUT,  G.  F.,  25. 
STRAYER,  G.  D.,  63,  102. 
Study,  training  in  art  of,  150. 
Symbols,    as   focal   representatives   of 

concepts,  34 ;  use  of,  39  f . 
Sympathy,  instinctive  basis  for,   159; 

as  ideal,  176. 

TARDE,  G.,  7. 

Tastes,  24,  74,  109;    and  habits,  69; 

as  conduct-controls,  64  f. 
TAYLOR,  C.  O.,  32. 
Teacher,  as  controlling  force  in  school 

environment,    251;     importance    of 

attitude  of,  72 ;  qualities  of  merit  in, 

102  n. 
Temperance,  158;  physiology  as  school 

subject,  144;  ideals  of,  176. 
Ten  Commandments,  influence  of,  173. 
Theoretical  values,  240  f. 
THOMSON,  J.  A.,  99,  100. 
THORNDIKE,  E.  L.,  30,  86,  91,  93,  100, 

115,  183,  184,  185,  186,  190,  193. 
Thought,  constructive,  40;    imageless, 

35  n. 

TITCHENER,  E.  B.,  31,  32,  66. 
Training  functions,  128  ff.;  defined,  119. 


INDEX 


267 


Transfer  of  training,  180  ff. 

Truth,  passion  for,  160;  ideals  of,  176. 

Twins,  studies  of,  92  ff. 

Universities,  utility  of  language  teach 
ing  in,  146. 

Utilitarian  values,  120  ff.,  202,  205; 
of  habits,  129  ff . ;  of  knowledge, 
139  ff . ;  of  ideals,  156. 

Value,  criterion  of,  107  ff . ;  contingent, 
122;  direct,  122. 

Values,  distinguished  from  functions, 
117  ff. ;  classification  of,  120  ff.; 
utilitarian,  120  ff.,  129  ff.,  139  ff., 
156;  conventional,  123  ff.,  135  f., 
151;  preparatory,  122  f.,  133,  152; 
socializing,  126  f.,  136  ff.,  258  f., 
152  f.,  156  ff.,  180  ff.,  229  ff.,  216  ff. 


Variation,  organic,  and  genius,  8q  ff . ; 

in  germ-cells,  89. 

Vicarious  experience,  152,  167,  170. 
Vocational  education,  151,  257  f. 

War,  ideals  of,  178. 

WARD,  L.  F.,  85,  103,  104. 

WASHBURN,  MARGARET  F.,  37. 

WELTON,  J.,  243. 

WHIPPLE,  G.  M.,  91. 

WINCH,  W.  H.,  197. 

Womanhood,  ideals  of  respect  for,  136, 

176. 

WOODS,  F.  A.,  87,  88,  99,  104,  105. 
WOODWORTH,  R.  S.,  31,  183,  187,  190, 

iQS- 

Work,  capacity  for,  83,  100. 
Writing,  as  school  subject,  133. 

YOUNG,  J.  W.  A.,  122,  203. 


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